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Search Results (349188 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-43333 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject direct access to nullable PTR_TO_BUF pointers check_mem_access() matches PTR_TO_BUF via base_type() which strips PTR_MAYBE_NULL, allowing direct dereference without a null check. Map iterator ctx->key and ctx->value are PTR_TO_BUF | PTR_MAYBE_NULL. On stop callbacks these are NULL, causing a kernel NULL dereference. Add a type_may_be_null() guard to the PTR_TO_BUF branch, matching the existing PTR_TO_BTF_ID pattern. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43332 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thermal: core: Fix thermal zone device registration error path If thermal_zone_device_register_with_trips() fails after registering a thermal zone device, it needs to wait for the tz->removal completion like thermal_zone_device_unregister(), in case user space has managed to take a reference to the thermal zone device's kobject, in which case thermal_release() may not be called by the error path itself and tz may be freed prematurely. Add the missing wait_for_completion() call to the thermal zone device registration error path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43331 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/kexec: Disable KCOV instrumentation after load_segments() The load_segments() function changes segment registers, invalidating GS base (which KCOV relies on for per-cpu data). When CONFIG_KCOV is enabled, any subsequent instrumented C code call (e.g. native_gdt_invalidate()) begins crashing the kernel in an endless loop. To reproduce the problem, it's sufficient to do kexec on a KCOV-instrumented kernel: $ kexec -l /boot/otherKernel $ kexec -e The real-world context for this problem is enabling crash dump collection in syzkaller. For this, the tool loads a panic kernel before fuzzing and then calls makedumpfile after the panic. This workflow requires both CONFIG_KEXEC and CONFIG_KCOV to be enabled simultaneously. Adding safeguards directly to the KCOV fast-path (__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc()) is also undesirable as it would introduce an extra performance overhead. Disabling instrumentation for the individual functions would be too fragile, so disable KCOV instrumentation for the entire machine_kexec_64.c and physaddr.c. If coverage-guided fuzzing ever needs these components in the future, other approaches should be considered. The problem is not relevant for 32 bit kernels as CONFIG_KCOV is not supported there. [ bp: Space out comment for better readability. ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-43330 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: caam - fix overflow on long hmac keys When a key longer than block size is supplied, it is copied and then hashed into the real key. The memory allocated for the copy needs to be rounded to DMA cache alignment, as otherwise the hashed key may corrupt neighbouring memory. The copying is performed using kmemdup, however this leads to an overflow: reading more bytes (aligned_len - keylen) from the keylen source buffer. Fix this by replacing kmemdup with kmalloc, followed by memcpy. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43329 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: flowtable: strictly check for maximum number of actions The maximum number of flowtable hardware offload actions in IPv6 is: * ethernet mangling (4 payload actions, 2 for each ethernet address) * SNAT (4 payload actions) * DNAT (4 payload actions) * Double VLAN (4 vlan actions, 2 for popping vlan, and 2 for pushing) for QinQ. * Redirect (1 action) Which makes 17, while the maximum is 16. But act_ct supports for tunnels actions too. Note that payload action operates at 32-bit word level, so mangling an IPv6 address takes 4 payload actions. Update flow_action_entry_next() calls to check for the maximum number of supported actions. While at it, rise the maximum number of actions per flow from 16 to 24 so this works fine with IPv6 setups. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43328 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cpufreq: governor: fix double free in cpufreq_dbs_governor_init() error path When kobject_init_and_add() fails, cpufreq_dbs_governor_init() calls kobject_put(&dbs_data->attr_set.kobj). The kobject release callback cpufreq_dbs_data_release() calls gov->exit(dbs_data) and kfree(dbs_data), but the current error path then calls gov->exit(dbs_data) and kfree(dbs_data) again, causing a double free. Keep the direct kfree(dbs_data) for the gov->init() failure path, but after kobject_init_and_add() has been called, let kobject_put() handle the cleanup through cpufreq_dbs_data_release(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-43327 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: dummy-hcd: Fix locking/synchronization error Syzbot testing was able to provoke an addressing exception and crash in the usb_gadget_udc_reset() routine in drivers/usb/gadgets/udc/core.c, resulting from the fact that the routine was called with a second ("driver") argument of NULL. The bad caller was set_link_state() in dummy_hcd.c, and the problem arose because of a race between a USB reset and driver unbind. These sorts of races were not supposed to be