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Search Results (393435 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-89817 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/gud: NUL-terminate TV mode names read from the device gud_connector_add_tv_mode() reads a buffer of fixed-size mode names from the USB device and passes pointers into it to drm_mode_create_tv_properties_legacy(), which calls strlen() on each one. Nothing guarantees the device NUL-terminates a name, so strlen() can run past the end of a slot and, for the last mode, past the end of the allocation. Terminate each name at the end of its slot before use. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89816 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm: Fix drm_crtc_commit leak if signaled when PAGE_FLIP_EVENT is used Commit 1c6ceeee6ebb ("drm/atomic: Fix memleak on ERESTARTSYS during non-blocking commits") fixed a very similar issue when the event was allocated by drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit() itself. However, if the event is allocated in prepare_signaling(), it will also be set to NULL in complete_signaling(), which prevents drm_crtc_commit from being put in __drm_atomic_helper_crtc_destroy_state(). Dropping the reference when the event is set to NULL at complete_signaling() fixes the leak. The leak can be reproduced by sending a signal to the thread using DRM_MODE_PAGE_FLIP_EVENT and using a sw_sync fence to cause the atomic ioctl to block at drm_atomic_helper_wait_for_fences(). It happened both with amdgpu and vkms. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89815 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/ttm: Drop tt->restore after successful restore ttm_pool_restore_and_alloc() can successfully complete the restore process via ttm_pool_restore_commit(), but tt->restore is not dropped afterward. As a result, subsequent backup/restore flows observe what appears to be a completed restore, while in reality shmem handles are still installed in tt->pages, leading to the stack trace below. Fix this by freeing and dropping tt->restore in ttm_pool_restore_and_alloc() upon successful completion of the restore. 20545 [ 309.784531] RIP: 0010:sg_alloc_append_table_from_pages+0x38c/0x490 20547 [ 309.809570] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000623b838 EFLAGS: 00010206 20548 [ 309.814827] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: ffff88816e42a160 RCX: 0000000000000000 20549 [ 309.821986] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000001000 20550 [ 309.829147] RBP: ffff88816e42a168 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000007ffff000 20551 [ 309.836310] R10: ffffc9000623b928 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000007ffff000 20552 [ 309.843471] R13: ffff88815ba5a100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001 20553 [ 309.850634] FS: 00007f9ff305e700(0000) GS:ffff888276c94000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 20554 [ 309.858749] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 20555 [ 309.864519] CR2: 00007f9fca701000 CR3: 00000001565e2005 CR4: 0000000008f70ef0 20556 [ 309.871678] PKRU: 55555558 20557 [ 309.874403] Call Trace: 20558 [ 309.876866] <TASK> 20559 [ 309.878988] sg_alloc_table_from_pages_segment+0x60/0x100 20560 [ 309.884415] ? ttm_resource_manager_usage+0x36/0x60 [ttm] 20561 [ 309.889845] ? xe_tt_map_sg+0x7d/0xd0 [xe] 20562 [ 309.894045] xe_tt_map_sg+0x7d/0xd0 [xe] 20563 [ 309.898037] xe_bo_move+0x927/0xaa0 [xe] 20564 [ 309.902029] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xba/0x170 [ttm] 20565 [ 309.907022] ttm_bo_validate+0xbe/0x190 [ttm] 20566 [ 309.911405] xe_bo_validate+0x9a/0x120 [xe] 20567 [ 309.915663] xe_gpuvm_validate+0xd9/0x140 [xe] 20568 [ 309.920206] drm_gpuvm_validate+0x2f0/0x5b0 [drm_gpuvm] 20569 [ 309.925459] ? drm_exec_lock_obj+0x63/0x210 [drm_exec] 20570 [ 309.930627] xe_vm_validate_rebind+0x46/0xb0 [xe] 20571 [ 309.935428] xe_exec_fn+0x20/0x40 [xe] 20572 [ 309.939249] drm_gpuvm_exec_lock+0x78/0xc0 [drm_gpuvm] 20573 [ 309.944410] xe_validation_exec_lock+0x5a/0xa0 [xe] 20574 [ 309.949385] xe_exec_ioctl+0x806/0xc30 [xe] 20575 [ 309.953639] ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0xd9/0xf0 20576 [ 309.957935] ? __pfx_xe_exec_fn+0x10/0x10 [xe] 20577 [ 309.962449] ? __wake_up_common+0x73/0xa0 20578 [ 309.966482] ? __pfx_xe_exec_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe] 20579 [ 309.971263] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa3/0x100 20580 [ 309.975209] drm_ioctl+0x213/0x440 20581 [ 309.978637] ? __pfx_xe_exec_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe] 20582 [ 309.983415] xe_drm_ioctl+0x67/0xd0 [xe] 20583 [ 309.987408] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xd0 | ||||
