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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64008 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/rocket: fix UAF via dangling GEM handle in create_bo rocket_ioctl_create_bo() inserts a GEM handle into the file's IDR via drm_gem_handle_create() early on, then performs several operations that can fail (sgt allocation, drm_mm insert, iommu_map). If any fail after the handle is live, the error path calls drm_gem_shmem_object_free() which kfree's the object without removing the handle from the IDR. This leaves a dangling handle pointing to freed slab memory. Any subsequent ioctl using that handle (PREP_BO, FINI_BO, SUBMIT) calls drm_gem_object_lookup() and dereferences freed memory (UAF). Fix by moving drm_gem_handle_create() to after all fallible operations succeed, matching the pattern used by panfrost, lima, and etnaviv. Also fix drm_mm_insert_node_generic() whose return value was silently overwritten by iommu_map_sgtable() on the next line. Add the missing error check. [tomeu: Move handle creation to the very end] | ||||
| CVE-2026-64007 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: synproxy: refresh tcphdr after skb_ensure_writable synproxy_tstamp_adjust() rewrites the TCP timestamp option in place and then patches the TCP checksum via inet_proto_csum_replace4() on the caller-supplied tcphdr pointer. Both ipv4_synproxy_hook() and ipv6_synproxy_hook() obtain that pointer with skb_header_pointer() before calling in, so it may either alias skb->head directly or point at the caller's on-stack _tcph buffer. Between obtaining the pointer and using it, the function calls skb_ensure_writable(skb, optend), which on a cloned or non-linear skb invokes pskb_expand_head() and frees the old skb->head. After that point the cached th is stale: caller (ipv[46]_synproxy_hook) th = skb_header_pointer(skb, ..., &_tcph) synproxy_tstamp_adjust(skb, protoff, th, ...) skb_ensure_writable(skb, optend) pskb_expand_head() /* kfree(old skb->head) */ ... inet_proto_csum_replace4(&th->check, ...) /* writes into freed head, or into the caller's stack copy leaving the on-wire checksum stale */ The option bytes are written through skb->data and are fine; only the checksum update goes through th and so lands in the wrong place. The result is either a write into freed slab memory or a packet leaving with a checksum that does not match its payload. Fix by re-deriving th from skb->data + protoff immediately after skb_ensure_writable() succeeds, so the subsequent checksum update targets the linear, writable header. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64005 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: Do not re-initialize smc hashtables INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&smc_v*_hashinfo.ht) are called after smc_nl_init(), proto_register() and sock_register(). This can lead to smc_v*_hashinfo.ht being reset even though hash entries already exist and are being used, possibly resulting in a corrupted list. Remove unnecessary and dangerous re-initialisation of smc_v*_hashinfo.ht in smc_init(); it is implicitly initialised to zero anyhow. Add HLIST_HEAD_INIT to the definitions for clarity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64004 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix locking in .getsockopt Mirror iucv_sock_setsockopt() and wrap the whole switch in lock_sock()/release_sock(). The pre-existing SO_MSGLIMIT-only lock becomes redundant and is removed. Any AF_IUCV HIPER user can potentially crash the kernel by racing recvmsg() with getsockopt(SO_MSGSIZE): the SO_MSGSIZE arm dereferences iucv->hs_dev->mtu after iucv_sock_close() (called from the racing recvmsg()) has set hs_dev to NULL, producing a NULL pointer dereference oops. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64003 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: core: Run queues for all non-SDEV_DEL devices from scsi_run_host_queues While a SCSI host is in a recovery state, scsi_mq_requeue_cmd() will not set the requeue list for a requeued command to be kicked in the future. The expectation is a call to scsi_run_host_queues() will kick all SCSI devices once the recovery state is cleared. However, scsi_run_host_queues() uses shost_for_each_device() which uses scsi_device_get() and so will ignore devices in a partially removed state like SDEV_CANCEL. But these devices may also have requeued requests, leaving their requests stuck from not being kicked and causing the removal process of the device to hang. scsi_run_host_queues() needs to run against more devices than the macro shost_for_each_device() allows. Instead of using the too limiting scsi_device_get() state checks, only ignore devices in SDEV_DEL state or when unable to acquire a reference. Attempt to run the queues for all other devices when scsi_run_host_queues() is called. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64002 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: free net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports after unregister_net_sysctl_table() ipv4_sysctl_exit_net() is currently freeing net->ipv4.sysctl_local_reserved_ports too soon. Only after unregister_net_sysctl_table() we can be sure no threads can possibly use the sysctls, including /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_reserved_ports. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64000 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hsr: fix potential OOB access in supervision frame handling Ensure the entire TLV header is linearized before access by adding sizeof(struct hsr_sup_tlv) to the pskb_may_pull() calls. Without this, a truncated frame could cause an out-of-bounds access. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63996 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: cmis: require exact CDB reply length Malicious SFP module could respond with rpl_len longer than what cmis_cdb_process_reply() expected, leading to OOB writes. Malicious HW is a bit theoretical but some modules may just be buggy and/or the reads may occasionally get corrupted, so let's protect the kernel. The existing check protects from short replies. We need to protect from long ones, too. All callers that pass a non-zero rpl_exp_len cast the reply payload to a fixed-layout struct and read fields at fixed offsets, with no version negotiation or short-reply handling: - cmis_cdb_validate_password() - cmis_cdb_module_features_get() - cmis_fw_update_fw_mng_features_get() so let's assume that responses longer than expected do not have to be handled gracefully here. Add a warning message to make the debug easier in case my understanding is wrong... Note that page_data->length (argument of kmalloc) comes from last arg to ethtool_cmis_page_init() which is rpl_exp_len. Note2 that AIs also like to point out overflows in args->req.payload itself (which is a fixed-size 120 B buffer, on the stack), but callers should be reading structs defined by the standard, so protecting from requests for more data than max seem like defensive programming. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63995 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: cmis: validate start_cmd_payload_size from module The CMIS firmware update code reads start_cmd_payload_size from the module's FW Management Features CDB reply and uses it directly as the byte count for memcpy. The destination buffer is 112 bytes (ETHTOOL_CMIS_CDB_LPL_MAX_PL_LENGTH - 8). So a malicious module (or corrupted response) can cause a OOB write later on in cmis_fw_update_start_download(). Let's error out. If modules that expect longer LPL writes actually exist we should revisit. struct cmis_cdb_start_fw_download_pl's definition has to move, no change there. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63994 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tunnels: load network headers after skb_cow() in iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp[v6]() Sashiko found that iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmp() and iptunnel_pmtud_build_icmpv6() were caching ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() before an skb_cow() call which can reallocate skb->head. Fix this possible UAF by initializing the local variables after the skb_cow() call. Remove skb_reset_network_header() calls which were not needed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63993 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: do not reuse cached ip_hdr() value after skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can change skb->head. Reusing old_iph afer skb_tunnel_check_pmtu() can cause an UAF. Use instead ip_hdr(skb) as done in drivers/net/bareudp.c and drivers/net/geneve.c. Found by Sashiko. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63992 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tunnels: do not assume transport header in iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp() In some cases, iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmp() can be called while skb transport header is not set. This triggers an out-of-bound access, because (typeof(skb->transport_header))~0U is 65535. Access the icmp header based on IPv4 network header, after making sure icmp->type is present in skb linear part. Note that iptunnel_pmtud_check_icmpv6()) is fine. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63987 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: coalesce: cap profile updates at NET_DIM_PARAMS_NUM_PROFILES ethnl_update_profile() walks the ETHTOOL_A_PROFILE_IRQ_MODERATION nest list with an index 'i' and writes new_profile[i++] without bounding i. The destination is kmemdup()'d at NET_DIM_PARAMS_NUM_PROFILES entries (5), but the Netlink nest count is entirely user-controlled. Netlink policies do not have support for constraining the number of nested entries (or number of multi-attr entries). | ||||
| CVE-2026-63985 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: eeprom: add more safeties to EEPROM Netlink fallback The Netlink fallback path for reading module EEPROM (fallback_set_params()) validates that offset < eeprom_len, but does not check that offset + length stays within eeprom_len. The ioctl equivalent (ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in ioctl.c) has always enforced both bounds: if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > total_len) return -EINVAL; This could lead to surprises in both drivers and device FW. Add the missing offset + length validation to fallback_set_params(), mirroring the ioctl. Similarly - ethtool core in general, and ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in particular tries to zero-init all buffers passed to the drivers to avoid any extra work of zeroing things out. eeprom_fallback() uses a plain kmalloc(), change it to zalloc. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63984 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() computes: outhdr->hdrlen = (((n + 1) * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) >> 3); hdrlen is __u8. For n >= 127 the result exceeds 255 and silently truncates. With n=127 (cmpri=15, cmpre=15, pad=0, hdrlen=16): (128 * 16) >> 3 = 256, truncated to 0 as __u8 The caller in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() then places the compressed header at buf + ((ohdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3). With hdrlen=0 this is buf + 8, but the decompressed region occupies buf[0..2055] (8-byte header plus 128 full addresses). The compressed header overlaps the decompressed data, and ipv6_rpl_srh_compress() writes into this overlap, corrupting the routing header of the forwarded packet. The existing guard at exthdrs.c:546 checks (n + 1) > 255, which prevents n+1 from overflowing unsigned char (the segments_left field), but does not prevent the computed hdrlen from overflowing __u8. n=127 passes because 128 <= 255, yet hdrlen=256 does not fit. Tighten the bound to (n + 1) > 127. This caps n at 126, giving hdrlen = (127 * 16) >> 3 = 254, which fits in __u8. The compressed header then lands at buf + ((254 + 1) << 3) = buf + 2040, exactly past the decompressed region (buf[0..2039]). No overlap. 