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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89792 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds reads in share config responses Validate IPC share configuration payload sizes before consuming variable-length fields. Bound veto list parsing and account for the separator byte when deriving the path length. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89766 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 2.5 Low |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pidfd: hold exec_update_lock around namespace ioctl The PIDFD_GET_*_NAMESPACE ioctls in pidfd_ioctl() perform a filesystem credentials ptrace access check before handing out a namespace file descriptor. The accompanying comment states that the code "mirrors nsfs behavior", but, unlike the corresponding procfs paths, it does so without holding the target task's exec_update_lock. proc_ns_get_link() and proc_ns_readlink() both take exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup, so that the credentials used for the access decision match those of the task when its namespace is read. Without it, a caller can pass the check against the target's old credentials and then read the namespace after the target has execve()'d a setuid binary and committed new credentials -- accessing namespace information it should have been denied. Hold exec_update_lock for reading around the ptrace check and the namespace lookup so that pidfd truly mirrors nsfs behavior, as the comment already claims. open_namespace() itself runs outside the lock: once a namespace reference is obtained it carries its own refcount and is opened with the caller's own credentials, so a concurrent execve() on the target can no longer affect the outcome. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89739 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc3: gadget: Fix use-after-free in dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints due to race condition In dwc3_gadget_init_endpoint, &dep->nostream_work is bound with dwc3_nostream_work, and dwc3_gadget_endpoint_stream_event can queue this delayed work on system_percpu_wq when a DEPEVT_STREAM_NOSTREAM event is received. If we remove the gadget, dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints makes cleanup and the memory allocated for dep with kzalloc() is released by kfree(dep), while the delayed work mentioned above may still be pending or running. The sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is as follows: CPU0 CPU1 | dwc3_thread_interrupt | dwc3_endpoint_interrupt | dwc3_gadget_endpoint_stream_event | queue_delayed_work(system_percpu_wq, | &dep->nostream_work) dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints | dwc3_free_trb_pool(dep) | list_del(&dep->endpoint.ep_list) | dwc3_debugfs_remove_endpoint_dir(dep) | kfree(dep) | // dep is freed | | dwc3_nostream_work | // use dep (use-after-free) Fix it by canceling the delayed work before kfree(dep) in dwc3_gadget_free_endpoints. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89560 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: landlock: Require LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG for whiteout creation Whiteout objects are used in the upper layer of an OverlayFS to indicate that the file with this name does not exist in the unified view, even if it is present in one of the lower layer file systems. For the userspace implementations of OverlayFS (fuse-overlayfs), whiteout objects can be created from userspace as well: * mknod(2) with S_IFCHR and makedev(0, 0) * renameat2(2) with RENAME_WHITEOUT, creating the whiteout in the old place of the moved file. This commit guards whiteout creation in both of these cases with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG. Whiteout objects are *not* considered character devices and are not bound to a driver. LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG describes the same permission class as a whiteout object: creating one is the only S_IFCHR creation that the VFS exempts from CAP_MKNOD, so it is as unprivileged as creating a regular file, while LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR and LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK keep meaning the creation of devices that expose a kernel interface [1]. For the mknod(2) case, introduce a Landlock erratum. The creation of whiteout objects through mknod(2) was previously guarded using LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR, and it is now guarded using LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG. For the renameat2(2) case, fix a bug: Before this commit, renameat2(2) with RENAME_WHITEOUT would create a directory entry even when all LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_* rights were denied. This does not affect normal renames within layered OverlayFS mounts: When doing a regular rename() on a mounted fuse-overlayfs, it is the fuse-overlayfs daemon that exercises renameat2() with RENAME_WHITEOUT, and only the Landlock domain of that daemon is checked there. Depends-on: 49c9e09d9610 ("landlock: Fix handling of disconnected directories") Depends-on: fe72ce6710cb ("landlock: Add errata documentation section") [mic: Record why LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG is the matching right, and add link(2) to the user doc] | ||||
