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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90270 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm_mpam: Disable driver unbind to avoid UAF When a user unbinds an MSC and that MSC is the only MSC left for a component then the corresponding mpam_component will be freed. If the user then goes on to read the schemata file in the resctrl filesystem then the mpam_component will be accessed from resctrl_arch_get_config() leading to a use after free. As the MPAM driver is not a module the unbind sysfs interface is the only way to trigger the remove. Instead of dealing with the complexity of allowing some unused MSC to unbind just remove the unbind sysfs interface. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90267 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: sd: Fix special_vec mempool leak when scsi_alloc_sgtables() fails sd_set_special_bvec() allocates a special payload page for UNMAP and WRITE SAME commands. If scsi_alloc_sgtables() fails afterward in sd_setup_unmap_cmnd() or sd_setup_write_same{10,16}_cmnd(), the SCSI midlayer does not call uninit_command() because RQF_DONTPREP is not set yet, leaking the page. Call sd_uninit_command() on error, and clear RQF_SPECIAL_PAYLOAD after freeing the page. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90266 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: zoned: don't force read-only on transient -EAGAIN from reloc merge On a zoned FS, btrfs_delayed_refs_rsv_refill() returns -EAGAIN whenever the over-committed metadata plus the zone_unusable bytes exceeds the usable size in a metadata block-group to avoid heavy over-commit of metadata and early ENOSPC in one transaction. If this happens while doing reclaim, the transaction is getting aborted. Treat -EAGAIN as a soft, retryable condition in case of block-group reclaim. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90264 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: always wait for ordered extents to avoid OE races [BUG] Syzbot reported a bug that there can be conflicting OEs for the same range: BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object alrea[ 179.162726][ T6897] BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object already exists) ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:264! Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026 RIP: 0010:btrfs_alloc_ordered_extent+0x943/0xad0 Call Trace: <TASK> cow_file_range+0x744/0x12a0 fallback_to_cow+0x5ea/0xa00 run_delalloc_nocow+0x110c/0x17a0 btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0xbe4/0x1c20 writepage_delalloc+0x104d/0x1ba0 btrfs_writepages+0x1667/0x28b0 do_writepages+0x338/0x560 filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x1f2/0x300 btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x54/0xf0 btrfs_direct_write+0x6a0/0xc30 btrfs_do_write_iter+0x329/0x790 do_iter_readv_writev+0x624/0x8d0 vfs_writev+0x34c/0x990 __se_sys_pwritev2+0x17a/0x2a0 do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [CAUSE] Since commit ff66fe666233 ("btrfs: fix incorrect buffered IO fallback for append direct writes"), if the direct IO finished short, we will revert the isize back to the original one, so that append writes can be respected during the buffered fallback. Normally we rely on lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() function during buffered writeback to wait for any existing ordered extents. But that ordered extent waiting only happens if the start_pos is inside the isize. Since we have reverted the isize during failed direct IO, we will not wait for any ordered extents. This means we can have a race where the direct IO OE is still in the tree, finished but not yet removed, then we're inserting the OE for the buffered write, causing the above crash. [FIX] Make the OE wait to be unconditional, to handle the reverted isize situation. And since lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() now either lock the extents or return -EAGAIN, also remove the branches that handles no-extent-locked cases, and rename it to remove the "_if_need" suffix. The following micro benchmark shows the runtime difference for btrfs_buffered_write(), doing `xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 1m"` workload, all values are the average runtime in nano seconds. function runtime | before | after -----------------------------------+-------------+--------------- lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() | 58.2 | 183.0 btrfs_buffered_write() | 2115.6 | 2973.3 The overall runtime of btrfs_buffered_write() is still pretty tiny (still less than 3 micro seconds), I'd say the extra cost is still acceptable. An alternative to fix this problem is to wait ordered extents during iomap_end() where the isize revert is done. But that solution will break nowait requirement, as if a nowait direct IO finished short, we have to wait for the OEs unconditionally or the next append buffered IO can still hit the same problem. So here we have to move the wait cost to buffered write, but at least the code is slightly more streamline. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90257 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: virtio_bt: avoid OOB read of build info string The virtbt_setup_zephyr() sends the Zephyr vendor command 0xfc08 (Read Build Information) and hands the response to bt_dev_info() and hci_set_fw_info() as a "%s" string starting at skb->data + 1, without checking the length. A backend that answers with status only leaves that pointer past the end of the received data, so the walk reads adjacent slab memory until it meets a NUL. Those bytes reach the kernel log and the firmware-info debugfs file. To fix this, print the string with a bounded "%.*s" limited to skb->len - 1. A short or unterminated response then prints as much as arrived instead of failing setup. This mirrors commit dd068ef04412 ("Bluetooth: bpa10x: avoid OOB read of revision string in bpa10x_setup()"), which fixed the identical pattern. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90249 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: light: gp2ap002: Fix unbalanced runtime PM on repeated event writes The IIO core does not filter duplicate writes to the event enable attribute, so writing the same value twice invokes write_event_config() twice. Enabling twice leaks a runtime PM reference, preventing the device from ever suspending again; disabling twice underflows the usage count and triggers a "Runtime PM usage count underflow" warning. Bail out early when the requested state matches the current state. While at it, switch to pm_runtime_resume_and_get() so a failed resume is propagated to userspace instead of silently marking the event enabled. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90248 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_api: fix teardown of an adopted proto on insert-race loss In tc_new_tfilter() the create branch sets tp_created = 1 before calling tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique(). When the caller loses the race (another request inserted a proto at the same chain/prio first), insert_unique() destroys the caller's own tp_new and returns the winner's proto with an extra reference. tp_created was never cleared, so the loser's errout path treated the winner's live proto as its own and called tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty() on it, silently unlinking an active classifier that the winning request already advertised via RTM_NEWTFILTER. Track the outcome of the insert step in a single tri-state variable so each errout path reacts correctly: - TP_NOT_CREATED: no proto created; pursue the old path. - TP_CREATED: proto inserted successfully; same code path as before. - TP_NOT_OWNED: New - lost the insert race; tp is another request's proto (chain ref already released by tp_new's destroy) Both errout reactions are single expressions derived from the state. This fix is motivated by the Sashiko's automated review of Patch (net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked classifiers) [1][2]. The review identified the silent-unlink behaviour of an adopted proto's teardown when a request loses the tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() race. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260801125632.360365-1-jhs%40mojatatu.com [2] https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260801125632.360365-1-jhs%40mojatatu.com | ||||
| CVE-2026-90247 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix mmap_lock leak in irq_work path stack_map_get_build_id_offset() introduced a per-CPU irq_work to defer mmap_read_unlock() from NMI context, and bpf_find_vma() later reused the same mmap_unlock_work. Both callers only check whether the work is busy before taking mmap_lock, so a nested caller can reuse the slot before the first caller queues it. Two read locks may then be acquired while only one deferred unlock runs, leaking a read lock and blocking exit_mmap(). Reserve the per-CPU slot before mmap_read_trylock(). Use the same wrapper in stackmap and bpf_find_vma() so both callers release the reservation on trylock failure. Keep rejecting the slot while the irq_work remains busy. Release it after the irq_work callback unlocks the mm. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90245 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbdev: kyro: Validate overlay viewport coordinates The overlay viewport end coordinates are computed from the viewport origin and dimensions using 32-bit unsigned arithmetic. Large input values can cause these calculations to wrap around before the resulting coordinates are passed to SetOverlayViewPort(). SetOverlayViewPort() packs the viewport coordinates into 16-bit register fields. The X coordinates are additionally adjusted by +2 and +1 before being written. Validate the coordinate calculations for 32-bit wraparound and ensure that the adjusted coordinates fit within their 16-bit register fields before calling SetOverlayViewPort(). Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90242 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/vt-d: Fix iopf_refcount leak on RID domain replacement intel_iommu_attach_device() enables IOPF for the new domain but never disables it for the old one. device_block_translation(), called at the start of the function, tears down translation but does not touch any IOPF state; blocking_domain_attach_dev() has to call iopf_for_domain_remove() explicitly before invoking it for exactly this reason. identity_domain_attach_dev() has the same problem. Its comment claims that no PRI handling is needed because the device has been put in the blocking state, but the blocking state and the IOPF reference count are independent of each other. As a result, replacing a domain that has an iopf_handler with another domain at RID level leaks a reference in info->iopf_refcount. The count never drops back to zero, so iopf_queue_remove_device() is never called and iommu_disable_pci_pri() triggers its WARN_ON(info->iopf_refcount) when the device is released. The PASID paths already handle this correctly by way of iopf_for_domain_replace(); convert the two RID paths to do the same. Using the replace helper rather than a bare remove keeps the enable before the disable, so the reference count does not transiently reach zero and evict the device from the IOPF queue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90238 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: amd: isp4: fix self-deadlock in isp4sd_pwron_and_init() error path isp4sd_pwron_and_init() holds ops_mutex via guard(mutex) and, on any init failure, jumps to err_deinit and calls isp4sd_pwroff_and_deinit(). That helper takes the same ops_mutex, re-acquiring a non-recursive mutex already held by the current thread, so any init failure deadlocks. Unwind the error path in stages instead, releasing only what each failure point acquired. This also avoids the issues that an unconditional teardown would hit at the earlier failures, such as a runtime-PM underflow from pm_runtime_resume_and_get() and MMIO access while the device is unpowered. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90233 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-pci: release descriptor pools on probe failure The per-NUMA-node descriptor DMA pools are created lazily from nvme_init_hctx_common() once the admin tag set is allocated, but they are only destroyed in nvme_remove() via nvme_release_descriptor_pools(). Any probe failure after the admin tag set has been allocated unwinds through the out_disable label and nvme_pci_free_ctrl(), neither of which releases the pools, leaking the dma_pool objects. Release the descriptor pools in the out_disable error path. It must not be added to nvme_pci_free_ctrl(), as that would double-free against nvme_remove() on the normal teardown path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90232 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: amt: Don't support cross-netns setup. When a lower device is unregistered, amt_device_event() tries to unregister its upper AMT device, but it has two problems. 1. amt_lookup_upper_dev() looks up an upper device in the lower device's netns only 2. amt_device_event() unregisters a single upper device only If AMT device is created on a lower device in another netns, removing the lower device triggers the splat below and gets stuck until all upper devices are removed. [0] The cross-netns setup seems unintentional considering 1. and the following points: * amt_link_setup() sets dev->netns_immutable to true * skb_scrub_packet() is not called in the fast path * iproute2 binary fails to find cross-netns lower device via link-netns: # ip -n ns1 link add amt0 link-netns ns2 type amt dev veth1 Cannot find device "veth1" Instead of supporting it properly and preparing for per-netns netdev unreg, let's forbid cross-netns setup. Note that the problem 2. needs a separate fix. [0]: WARNING: net/core/dev.c:12518 at unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x1cce/0x2250, CPU#48: ip/2031 Modules linked in: CPU: 48 UID: 0 PID: 2031 Comm: ip Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5+ #27 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:unregister_netdevice_many_notify (net/core/dev.c:12518) Code: 89 ef e8 d5 52 ae fe e9 d0 f4 ff ff 48 8d 3d f9 3b 9c 02 48 c7 c6 c0 0b 63 84 ba ab 1f 00 00 67 48 0f b9 3a e9 65 ff ff ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 81 48 8d 3d f6 3b 9c 02 48 c7 c6 c0 0b 63 84 ba e2 1f RSP: 0018:ffffc90004abf160 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: ffff888104d38260 RBX: ffff88800b0911b8 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffffffff85b9f880 RBP: ffffc90004abf2d0 R08: ffffffff85b9f887 R09: 1ffffffff0b73f10 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff0b73f11 R12: ffff88800b091d08 R13: ffff88800b091178 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff88800b091000 FS: 00007f555b86c600(0000) GS:ffff8881942a0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000562107d489c0 CR3: 0000000109a40002 CR4: 0000000000372ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> rtnl_dellink (net/core/rtnetlink.c:3632 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3674) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:7112) netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2556) netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319) netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1900) ____sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:775) __sys_sendmsg (net/socket.c:2738) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) ... unregister_netdevice: waiting for veth0 to become free. Usage count = 7 ref_tracker: netdev@ffff88800d7496d8 has 3/3 users at __netdev_adjacent_dev_insert (./include/linux/netdevice.h:4525 ./include/linux/netdevice.h:4554 net/core/dev.c:8791) __netdev_upper_dev_link (net/core/dev.c:8879 net/core/dev.c:8963) netdev_upper_dev_link (net/core/dev.c:9009) amt_newlink (drivers/net/amt.c:3321) | ||||
| CVE-2026-90226 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: llcp: avoid userspace overflow on invalid optlen nfc_llcp_getsockopt() casts optval to (u32 __user *) for put_user(), so the kernel always stores 4 bytes regardless of the caller-supplied optlen. The existing min_t(u32, len, sizeof(u32)) only clamps the length reported back to userspace; it does not constrain the store. A call with optlen < 4 therefore writes past the user buffer, violating the getsockopt(2) contract for all five supported optnames. Reject any call with optlen < sizeof(u32) up front. 'len' is int, so a plain size comparison would promote a negative optlen to size_t and slip past the check; an explicit 'len < 0' test is added first to catch negative values before the size compare. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90224 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: nci: fix double completion race in nci_data_exchange_complete nci_close_device() and nci_rx_work can both call nci_data_exchange_complete() concurrently. After commit 4527025d440ce8 ("nfc: nci: fix circular locking dependency in nci_close_device") moved flush_workqueue(ndev->rx_wq) after mutex_unlock(&ndev->req_lock), rx_work is no longer serialized with the explicit completion call in the close path. Both callers read the non-NULL callback pointer and invoke rawsock_data_exchange_complete(), which calls sock_put() -- but only one sock_hold() was taken, so the second sock_put() underflows the refcount and frees the socket while it is still in use. Replace the bare clear_bit(NCI_DATA_EXCHANGE) with test_and_clear_bit() so that only the first caller proceeds to invoke the callback. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90222 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: pn533: hold a reference to the request skb during send_frame __pn533_send_async() publishes the command and then calls dev->phy_ops->send_frame(). Once dev->cmd is set, an incoming frame can be matched to this command: the I2C threaded IRQ runs pn533_recv_frame(), which queues cmd_complete_work, and pn533_send_async_complete() frees cmd->req with consume_skb(). On the I2C transport, pn533_i2c_send_frame() still dereferences the same skb after i2c_master_send() returns, so a completion that races the send can free the skb while the transport is still using it. The request skb is owned by the command object and may be freed by command completion at any time after dev->cmd is published, so the transport send path must not assume it stays alive. Hold a temporary reference to the request skb across the send_frame() call so the transport always sees a live skb even if completion races the send. Add a pn533_send_cmd_frame() helper and use it from all three send paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90221 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfc: nci: fix use of uninitialized memory in CORE_INIT_RSP parsing nci_core_init_rsp_packet_v1() and nci_core_init_rsp_packet_v2() parse the CORE_INIT_RSP packet without validating that the skb contains enough data. A malformed response (e.g. injected via virtual_ncidev) can declare a large num_supported_rf_interfaces while providing insufficient data, causing reads of uninitialized slab memory. This is later used in nci_init_complete_req(), triggering a KMSAN uninit-value warning. Add skb length checks before accessing packet fields: - Validate the skb has at least 1 byte for the status field. - Validate the skb can hold the fixed-size header before parsing. - In v2, bounds-check each variable-length rf_interface entry and its extension parameters within the parsing loop. - In v1, verify the skb is large enough for both the variable-length rf_interfaces array and the trailing rsp_2 structure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90220 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: seq: Don't leak the extension cell pointer in the bounce payload The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload by pointing data.ext.ptr at it. When that event is a queued variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup(). The payload goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address reaches userspace. That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read") removed from the event header. The read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the payload. Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read() treats the header. A stack copy is enough because delivery is synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning. An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE, queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and reading the bounce back. Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90218 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cma: Fix WARNING in res_to_rt syzbot reported a WARN_ON(!res->dev) in res_to_rt() triggered via addr_handler() during asynchronous address resolution: " WARNING: drivers/infiniband/core/restrack.c:138 at res_to_rt+0x1c4/0x230 CPU#1: kworker/u8:4/59 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: kworker/u8:4 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026 Workqueue: ib_addr process_one_req RIP: 0010:res_to_rt+0x1c4/0x230 drivers/infiniband/core/restrack.c:138 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000201f850 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff88d00ce5 RBX: ffff88807f0fd4f8 RCX: ffff88801e6e0000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8fd996f0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff88801e6e0000 R09: 000000000000000a R10: 0000000000000009 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: 1ffff1100fe1fa9f R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888125012000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00001d559c3d2000 CR3: 0000000077c4c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: <TASK> rdma_restrack_add+0x5a/0x8a0 drivers/infiniband/core/restrack.c:236 addr_handler+0x41a/0x5a0 drivers/infiniband/core/cma.c:3534 process_one_req+0x2eb/0x540 drivers/infiniband/core/addr.c:624 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3375 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xc4e/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:3458 worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3539 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK> " In addr_handler(), cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() is called to populate id_priv->cma_dev and bind the associated ib_device to id_priv->id.device. If cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() returns an error (non-zero status), the ID remains unassociated with any RDMA device. Previously, rdma_restrack_add(&id_priv->res) was invoked unconditionally even when cma_acquire_dev_by_src_ip() failed, passing a resource with a NULL dev pointer and triggering the WARN_ON assertion in res_to_rt(). Fix this by only adding the resource to restrack when acquiring the device succeeds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90216 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ubi: Fix rollback for explicit UBI device numbers ubi_init_attach() rolls back module initialization failures by scanning ubi_devices[0..i-1], where i is the mtd= parameter index. That assumes the parameter index matches the UBI device number. That assumption is not true when mtd= specifies an explicit ubi_num. A successfully attached device can be stored at a higher ubi_devices[] slot, and a later failure can miss it during rollback. Scan the full ubi_devices[] array and detach by the actual array index, matching the way UBI devices are stored. | ||||