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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89999 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: validate report length in wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq() receives the wire report length in `len` but never consults it before parsing. After the report-id gate it unconditionally calls wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pen() and then, selected by features.type, a fixed chain of sub-parsers, none of which receive `len`: wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pen(wacom); if (type == INTUOSP2_BT || type == INTUOSP2S_BT) { wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_touch(wacom); wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pad(wacom); wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_battery(wacom); } else { wacom_intuos_gen3_bt_pad(wacom); wacom_intuos_gen3_bt_battery(wacom); } Each sub-parser dereferences wacom->data at fixed offsets. The furthest byte touched on each branch is: INTUOSP2_BT / INTUOSP2S_BT: wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_pad() reads data[285] (the touchring byte), so the report must be at least 286 bytes; INTUOSHT3_BT ("gen3"): wacom_intuos_gen3_bt_battery() reads data[45], so the report must be at least 46 bytes. features.type is selected from the VID/PID id_table entry and wacom_setup_device_quirks() force-registers the pen/pad/touch inputs for that type independent of the report descriptor, so a malicious or malfunctioning paired/spoofed Bluetooth peripheral can advertise that VID/PID and send an undersized report that still satisfies the data[0] == 0x80/0x81 gate. The driver then reads past the received report and forwards the bytes to userspace via evdev (MSC_SERIAL / ABS_MISC / ABS_WHEEL on the pen and pad input nodes), an out-of-bounds read with a concrete userspace read-back channel, and a true out-of-bounds read on transports whose backing buffer is sized to the (small) report descriptor rather than a fixed-size staging buffer. This is the same class of bug commit 2f1763f62909 ("HID: wacom: fix out-of-bounds read in wacom_intuos_bt_irq") already hardened in the sibling wacom_intuos_bt_irq(), which guards each report id against its minimum length before parsing. Guard wacom_intuos_pro2_bt_irq() the same way: before parsing, reject reports shorter than the furthest offset the selected branch actually dereferences, warn, and bail out. Because the whole pen/touch/pad/ battery chain runs unconditionally per branch, a single up-front check against the maximum offset (286 bytes for INTUOSP2_BT/INTUOSP2S_BT, 46 bytes for the gen3 branch) bounds every sub-parser. Returning 0 on a short report also skips those calls for the same malformed report, which is the safe, conservative behavior. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90001 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: bpf: serialize device reference release in struct_ops destroy path __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device() and hid_bpf_unreg() can race on the same registration reference, double-putting struct hid_device and freeing it while hid_destroy_device() still uses it. Serialize the remove/NULL decision under hdev->bpf.prog_list_lock so exactly one path releases each registration reference: unreg re-checks ops->hdev under the lock and returns without putting when the destroy path already cleared it; all put_device() calls happen after the lock is dropped, which is safe because a concurrent unreg then observes ops->hdev == NULL under the lock. Background: each successful attach (hid_bpf_ops_reg) acquires one device reference (hid_get_device()). Two paths can release it: - device destruction: hid_destroy_device() -> hid_bpf_destroy_device() -> __hid_bpf_ops_destroy_device(), which walks hdev->bpf.prog_list under rcu_read_lock() and drops one reference per attached program; - BPF link release: bpf map delete (no BPF_F_LINK) synchronously calls st_ops->unreg() -> hid_bpf_unreg(), which drops the reference for its own registration. The coordination handshake (e->hdev = NULL on the destroy side vs "if (!hdev) return" on the unreg side) is a TOCTOU check: the two paths run under different lock domains (rcu_read_lock vs prog_list_lock), so a concurrent unreg can read ops->hdev as non-NULL, block on prog_list_lock, and then proceed while the destroy traversal executes - both paths then drop the same reference. The refcount reaches zero legitimately (each decrement is individually valid), so no refcount_t saturation fires: the device is simply freed while the transport is still inside hid_destroy_device(), and subsequent teardown touches freed memory. The fix serializes the remove/NULL decision under prog_list_lock on both sides and moves the destroy-side puts outside the lock. With the lock held, plain reads/writes of ops->hdev are sufficient; no READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE are added, keeping the patch minimal. Unlocked-read safety: the unlocked read of ops->hdev at the top of hid_bpf_unreg() cannot touch a freed device, because the unreg path itself still holds this registration's reference (released only by its own hid_put_device() after the lock is dropped), and a destroy traversal that already cleared ops->hdev makes the lock-internal re-check return early without any put. At most one of the two paths releases each registration reference. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90014 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Have show_event_filters/triggers files take trace array ref The newly added files show_event_filters and show_event_triggers that show all filters or triggers that are set within the trace array do not take a reference for the trace array it is showing. Without taking a reference, the trace_array may be freed via "rmdir" while a task is reading one of theses files. Those files iterate all the events within an instance (trace_array) and nothing prevents that instance from being freed while its data is being read. This causes a use-after-free crash. Have the open of both those files take the trace_array reference via the trace_array_get() that prevents the trace_array from being freed while the files are opened. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84858 | 1 Scada-lts | 1 Scada-lts | 2026-09-18 | 8.8 High |
| ScadaLTS 2.8.1-release-candidate build 0 is affected by an Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Scripting Sandbox Bypass The DWR "DataSourceEditDwr" class exposes the "validateScript" method that compiles and executes attacker-supplied JavaScript via the Rhino scripting engine. There are no authorization checks on this method and so it is possible for an attacker with access to a low privilege user to abuse this flaw by leveraging the DWR routing bypass. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84860 | 1 Scada-lts | 1 Scada-lts | 2026-09-18 | 8.8 High |
| ScadaLTS 2.8.1-release-candidate build 0 is affected by an Authorization Bypass Spring Security gates DWR endpoints by URL path pattern, but DWR itself dispatches method calls based on the POST body parameters c0-scriptName and c0-methodName. The crossDomainSessionSecurity setting in web.xml is set to false, which disables DWR's built-in origin validation. This means any authenticated user can invoke any DWR method (regardless of the URL-based access control) by sending their request to a URL they are permitted to access (e.g. MiscDwr.initializeLongPoll.dwr) while targeting a restricted class in the POST body. This is the systemic root cause that enables multiple other findings to be exploited as a low privilege user. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90045 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: gadget: ffs: fix mm lifetime handling io_data stores a pointer to the submitting task's mm_struct, but does not currently hold a reference to it while async requests are pending. This can result in a use-after-free if the task exits before completion handling finishes. Take a reference with mmgrab() when queuing the read request and release it with mmdrop() on request completion. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71179 | 1 Dell | 1 Update Package Framework | 2026-09-18 | 7.3 High |
| Dell Update Package Framework, versions prior to 26.07.03, contains an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Elevation of privileges. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59974 | 1 Stanfordnlp | 1 Stanza | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| Stanza is a Stanford NLP Python library for tokenization, sentence segmentation, NER, and parsing of many human languages. Prior to 1.14.0, stanza.resources.common.unzip in stanza/resources/common.py passes downloaded model and resource archives to zipfile.ZipFile.extractall without validating member paths, and the vulnerable extraction path is reachable through stanza.download and stanza.install_corenlp. A malicious archive containing parent-directory traversal entries can write outside the intended model directory, allowing files writable by the Stanza process to be overwritten and potentially enabling code execution through modified shell configuration, SSH authorization data, Python packages, or executable scripts. This issue is fixed in version 1.14.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-71180 | 1 Dell | 1 Update Package Framework | 2026-09-18 | 8.2 High |
| Dell Update Package Framework, versions prior to 26.07.03, contains an Unchecked Return Value vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Elevation of privileges. | ||||
| CVE-2026-85731 | 1 Oras-project | 1 Oras-go | 2026-09-18 | 8.8 High |
