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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-98588 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Reject max_entries > INT_MAX in sock_map_alloc sock_map_alloc() only rejects max_entries == 0 and otherwise allows any u32 value. sock_map_free() then walks the sks[] array with a signed int iterator: int i; for (i = 0; i < stab->map.max_entries; i++) struct sock **psk = &stab->sks[i]; When a SOCKMAP is created with max_entries = 0xffffffff (UINT_MAX), the allocation of 32 GiB can succeed on large-memory hosts. During free the counter reaches 0x80000000, wraps to INT_MIN, is sign-extended by movslq and turned into a ~16 GiB negative offset from stab->sks, pointing far below the allocation. The faulting access is an xchg() write in sock_map_free(). Without KASAN, the same out-of-bounds write can fault on an unmapped vmalloc page or corrupt an unrelated allocation if that vmalloc address is populated. On a KASAN kernel with CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC=y, the shadow check for that address hits an unmapped shadow page and oopses first: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffff521b59c5a00 RIP: 0010:kasan_check_range+0x107/0x190 Call Trace: sock_map_free+0x93/0x190 map_create+0x68d/0xb30 __sys_bpf+0x21e/0x2e70 Vmcore confirmed stab->map.max_entries == 0xffffffff, stab->sks == 0xffffc911ace2d000, and the faulting address sks + (s64)INT_MIN * 8 exactly at 0xffffc90dace2d000. The same buggy path is reached on the normal close()/bpf_map_free_deferred() path whenever such a map is destroyed. sock_map_alloc() used to bound its allocation size through bpf_map_charge_init(), but the bound was dropped when rlimit-based memory accounting was removed. Reject max_entries > INT_MAX at creation time so the signed iterator in sock_map_free() never sees a value that would overflow. Triggered by syzkaller and reproduced on both a 6.6-based KASAN kernel and the upstream v7.3-rc2 kernel. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98595 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: udp: remove a disconnected socket from the 4-tuple hash table A UDP socket bound to a specific address and port keeps its entry in the 4-tuple hash table after it is disconnected: sk binds to 127.0.0.1:21001 sk connects to 127.0.0.2:20001 // filed in the 4-tuple table sk disconnects, connect(AF_UNSPEC) // still filed, peer now 0.0.0.0:0 __udp_disconnect() takes a socket out of that table only as a side effect of ->rehash() or ->unhash(), and it skips ->rehash() when SOCK_BINDADDR_LOCK is set and ->unhash() when SOCK_BINDPORT_LOCK is set. commit 6996a2d2d0a6 ("udp: Unhash auto-bound connected sk from 4-tuple hash table when disconnected.") fixed the same end state for a wildcard-bound socket, by a path this one does not take. The entry is counted whether or not anything hits it. hash4_cnt on the hash2 slot stays raised for as long as the socket lives, so udp_has_hash4() keeps sending every packet for that address and port through the 4-tuple lookup first. On IPv6 it can also be hit. __udp_disconnect() does not clear sk_v6_daddr, so udp_v6_rehash() files the entry under the peer the socket was connected to with a zero dport, and inet6_match() compares that same field: a datagram from the former peer with a zero source port matches, and source port zero is accepted on receive. On IPv4 the peer is cleared, so a match would need a zero source address as well, which the routing layer rejects as martian. The stale sk_v6_daddr is a separate defect, not addressed here; removing the entry closes this path either way. The entry can also be relocated. __udp_disconnect() clears sk_bound_dev_if, so a subsequent SO_BINDTODEVICE calls ->rehash(), and because the receive address is still specific udp_lib_rehash() moves the entry instead of removing it, into the bucket that (rcv_saddr, num, 0, 0) hashes to -- a pure function of the address and port, so every socket reaching this state on one address and port collects in one bucket. The bucket cannot be chosen from outside, as udp_ehashfn() is seeded with a per-boot secret. This last one became reachable only with commit 644f9108f3a5 ("udp: Make rehash4 independent in udp_lib_rehash()"), which moved the hash4 handling out of a branch a disconnected socket does not take; the stale entry itself dates from the commit in Fixes. Take the socket out of the table before __udp_disconnect() runs, while it still matches how it was filed. This also reaches the wildcard case ahead of udp_lib_rehash()'s udp_unhash4() branch, leaving that branch unreachable from udp_disconnect(); removing it belongs in net-next. udp_disconnect() and udp_abort() are the only UDP entries into __udp_disconnect(), which