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Search Results (395618 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90234 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFS: Return a delegation the client fails to record When an NFS server grants a delegation in an OPEN reply, nfs_inode_set_delegation() records it on the client. However, three of its error flows return without sending DELEGRETURN. A delegation can be relinquished only by DELEGRETURN (RFC 8881 Section 20.2.4), so dropping one silently leaves the server believing the client still holds it. If the server happens to recall that delegation, the client answers CB_RECALL with NFS4ERR_BADHANDLE because it has no record of the stateid. The server revokes the delegation and moves it onto its cl_revoked list, because the client never sends the FREE_STATEID that would drain it. Every subsequent SEQUENCE reply then carries SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED, and the client's state manager loops issuing TEST_STATEID across its delegations without ever clearing the condition. The window is easy to reach now that a server offers a write delegation on any write OPEN: a delegation recalled for one opener races a re-open that the server answers with a fresh write delegation. Instead of dropping it, hand the delegation back during these error flows. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90312 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Check load-acquire src ptr type before the load check_atomic_load() calls check_load_mem() before atomic_ptr_type_ok(). For a load-acquire that fetches into its own source register (dst_reg == src_reg), check_load_mem() overwrites src_reg's type with the type of the loaded value, so the subsequent atomic_ptr_type_ok() no longer sees the source pointer and fails to reject the disallowed types (ctx, pkt, flow_keys, sock). Since bpf_convert_ctx_accesses() does not rewrite atomic loads, the raw access to the underlying kernel object is left in place. The destination type is taken from the ctx access itself, so a load-acquire of the sk field of struct __sk_buff for example leaves the register typed as PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON_OR_NULL, which type_is_sk_pointer() does not match either, while it actually holds unconverted struct sk_buff bytes. Once the NULL check has passed this is a type confusion, not just a leak of kernel data. Validate src_reg with check_reg_arg() and check the source pointer type with atomic_ptr_type_ok() before the load again, mirroring check_atomic_rmw(). Out-of-range register numbers are already rejected earlier by check_and_resolve_insns() (commit 503d21ef8eac ("bpf: Do register range validation early")), and the only exemption there, is_stack_arg_ldx(), requires BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW and thus never matches a BPF_ATOMIC insn. atomic_ptr_type_ok() can therefore not dereference register state out of bounds, that is, the out-of-bounds read addressed by the Fixes commit below does not reappear (as proven also via selftest). | ||||
| CVE-2026-90321 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: validate inline xattrs during inode block validation Patch series "ocfs2: validate xattr entry bounds", v7. This series validates OCFS2 xattr entry name/value bounds when xattr metadata is read and validated, before getxattr() or listxattr() can walk out-of-range entry arrays or offsets from corrupted metadata. This patch (of 2): ocfs2_validate_inode_block() verifies a dinode before OCFS2 users walk metadata from it, but inline xattr metadata is still checked only in operation-specific consumers. The existing ibody lookup helper validates inline header placement and entry count, but inode block validation does not reject entry name/value bounds. Add a flat xattr entry validator and call it from inode block validation for inline xattrs. Keep the operation paths on their existing header/count lookup checks; the full entry bounds check now runs when the inode block is validated at read time. Reject corrupted inline xattr metadata before ocfs2_xattr_ibody_get() or listxattr() can walk past the inline storage. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881242a2000 by task python3/529 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ocfs2_xattr_find_entry+0x5a/0x170 ocfs2_xattr_get_nolock+0x20a/0x820 ocfs2_xattr_get+0x10c/0x1e0 __vfs_getxattr+0xe2/0x130 vfs_getxattr+0x185/0x1b0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-90326 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: blk-cgroup: fix race between policy activation and blkg destruction When switching an IO scheduler on a block device, blkcg_activate_policy() allocates blkg_policy_data (pd) for all blkgs attached to the queue. However, blkcg_activate_policy() may race with concurrent blkcg deletion, leading to use-after-free and memory leak issues. The use-after-free occurs in the following race: T1 (blkcg_activate_policy): - Successfully