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Search Results (409233 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-43067 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: handle wraparound when searching for blocks for indirect mapped blocks Commit 4865c768b563 ("ext4: always allocate blocks only from groups inode can use") restricts what blocks will be allocated for indirect block based files to block numbers that fit within 32-bit block numbers. However, when using a review bot running on the latest Gemini LLM to check this commit when backporting into an LTS based kernel, it raised this concern: If ac->ac_g_ex.fe_group is >= ngroups (for instance, if the goal group was populated via stream allocation from s_mb_last_groups), then start will be >= ngroups. Does this allow allocating blocks beyond the 32-bit limit for indirect block mapped files? The commit message mentions that ext4_mb_scan_groups_linear() takes care to not select unsupported groups. However, its loop uses group = *start, and the very first iteration will call ext4_mb_scan_group() with this unsupported group because next_linear_group() is only called at the end of the iteration. After reviewing the code paths involved and considering the LLM review, I determined that this can happen when there is a file system where some files/directories are extent-mapped and others are indirect-block mapped. To address this, add a safety clamp in ext4_mb_scan_groups(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-43063 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: don't irele after failing to iget in xfs_attri_recover_work xlog_recovery_iget* never set @ip to a valid pointer if they return an error, so this irele will walk off a dangling pointer. Fix that. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43062 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix type confusion in l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() casts the incoming data to struct l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp (the ECRED *connection* response, 8 bytes with result at offset 6) instead of struct l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp (2 bytes with result at offset 0). This causes two problems: - The sizeof(*rsp) length check requires 8 bytes instead of the correct 2, so valid L2CAP_ECRED_RECONF_RSP packets are rejected with -EPROTO. - rsp->result reads from offset 6 instead of offset 0, returning wrong data when the packet is large enough to pass the check. Fix by using the correct type. Also pass the already byte-swapped result variable to BT_DBG instead of the raw __le16 field. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43060 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_ct: drop pending enqueued packets on removal Packets sitting in nfqueue might hold a reference to: - templates that specify the conntrack zone, because a percpu area is used and module removal is possible. - conntrack timeout policies and helper, where object removal leave a stale reference. Since these objects can just go away, drop enqueued packets to avoid stale reference to them. If there is a need for finer grain removal, this logic can be revisited to make selective packet drop upon dependencies. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43056 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: fix use-after-free in add_adev() error path If auxiliary_device_add() fails, add_adev() jumps to add_fail and calls auxiliary_device_uninit(adev). The auxiliary device has its release callback set to adev_release(), which frees the containing struct mana_adev. Since adev is embedded in struct mana_adev, the subsequent fall-through to init_fail and access to adev->id may result in a use-after-free. Fix this by saving the allocated auxiliary device id in a local variable before calling auxiliary_device_add(), and use that saved id in the cleanup path after auxiliary_device_uninit(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-43055 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: file: Use kzalloc_flex for aio_cmd The target_core_file doesn't initialize the aio_cmd->iocb for the ki_write_stream. When a write command fd_execute_rw_aio() is executed, we may get a bogus ki_write_stream value, causing unintended write failure status when checking iocb->ki_write_stream > max_write_streams in the block device. Let's just use kzalloc_flex when allocating the aio_cmd and let ki_write_stream=0 to fix this issue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43051 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: wacom: fix out-of-bounds read in wacom_intuos_bt_irq The wacom_intuos_bt_irq() function processes Bluetooth HID reports without sufficient bounds checking. A maliciously crafted short report can trigger an out-of-bounds read when copying data into the wacom structure. Specifically, report 0x03 requires at least 22 bytes to safely read the processed data and battery status, while report 0x04 (which falls through to 0x03) requires 32 bytes. Add explicit length checks for these report IDs and log a warning if a short report is received. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43048 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset() The memset() in hid_report_raw_event() has the good intention of clearing out bogus data by zeroing the area from the end of the incoming data string to the assumed end of the buffer. However, as we have previously seen, doing so can easily result in OOB reads and writes in the subsequent thread of execution. The current suggestion from one of the HID maintainers is to remove the memset() and simply return if the incoming event buffer size is not large enough to fill the associated report. Suggested-by Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org> [bentiss: changed the return value] | ||||
