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Search Results (376570 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68089 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: core: fix uninitialized data in debugfs If *ppos is non-zero then simple_write_to_buffer() will not initialize the start of buf[]. Non zero values for *ppos aren't going to work anyway. Test for them at the start of the function and return -EINVAL. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68090 | 1 Linux | 2 Kernel, Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: debugobjects: Plug race against a concurrent OOM disable syzbot reported a puzzling splat: WARNING: kernel/time/hrtimer.c:443 at stub_timer+0xa/0x20 stub_timer() is installed as timer callback function in hrtimer_fixup_assert_init(), which is invoked when debug_object_assert_init() can't find a shadow object. In that case debug objects emits a warning about it before invoking the fixup. Though the provided console log lacks this warning and instead has the following a few seconds before the splat: ODEBUG: Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled So the object was looked up in debug_object_assert_init() and the lookup failed due a concurrent out of memory situation which disabled debug objects and freed the shadow objects: debug_object_assert_init() if (!debug_objects_enabled) return; obj = alloc(); if (!obj) { // Out of memory debug_objects_enabled = false; free_objects(); obj = lookup_or_alloc(); // The lookup failed because the other side // removed the objects, so this returns // an error code as the object in question // is not statically initialized if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(obj)) return; if (!obj) { debug_oom(); return; } print(...) if (!debug_objects_enabled) return; fixup(...) The debug object splat is skipped because debug_objects_enabled is false, but the fixup callback is invoked unconditionally, which makes the timer disfunctional. This is only a problem in debug_object_assert_init() and debug_object_activate() as both have to handle statically initialized objects and therefore must handle the error pointer return case gracefully. All other places only handle the found/not found case and the NULL pointer return is a signal for OOM. Otherwise they get a valid shadow object. Plug the hole by checking whether debug objects are still enabled before invoking the print and fixup function in those two places. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68092 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: time/jiffies: Register jiffies clocksource before usage Teddy reported that a XEN HVM has a long boot delay, which was bisected to the recent enhancements to the negative motion detection. It turned out that the jiffies clocksource is used in early boot before it is registered, which leaves the max_delta_raw field at zero. That causes the read out to be clamped to the max delta of 0, which means time is not making progress. Cure it by ensuring that it is initialized before its first usage in timekeeping_init(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68103 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: reject mapping a reserved doorbell to a new queue When creating an user-queue, the user space provides a doorbell BO handle and an offset within the bo to obtain a doorbell. However current implementation using xa_store_irq() to store a doorbell, which allows a later queue created with the same BO and offset parameters to overwrite an existing queue and doorbell mapping. This can cause problems like misrouting fence IRQ processing to a wrong queue, and mislead the cleanup process of one queue erasing the mapping of another queue. This commit fixes this issue by replacing xa_store_irq with xa_insert_irq, which rejects mapping a reserved doorbell to a newly created queue (cherry picked from commit 6244eae22966350db52faf9c1369d3b2ffc5de4e) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68104 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: invoke pm_genpd_remove() before freeing genpd Call pm_genpd_remove() to unregister from global list prior to releasing acp_genpd memory, and clear the pointer after free. (cherry picked from commit cd8650d7a91ee8b768e202354672553faa5cc1f2) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68106 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 5.0 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix division by zero with invalid uvd dimensions When width or height is less than 16, width_in_mb or height_in_mb becomes 0, leading to fs_in_mb being 0. This causes a division by zero when calculating num_dpb_buffer in H264 and H264 Perf decode paths. Add validation to reject frames with width < 16 or height < 16 before performing any calculations that depend on these values. V2: Format change - move up all vaiable definitions. V3: Use warn_once to avoid spam. (cherry picked from commit 3e41d26c70b0a459d041cc19482a226c4b7423cb) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68113 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/gfx12: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases. (cherry picked from commit f952076f76d62f783e8ba4995a7c400d39354ccf) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68117 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path in tipc_sk_create() When tipc_sk_create() fails to insert the new socket (tipc_sk_insert() returns non-zero), its error path frees the sk with sk_free() but leaves sock->sk pointing at the freed object: if (tipc_sk_insert(tsk)) { sk_free(sk); pr_warn("Socket create failed; port number exhausted\n"); return -EINVAL; } This is harmless for plain socket(): the syscall layer clears sock->ops before releasing, so tipc_release() is never called. It is not harmless on the accept() path. tipc_accept() creates the pre-allocated child socket with tipc_sk_create(net, new_sock, 0, kern); on failure it leaves new_sock->sk dangling and new_sock->ops non-NULL, and do_accept() then fput()s the new file, so __sock_release() -> tipc_release() runs lock_sock(new_sock->sk) on the freed sk -- a use-after-free write of the sk_lock spinlock. tipc_release() already guards this exact "failed accept() releases a pre-allocated child" case with "if (sk == NULL) return 0;", but the guard is bypassed because tipc_sk_create() left sock->sk non-NULL (dangling) rather than NULL. Clear sock->sk on the failed-insert path so the existing tipc_release() NULL check fires and the use-after-free is avoided. The tipc_sk_insert() failure is reached when the per-netns socket rhashtable hits its max_size (tsk_rht_params.max_size = 1048576, ~2M elements) -- i.e. once a netns holds ~2M TIPC sockets every insert returns -E2BIG. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839) Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880047cdc38 by task init/1 lock_sock_nested (net/core/sock.c:3839) tipc_release (net/tipc/socket.c:638) __sock_release (net/socket.c:710) sock_close (net/socket.c:1501) __fput (fs/file_table.c:512) Allocated by task 1: sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2308) tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:487) tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744) do_accept (net/socket.c:2034) Freed by task 1: __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2391) tipc_sk_create (net/tipc/socket.c:504) tipc_accept (net/tipc/socket.c:2744) do_accept (net/socket.c:2034) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68121 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pppoe: reload header pointer after dev_hard_header() pppoe_sendmsg() saves a pointer to the PPPoE header before calling dev_hard_header(). Device header callbacks are allowed to reallocate the skb head, invalidating pointers into it. This can happen when a send is blocked in copy_from_user() while the first non-Ethernet port is added to an empty team device. The team's delegated GRE header callback then expands the skb head. PPPoE subsequently writes six bytes through the stale pointer into the freed head. Reload the PPPoE header through the skb's network-header offset after device header creation. pskb_expand_head() updates that offset when it relocates the head. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68128 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: reject out-of-range ptype in ice_parser_profile_init set_bit(rslt->ptype, prof->ptypes) operates on a DECLARE_BITMAP of ICE_FLOW_PTYPE_MAX (1024) bits. Nothing prevents a malicious VF from providing ptype >= 1024 through VIRTCHNL, resulting in a write past the end of the bitmap and a kernel page fault. Reproduced with a custom kernel module injecting a crafted VIRTCHNL_OP_ADD_RSS_CFG on E810-C QSFP (8086:1592), FW 4.91 0x800214af 1.3909.0, ICE COMMS DDP 1.3.53.0, kernel 7.1.0-rc1. crash_parser: ice_parser_profile_init @ ffffffffc0d61b60 crash_parser: setting ptype=0xffff (max valid=1023) crash_parser: calling ice_parser_profile_init -- expect OOB crash! BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 56 UID: 0 PID: 165011 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S U OE 7.1.0-rc1 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB RIP: 0010:ice_parser_profile_init+0x2d/0x1d0 [ice] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __pfx_ice_parser_profile_init+0x10/0x10 [ice] crash_init+0x127/0xff0 [crash_parser] do_one_initcall+0x45/0x310 do_init_module+0x64/0x270 init_module_from_file+0xcc/0xf0 idempotent_init_module+0x17b/0x280 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x6e/0xe0 Bail out early with -EINVAL when ptype is out of range. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68136 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 5.9 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: gro: fix double aggregation of flush-marked skbs Commit 0ab03f353d36 ("net-gro: Fix GRO flush when receiving a GSO packet.") added a flush check to skb_gro_receive(), but skb_gro_receive_list() lacks the same validation. As a result, packets marked with NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush may still be re-aggregated. This allows already-GRO'd packets with existing frag_list to be re-aggregated into a new GRO session, corrupting the frag_list chain structure. When skb_segment() attempts to unpack these malformed packets, it encounters invalid state and triggers a kernel panic. Scenario (Tethering/Device forwarding): 1. Driver: Generated aggregated packet P1 via LRO with frag_list 2. Dev A: Receives aggregated fraglist packet and flush flag set 3. Dev A: Re-enters GRO, skb_gro_receive_list() is called 4. Missing flush check allows re-aggregation despite flush flag 5. Frag_list chain becomes corrupted (loops or dangling refs) 6. Dev B: TX path calls skb_segment(), crashes on corrupted frag_list Root cause in skb_segment(): The check at line ~4891: if (hsize <= 0 && i >= nfrags && skb_headlen(list_skb) && (skb_headlen(list_skb) == len || sg)) { When frag_list is corrupted by double aggregation, when list_skb is a NULL pointer from skb->next, skb_headlen(list_skb) dereference NULL/corrupted pointers occurs. Call Trace: skb_headlen(NULL skb) skb_segment tcp_gso_segment tcp4_gso_segment inet_gso_segment skb_mac_gso_segment __skb_gso_segment skb_gso_segment validate_xmit_skb validate_xmit_skb_list sch_direct_xmit qdisc_restart __qdisc_run qdisc_run net_tx_action Fix: Add NAPI_GRO_CB(skb)->flush validation to the early-return check in skb_gro_receive_list(), matching the defensive programming pattern of skb_gro_receive(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-68140 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 5.8 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix use-after-free of a severed iucv_path af_iucv queues not-yet-received message notifications on iucv->message_q, each holding a raw pointer to the connection's iucv_path. When the peer severs the connection, iucv_sever_path() frees that path with iucv_path_free() but leaves the notifications queued. A later recvmsg() drains message_q via iucv_process_message_q() and hands the stale path to message_receive() -- a use-after-free of the freed iucv_path. Drop the queued notifications when the path is severed; once the path is gone they can no longer be received. This also frees the notifications leaked when a socket is closed with messages still queued. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68159 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 5.0 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE __decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack out-of-bounds write. An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds Write of size 4 ... by task exploit kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833) calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638) __submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394) ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490) ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164) rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899) do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138) ... kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670! [ idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items() ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68162 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 4.1 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: avoid auth_enable sysctl UAF during netns teardown proc_sctp_do_auth() updates the SCTP control socket after changing net.sctp.auth_enable. The handler gets the per-net SCTP state from ctl->data, so an already opened sysctl file can still target a network namespace while that namespace is being torn down. SCTP previously registered its per-net sysctls from sctp_defaults_init(), while the control socket is created later from sctp_ctrlsock_init(). This exposed a window during initialization where auth_enable was writable before net->sctp.ctl_sock existed, and a teardown window where auth_enable stayed writable after inet_ctl_sock_destroy() had released the control socket. Move the per-net SCTP sysctl registration into sctp_ctrlsock_init() after sctp_ctl_sock_init() succeeds, and unregister the sysctl table before destroying the control socket in sctp_ctrlsock_exit(). If sysctl registration fails after the control socket was created, destroy the control socket in the same init path. Make sctp_sysctl_net_unregister() tolerate a missing header and clear the saved pointer so init-error and exit paths can safely share the unregister helper. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68109 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/sdma7.1: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON() There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases. (cherry picked from commit c4f230b51cf2d3e7e8b1c800331f3dbed2a9e3f5) | ||||
| CVE-2026-68153 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free. Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients. debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68154 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 4.7 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: reject zero bucket types in crush_decode CRUSH bucket type 0 is reserved for devices. The mapper relies on that invariant and uses type 0 to identify leaf devices. If crush_decode() accepts a bucket with type 0, a malformed CRUSH map can make the mapper treat a negative bucket ID as a device and pass it to is_out(), which then indexes the OSD weight array with a negative value. Reject zero bucket types while decoding the CRUSH map so the invalid state never reaches the mapper. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68155 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 4.4 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Reject monmaps advertising zero monitors A message of type CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP contains a monmap that is sent from a monitor to the client. This monmap contains information about the existing monitors in the cluster. Currently, a monmap indicating that there are zero monitors in the cluster is treated as valid. However, it is impossible to have zero monitors in the cluster and still receive a valid monmap from a monitor. Therefore, such a monmap must be corrupted and should be treated as invalid. Furthermore, a monmap with a monitor count of zero can subsequently crash the client when attempting to open a session with a monitor in __open_session(). This happens because the "BUG_ON(monc->monmap->num_mon < 1)" assertion in pick_new_mon() is triggered. This patch extends a check in ceph_monmap_decode() to also reject arriving mon_maps with num_mon == 0 rather than only with num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON. [ idryomov: drop "log output for unusual values of num_mon" part ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68158 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Fix multiplication overflow in decode_new_up_state_weight() If a message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains a (maliciously) corrupted osdmap, out-of-bounds memory accesses may occur in decode_new_up_state_weight(). This happens because the bounds check for the new_state part is based on calculating its length depending on a len value read from the incoming message. This calculation may overflow leading to an incorrect bounds check. Subsequently, out-of-bounds reads may occur when decoding this part. This patch switches the multiplication to use check_mul_overflow() to abort processing the osdmap if an overflow occurred. Therefore, osdmaps/messages containing large values for len that result in a multiplication overflow are treated as invalid. [ idryomov: rename new_state_len -> new_state_item_size, formatting ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68163 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 5.2 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_vma_mapped: fix device-private PMD handling Commit 65edfda6f3f2 ("mm/rmap: extend rmap and migration support device-private entries") introduced the concept of device-private PMD entries, but did not correctly update the rmap walk code to account for them. As a result, when page_vma_mapped_walk() encounters device-private PMD entries, it takes no action other than to acquire the PMD lock and exit. However this is highly problematic for two reasons - firstly, device private entries possess a PFN so check_pmd() needs to be called to ensure an overlapping PFN range. Secondly, and more importantly, if PVMW_MIGRATION is set the caller assumes the returned entry is a migration entry, resulting in memory corruption when the caller tries to interpret the device private entry as such. In addition, commit 146287290023 ("mm/huge_memory: implement device-private THP splitting") allowed device private PMDs to be split like THP mappings, but again did not update this code path. As a result, we might race a PMD split prior to acquiring the PMD lock. This patch addresses all of these issues by invoking check_pmd(), ensuring PMVW_MIGRATION is not set and checks whether a split raced us we do for PMD THP and migration entries. Instead of checking for a subset of the cases after taking the pmd_lock(), put device-private along with pmd_trans_huge() and pmd_is_migration_entry(). Also remove thp_migration_supported() as it is already guarded by pmd_is_migration_entry(). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix Raspberry Pi 1 build, per David] | ||||