allocates pd for blkg1 (loop0->queue, blkcgA) - Fails to allocate pd for blkg2 (loop0->queue, blkcgB) - Enters the enomem rollback path to release blkg1 resources T2 (blkcg deletion): - blkcgA is deleted concurrently - blkg1 is freed via blkg_free_workfn() - blkg1->pd is freed T1 (continued): - Rollback path accesses blkg1->pd->online after pd is freed - Triggers use-after-free In addition, blkg_free_workfn() frees pd before removing the blkg from q->blkg_list. This allows blkcg_activate_policy() to allocate a new pd for a blkg that is being destroyed, leaving the newly allocated pd unreachable when the blkg is finally freed. Fix these races by extending blkcg_mutex coverage to serialize blkcg_activate_policy() rollback and blkg destruction, ensuring pd lifecycle is synchronized with blkg list visibility. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93116 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: asus-wmi: fix resource leaks on probe failure During driver initialization in asus_wmi_add(), various subsystems are registered sequentially. However, the error path labels are out of order relative to the registration sequence. Specifically: 1. If asus_wmi_custom_fan_curve_init() fails, the driver jumps to fail_custom_fan_curve. Because this label is placed below fail_sysfs, it bypasses the cleanup calls for the input device and sysfs groups, which were successfully registered before, leaking those resources. 2. If asus_screenpad_init() fails, the driver jumps to fail_screenpad. Because fail_screenpad is placed below fail_backlight, it bypasses the cleanup calls for backlight and rfkill, leaking those resources. Fix these resource leaks by reordering the error path labels in asus_wmi_add() to match the exact reverse order of the resource allocations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93165 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 7.7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/chrome: sensorhub: Fix memory overread in ring handler `max_response` and `sensor_num` are read from different EC commands: - `max_response` is from cros_ec_get_proto_info(). ec_dev->max_response = info->max_response_packet_size - sizeof(struct ec_host_response); - `sensor_num` is from cros_ec_get_sensor_count(). sensor_num = cros_ec_get_sensor_count(ec); With a malfunctioning EC firmware, it is possible that the `msg->insize` (i.e., `fifo_info_length` in the context) could be clamped in cros_ec_cmd_xfer() because `msg->insize` is greater than `max_response`. int fifo_info_length = sizeof(struct ec_response_motion_sense_fifo_info) + sizeof(u16) * sensorhub->sensor_num; This means the number of read bytes could be less than expected. As a result, the subsequent memcpy() in cros_ec_sensorhub_ring_handler() overreads the `resp->fifo_info` buffer. Check the return value of cros_ec_cmd_xfer_status() and abort if the number of bytes read does not match the expected length. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93189 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: core: quiesce input in hid_hw_stop() to prevent use-after-free A driver's probe calls hid_device_io_start() to enable input delivery, then fails at a later initialization step and unwinds via hid_hw_stop(). The unwind frees struct hidraw via hidraw_disconnect() while in-flight HID reports may still be running on another CPU, dereferencing the freed object through hidraw_report_event(). syzbot reports the resulting use-after-free for the corsair-psu HID driver. Edward Adam Davis posted a per-driver fix for corsair-psu that adds an explicit hid_device_io_stop() before hid_hw_stop() in the probe error path ("hwmon: prevent packets from going to driver for probe", 2026-04-28). Auditing the tree shows 15 drivers call hid_device_io_start(); 7 also call hid_device_io_stop() and 8 do not: drivers calling hid_device_io_start() without a matching hid_device_io_stop() before hid_hw_stop(): drivers/hwmon/corsair-psu.c (fix posted by Edward) drivers/hwmon/corsair-cpro.c drivers/hwmon/nzxt-kraken3.c drivers/hwmon/nzxt-smart2.c drivers/hwmon/gigabyte_waterforce.c drivers/hid/hid-logitech-dj.c drivers/hid/hid-nintendo.c drivers/hid/hid-mcp2221.c Roughly half of all callers of the API are exposed. Centralize the quiesce in hid_hw_stop() so callers do not have to remember the matching stop: if a driver has left hdev->io_started true on entry, call hid_device_io_stop() before hid_disconnect(). For the 7 drivers that already call hid_device_io_stop() correctly, hdev->io_started is false on entry, the guard short-circuits, and behavior is unchanged. No Fixes: tag because the affected drivers gained their hid_device_io_start() calls independently over years; the bug is a class-wide API misuse rather than a regression from one commit. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81180 | 1 Syslifters | 1 Sysreptor | 2026-09-20 | 8.8 High |