127 segments is well beyond any realistic RPL deployment. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63980 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Use spin_lock_bh for hn_lock nvmet_tcp_state_change(), a socket callback that runs in BH context, can reach handshake_req_cancel() via nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() and tls_handshake_cancel(). handshake_req_cancel() acquires hn->hn_lock with plain spin_lock(). If a process-context thread on the same CPU holds hn->hn_lock when a softirq invokes the cancel path, the lock attempt deadlocks. This is the only caller that invokes tls_handshake_cancel() from BH context; every other consumer calls it from process context. Deferring the cancel to process context in the NVMe target is not straightforward: nvmet_tcp_schedule_release_queue() must call tls_handshake_cancel() atomically with its state transition to DISCONNECTING. If the cancel were deferred, the handshake completion callback could fire in the window before the cancel runs, observe the unexpected state, and return without dropping its kref on the queue. Reworking that interlock is considerably more invasive than hardening the handshake lock. Convert all hn->hn_lock acquisitions from spin_lock/spin_unlock to spin_lock_bh/spin_unlock_bh so the lock is never taken with softirqs enabled. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63979 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: hand off the pinned file reference to accept_doit handshake_req_next() removes the request from the per-net pending list and drops hn_lock before handshake_nl_accept_doit() reads req->hr_sk->sk_socket and dereferences sock->file (once in FD_PREPARE() and again in get_file()). In that window a consumer running tls_handshake_cancel() followed by sockfd_put() (svc_sock_free) or __fput_sync() (xs_reset_transport) releases sock->file. sock_release() then runs sock_orphan(), zeroing sk_socket, and frees the struct socket. The accept-side code either reads NULL through sk_socket or chases freed memory. The submit-side sock_hold() does not prevent this. sk_refcnt protects struct sock, but struct socket and sock->file are independently refcounted via the file descriptor the consumer owns. Pinning sk leaves sock and sock->file unprotected. Retarget the accept-side dereferences at req->hr_file, which was pinned at submit time, instead of req->hr_sk->sk_socket->file. Pinning on its own is not sufficient: a consumer that cancels between handshake_req_next() returning and accept_doit reaching FD_PREPARE() takes the !remove_pending() branch in handshake_req_cancel() and drops hr_file before the accept side takes its own reference. Hand off an additional file reference inside handshake_req_next(), under hn_lock, so the accept side operates on a reference that no concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can revoke. FD_PREPARE() consumes that handed-off reference, either by transferring it to the new fd in fd_publish() or by dropping it in the cleanup destructor on error; the explicit get_file() that previously balanced FD_PREPARE() is therefore redundant and goes away. Update handshake_req_cancel_test2 and _test3 to simulate the FD_PREPARE() consumption with an fput() so the kunit file-count assertions stay balanced. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63978 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on the handshake_req allocation. Pass the source and destination in the documented order (list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through handshake_complete(). Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers, threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests. A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list). __remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an entry hits LIST_POISON instead. Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry. The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false, but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference. Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list. Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list, and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63977 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dpll: zl3073x: use __dpll_device_change_ntf() and remove change_work The change_work was introduced to send device change notifications from DPLL device callbacks without deadlocking on dpll_lock, since the callbacks are already invoked under that lock. Now that __dpll_device_change_ntf() is exported for callers that already hold dpll_lock, use it directly and remove the change_work infrastructure entirely. This eliminates a race condition where change_work could be re-scheduled after cancel_work_sync() during device teardown, potentially causing the handler to dereference a freed or NULL dpll_dev pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-63976 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-07-20 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: l2cap: clear chan->ident on ECRED reconfiguration success l2cap_ecred_reconf_rsp() returns early on success without clearing chan->ident. Every other L2CAP response handler (l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp, l2cap_le_connect_rsp, l2cap_config_rsp) clears chan->ident after a successful transaction to prevent the channel from matching subsequent responses with the recycled ident value. A remote attacker that completed a reconfiguration as the peer can replay a failure response with the stale ident, causing the kernel to match and destroy the already-established channel via l2cap_chan_del(chan, ECONNRESET). Clear chan->ident for all matching channels on success, and harden the failure path by using l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() consistent with other L2CAP handlers (l2cap_le_command_rej, __l2cap_get_chan_by_ident). | ||||