is shared with raw, ping and l2tp sockets that are not struct udp_sock: ping_prot.obj_size is sizeof(struct inet_sock), so udp_hashed4() on one would read past the allocation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98597 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: sr9700: include receive overhead in the length check The receive fixup subtracts the Ethernet CRC from the reported packet length, but compares that payload length against the whole remaining receive buffer. The following copy starts after the three-byte header, and the cursor advance consumes both that header and the four-byte CRC. Require the payload to fit after SR_RX_OVERHEAD before copying it or advancing to the next packet. The loop already ensures that the remaining buffer is larger than the overhead, so the subtraction is safe. The issue was found by our static-analysis tool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98598 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: Prevent rt6_insert_exception() for dying fib6_info. Before the cited commit, fib6_nh_flush_exceptions() always set from->exception_bucket_flushed = 1 under rt6_exception_lock to prevent rt6_insert_exception() from inserting a new exception for a dying fib6_info. The flag was replaced with the FIB6_EXCEPTION_BUCKET_FLUSHED bit stored in nh->rt6i_exception_bucket. The problem is that now the bit is only set when the bucket is not NULL and fib6_nh_flush_exceptions() is called from fib6_nh_release() after fib6_ref has already reached zero. If rt6_insert_exception() is called while the target fib6_info is being removed via fib6_purge_rt(), a new exception could be created successfully because rt6_flush_exceptions() no longer sets the bit. This creates a reference cycle between the fib6_info and the exception route, leaking the fib6_info, its nexthop device, and all per-CPU routes in fib6_nh->rt6i_pcpu, which stalls netdev unregistration. [ 34.680602] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68 [ 44.920675] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68 [ 55.176582] unregister_netdevice: waiting for gre6 to become free. Usage count = 68 Let's call fib6_drop_pcpu_from() before rt6_flush_exceptions(), to set fib6_destroying before rt6_exception_lock, and check f6i->fib6_destroying in rt6_insert_exception(). Note that FIB6_EXCEPTION_BUCKET_FLUSHED logic is dead and we can clean it up in net-next. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98599 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject non-negative offsets in stack_slot_obj_get_spi() bpf_get_spi() computes (-off - 1) / BPF_REG_SIZE using C division, which truncates toward zero. For off == 0, this produces spi 0, the same index used by the valid stack slot at fp-8. stack_slot_obj_get_spi() currently checks alignment and the resulting spi bounds, but does not reject the non-negative offset itself. It can therefore validate a PTR_TO_STACK register holding fp+0 against an iterator stored at fp-8 even though the runtime receives the actual fp+0 pointer. An effectful iterator kfunc can then interpret memory outside the BPF stack as iterator state. Reject non-negative offsets before converting the offset to an spi. All valid stack objects begin at a negative offset from the frame pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98600 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcomm_recv_frame() While rfcomm_recv_frame() verifies that skb->len is at least sizeof(*hdr) + 1 (4 bytes: 3-byte header + 1-byte FCS), an RFCOMM frame with an extended 2-byte length field (!__test_ea(hdr->len)) has a 4-byte header plus a 1-byte FCS (5 bytes minimum, sizeof(*hdr) + 2). When a 4-byte RFCOMM frame with EA == 0 arrives: 1. The initial skb->len < sizeof(*hdr) + 1 check passes (4 < 4 is false). 2. Trimming the FCS byte decrements skb->len to 3. 3. If __check_fcs() succeeds, skb_pull(skb, 4) fails (4 > 3) and returns NULL without advancing skb->data. 4. Because the return value of skb_pull() is ignored, the un-pulled 3-byte struct rfcomm_hdr remains at skb->data and is either queued as application payload via rfcomm_recv_data() or parsed as a multiplexer control command via rfcomm_recv_mcc() on DLCI 0. Fix this by extending the length check in rfcomm_recv_frame() to also require skb->len >= sizeof(*hdr) + 2 when !__test_ea(hdr->len). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98602 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: bnep: fix out-of-bounds reads on short RX/TX frames and control fallthrough Fix multiple out-of-bounds reads in Bluetooth BNEP frame processing: 1. In bnep_rx_frame() and bnep_ctrl_frame() (net/bluetooth/bnep/core.c), use pskb_may_pull() to verify the BNEP header, control type byte, filter count, and extension headers exist before reading them, and return 0 after handling BNEP_CONTROL instead of falling through to Ethernet frame submission when no extension headers follow. 