| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| RabbitMQ is a messaging and streaming broker. From 4.0.0 until 4.0.22 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.7, Admin-only atom exhaustion: PUT /api/users tags list. settags/2 maps rabbitdatacoercion:toatom/1 over the user's tags list. The 20 MB management body limit fits ~3-4M short tag strings. An administrator can crash the node in a single request by creating a user (or importing definitions) with ~1M unique tag administrator. This issue is fixed in versions 4.0.22 and 4.1.14 and 4.2.7. |
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.0.1, a low-privilege authenticated user may inject arbitrary HTML markup, including JavaScript event handlers, into a ticket title via the standard ticket creation workflow. The title is persisted without sanitization. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.1. |
| GLPI is a free asset and IT management software package. From 9.4.0 until 10.0.26 and 11.0.8, an attacker with the READ right on logs can craft a URL for the history tab that injects attacker-controlled values into a database query. This permits SQL injection through the history tab endpoint. This issue is fixed in versions 11.0.8 and 10.0.26. |
| GLPI is a free asset and IT management software package. From 0.72 until 10.0.26 and 11.0.8, an authenticated user without the required permission can enable debug mode. The affected user-setting update does not enforce the privilege boundary intended to restrict debug-mode activation. This issue is fixed in versions 11.0.8 and 10.0.26. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: remove stale namespaces by NSID range during scan
nvme_scan_ns_list() drops the stale namespaces in each gap in the
reported NSID list one NSID at a time. Every iteration calls
nvme_find_get_ns() to look the namespace up and removes it if it is
present. The loop runs once per NSID in the gap rather than once per
namespace actually present.
NSIDs are 32-bit, so a target with a sparse NSID space can make a
single gap spin the loop billions of times with nothing to remove.
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#4 stuck for 26s!
Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work [nvme_core]
RIP: 0010:__srcu_read_unlock+0xb/0x20
Call Trace:
nvme_find_get_ns+0x7d/0xb0 [nvme_core]
nvme_scan_ns_list+0xe8/0x280 [nvme_core]
nvme_scan_work+0x18a/0x280 [nvme_core]
process_one_work+0x197/0x380
worker_thread+0x2fe/0x410
kthread+0xe0/0x100
Rename nvme_remove_invalid_namespaces() to nvme_remove_nsid_range()
and give it an open (start, end) NSID range. ctrl->namespaces is
sorted by NSID, so the whole gap is dropped in a single walk that
stops once end is reached. This bounds the work by the namespaces
that are present instead of by the size of the gap. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown()
rds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by
waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and
then runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset(). Sampling
the bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the
wait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or
rds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run
concurrently with the teardown.
The sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock,
but that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes
the state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads
the state. acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on
weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write,
and the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings
(e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the
transmit state under it.
Oracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of
BUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL
dereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing -
by making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead
of testing them ("rds: Make sure transmit path and connection
tear-down does not run concurrently"). Ownership of a single word is
decided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed.
Do the same here: take both locks before calling the transport
shutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them
explicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with
clear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the
transport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by
rds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by
the next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill().
The fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and
rds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown
owns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them.
rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it
acquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now
spans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter
runs from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue
and holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so
a duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks
accept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded
by the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(). An IB
path's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no
blocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking
acquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the
fastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB
drain lengthens only that path's own quiesce. The
window is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the
teardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING.
Because krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued
there - accept processing for other connections and network
namespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop()
during namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for
that time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each
other: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and
the holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes
without needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels
rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on
the path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by
the blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel
without flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now
noted next to those cancels (on
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks()
rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the
path state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to
be sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling
rds_send_path_reset().
Sampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit()
can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns. Its
state recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the
resetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the
bit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire
operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss
each other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with
rds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly
what the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to
prevent.
Take the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and
rds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end. The
lock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the
lock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg()
can never be waited on while we hold the socket lock.
Two details of the old code go away with the same change:
- t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired. The old code
cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown()
releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before
the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes. Reading
it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the
teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until
then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths
remain as exposed to each other as they are today.
- The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no
serialization at all. It now runs under the lock like the normal
path. The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the
previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path
found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect
worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes
RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down
meanwhile and is dropped.
The in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is
rewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment
above the function (which still described a return value and an
incomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four
writers - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what
serializes each of them. |
| Zammad is a web based open source helpdesk/customer support system. Prior to 7.1.2, when a Microsoft Graph request fails, Zammad logs the error including the authentication token used to access the mailbox. The system attempts to hide this token in the log, but the masking is incomplete: for the token format Microsoft uses (JWT), only the first part is hidden, while the remaining parts remain readable in plain text. A Zammad admin with Microsoft Graph channel access can view these logs and see the partial token, which may reveal sensitive claims such as the account scope, tenant, or timing, and could assist in reconstructing the full token while it is still valid. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2. |
| Incorrect authorization in Azure Machine Learning allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| MediaFlow Proxy through 2.4.9 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the /proxy routes due to missing and incomplete destination validation in the d query parameter. Remote attackers can supply arbitrary internal URLs including loopback and cloud metadata endpoints to read full responses from the proxy server. |
| GestSup versions before 3.2.61 contain a remote code execution vulnerability in the basic IMAP connector's attachment handling that fails to skip blocked file extensions. Unauthenticated attackers can send emails with PHP attachments to monitored mailboxes, which are written to the web-accessible upload/ticket directory and executed when accessed. |
| RustDesk versions before 1.5.0 fail to properly validate file transfer permissions on incoming file clipboard messages in the Cliprdr message handler on Linux and macOS. Authenticated remote peers with disabled file transfer permissions can place files onto the host clipboard and retrieve copied files and contents from the process-wide clipboard cache. |
| pgPointcloud through 1.2.5 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in dimensional patch WKB deserialization that allows authenticated database users to read adjacent heap memory. Attackers can supply crafted pcpatch values with attacker-controlled size fields to copy heap memory into stored patches for exfiltration or crash the PostgreSQL backend. |
| Azure Arc Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
| Improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') in Azure Logic Apps allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| Authentication bypass by spoofing in Microsoft Dataverse allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
| Improper access control in Azure Logic Apps allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges over a network. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority. |