| CVE-2026-43047 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: multitouch: Check to ensure report responses match the request It is possible for a malicious (or clumsy) device to respond to a specific report's feature request using a completely different report ID. This can cause confusion in the HID core resulting in nasty side-effects such as OOB writes. Add a check to ensure that the report ID in the response, matches the one that was requested. If it doesn't, omit reporting the raw event and return early. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43042 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mpls: add seqcount to protect the platform_label{,s} pair The RCU-protected codepaths (mpls_forward, mpls_dump_routes) can have an inconsistent view of platform_labels vs platform_label in case of a concurrent resize (resize_platform_label_table, under platform_mutex). This can lead to OOB accesses. This patch adds a seqcount, so that we get a consistent snapshot. Note that mpls_label_ok is also susceptible to this, so the check against RTA_DST in rtm_to_route_config, done outside platform_mutex, is not sufficient. This value gets passed to mpls_label_ok once more in both mpls_route_add and mpls_route_del, so there is no issue, but that additional check must not be removed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43038 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() Sashiko AI-review observed: In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2 and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2). IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm at offset 18. If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO). This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao. Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end of the packet data into skb_shared_info? Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and ip6ip6_err() to prevent this? This patch implements the first suggestion. I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed. A separate patch would be better anyway. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43037 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip6_tunnel: clear skb2->cb[] in ip4ip6_err() Oskar Kjos reported the following problem. ip4ip6_err() calls icmp_send() on a cloned skb whose cb[] was written by the IPv6 receive path as struct inet6_skb_parm. icmp_send() passes IPCB(skb2) to __ip_options_echo(), which interprets that cb[] region as struct inet_skb_parm (IPv4). The layouts differ: inet6_skb_parm.nhoff at offset 14 overlaps inet_skb_parm.opt.rr, producing a non-zero rr value. __ip_options_echo() then reads optlen from attacker-controlled packet data at sptr[rr+1] and copies that many bytes into dopt->__data, a fixed 40-byte stack buffer (IP_OPTIONS_DATA_FIXED_SIZE). To fix this we clear skb2->cb[], as suggested by Oskar Kjos. Also add minimal IPv4 header validation (version == 4, ihl >= 5). | ||||
| CVE-2026-43033 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: authencesn - Do not place hiseq at end of dst for out-of-place decryption When decrypting data that is not in-place (src != dst), there is no need to save the high-order sequence bits in dst as it could simply be re-copied from the source. However, the data to be hashed need to be rearranged accordingly. Thanks, | ||||
| CVE-2026-43030 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix regsafe() for pointers to packet In case rold->reg->range == BEYOND_PKT_END && rcur->reg->range == N regsafe() may return true which may lead to current state with valid packet range not being explored. Fix the bug. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43028 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: x_tables: ensure names are nul-terminated Reject names that lack a \0 character before feeding them to functions that expect c-strings. Fixes tag is the most recent commit that needs this change. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43025 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.3 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ctnetlink: ignore explicit helper on new expectations Use the existing master conntrack helper, anything else is not really supported and it just makes validation more complicated, so just ignore what helper userspace suggests for this expectation. This was uncovered when validating CTA_EXPECT_CLASS via different helper provided by userspace than the existing master conntrack helper: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_ct_expect_related_report+0x2479/0x27c0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880043fe408 by task poc/102 Call Trace: nf_ct_expect_related_report+0x2479/0x27c0 ctnetlink_create_expect+0x22b/0x3b0 ctnetlink_new_expect+0x4bd/0x5c0 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x67a/0x950 netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x350 Allowing to read kernel memory bytes off the expectation boundary. CTA_EXPECT_HELP_NAME is still used to offer the helper name to userspace via netlink dump. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43023 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: fix race conditions in sco_sock_connect() sco_sock_connect() checks sk_state and sk_type without holding the socket lock. Two concurrent connect() syscalls on the same socket can both pass the check and enter sco_connect(), leading to use-after-free. The buggy scenario involves three participants and was confirmed with additional logging instrumentation: Thread A (connect): HCI disconnect: Thread B (connect): sco_sock_connect(sk) sco_sock_connect(sk) sk_state==BT_OPEN sk_state==BT_OPEN (pass, no lock) (pass, no lock) sco_connect(sk): sco_connect(sk): hci_dev_lock hci_dev_lock hci_connect_sco <- blocked -> hcon1 sco_conn_add->conn1 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: conn1->sk = sk sk->conn = conn1 sk_state=BT_CONNECT release_sock hci_dev_unlock hci_dev_lock sco_conn_del: lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_del: sk->conn=NULL conn1->sk=NULL sk_state= BT_CLOSED SOCK_ZAPPED release_sock hci_dev_unlock (unblocked) hci_connect_sco -> hcon2 sco_conn_add -> conn2 lock_sock(sk) sco_chan_add: sk->conn=conn2 sk_state= BT_CONNECT // zombie sk! release_sock hci_dev_unlock Thread B revives a BT_CLOSED + SOCK_ZAPPED socket back to BT_CONNECT. Subsequent cleanup triggers double sock_put() and use-after-free. Meanwhile conn1 is leaked as it was orphaned when sco_conn_del() cleared the association. Fix this by: - Moving lock_sock() before the sk_state/sk_type checks in sco_sock_connect() to serialize concurrent connect attempts - Fixing the sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET check to actually return the error instead of just assigning it - Adding a state re-check in sco_connect() after lock_sock() to catch state changes during the window between the locks - Adding sco_pi(sk)->conn check in sco_chan_add() to prevent double-attach of a socket to multiple connections - Adding hci_conn_drop() on sco_chan_add failure to prevent HCI connection leaks | ||||
| CVE-2026-43019 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_conn: fix potential UAF in set_cig_params_sync hci_conn lookup and field access must be covered by hdev lock in set_cig_params_sync, otherwise it's possible it is freed concurrently. Take hdev lock to prevent hci_conn from being deleted or modified concurrently. Just RCU lock is not suitable here, as we also want to avoid "tearing" in the configuration. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43018 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_event: fix potential UAF in hci_le_remote_conn_param_req_evt hci_conn lookup and field access must be covered by hdev lock in hci_le_remote_conn_param_req_evt, otherwise it's possible it is freed concurrently. Extend the hci_dev_lock critical section to cover all conn usage. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43016 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-16 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: sockmap: Fix use-after-free of sk->sk_socket in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(). syzbot reported use-after-free of AF_UNIX socket's sk->sk_socket in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(). [0] In unix_stream_sendmsg(), the peer socket's ->sk_data_ready() is called after dropping its unix_state_lock(). Although the sender socket holds the peer's refcount, it does not prevent the peer's sock_orphan(), and the peer's sk_socket might be freed after one RCU grace period. Let's fetch the peer's sk->sk_socket and sk->sk_socket->ops under RCU in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready(). [0]: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0xec/0x590 net/core/skmsg.c:1278 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880594da860 by task syz.4.1842/11013 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 11013 Comm: syz.4.1842 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xba/0x230 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0x117/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:595 sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0xec/0x590 net/core/skmsg.c:1278 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x8a3/0xe80 net/unix/af_unix.c:2482 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:721 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x972/0x9f0 net/socket.c:2585 ___sys_sendmsg+0x2a5/0x360 net/socket.c:2639 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2671 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x1bd/0x2a0 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7facf899c819 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007facf9827028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007facf8c15fa0 RCX: 00007facf899c819 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000200000000500 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007facf8a32c91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007facf8c16038 R14: 00007facf8c15fa0 R15: 00007ffd41b01c78 </TASK> Allocated by task 11013: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:340 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x6c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:366 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:253 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4538 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4866 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x2b8/0x640 mm/slub.c:4885 sock_alloc_inode+0x28/0xc0 net/socket.c:316 alloc_inode+0x6a/0x1b0 fs/inode.c:347 new_inode_pseudo include/linux/fs.h:3003 [inline] sock_alloc net/socket.c:631 [inline] __sock_create+0x12d/0x9d0 net/socket.c:1562 sock_create net/socket.c:1656 [inline] __sys_socketpair+0x1c4/0x560 net/socket.c:1803 __do_sys_socketpair net/socket.c:1856 [inline] __se_sys_socketpair net/socket.c:1853 [inline] __x64_sys_socketpair+0x9b/0xb0 net/socket.c:1853 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x14d/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 15: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:57 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_free_info+0x46/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:584 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:253 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x5c/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:285 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:235 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2685 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:6165 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x187/0x630 mm/slub.c:6295 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c: ---truncated--- | ||||