possible; commit 7dbd8f4cabd9 ("USB: dummy-hcd: Fix erroneous synchronization change"), along with a few followup commits, was written specifically to prevent them. As it turns out, there are (at least) two errors remaining in the code. Another patch will address the second error; this one is concerned with the first. The error responsible for the syzbot crash occurred because the stop_activity() routine will sometimes drop and then re-acquire the dum->lock spinlock. A call to stop_activity() occurs in set_link_state() when handling an emulated USB reset, after the test of dum->ints_enabled and before the increment of dum->callback_usage. This allowed another thread (doing a driver unbind) to sneak in and grab the spinlock, and then clear dum->ints_enabled and dum->driver. Normally this other thread would have to wait for dum->callback_usage to go down to 0 before it would clear dum->driver, but in this case it didn't have to wait since dum->callback_usage had not yet been incremented. The fix is to increment dum->callback_usage _before_ calling stop_activity() instead of after. Then the thread doing the unbind will not clear dum->driver until after the call to usb_gadget_udc_reset() safely returns and dum->callback_usage has been decremented again. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43326 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Fix SCX_KICK_WAIT deadlock by deferring wait to balance callback SCX_KICK_WAIT busy-waits in kick_cpus_irq_workfn() using smp_cond_load_acquire() until the target CPU's kick_sync advances. Because the irq_work runs in hardirq context, the waiting CPU cannot reschedule and its own kick_sync never advances. If multiple CPUs form a wait cycle, all CPUs deadlock. Replace the busy-wait in kick_cpus_irq_workfn() with resched_curr() to force the CPU through do_pick_task_scx(), which queues a balance callback to perform the wait. The balance callback drops the rq lock and enables IRQs following the sched_core_balance() pattern, so the CPU can process IPIs while waiting. The local CPU's kick_sync is advanced on entry to do_pick_task_scx() and continuously during the wait, ensuring any CPU that starts waiting for us sees the advancement and cannot form cyclic dependencies. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43325 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: don't send a 6E related command when not supported MCC_ALLOWED_AP_TYPE_CMD is related to 6E support. Do not send it if the device doesn't support 6E. Apparently, the firmware is mistakenly advertising support for this command even on AX201 which does not support 6E and then the firmware crashes. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43324 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: dummy-hcd: Fix interrupt synchronization error This fixes an error in synchronization in the dummy-hcd driver. The error has a somewhat involved history. The synchronization mechanism was introduced by commit 7dbd8f4cabd9 ("USB: dummy-hcd: Fix erroneous synchronization change"), which added an emulated "interrupts enabled" flag together with code emulating synchronize_irq() (it waits until all current handler callbacks have returned). But the emulated interrupt-disable occurred too late, after the driver containing the handler callback routines had been told that it was unbound and no more callbacks would occur. Commit 4a5d797a9f9c ("usb: gadget: dummy_hcd: fix gpf in gadget_setup") tried to fix this by moving the synchronize_irq() emulation code from dummy_stop() to dummy_pullup(), which runs before the unbind callback. There still were races, though, because the emulated interrupt-disable still occurred too late. It couldn't be moved to dummy_pullup(), because that routine can be called for reasons other than an impending unbind. Therefore commits 7dc0c55e9f30 ("USB: UDC core: Add udc_async_callbacks gadget op") and 04145a03db9d ("USB: UDC: Implement udc_async_callbacks in dummy-hcd") added an API allowing the UDC core to tell dummy-hcd exactly when emulated interrupts and their callbacks should be disabled. That brings us to the current state of things, which is still wrong because the emulated synchronize_irq() occurs before the emulated interrupt-disable! That's no good, beause it means that more emulated interrupts can occur after the synchronize_irq() emulation has run, leading to the possibility that a callback handler may be running when the gadget driver is unbound. To fix this, we have to move the synchronize_irq() emulation code yet again, to the dummy_udc_async_callbacks() routine, which takes care of enabling and disabling emulated interrupt requests. The synchronization will now run immediately after emulated interrupts are disabled, which is where it belongs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43323 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking fix John reported that stress-ng-yield could make his machine unhappy and managed to bisect it to commit b3d99f43c72b ("sched/fair: Fix zero_vruntime tracking"). The combination of yield and that commit was specific enough to hypothesize the following scenario: Suppose we have 2 runnable tasks, both doing yield. Then one will be eligible and one will not be, because the average position must be in between these two entities. Therefore, the runnable task will be eligible, and be promoted a full