| CVE-2026-89520 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/core: Make core-sched flips wait for in-flight selections Core scheduling's pick_next_task() operates on all sibling rqs under one acquisition of the shared core-wide lock. A ->pick_task() that releases the rq lock leaves every sibling __lock momentarily free, letting __sched_core_flip(false) complete mid-selection and rebind rq_lockp() under it. The selection resumes on the split locks, touching sibling state it no longer protects, and __schedule() finally releases a lock that was never taken while leaking the one that was. Count in-flight core-wide selections in the leader's rq->core_pick_in_flight and make __sched_core_flip() wait for the count to drain. The count only changes under the shared lock, which the flip holds while sampling, so no other ordering is needed. The wait can repeat while selections overlap, but the flip backs off between samples and flips are rare cookie-lifetime events. sched_core_cpu_deactivate() moves the count to the new leader - a stale copy left behind would bias it forever if that CPU later returns as its own leader. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89503 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix subbuf resize race with ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() ring_buffer_alloc_read_page() is racy with ring_buffer_subbuf_order_set, it can allocate a reader page with an outdated order. This isn't a big issue, the user can still re-allocate a new reader page and try again. However, what is more problematic is if the value of subbuf_order changes in the middle of ring_buffer_alloc_read_page(). In that case, bpage->order might not match the actual allocated memory. Use bpage->order for the allocation to prevent this race. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89500 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Make cpu_buffer::free_page a buffer_data_read_page Discarding a cached reader page after a concurrent ring buffer resize uses the new global subbuf_order for the free_pages() call. This mismatched order may crashes the kernel or leaks memory because the cached page was allocated under the old size. Save the actual free_page order alongside the page address to ensure we always refer to the correct value and do not rely on the potentially stalled cpu_buffer->subbuf_order value. The simplest is to make free_page a buffer_data_read_page which already covers exactly what we need: a page address and a page order. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89467 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: power: supply: qcom_battmgr: fix use-after-free qcom_battmgr_pdr_notify() queues enable_work when the PMIC GLINK service comes up, and the worker recovers battmgr through container_of() to issue firmware requests. The PMIC GLINK client stays on the client list until its devres release action runs, so a PDR notification can keep queueing the work, and a pending or running worker can access battmgr after devres frees it. Make enable_work device-managed with devm_work_autocancel(), registered before the PMIC GLINK client is allocated. The devres cleanup then releases the client first, so no further notification can queue the work, and cancels the work before battmgr is freed. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89452 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/msm: Unwind probe state on registration failure msm_iommu_probe() adds its devm-managed IOMMU object to qcom_iommu_devices before adding the IOMMU sysfs device and registering it with the IOMMU core. If iommu_device_sysfs_add() fails, probe returns with the object still on qcom_iommu_devices. The driver core then releases the devm allocation, leaving a dangling list entry that later list walks may dereference. If iommu_device_register() fails, the same dangling list entry remains and the sysfs device is left registered as well. Unwind the sysfs device and global list entry in reverse setup order on the corresponding failure paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89445 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Fix UAF in selftest IOPF reporting IOMMUFD selftest TRIGGER_IOPF borrows an attach handle from group->pasid_array without synchronizing against PASID detach, then a concurrent iommu_report_device_fault() can dereference that borrowed handle's domain pointer after the detach erases the handle and frees the backing struct iommufd_attach_handle. TRIGGER_IOPF then dereferences the freed handle, causing a UAF. Fix by adding a iopf_rwsem in mock_dev to follow the expected design of a real driver. Hold its read side across the whole iommu_report_device_fault() call, and its write side around every path that attaches, detaches, or replaces a device domain. This can block new reports and drains in-flight reports before an old attach handle or the IOPF fault parameter can be removed. Also take the write side while registering a mock device, since it can invoke the mock driver's default-domain attach callback. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89441 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: via-sdmmc: cancel card-detect work on remove Disabling the device interrupt and freeing the IRQ prevents new card-detect work from being queued, but carddet_work already queued by the handler can still run after via_sd_remove() returns. via_sdc_card_detect() recovers the host through container_of() and dereferences its MMIO base; once remove() returns the host can be freed, so that work would touch freed memory. Cancel carddet_work after freeing the IRQ and before cancelling finish_bh_work, which the card-detect handler can also queue. carddet_work can re-enable the interrupt through via_reset_pcictrl(); mask it again afterwards. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool and confirmed by manual code review. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89437 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86: int1092: Fix potential memory leak in sar_probe() The memory allocated for device_mode_info in parse_package() called by sar_get_data() is not freed in some of the error paths in sar_probe(). Fix that by converting to use device managed allocations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-81016 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86/amd/pmc: Propagate SMU errors and validate S2D address amd_stb_s2d_init() discards the return value of several S2D SMU commands. When the SMU refuses a command (e.g. "SMU cmd failed. err: 0xff") the failure is only noticed indirectly - if at all - and reported as -EIO, masking the real error. More seriously, the S2D_PHYS_ADDR_LOW/HIGH return values are ignored, so on failure phys_addr_low/hi are left uninitialised and the assembled address is passed straight to devm_ioremap(). When the SMU leaves them at zero this maps physical address 0 and trips the ioremap-on-RAM warning: amd_pmc AMDI000B:00: SMU cmd failed. err: 0xff ioremap on RAM at 0x0000000000000000 - 0x0000000000ffffff WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 4592 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:... Check the return value of each SMU command and propagate it, and reject a zero physical address before calling devm_ioremap(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-81015 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86/amd/pmc: Fix LPS0 and debugfs leaks when STB init fails amd_pmc_probe() registers the LPS0 s2idle handler with acpi_register_lps0_dev() and creates the driver's debugfs directory before calling amd_stb_s2d_init(), which is the last step in probe that can fail. When amd_stb_s2d_init() fails (for example the S2D telemetry region cannot be ioremapped on a long-running system, or the SMU rejects the S2D setup) the error path only calls pci_dev_put() and returns. This leaves amd_pmc_s2idle_dev_ops on the global lps0_s2idle_devops_head list and leaks the debugfs directory, while the devm-managed resources backing the handler are torn down. Reloading the module then walks the corrupted list in acpi_register_lps0_dev() and hits: list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev, but was NULL. kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! acpi_register_lps0_dev+0x44/0x80 amd_pmc_probe+0x224/0x380 [amd_pmc] platform_probe+0x67/0x90 Even without a reload, the stale registration means the next s2idle transition calls into torn-down driver state. Unwind the debugfs directory and the LPS0 registration on the amd_stb_s2d_init() error path. acpi_unregister_lps0_dev() is safe to call unconditionally here: it is guarded on the same conditions as acpi_register_lps0_dev(), which is exactly what amd_pmc_remove() already relies on. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80980 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: stop killed, freed and out_of_sync sharing a byte The three connection state flags are single-bit bitfields, so they occupy one byte of struct smc_connection and every store to one is a read-modify-write of the other two: u8 killed : 1; u8 freed : 1; u8 out_of_sync : 1; They are not written under a common lock. smc_cdc_msg_validate() sets out_of_sync from the receive tasklet, while smc_conn_kill() sets killed from process context under lock_sock(), and the receive path does not defer to the backlog when the socket is owned -- smc_cdc_msg_recv() takes only bh_lock_sock(). Give each flag its own byte so a store no longer touches its neighbours. All readers test them as booleans and are unchanged. struct smc_connection grows by two bytes. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80939 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: rtw89: pci: add .shutdown callback to stop rfkill polling on reboot Since the hardware rfkill polling was introduced, arm64 platforms can panic with an asynchronous SError during warm reboot: SError Interrupt on CPU8, code 0x00000000be000011 -- SError Workqueue: events_power_efficient rfkill_poll [rfkill] rtw89_pci_ops_read8+0x94/0x160 [rtw89_pci] rtw89_core_rfkill_poll+0x50/0x1e0 [rtw89_core] rtw89_ops_rfkill_poll+0x40/0x68 [rtw89_core] ieee80211_rfkill_poll+0x3c/0x70 [mac80211] cfg80211_rfkill_poll+0x40/0x2a0 [cfg80211] rfkill_poll+0x30/0x88 [rfkill] Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt On the reboot path the kernel only runs device_shutdown(), which calls each driver's .shutdown callback; .remove is not invoked. The rtw89 PCI driver had no .shutdown callback, so nothing stopped the rfkill polling work while the platform was tearing the PCIe link down. Once the link is gone, the next MMIO read from the poll handler targets a non-responding device and is reported as a fatal asynchronous SError on arm64. Add rtw89_pci_shutdown(), wired to all rtw89 PCI device drivers, which sets a new RTW89_FLAG_SHUTDOWN flag (mirroring the USB RTW89_FLAG_UNPLUGGED pattern). When the flag is set, rtw89_ops_rfkill_poll() returns early, so no MMIO read is issued to the chip after shutdown begins and the SError no longer occurs. This does not call the full .remove path from .shutdown, to keep the shutdown handler minimal and avoid running the non-idempotent teardown twice. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80937 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7915: bound the device EEPROM address before the EFUSE copy mt7915_mcu_get_eeprom() copies a fixed EFUSE block into the driver's dev->mt76.eeprom.data buffer at the offset reported by the MCU response (res->addr, a device-controlled __le32) without checking it against the buffer size. A malicious or malfunctioning device can report an arbitrary address and drive a 16-byte out-of-bounds write past eeprom.data. Reject a response whose address would place the copy outside eeprom.data before deriving the destination pointer. Devices that echo the requested in-bounds offset are unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80935 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mt76: mt7996: bound the device EEPROM address before the EFUSE copy mt7996_mcu_get_eeprom() derives the destination of the EFUSE/EXT block copy from the address reported by the MCU response (event->addr, a device-controlled __le32) and clamps only the copy length, never the destination offset into dev->mt76.eeprom.data. A malicious or malfunctioning device can report an arbitrary address and drive an out-of-bounds write of up to MT7996_EXT_EEPROM_BLOCK_SIZE bytes past eeprom.data. Reject a response whose address would place the copy outside eeprom.data before deriving the destination pointer. Devices that echo the requested in-bounds offset are unaffected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80926 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free in oplock break notification smb2_oplock_break_noti() reads opinfo->conn without any lock and dereferences it after two allocations which may sleep. When the durable handle owning the oplock is disconnected, session_fd_check() clears opinfo->conn and drops its conn reference under ci->m_lock, and the last ksmbd_conn_put() frees the connection. A break triggered by another connection that races with the teardown can then resurrect the freed connection: ksmbd_conn_get() is a plain atomic_inc, and the queued break work later dereferences the stale conn via ksmbd_conn_write(), a use-after-free reachable by any authenticated client holding a durable batch oplock. Thread the caller's inode into the notification path instead of taking a new reference on it. Every caller of oplock_break() already holds a live ksmbd_file (or an explicit ksmbd_inode_lookup_lock() reference, in the parent lease break paths) on the inode that owns the break target's oplock list, so ci cannot be freed during the call, and its lock can be taken without dereferencing opinfo->o_fp, which a concurrent close may free. Select and pin the connection under ci->m_lock, the same lock session_fd_check() and ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd() use to update opinfo->conn, so a concurrent detach either loses the race to the clear or keeps the connection alive until the notification work releases it. Transfer the reference to the work item and release it on allocation failures. | ||||
| CVE-2026-80925 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-03 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: fix skb_under_panic and races when toggling HW VLAN offload Toggling hardware VLAN TX offload (NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX or NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX) on a lower device invokes vlan_transfer_features(), which dynamically changed vlandev->hard_header_len. This causes two issues: 1. Lockless TX paths (e.g. packet_snd in af_packet.c, ip6_finish_output2) read dev->hard_header_len without holding RTNL lock. Mutating hard_header_len dynamically under RTNL creates a data race where upper layers reserve insufficient headroom based on a stale hard_header_len, resulting in skb_under_panic when vlan_dev_hard_header() is called. 2. In addition, vlan_transfer_features() updated hard_header_len without updating header_ops, causing a mismatch between allocated headroom and header creation. Always setting dev->hard_header_len = real_dev->hard_header_len and dev->needed_headroom = real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN unconditionally ensures: - dev->hard_header_len remains 100% static and immutable at real_dev->hard_header_len, eliminating all dynamic runtime updates and data races on hard_header_len. - Upper layers allocating skbs via LL_RESERVED_SPACE() will always reserve sufficient headroom for software VLAN tag insertion (real_dev->hard_header_len + real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN). - vlandev inherits real_dev->needed_tailroom so underlying trailer/padding/ICV requirements are honored. - AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW network header offsets remain correctly aligned at real_dev->hard_header_len. - vlan_header_ops is used unconditionally. Note to stable teams: Make sure to backport these commits: e16e960d55a4 ("ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev") cef51860becd ("macvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from lowerdev") | ||||