| oras-go is a Go library for managing OCI artifacts. Prior to 2.6.2, content/file.Store extraction of OCI layers marked with io.deis.oras.content.unpack=true can write outside the store working directory. The pushDir path through extractTarDirectory and ensureLinkPath validates symlink targets lexically, resolveRelToBase skips its parent-symlink walk for root-level entries, and writeFile follows a terminal symlink when opening a regular file. A malicious archive can therefore create a symlink chain whose lexical target remains inside the extraction root but whose resolved target is an attacker-selected absolute path, then overwrite that target with a same-named regular-file entry even when AllowPathTraversalOnWrite is false. Pulling an attacker-controlled artifact can create or overwrite any file writable by the process and may lead to code execution. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.2. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84578 | 1 Apple | 1 Macos | 2026-09-18 | 8.8 High |
| A logic issue was addressed with improved checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27, macOS Sequoia 15.8, macOS Tahoe 26.7. An app may be able to break out of its sandbox. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89960 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vfio-ap: fix stale pqap_hook pointer on error in vfio_ap_mdev_set_kvm() In vfio_ap_mdev_set_kvm(), kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook is set to &matrix_mdev->pqap_hook before the update locks are acquired and the mdev list is checked for a conflicting assignment. If another mdev is already attached to the same KVM instance, the function returns -EPERM without restoring the hook pointer, leaving kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook pointing at the failing matrix_mdev instead of the mdev that legitimately owns the KVM. Since matrix_mdev->kvm is never set on this error path, vfio_ap_mdev_unset_kvm() will not clean up the hook when matrix_mdev is later closed. If matrix_mdev is subsequently freed, any PQAP instruction executed by the guest will dereference the stale pointer through pqap_hook_rwsem, resulting in a use-after-free. Since kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook is only set in the vfio_ap_mdev_set_kvm() function and is cleared in the vfio_ap_mdev_unset_kvm() function, a check for 'kvm->arch.crypto.pqap_hook != NULL' is all that is needed to determine whether it belongs to another mdev. This will alleviate the need to iterate the matrix_dev->mdev_list list to see if the kvm object is assigned to another mdev.This was introduced in v3 to alleviate the need to take the mdevs_lock while iterating the list; however, this did not prevent a potential race condition. The pqap_hook_rwsem(write) is now performed inside get_update_locks_for_kvm(), which is updated to acquire pqap_hook_rwsem(write) between kvm->lock and mdevs_lock. This ordering is consistent with the PQAP intercept path, which acquires pqap_hook_rwsem in read mode while srcu is held under vcpu->mutex, establishing the dependency: kvm->lock -> vcpu->mutex -> srcu -> pqap_hook_rwsem(read). The pqap_hook_rwsem is now released inside the release_update_locks_for_kvm(), which is updated to release pqap_hook_rwsem(write) between mdevs_lock and kvm->lock. Additionally, kvm_put_kvm() in vfio_ap_mdev_unset_kvm() is moved after release_update_locks_for_kvm(). Previously it was called while kvm->lock was held; if it were ever the last reference, kvm_destroy_vm() would run under kvm->lock, which would deadlock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89961 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/mm: fix wrong addr_pfn tracking in compound vmemmap population vmemmap_populate_compound_pages() uses addr_pfn to determine the PFN offset within a compound page and to decide whether the current vmemmap slot should be populated as a head page mapping or should reuse a tail page mapping. However, addr_pfn is advanced manually in parallel with addr. The loop itself progresses in vmemmap address space, so each PAGE_SIZE step in addr covers PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct page) struct page slots. Since addr_pfn is compared against nr_pages in data-PFN units, it should advance by the same number of PFNs. The existing manual increments do not match that and therefore do not reliably track the PFN corresponding to the current addr. As a result, pfn_offset can be computed from the wrong PFN and the code can make the head/tail decision for the wrong compound-page position. Fix this by deriving addr_pfn directly from the current vmemmap address instead of carrying it as loop state. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89971 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme: skip the zoned limits update if the zone info query failed nvme_query_zone_info() returns either a negative errno or a positive NVMe status code, but nvme_update_ns_info_block() only tests for the negative case: ret = nvme_query_zone_info(ns, lbaf, &zi); if (ret < 0) goto out; If the device fails the Identify Namespace (I/O Command Set specific) command, or the Identify Controller command issued by nvme_set_max_append(), the positive status falls through and setup continues with the zero-initialized zone info. nvme_update_zone_info() then marks the queue zoned with chunk_sectors and ns->head->zsze set to zero. blk_validate_zoned_limits() does not check chunk_sectors, so the limits commit succeeds. blk_revalidate_disk_zones() does reject the zero zone size, but by then the limits are live and nothing rolls them back, so I/O keeps being submitted to a zoned queue with a zero zone size and disk_zone_no() shifts by ilog2(0): nvme0n1: Invalid non power of two zone size (0) UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in include/linux/blkdev.h:747:16 shift exponent -1 is negative disk_zone_no include/linux/blkdev.h:747 [inline] bio_straddles_zones include/linux/blkdev.h:1058 [inline] blk_zone_wplug_handle_write block/blk-zoned.c:1423 [inline] blk_zone_plug_bio.cold+0x25/0x1c8 block/blk-zoned.c:1605 blk_mq_submit_bio+0x18fb/0x2870 block/blk-mq.c:3196 submit_bh_wbc+0x575/0x740 fs/buffer.c:2824 __block_write_full_folio+0x728/0xdd0 fs/buffer.c:1933 Any device, firmware or NVMe-oF target that fails this one command reaches this. Skip the zoned limits update in that case, and log which of the two things happened: during a revalidation the queue keeps the zone geometry it was last validated with, and on a first scan the namespace is registered without zoned limits, so that it is still available as a handle for admin commands. Neither of the paths in nvme_query_zone_info() that return a positive status logs anything, so the failure would otherwise be silent. zi.zone_size is an exact indicator: every path that returns a positive status returns before it is assigned, and after that the only failure left is -ENODEV, which the caller already handles. Found by FuzzNvme. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89973 | 1 Linux | 2 Kernel, Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 8.2 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-tcp: check the data direction of a C2HData PDU nvme_tcp_handle_c2h_data() finds the request by command id and checks that it has a payload, but it does not check that the command asked for data to be read. A controller that answers a write command with C2HData therefore reaches nvme_tcp_recv_data(), where _copy_to_iter() hits WARN_ON_ONCE(i->data_source) and returns 0. The receive path turns that into -EFAULT and resets the controller. No data is copied, so this is not memory corruption. What a controller gets is a kernel warning it can raise at will, which is fatal on a host booted with panic_on_warn. The send path already knows the direction - it consults rq_data_dir() when it builds a command - and nvme_tcp_handle_r2t() checks the length and the offset of the request it names. The C2HData path does not check the direction at all. Reject a C2HData PDU whose command is not a read. Rejecting it fails the command and resets the controller, as the neighbouring check in this function does; what goes away is the warning. [ 6.885580] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 6.886457] WARNING: lib/iov_iter.c:193 at _copy_to_iter+0x289/0x1330, CPU#0: kworker/0:1H/71 [ 6.888137] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 71 Comm: kworker/0:1H Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-NVMETCP-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 6.891165] Workqueue: nvme_tcp_wq nvme_tcp_io_work [ 6.891875] RIP: 0010:_copy_to_iter+0x289/0x1330 [ 6.903739] Call Trace: [ 6.904085] <TASK> [ 6.909254] __skb_datagram_iter+0x433/0x820 [ 6.911026] skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x37/0x120 [ 6.911622] nvme_tcp_recv_skb+0xa07/0x4320 [ 6.913378] __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810 [ 6.915788] nvme_tcp_try_recv+0x152/0x1e0 [ 6.918222] nvme_tcp_io_work+0x1e4/0x6c0 [ 6.926906] </TASK> [ 6.927226] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 6.927878] nvme nvme0: queue 1 failed to copy request 0x71 data [ 6.928709] nvme nvme0: receive failed: -14 | ||||
| CVE-2026-89899 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cec: disable delayed work before freeing an interrupted transmit cec_transmit_msg_fh() drops adap->lock to wait for a blocking transmit in wait_for_completion_killable(). If that wait is interrupted by a signal, cancel_delayed_work_sync() can run before the CEC kthread arms the reply timeout via schedule_delayed_work(&data->work) in cec_transmit_done_ts(). The work is then armed after the cancel, and the data is freed with its delayed_work still pending: ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ... hint: cec_wait_timeout Use disable_delayed_work_sync(): it cancels the work and disables it, so the later schedule_delayed_work() becomes a no-op and the work cannot be re-armed. The data is freed right after, so it need not be re-enabled. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89902 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Avoid preempt count underflow without probe LoongArch uses break 11 for the breakpoint placed after an instruction that Kprobes executes out of line. Since userspace can issue the same break instruction, do_bp() can reach kprobe_singlestep_handler() when there is no current probe. The handler actually returns false in this case, but it first calls preempt_enable_no_resched(). The corresponding preempt_disable() is done by kprobe_breakpoint_handler() on a real Kprobe hit, so it has not run here. As a result, an ordinary userspace breakpoint (code 11) underflows the current task's preempt count. This also makes in_interrupt() return true until the task schedules. One visible consequence is the socket cgroup attribution: cgroup_sk_alloc() treats the allocation as interrupt context and assigns the socket to the root cgroup. A socket opened from the SIGTRAP handler can then avoid a BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE policy attached to the task's own cgroup. Return as soon as kprobe_running() reports no active probe. The same check has appeared in [PATCH v10 2/4] of the original LoongArch Kprobes series, but was dropped before the feature reached mainline. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89903 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: LoongArch: Do not save/restore percpu base register in rethook trampoline The rethook trampoline saves $r21 ($u0), the percpu base, into its frame at entry and restores it at exit. Inbetween rethook_trampoline_handler() may schedule via preempt_enable_notrace(). If the task migrates to another CPU, the frame's $r21 holds the old CPU's percpu base, and restoring it poisons $r21 on the new CPU. Until the next user->kernel transition heals $r21, all this_cpu_*() accesses (runqueues, RCU per-CPU data, timer tick programming, FPU ownership) hit the wrong CPU's percpu area. Under kretprobe-heavy preemptible load this can corrupt scheduler and timer state: scheduling-while-atomic splats, wrong-CPU RCU warnings, WARN_ON_ONCE(rq != this_rq()) in nohz_balance_exit_idle(), and CPUs parking in the idle loop with the constant timer never re-armed (hard lockup). Reproduces on a Loongson-3A6000 with kretprobes on VFS paths plus heavy file churn (OS install / unsquashfs). By convention $r21 always holds the current CPU's percpu base in kernel mode: SAVE_SOME() at exception entry reloads it only when coming from user mode, and RESTORE_SOME() restores it only when returning to user mode; the context-switch path never writes it. Therefore the live $r21 at trampoline exit is already correct, and nothing inbetween can change it legitimately (kernel C code cannot write a global register variable). The same flaw existed even in the pre-rethook kretprobe trampoline since v6.3; it was carried over when rethook replaced it. Drop both the save and the restore here. Drop the restore is enough to solve the issue, and drop the save is to keep the code tidy and no need to clear it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89985 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memcg: keep folio's objcg same as its node memcg_reparent_objcgs() has an inherent assumption that a folio's objcg is the objcg of the folio's node. Folio migration across nodes breaks that assumption: the new folio simply inherits the old folio's objcg while living on a different node. Once the assumption is broken, the reparenting of the folio's objcg and the reparenting of the folio's LRU list are no longer atomic. memcg_reparent_objcgs() handles one node per iteration and drops all the locks in between, so the objcg gets reparented in the iteration for the objcg's node while the LRU list gets spliced in the iteration for the folio's node. Any LRU operation on that folio in between resolves its lruvec through the objcg, and thus takes the lru_lock of the wrong memcg, not the lru_lock of the list the folio is actually on. Fix this by selecting the objcg by folio_nid() at charge time, and by re-deriving it for the destination node in mem_cgroup_migrate() and mem_cgroup_replace_folio(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89986 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-18 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/mempolicy: fix sleeping allocation in alloc_pages_bulk_weighted_interleave() syzbot reported a sleeping function called from invalid context splat in bucket_table_alloc(). When rhashtable_insert_slow() rehashes the table under rcu_read_lock(), it calls bucket_table_alloc(..., GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOWARN). If the bucket table allocation uses vmalloc, __vmalloc_node_range_noprof() invokes vm_area_alloc_pages() -> alloc_pages_bulk_mempolicy_noprof() with the passed GFP_ATOMIC flags. If the current task has an MPOL_WEIGHTED_INTERLEAVE mempolicy, alloc_pages_bulk_weighted_interleave() is called and currently hardcodes GFP_KERNEL when allocating the temporary weights array, triggering a might_alloc() splat in atomic/RCU contexts. Pass the gfp flags (masked with GFP_RECLAIM_MASK to strip page-allocator zone modifiers like __GFP_HIGHMEM) received by alloc_pages_bulk_weighted_interleave() to kmalloc() instead of hardcoding GFP_KERNEL. Since the weights buffer is immediately initialized in full, kmalloc() is sufficient. | ||||