slice (all the tasks do is yield after all). This causes it to jump over the other task and now the other task is eligible and current is no longer. So we schedule. Since we are runnable, there is no {de,en}queue. All we have is the __{en,de}queue_entity() from {put_prev,set_next}_task(). But per the fingered commit, those two no longer move zero_vruntime. All that moves zero_vruntime are tick and full {de,en}queue. This means, that if the two tasks playing leapfrog can reach the critical speed to reach the overflow point inside one tick's worth of time, we're up a creek. Additionally, when multiple cgroups are involved, there is no guarantee the tick will in fact hit every cgroup in a timely manner. Statistically speaking it will, but that same statistics does not rule out the possibility of one cgroup not getting a tick for a significant amount of time -- however unlikely. Therefore, just like with the yield() case, force an update at the end of every slice. This ensures the update is never more than a single slice behind and the whole thing is within 2 lag bounds as per the comment on entity_key(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-43322 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF in le_read_features_complete This fixes the following backtrace caused by hci_conn being freed before le_read_features_complete but after hci_le_read_remote_features_sync so hci_conn_del -> hci_cmd_sync_dequeue is not able to prevent it: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:96 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_dec_and_test include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1383 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_conn_drop include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1688 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in le_read_features_complete+0x5b/0x340 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:7344 Write of size 4 at addr ffff8880796b0010 by task kworker/u9:0/52 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u9:0 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025 Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0xcd/0x630 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:595 check_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:194 [inline] kasan_check_range+0x100/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:200 instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:96 [inline] atomic_dec_and_test include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1383 [inline] hci_conn_drop include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:1688 [inline] le_read_features_complete+0x5b/0x340 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:7344 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x1ff/0x430 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:334 process_one_work+0x9ba/0x1b20 kernel/workqueue.c:3257 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3340 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x3c5/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x983/0xb10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 </TASK> Allocated by task 5932: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:77 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:400 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:417 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:957 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline] __hci_conn_add+0xf8/0x1c70 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:963 hci_conn_add_unset+0x76/0x100 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:1084 le_conn_complete_evt+0x639/0x1f20 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5714 hci_le_enh_conn_complete_evt+0x23d/0x380 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:5861 hci_le_meta_evt+0x357/0x5e0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7408 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7716 [inline] hci_event_packet+0x685/0x11c0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7773 hci_rx_work+0x2c9/0xeb0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4076 process_one_work+0x9ba/0x1b20 kernel/workqueue.c:3257 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3340 [inline] worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3421 kthread+0x3c5/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:463 ret_from_fork+0x983/0xb10 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:246 Freed by task 5932: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:56 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:77 __kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:587 kasan_save_free_info mm/kasan/kasan.h:406 [inline] poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:252 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:284 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:234 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2540 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:6663 [inline] kfree+0x2f8/0x6e0 mm/slub.c:6871 device_release+0xa4/0x240 drivers/base/core.c:2565 kobject_cleanup lib/kobject.c:689 [inline] kobject_release lib/kobject.c:720 [inline] kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] kobject_put+0x1e7/0x590 lib/kobject. ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-43321 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Properly mark live registers for indirect jumps For a `gotox rX` instruction the rX register should be marked as used in the compute_insn_live_regs() function. Fix this. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43320 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Fix dsc eDP issue [why] Need to add function hook check before use | ||||