| CVE-2026-89814 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: clamp the isolation index for rings outside a partition adev->isolation[] has one slot per partition, but a ring that is not assigned to one keeps AMDGPU_XCP_NO_PARTITION, which is ~0, so indexing the array with it is out of bounds. SDMA submissions hit this on both the isolation enforcement and the VM flush path and trip UBSAN. Fall back to the first slot the way the cleaner shader path already does, and stop taking the address before the ring type check that makes it relevant. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89813 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: force complete the KIQ ring fences on reset Like the MES scheduler ring, the KIQ ring sets no_scheduler = true and uses a polling fence, so it is skipped by the force-completion loop in amdgpu_device_pre_asic_reset(). Its hw fence value lives in wb (GTT) memory and survives a MODE1 reset while fence_drv.sync_seq keeps advancing, so after a reset the first KIQ submission can poll forever on a seq that is never written back. Force complete the KIQ ring fences too so their hw fence is realigned to sync_seq. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89812 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: force complete the MES ring fences on reset The MES scheduler ring has no drm scheduler (no_scheduler = true), so it is skipped by the force-completion loop in amdgpu_device_pre_asic_reset(). It uses a polling fence whose hw value lives in wb (GTT) memory and survives a MODE1 reset, while fence_drv.sync_seq keeps advancing for every packet. When the reset is triggered because MES itself stopped responding, the timed-out packets advance sync_seq past the last hw fence value MES wrote. After resume the first MES submission polls forever on a seq that is never written back, failing the resume and wedging the box on a second reset: amdgpu: MES ring buffer is full. amdgpu: *ERROR* ring gfx_0.0.0 test failed (-110) amdgpu: resume of IP block <gfx_v11_0> failed -110 amdgpu: GPU reset end with ret = -110 Force complete the MES scheduler ring fences together with the scheduler rings so their hw fence is realigned to sync_seq. v2: cover all XCCs (one scheduler ring each), not just mes.ring[0]. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89811 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Add TLB flush after MES queue eviction/suspension MES (Micro Engine Scheduler) does not perform heavy-weight TLB invalidation after unmapping queues, unlike HWS which does this automatically. This causes a race condition where in-flight DMA descriptors can access memory that has been unmapped, leading to page faults and GPU queue hangs during SVM page migration. The issue manifests as KFDSVMRangeTest.MultiThreadMigrationTest failures on gfx1151 (Strix Point) with XNACK mode 1 enabled - the GPU compute queue hangs with packets submitted but never consumed. Add kfd_flush_tlb() calls after MES queue removal in two locations: - evict_process_queues_cpsch(): after all queues removed during eviction - suspend_queues(): after debug/criu queue suspension (with mem_fence barrier) This ensures all in-flight memory accesses from unmapped queues are flushed before memory is freed or migrated. (cherry picked from commit f5c4f88e0f9c45a8fb9dfac0c1df726c95e41b77) | ||||
| CVE-2026-89810 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix error path at svm_migrate_copy_to_ram If page migration from device to sys ram fails for some reasons driver needs release and unlock allocated system pages. To do that driver should use page physical address, or pfn, then get struct page*. Current driver uses dma address(for adev) that is not correct with IOMMU enabled, or even in general. The patch releases and unlocks allocated system pages based on where migration failed by struct page* of sys ram pages. Also dma_unmap correspodent system ram pages at error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89809 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: fix scope of mqd_mgr dereference in pqm_debugfs_mqds Reading /sys/kernel/debug/kfd/mqds while a process holds an active KFD queue triggers a NULL pointer dereference because the for loop that calls mqd_mgr->debugfs_show_mqd() is incorrectly placed outside the if (pqn->q) block that initializes mqd_mgr. The queue list can contain entries where pqn->q is NULL (kernel queues where only pqn->kq is valid). In the original code: if (pqn->q) { ... mqd_mgr = q->device->dqm->mqd_mgrs[mqd_type]; size = mqd_mgr->mqd_stride(...); } for (xcc = 0; xcc < num_xccs; xcc++) { // WRONG: outside if block mqd = q->mqd + size * xcc; r = mqd_mgr->debugfs_show_mqd(m, mqd); } When iterating over a queue node where pqn->q is NULL: 1. The if (pqn->q) block is skipped 2. mqd_mgr remains uninitialized (NULL from declaration) 3. The for loop executes anyway 4. mqd_mgr->debugfs_show_mqd(m, mqd) dereferences NULL The crash manifests as: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode RIP: 0010:0x0 Call Trace: pqm_debugfs_mqds+0x10c/0x1d0 [amdgpu] kfd_debugfs_mqds_by_process+0x9b/0x110 [amdgpu] seq_read_iter+0x132/0x4b0 ... Fix by moving the for loop inside the if (pqn->q) block, so mqd_mgr and related variables are only used when properly initialized. (cherry picked from commit 8bfe29d5c798940f797aa24135d2734c3ffce9de) | ||||