| SysReptor is a fully customizable pentest reporting platform. Prior to 2026.61, authenticated users of SysReptor Professional can upload image files whose formats cause image processing to invoke Ghostscript, allowing embedded PostScript to operate in the shared temporary directory. An attacker can combine that behavior with a race involving GnuPG configuration files in temporary subdirectories to cause GnuPG to copy attacker-controlled Python code into the application code directory. The injected code executes with the privileges of the SysReptor application process after a worker restart. The Community edition is not affected. Version 2026.58 contains a partial mitigation, and this issue is fully fixed in version 2026.61. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81182 | 1 Syslifters | 1 Sysreptor | 2026-09-20 | 4.2 Medium |
| SysReptor is a fully customizable pentest reporting platform. Prior to 2026.68, an unauthenticated attacker who holds a public read-write note share link can disclose an uploaded file or image from the same project by updating the shared note to reference the target asset filename. The user-controlled reference causes the shared-note authorization logic to treat the asset as permitted, after which the attacker can download it. The attacker must know the asset filename, and the issue does not permit cross-project access. This issue is fixed in version 2026.68. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81181 | 1 Syslifters | 1 Sysreptor | 2026-09-20 | 3.7 Low |
| SysReptor is a fully customizable pentest reporting platform. Prior to 2026.68, the password authentication flow for protected shared notes does not rotate the session identifier after successful authentication, allowing session fixation. An attacker who can obtain an unauthenticated SysReptor session cookie, place it in a victim's browser, and know the shared-note URL where the victim authenticates can reuse the fixed session after the victim enters the correct password and access that shared note. The main SysReptor login flow is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2026.68. | ||||
| CVE-2026-11899 | 2 Edgarrojas, Wordpress | 2 Pdf Builder For Woocommerce. Create Invoices,packing Slips And More, Wordpress | 2026-09-20 | 4.3 Medium |
| The PDF Builder for WooCommerce. Create invoices,packing slips and more plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 2.0.11. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to retrieve invoice numbers, formatted invoice numbers, and creation timestamps for arbitrary WooCommerce orders by supplying any OrderNumber and InvoiceId values with a garbage nonce. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90103 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4.2: fix LAYOUTSTATS send buffer exhaustion encode_layoutstats_maxsz budgets XDR_QUADLEN(PNFS_LAYOUTSTATS_MAXSIZE), i.e. 256 bytes, for the layoutupdate4 body written by the layout driver. The flexfiles record can exceed that. ff_layout_encode_ff_layoutupdate() emits, per data server, a netaddr4, an nfs_fh4, two ff_io_latency4, an nfstime4 and a bool. A data server whose filehandle is NFS_MAXFHSIZE bytes long already accounts for 132 of those bytes, and the two ff_io_latency4 at 64 bytes each, the nfstime4 and the bool add a further 144, so the body passes 256 bytes before the netaddr4 is encoded at all. encode_layoutstats() additionally writes the deviceid4 and the layoutupdate4 lou_type word, neither of which the macro accounts for. The filehandle and the address are both chosen by the server, through LAYOUTGET and GETDEVICEINFO, so it can drive the encoder past the end of the send buffer. xdr_reserve_space() returns NULL once that happens, and the two ff_layout_encode_io_latency() calls run with dss_info->mirror->lock held, so a NULL return there leaves the lock permanently held. Raise PNFS_LAYOUTSTATS_MAXSIZE to 384 so that the record fits inside the reservation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90127 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio: rtc: time out alarm requests RTC class operations run with rtc_device.ops_lock held. The virtio RTC alarm requests currently wait without a timeout for the device to return their requestq buffers. On surprise removal, virtio-pci marks the virtqueues broken before unregistering the virtio device. If an alarm request is waiting when the device stops responding, viortc_remove() blocks in viortc_class_stop() while trying to acquire ops_lock. The request cannot complete and device removal hangs until the waiting task is signalled. Use the same 60-second timeout as clock read requests for alarm reads, alarm programming, and alarm interrupt enable requests. The existing message reference counting keeps a timed-out request alive until a late response or device teardown. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90140 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cuse: wait for pending RCU callbacks on module exit Since commit 053fc4f755ad ("fuse: fix UAF in rcu pathwalks"), fuse_conn_put() frees the fuse_conn through call_rcu() rather than synchronously. For cuse, fc->release is cuse_fc_release(), which lives in the cuse module. If the module is removed before the RCU grace period ends, the callback jumps into freed module memory: userspace / module unload | RCU softirq ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ close(/dev/cuse) | cuse_channel_release() | fuse_dev_release() | fuse_conn_put(fch->conn) | call_rcu(delayed_release) ------+---> callback queued | rmmod cuse | cuse_exit() | cuse_channel_destroy() | ... | return | | <module text freed> | | rcu_do_batch() | delayed_release() | fc->release() | -> cuse_fc_release() | ^^^ freed text! The freed module text is unmapped by vfree(), so the jump into the stale callback triggers a page-fault Oops. If the virtual address is subsequently reused, the callback could execute unrelated code (undefined behaviour). Fix this by calling rcu_barrier() in cuse_exit() so that any pending fuse_conn release callback completes before the module is removed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90143 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: kcm: Hold RCU read lock while running BPF parser kcm_parse_func_strparser() calls bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu() which prevents CPU migration, but does not establish an RCU read-side critical section. Consequently, BPF map operations can trigger WARN_ON_ONCE(!bpf_rcu_lock_held()) when called from the KCM strparser program. Hold the RCU read lock while running the program. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90179 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: apparmor: fix deadlock in complain-mode change_hat The use of change_hat when in complain mode can cause a deadlock when the hat doesn't exist and a new learning profile is created for the missing profile. This is because change_hat() has taken the lock to search the hat list and creating the new learning profile needs to take the lock to add it to the list. From the bug report: Originally found in 7.0.0 in LTS ubuntu 26.04 with pam_apparmor + su in complain mode set to change hats. Then verified in newest available vanilla kernel I've compiled to see if still present: 7.2-rc7 vanilla -> affected checked also some other kernels: 6.18.44 vanilla -> affected 6.12.95 with debian patches -> unaffected On systems without bug (for example 6.12.95 debian) it just prints: aa_change_hat rc=0 On systems with bug, the executable always hangs, prints nothing and becomes unkillable. (And once stuck this way, it will cause any further hat changes to also cause the changing process to get stuck) Then in syslog you can find hint about cause: kernel: INFO: task hat:3409 blocked for more than 483 seconds. kernel: Not tainted 7.2.0-rc7 #1 kernel: "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message. kernel: task:hat state:D stack:0 pid:3409 tgid:3409 ppid:2605 task_flags:0x400000 flags:0x00080800 kernel: Call Trace: kernel: <TASK> kernel: __schedule+0x48f/0xfe0 kernel: schedule+0x27/0xa0 kernel: schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30 kernel: __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x569/0xa10 kernel: aa_new_learning_profile+0x15f/0x210 kernel: build_change_hat+0x19f/0x3b0 kernel: change_hat.isra.0+0x5dd/0xd60 kernel: aa_change_hat+0x2f3/0x710 kernel: aa_setprocattr_changehat+0x121/0x1f0 kernel: do_setattr+0x28c/0x340 kernel: apparmor_setselfattr+0x20/0x50 kernel: security_setselfattr+0xf6/0x110 kernel: __x64_sys_lsm_set_self_attr+0x53/0x90 kernel: do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x5e0 kernel: ? __mod_memcg_lruvec_state+0xfd/0x260 kernel: ? lruvec_stat_mod_folio+0x8d/0xd0 kernel: ? __folio_mod_stat+0x2d/0x90 kernel: ? map_anon_folio_pte_nopf+0xd1/0x1f0 kernel: ? do_anonymous_page+0x184/0xa10 kernel: ? __handle_mm_fault+0x805/0x870 kernel: ? count_memcg_events+0xef/0x230 kernel: ? handle_mm_fault+0x1f0/0x2f0 kernel: ? do_user_addr_fault+0x2bb/0x7b0 kernel: ? do_syscall_64+0x94/0x5e0 kernel: ? exc_page_fault+0x75/0x160 kernel: entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e kernel: RIP: 0033:0x7f815e134c8d kernel: RSP: 002b:00007fff6df94ea8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000001cc kernel: RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000556d8c81d040 RCX: 00007f815e134c8d kernel: RDX: 0000000000000046 RSI: 0000556d8c81d040 RDI: 0000000000000064 kernel: RBP: 00007fff6df94ef0 R08: 00007f815e212ac8 R09: 000000000000000c kernel: R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000556d8c81d010 kernel: R13: 0000000000000026 R14: 0000000000000046 R15: 0000000000000064 kernel: </TASK> kernel: INFO: task hat:3409 is blocked on a mutex likely owned by task hat:3409. To fix the issue, lift the locking out of the core of aa_new_learning_profile(), introduce a wrapper function that takes the lock where needed, and have build_change_hat() call the core function that no longer takes the lock. In addition fix 