| CVE-2026-43319 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: spidev: fix lock inversion between spi_lock and buf_lock The spidev driver previously used two mutexes, spi_lock and buf_lock, but acquired them in different orders depending on the code path: write()/read(): buf_lock -> spi_lock ioctl(): spi_lock -> buf_lock This AB-BA locking pattern triggers lockdep warnings and can cause real deadlocks: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected spidev_ioctl() -> mutex_lock(&spidev->buf_lock) spidev_sync_write() -> mutex_lock(&spidev->spi_lock) *** DEADLOCK *** The issue is reproducible with a simple userspace program that performs write() and SPI_IOC_WR_MAX_SPEED_HZ ioctl() calls from separate threads on the same spidev file descriptor. Fix this by simplifying the locking model and removing the lock inversion entirely. spidev_sync() no longer performs any locking, and all callers serialize access using spi_lock. buf_lock is removed since its functionality is fully covered by spi_lock, eliminating the possibility of lock ordering issues. This removes the lock inversion and prevents deadlocks without changing userspace ABI or behaviour. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43318 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix sync handling in amdgpu_dma_buf_move_notify Invalidating a dmabuf will impact other users of the shared BO. In the scenario where process A moves the BO, it needs to inform process B about the move and process B will need to update its page table. The commit fixes a synchronisation bug caused by the use of the ticket: it made amdgpu_vm_handle_moved behave as if updating the page table immediately was correct but in this case it's not. An example is the following scenario, with 2 GPUs and glxgears running on GPU0 and Xorg running on GPU1, on a system where P2P PCI isn't supported: glxgears: export linear buffer from GPU0 and import using GPU1 submit frame rendering to GPU0 submit tiled->linear blit Xorg: copy of linear buffer The sequence of jobs would be: drm_sched_job_run # GPU0, frame rendering drm_sched_job_queue # GPU0, blit drm_sched_job_done # GPU0, frame rendering drm_sched_job_run # GPU0, blit move linear buffer for GPU1 access # amdgpu_dma_buf_move_notify -> update pt # GPU0 It this point the blit job on GPU0 is still running and would likely produce a page fault. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43317 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: most: core: fix leak on early registration failure A recent commit fixed a resource leak on early registration failures but for some reason left out the first error path which still leaks the resources associated with the interface. Fix up also the first error path so that the interface is always released on errors. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43316 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: solo6x10: Check for out of bounds chip_id Clang with CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT=y noticed a condition where a signed type (literal "1" is an "int") could end up being shifted beyond 32 bits, so instrumentation was added (and due to the double is_tw286x() call seen via inlining), Clang decides the second one must now be undefined behavior and elides the rest of the function[1]. This is a known problem with Clang (that is still being worked on), but we can avoid the entire problem by actually checking the existing max chip ID, and now there is no runtime instrumentation added at all since everything is known to be within bounds. Additionally use an unsigned value for the shift to remove the instrumentation even without the explicit bounds checking. [hverkuil: fix checkpatch warning for is_tw286x] | ||||
| CVE-2025-71302 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-05-08 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/panthor: fix for dma-fence safe access rules Commit 506aa8b02a8d6 ("dma-fence: Add safe access helpers and document the rules") details the dma-fence safe access rules. The most common culprit is that drm_sched_fence_get_timeline_name may race with group_free_queue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-44334 | 2026-05-08 | 8.4 High | ||
| PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. From version 4.5.139 to before version 4.6.32, CVE-2026-40287's fix gated tools.py auto-import behind PRAISONAI_ALLOW_LOCAL_TOOLS=true in two files (tool_resolver.py, api/call.py). A third import sink in praisonai/templates/tool_override.py was missed and remains unguarded. It is reached by the recipe runner on every recipe execution and is remotely triggerable through POST /v1/recipes/run with a recipe value pointing at any local absolute path or any GitHub repo (because SecurityConfig.allow_any_github defaults to True). The attacker drops a tools.py next to TEMPLATE.yaml; the server exec_module()s it. No auth required by default, no environment opt-in required. This issue has been patched in version 4.6.32. | ||||