| CVE-2026-89808 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Fix the case that vm range is hole at svm_migrate_copy_to_vram When migration vm range is hole at cpu side(MIGRATE_PFN_MIGRATE set + MIGRATE_PFN_VALID unset) driver still allocates device pages. There is no dma map of src pages and migration. j is 0 and svm_migrate_copy_memory_gart() will return an uninitialized r. That can trigger out_free_vram_pages to drop all VRAM just set up. Initialize r and only call the last svm_migrate_copy_memory_gart if j > 0. Current code postponed the last page to the final copy. This patch flushes on the last page when reach to the end of current drm_buddy_block; avoids another svm_migrate_copy_memory_gart. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89807 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: guard against NULL restore_mqd in CRIU queue restore Both create_queue_cpsch() and create_queue_nocpsch() unconditionally call mqd_mgr->restore_mqd() when a CRIU restore is in progress (qd != NULL), with no NULL guard. On any system where restore_mqd is not implemented for the given queue type, a user holding CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE can trigger a kernel NULL pointer dereference and panic the machine by issuing KFD_IOC_CRIU_OP_RESTORE with a crafted queue restore object. Note that checkpoint_mqd is likewise unimplemented on GFX12, so no legitimate CRIU image can reach this path — only a hand-crafted restore payload. Add a NULL guard for restore_mqd immediately after mqd_mgr is resolved, unwinding via the existing error labels and returning -EOPNOTSUPP if the callback is not implemented. This mirrors the existing checkpoint_mqd guard in checkpoint_mqd(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89806 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/sysfb: ofdrm: Fix integer overflow in fb_size calculation The framebuffer size calculation `fb_size = linebytes * height` can overflow when both values are large (e.g., 46341 * 46341 > INT_MAX). Since linebytes and height are both int types, the multiplication is performed as int * int, which results in undefined behavior on overflow. Use check_mul_overflow() to detect and prevent this overflow, consistent with the approach used in simpledrm.c and corebootdrm.c. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89805 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/pagemap: Fix folio allocation fallback and use-after-put drm_pagemap_migrate_populate_ram_pfn() had two issues when populating RAM PFNs with higher-order folios: 1. The higher-order vma_alloc_folio()/folio_alloc() calls did not pass __GFP_NOWARN, so a THP allocation failure under memory pressure would spam the kernel log, and there was no fallback path despite a TODO comment stating one was needed. Add __GFP_NOWARN to the higher-order allocation and, on failure, fall back to order-0 allocations for the entire range originally covered by the failed higher-order allocation, leaving MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND unset for those PFNs. 2. In the free_pages error path, order was computed via folio_order(page_folio(page)) *after* put_page(page) had already dropped the reference, resulting in a use-after-free/put when that was the last reference on the page. Compute order before releasing the page. Introducing the fallback in 1. also requires the source page array handed to ->copy_to_ram() to be built differently. Both callers only populated the entry at the head of each source folio, relying on the copy callback to derive the rest of the folio from the order recorded in the matching drm_pagemap_addr. Once the destination has been demoted to order-0 folios the drm_pagemap_addr entries are per-page, so a source page is needed for every one of them; leaving them NULL makes the copy callback stop after the first page and the remainder of the range is never copied. The source folio is only split later, by migrate_vma_pages() / migrate_device_pages(), so its order cannot be used to detect the demotion - test the destination for MIGRATE_PFN_COMPOUND instead. Factor the array population out into drm_pagemap_migrate_populate_src_pages() and use it from both drm_pagemap_evict_to_ram() and __drm_pagemap_migrate_to_ram(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-89804 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau/dmem: fix mismatched DMA unmap size for large folios Device-private THP migration maps migration buffers with page_size() and records that length in dma_info->size. For a compound folio page_size() is PAGE_SIZE << order, but two teardown sites still pass a literal PAGE_SIZE to dma_unmap_page(): - nouveau_dmem_migrate_to_ram() on the success path, and - nouveau_dmem_migrate_copy_one() on the copy-error path. For an order > 0 folio this unmaps less than was mapped, leaking the remainder of the IOMMU/IOVA mapping. The other unmap sites, in nouveau_dmem_migrate_chunk() and nouveau_dmem_evict_chunk(), already use the saved size; use it here too. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89803 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau: unsubscribe the channel-kill event before the fence context nouveau_channel_del() tears the fence context down first and only drops the channel-kill subscription later, in the middle of the nvif object teardown: if (chan->fence) nouveau_fence(chan->cli->drm)->context_del(chan); ... nvif_object_dtor(&chan->vram); nvif_event_dtor(&chan->kill); The subscribed handler is nouveau_channel_killed(), which calls nouveau_channel_kill() and from there nouveau_fence_context_kill() on chan->fence. A kill event delivered in that window takes fctx->lock and walks fctx->pending on a fence context that context_del() has already freed. Nothing reaches this below Fermi today, because the subscription is gated on FERMI_CHANNEL_GPFIFO and nothing kills a channel there. On Fermi and newer the window is real but narrow, since a kill has to land exactly while the channel is being destroyed. That is reason enough on its own, which is why this carries a Fixes: tag. The last patch in this series subscribes Tesla channels as well; nothing kills those today, so it does not widen the exposure now, but it is the groundwork for a recovery path that would, and the ordering is better fixed before that lands than alongside it. Drop the subscription before anything it depends on is torn down. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89802 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau/uvmm: fix NULL deref unwinding an OP_MAP_SPARSE op Each bind_job_op is zeroed by kzalloc_obj() in bind_job_op_from_uop(), and the OP_MAP_SPARSE case in nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_submit() only creates a region, so op->ops stays NULL for a successfully processed sparse map. If a later op in the same job fails, the reverse unwind loop revisits that op and calls drm_gpuva_ops_free(&uvmm->base, op->ops) unconditionally. drm_gpuva_ops_free() dereferences its argument right away (list_for_each_entry_safe on &ops->list), so a NULL op->ops oopses. The path is reachable by any render-node fd holder, since NOUVEAU_VM_BIND is DRM_RENDER_ALLOW. Guard the free with IS_ERR_OR_NULL(), as nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_cleanup() already does for the identical free. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89801 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau/uvmm: fix premature region free on failed OP_UNMAP_SPARSE In nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_submit()'s OP_UNMAP_SPARSE arm, op->reg is set from nouveau_uvma_region_find(), which only looks the region up and takes no reference; a region's sole reference is its membership in uvmm->region_mt. Two failure paths leave op->reg set: the -ENOENT check when the region is busy, and the drm_gpuvm_sm_unmap_ops_create() failure. The sibling nouveau_uvmm_sm_unmap_prepare() failure just below clears op->reg; these two do not. unwind_continue steps back one op, so the failing op is skipped by the unwind loop and its op->reg stays set. nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_cleanup() then enters its if (op->reg) branch and calls nouveau_uvma_region_remove() and nouveau_uvma_region_put() on it, dropping the tree's sole reference and freeing a region this job never created. The comment above the cleanup loop documents the broken invariant: op->reg must be NULL on submit failure. This frees a live region on an unrelated failure, reachable single-job when drm_gpuvm_sm_unmap_ops_create() returns -ENOMEM; if another job owns the same region, its cleanup then removes and puts the freed region, a use-after-free. Clear op->reg on both failure paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89800 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/nouveau/uvmm: clear the dirty flag when unwinding an OP_UNMAP_SPARSE A successful OP_UNMAP_SPARSE marks its region dirty with nouveau_uvma_region_dirty() and defers the teardown to nouveau_uvmm_bind_job_cleanup(); it does not remove the region from uvmm->region_mt. If a later op in the job fails, the unwind path never clears reg->dirty (set in one place, cleared nowhere) and sets op->reg = NULL, so cleanup skips the teardown. The region is left in the tree with dirty set and its completion never signalled. Later binds over that range then fail permanently -- -ENOENT or -EINVAL from the dirty checks, or an unkillable wait_for_completion() in bind_validate_region() -- for the lifetime of the uvmm. Clear reg->dirty when the unwind reverts the sparse unmap, restoring the region to the state it was found in. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89799 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Disable preemption in bpf_get_stackid The get_perf_callchain call needs disabled preemption plus we need it disabled as long as we access its returned trace entries buffer. Note the bpf_get_stackid_pe function is executed already with preemption disabled. | ||||
| CVE-2026-89798 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-16 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rpcrdma: arm rn_done before publishing the notification rpcrdma_rn_register() inserts @rn into rd_xa with xa_alloc() before storing the caller's callback in rn->rn_done. The xarray makes @rn reachable to rpcrdma_remove_one(), which walks rd_xa and invokes rn->rn_done(rn) for every registered notification. A device removal that races a fresh registration can therefore observe @rn with rn_done still NULL, because the notification objects are zero allocated by their owners, and call through a NULL function pointer. Store rn->rn_done before xa_alloc() publishes @rn. The xarray's store-side and load-side ordering then guarantees that any CPU which finds @rn in rd_xa also observes the armed callback. rpcrdma_rn_unregister() treats a non-NULL rn_done as the sentinel for a completed registration, so the early store must not survive a failed registration. Clear rn_done again when xa_alloc() fails. Were it left set, the failed-accept cleanup path would call rpcrdma_rn_unregister() on an @rn that was never inserted, erasing an unrelated rd_xa slot and underflowing rd_kref. | ||||