4 other issues introduced by commit 32e92764d6f8d ("apparmor: grab ns lock and refresh when looking up changehat child profiles") - aa_get_profile_rcu() was replaced-by: aa_get_profile without the accompanying rcu_dereference_protected() - an extra aa_get_label(label) was introduced at the start of change_hat() without an accompanying aa_put_label() causing a reference count leak. - a reference count leak was introduced in the label_is_stale(label) case, where the newest profile would be leaked instead of the label passed to the function. - a potential UAF when the lookup walks up the tree with new_ns != ns the new label refere ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-90185 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: null_blk: serialize configfs attribute stores with the lock The NULLB_DEVICE_ATTR _store takes no lock: apply_fn attributes (submit_queues, poll_queues) get dev->NAME written again after apply_fn returns, outside its lock; APPLY=NULL attributes are entirely lockless. configfs only serializes stores per-open-file, so concurrent stores on separate fds race. For apply_fn attributes, once one store's apply_fn has reconfigured the hardware, a second (losing) store can still overwrite dev->NAME afterwards. This leaves dev->submit_queues out of sync with the live queue count, which is later caught by the WARN_ON_ONCE() in null_map_queues(). For !apply_fn attributes, power_store()'s null_add_dev() validates and builds the device under "lock" but only sets CONFIGURED afterwards. A store slipping in during this window can change a field mid-setup -- for example, zone_nr_conv can be pushed above nr_zones after it has already been clamped, leading to an out-of-bounds dev->zones[] access. Take "lock" in the macro around the apply_fn call, the CONFIGURED test and the field write, and move it out of nullb_apply_submit_queues()/ nullb_apply_poll_queues() so both paths are covered once. This serializes stores with power_store's setup and with each other. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90211 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, s390: Clear fetch destination on faulting arena atomic Same missing register clear as on riscv64. A RMW atomic on an arena pointer is converted to BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC and gets an exception table entry, but bpf_jit_probe_atomic_pre() only fills in the arena base and the probe offset, leaving probe->reg at the -1 that bpf_jit_probe_init() set, which bpf_jit_probe_post() writes into the entry and ex_handler_bpf() then reads back as "there is nothing to clear". That is right for a plain BPF_{ADD,AND,OR,XOR}, which only writes memory, but an RMW carrying BPF_FETCH also reads the old value into a register: src_reg for BPF_{ADD,AND,OR,XOR} | BPF_FETCH and BPF_XCHG, and r0 for BPF_CMPXCHG. So on a fault over an unmapped arena page the program resumes at the landing pad with whatever that register held before the atomic instead of the 0 that every other BPF_PROBE_* access delivers. Fill probe->reg in from bpf_atomic_load_reg(). Unlike x86-64 and arm64, s390x does not report arena violations from its exception handler, so there is no access direction to correct here, only the missing register clear. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90240 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Flush context cache with correct SID when tearing down aliases domain_context_clear_one() and device_pasid_table_teardown() are both invoked once per DMA alias of a device. Each function locates the context entry using the bus/devfn pair provided by the pci_for_each_dma_alias() callback, then calls intel_context_flush_no_pasid(), which constructs a device-selective context-cache invalidation from info->bus and info->devfn (that is, always the requester ID of the device itself). As a result, for every alias other than the device’s own RID, the context entry that was just cleared in memory is never invalidated in the context cache. Hardware may continue using that stale cached entry. In the scalable-mode teardown path, intel_pasid_free_table() can then free the PASID directory still referenced by that stale entry, allowing the IOMMU to walk freed memory. Fix this by passing the source ID of the entry being torn down to intel_context_flush_no_pasid(), instead of deriving it from @info. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90256 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-20 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: use proto_lock for l2cap_data to fix l2cap_disconn_ind hci_conn::l2cap_data is accessed without locks in l2cap_disconn_ind via hci_conn_timeout (disc_work) -> hci_proto_disconn_ind -> l2cap_disconn_ind. This is UAF if the l2cap_conn is deleted concurrently. disc_work is disabled sync in hci_conn_del(), so we cannot take hci_dev_lock in disc_work. Fix by using proto_lock to guard l2cap_data, in addition to hdev->lock which is held in other access paths. | ||||