2. In bnep_net_xmit() (net/bluetooth/bnep/netdev.c), verify skb->len >= ETH_HLEN with pskb_may_pull() before reading the 14-byte Ethernet header to prevent an out-of-bounds heap read and infoleak on short AF_PACKET TX frames. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98603 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: replace bind when clearing stale local source The UDP output fallback clears bind->local in place when the remembered source address is no longer usable. The bind is RCU-published and read locklessly by concurrent TX, so an IPv6 reader can observe a torn address. Retry the route lookup with source address autoselection without modifying the bind. After a successful lookup, revalidate the bind and route key under peer->lock, reset the dst cache, and best-effort publish a replacement bind with a wildcard local address. Do not cache the resolved dst when clearing the local source. Replacing the source invalidates all per-CPU cache entries, while dst_cache_set_ip4 and dst_cache_set_ip6 update only the current CPU slot. The current packet can still use the resolved route; if bind allocation fails, a later cache miss retries the repair. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98606 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: release the GEM object on virtio_gpu_vram_create() errors virtio_gpu_vram_create() frees the object with a bare kfree(vram) on both error paths after drm_gem_private_object_init() has run, and on the second one after drm_gem_create_mmap_offset() has linked obj->vma_node into the device's VMA offset manager. The freed object stays in that interval tree, so a later lookup or insertion walks freed memory, and the dma_resv and gpuva lock are never destroyed. Call drm_gem_object_release() before kfree() on both paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98608 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/virtio: fix object leak in virtio_gpu_resource_create_ioctl() virtio_gpu_resource_create_ioctl() calls drm_gem_object_release() on the drm_gem_handle_create() error path instead of dropping the reference it owns, so obj->funcs->free() never runs and the virtio_gpu_object, its pages and sg table, the resource id and the host-side resource are leaked. Use drm_gem_object_put() instead. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98686 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: discard post-EOF pagecache when extending a file via zero range smb3_zero_range() removed the pagecache only for the range being zeroed, so when it extends the file the folio straddling the old EOF - which may hold data dirtied past EOF through an mmap - was never dropped and became visible as file content once the file was extended. Lower the discard boundary to the smaller of the zero-range offset and the old EOF. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98543 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: fs/xattr: don't assume the inode is locked in path_unlink/path_rmdir bpf_lsm_has_d_inode_locked() makes the verifier rewrite bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr() to the _locked variants, which assume that the caller already holds the inode's i_rwsem. The path_unlink and path_rmdir hooks are listed, but security_path_unlink() and security_path_rmdir() run before vfs_unlink()/vfs_rmdir() take the victim inode's i_rwsem, so a sleepable BPF LSM program attached to either hook mutates the victim's xattrs without the lock held. Drop the two path hooks from d_inode_locked_hooks so that the verifier keeps the locking bpf_[set|remove]_dentry_xattr() variants, which take the lock themselves. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98548 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: discard the rest of the packet on a stale-cookie error When an association is in COOKIE-ECHOED state and the peer sends a bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] packet from one of its non-primary addresses, processing the ERROR chunk takes the non-fatal stale-cookie retry path sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale(), which queues SCTP_CMD_DEL_NON_PRIMARY while keeping the association alive. sctp_cmd_del_non_primary() removes every non-primary transport - including the very transport this packet arrived on, which is still referenced by the receive lookup and shared by all chunks of the packet via chunk->transport. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() does redirect asoc->peer.last_data_from away from the removed transport, but right afterwards the bundled DATA chunk makes sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() re-register asoc->peer.last_data_from = chunk->transport unconditionally, undoing the redirection with the just-removed transport. Once the packet is done, the receive reference is dropped and the transport is RCU-freed, while the surviving association keeps the dangling last_data_from. A later FWD-TSN (or the delayed SACK timer) makes sctp_gen_sack() dereference it (->param_flags and friends), and sctp_make_sack()/sctp_outq_select_transport() may write to the freed object and link it into the live transport list. This is a use-after-free triggerable by any malicious SCTP peer (or a local unprivileged user acting as one) with no capabilities required: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sctp_do_sm+0x498a/0x5660 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800e1e356c by task poc/115 Call Trace: sctp_do_sm <- sctp_assoc_bh_rcv <- sctp_inq_push <- sctp_rcv <- ip_protocol_deliver_rcu <- ip_rcv Allocated: sctp_transport_new <- sctp_assoc_add_peer <- sctp_process_init (INIT-ACK processing) Freed: kfree <- sctp_transport_destroy_rcu <- rcu_core (call_rcu queued by sctp_transport_put at end of sctp_rcv) The buggy address is located 364 bytes inside of freed 1024-byte region [ffff88800e1e3400, ffff88800e1e3800), cache kmalloc-1k Note that commit 03a9d10ecf71 ("sctp: drop a chunk if its transport was removed") only covers the window between the receive lookup and the chunk processing (e.g. an ASCONF DEL-IP racing the socket backlog); here the transport is removed *while* the packet is being processed, by an earlier chunk of the same packet, so the drop in sctp_inq_push() does not reach this path. Verified with the bundled [ERROR(Stale Cookie)][DATA] + FWD-TSN reproducer: the KASAN report above still fires with that commit applied, and is gone with this patch on top. Fix it by discarding the rest of the packet on this path, as suggested by Xin. After the stale-cookie ERROR has sent the association back to COOKIE-WAIT and removed the non-primary transports, the remaining chunks of the packet can only run against the restarted handshake while referencing the removed arrival transport through chunk->transport: besides the last_data_from registration above, sctp_cmd_setup_t2() and the sctp_make_*() reply builders would also copy that pointer into association-lifetime state that sctp_assoc_rm_peer() has already sanitized. Let the peer retransmit them, in line with what sctp_inq_push() does for chunks whose transport was removed before processing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98549 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: prevent collapsing skbs across boundary in rtx queue tcp_write_collapse_fence() sets TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = 1 on tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) to prevent skbs queued after a switch to device encryption from being collapsed into earlier skbs. The fence is a no-op if all earlier data has already been transmitted when the switch happens: sk->sk_write_queue is empty. The not yet acknowledged earlier skbs wait in sk->tcp_rtx_queue with eor 0. On a subsequent retransmit or SACK shift, tcp_retrans_try_collapse() or tcp_shift_skb_data() can then merge an skb queued after the switch into one queued before it. Both users of the fence are affected: - psp: devices only encrypt skbs with skb->decrypted set. The merged skb keeps decrypted = 0 from the earlier skb, so merged data sent after psp_sock_assoc_set_tx() is retransmitted in cleartext. - tls device offload: the merged skb straddles the start marker set in tls_set_device_offload(). The software fallback (fill_sg_in() returns -EINVAL) and the mlx5, nfp and funeth drivers cannot handle such an skb and drop it. Every retransmit rebuilds the same skb, so the connection stalls. Fix this in two places, for defense in depth: 1. Fall back to tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk) in tcp_write_collapse_fence() when tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) is NULL. 2. Check !skb_cmp_decrypted(to, from) in tcp_skb_can_collapse(), as tcp_skb_can_collapse_rx() does on receive. skb_shift(), which both collapse paths call, already has a DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE() for this condition. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98552 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/core: Fix a refcount leak in attach_perf_ctx_data() The attach_perf_ctx_data() can race on global and !global cases. The global case is protected by global_ctx_data_rwsem and shares a single reference count using perf_ctx_data.global field. But when it races with !global case, it may miss to set the global field and result in a reference count leak. CPU1 CPU2 ---------------------------------------------------------------- attach_task_ctx_data(.global=1) attach_task_ctx_data(.global=0) cd1 = alloc_perf_ctx_data(); cd2 = alloc_perf_ctx_data(); // { .global = 0, .refcount = 1 }; try_cmpxchg(); // success, // task->perf_ctx_data = cd2 try_cmpxhg(); // fail; old = cd2 refcount_inc_not_zero(&old->refcount); // success // old.refcount = 2 free_perf_ctx_data(cd1); Then later detach_global_ctx_data() will see the data but it's not marked as global, so it won't call detach_task_ctx_data(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-98553 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: autofs: fix sbi->pipe file reference leak in autofs_kill_sb() When autofs_fill_super() fails before clearing AUTOFS_SBI_CATATONIC (for example, when find_get_pid() fails on an invalid pgrp mount option, or when an fs_context is closed before mounting), deactivate_locked_super() invokes autofs_kill_sb() -> autofs_catatonic_mode(sbi). Because AUTOFS_SBI_CATATONIC is still set in sbi->flags, autofs_catatonic_mode() returns early without calling fput(sbi->pipe), permanently leaking the pipe struct file reference. Explicitly release sbi->pipe in autofs_kill_sb() if it is still non-NULL after autofs_catatonic_mode(). | ||||
| CVE-2024-4457 | 1 Wso2 | 7 Wso2 Api Manager, Wso2 Carbon User Manager Kernel, Wso2 Enterprise Integrator and 4 more | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| The Management Console fails to properly validate input related to the configuration of JDBC user stores. This weakness allows an attacker to supply specially crafted input that can lead to the execution of arbitrary code on the affected server. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability enables an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server with the privileges of the WSO2 product. This could lead to a full compromise of the system. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98578 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: st21nfca: validate ISO15693 inventory length The ISO15693 inventory helper removes a two-byte prefix without checking that it exists, then accepts a one-byte remainder before reading data[1] as the DSFID. Require the prefix and at least two remaining bytes before copying the UID data and reading the DSFID. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98580 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: llcp: Fix race condition in accept_queue lifecycle In nfc_llcp_socket_release(), sockets and listener accept queues are walked under the local sockets rwlock and bh_lock_sock(). However, bh_lock_sock() does not synchronise against process-context lock_sock() held by nfc_llcp_accept_dequeue() during accept(). Because socket_release() does not check sock_owned_by_user(), both paths can concurrently unlink and release the same child socket, resulting in use-after-free or a NULL pointer dereference of child->parent in nfc_llcp_accept_unlink(). Fix this synchronisation race by having nfc_llcp_socket_release() use process-context lock_sock() instead of bh_lock_sock(): 1. Pop sockets from the local sockets list under the write lock using nfc_llcp_sock_list_pop() so lock_sock() can be acquired without holding the rwlock. 2. Because lock_sock() can sleep, defer the final release of the nfc_llcp_local structure to a workqueue (release_work). This avoids a sleeping-in-atomic bug when the last local reference is dropped from softirq context. Additionally, hold a single device reference on local from registration until final destruction. 3. In nfc_llcp_local_get(), use kref_get_unless_zero() to prevent resurrecting a local object whose teardown has been scheduled. 4. In llcp_sock_accept(), verify that the listener socket state is still LLCP_LISTEN after waking from schedule_timeout() to prevent hangs if the listener is closed concurrently. 5. When unlinking unaccepted child sockets during listener release, unlink them from local->sockets, call sock_orphan(), and drop their initial sk_alloc creation reference via sock_put(). 6. Make nfc_llcp_accept_unlink() idempotent by guarding parent access with a NULL check. | ||||
| CVE-2026-98488 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-18 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: atl1e: fix soft lockup on out-of-range hw_next_to_clean read Same issue as atl1c (see the first commit in this series, "net: atl1c: fix soft lockup on out-of-range tpd_cons read"): the hardware can report an out-of-range hw_next_to_clean (seen as 0xffff) while the PCIe link/MAC is resetting. An out-of-range value can never be reached and the loop below would spin forever. Treat it as "nothing new to clean" instead. | ||||