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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-93037 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/hfi1: Propagate sdma_txinit_ahg() errors set_txreq_header_ahg() ignores the return value of sdma_txinit_ahg(). If sdma_txinit_ahg() fails, it returns before initializing tx->txreq. However, set_txreq_header_ahg() ignores the error and returns the AHG change count, causing the caller to continue processing the request as though initialization had succeeded. Propagate sdma_txinit_ahg() failures to the caller and abort request processing when initialization fails. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90413 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/isert: reject login PDUs declaring more data than was received isert_login_recv_done() records how many bytes the HCA actually placed in the login buffer, but nothing compares that against the length the login PDU's BHS declares. isert_rx_login_req() copies min(login_req_len, MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS) bytes into login->req_buf, and the login code then reads the declared length back out of that buffer - for the first PDU in iscsi_target_locate_portal(), payload_length = ntoh24(login_req->dlength); tmpbuf = kmemdup_nul(login->req_buf, payload_length, GFP_KERNEL); and for the ones after it in iscsi_decode_text_input(), reached from iscsi_target_do_login(). login->req_buf is a fixed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) byte allocation, so an initiator that declares more than it sends reads off the end of it, before authentication and with the length under its control: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 Read of size 8193 at addr ffff8881056a8000 by task iscsi_np/167 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 iscsi_target_locate_portal+0x48d/0x1180 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x19a9/0x3350 Allocated by task 167: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x158/0x370 iscsi_target_login_thread+0x971/0x3350 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 allocated 8192-byte region Falsifying the second login PDU instead reaches the other reader, on the same buffer: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 Read of size 8193 at addr ffff888104d10000 by task kworker/1:1/50 Workqueue: isert_login_wq iscsi_target_do_login_rx __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_nul+0x43/0x80 iscsi_decode_text_input+0xc6/0x11c0 iscsi_target_do_login+0x261/0x1470 iscsi_target_do_login_rx+0x51d/0x7d0 iscsit over TCP is not exposed: iscsit_get_login_rx() validates the declared length with iscsi_target_check_login_request() and then reads exactly that many bytes off the socket, so the declared length governs how much arrives rather than how much is copied out of an already-filled buffer. isert does not call iscsi_target_check_login_request() at all. Reject a login PDU whose declared DataSegmentLength exceeds what was received, in both paths that reach isert_rx_login_req(): isert_get_login_rx() for the first login PDU and isert_login_recv_done() for the ones after it. dlength <= login_req_len is allowed because the received count can include up to three bytes of iSCSI padding. Once the check is in place the copy out can no longer exceed the copy in: the posted login SGE is ISER_RX_PAYLOAD_SIZE, so login_req_len cannot exceed MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS and the min() in isert_rx_login_req() is login_req_len. Like the existing short-PDU check added by 29e7b925ae6d, the reject in isert_login_recv_done() returns without completing login_req_comp, so a malformed subsequent PDU leaves the login to be torn down by the login timer rather than failing immediately. The first-PDU path returns an error and fails straight away. Reproduced on 7.2.0-rc4 with soft-RoCE (rdma_rxe) under KASAN, using an initiator that sends the real key=value payload while declaring 8193 in the BHS, on the first login PDU and on the second in separate runs. The reported read size tracks the declared value exactly; 16384 and 61440 behave the same. Unpatched 3 of 3 runs report on each of the two paths, patched 0 of 3 on both, run alternately in a single session, and a normal login still completes on the patched build. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90414 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 9.1 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/isert: reject PDUs declaring more data than was received isert_recv_done() hands each received PDU to the opcode handlers without ever looking at wc->byte_len, the number of bytes the HCA actually placed in the receive descriptor. The handlers then copy that many bytes - the data-segment length the initiator declared in the BHS (ntoh24(hdr->dlength), via the derived unsol_data_len / imm_data_len) - out of the fixed-size descriptor: isert_handle_iscsi_dataout(): sg_copy_from_buffer(sg_start, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc), unsol_data_len); isert_handle_scsi_cmd(): sg_copy_from_buffer(cmd->se_cmd.t_data_sg, sg_nents, isert_get_data(rx_desc), imm_data_len); Because the declared length is never checked against wc->byte_len, an initiator can declare a data segment larger than the bytes it actually sent (and larger than the descriptor) and cause an out-of-bounds read of the receive buffer. Nothing upstream of isert closes this door: - __iscsit_check_dataout_hdr() bounds the inbound payload against conn_ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength (MXDSL) - a transmit parameter, used here for the inbound check. - iscsi_set_connection_parameters() sets ops->MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = ops->TargetRecvDataSegmentLength; and TARGETRECVDATASEGMENTLENGTH is absent from the min()-clamp list in iscsi_check_acceptor_state(), so the value the initiator declares is adopted verbatim (type range 512..16777215). The initiator effectively raises its own ceiling. - isert never clamps the negotiated value to its own fixed receive descriptor (ISER_RX_SIZE, 9216 bytes), so the target core's bound and the descriptor size are unrelated. The imm_data_len == data_len path is more than an over-read: it aliases the receive descriptor via sg_set_buf() and passes it to the backend as the data source for the SCSI WRITE, so an over-declared length causes heap contents past the descriptor to be written through the backend to the backing store. The backend is the victim of the oversized scatterlist isert hands it, not the cause; no read-back of the written bytes was demonstrated. Trigger: after login completes (full feature phase), an initiator that has declared a large TargetRecvDataSegmentLength and a FirstBurstLength that permits unsolicited/immediate data sends a PDU whose declared data-segment length exceeds what was received. With KASAN: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 Read of size 4096 at addr ffff888109720800 by task kworker/1:0H/25 Workqueue: ib-comp-wq ib_cq_poll_work Call Trace: sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 isert_recv_done+0xba6/0x2390 __ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390 ib_cq_poll_work+0x46/0x150 isert_recv_done+0xba6 resolves to isert_handle_iscsi_dataout() (ib_isert.c:1160), inlined through isert_rx_opcode(). Validate wc->byte_len against the framing in isert_recv_done() before the PDU reaches any handler, and reinstate the connection if it is short. Because the test compares without subtracting the header length, it also rejects PDUs shorter than the iSER and iSCSI headers, which would otherwise be parsed out of stale descriptor contents. The login handler rejects PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN (commit 29e7b925ae6d ("IB/isert: Reject login PDUs shorter than ISER_HEADERS_LEN")) but does not bound the declared length either; that is fixed in the next patch. The data handlers had no length check at all. isert reads the data segment from a fixed offset: isert_get_data() returns the iSER header plus ISER_HEADERS_LEN and makes no adjustment for an AHS. The bytes the handlers touch are therefore exactly [ISER_HEADERS_LEN, ISER_HEADERS_LEN + dlength), and comparing that sum against wc->byte_len bounds precisely the region that is read. An AHS term would only make the test stricter without bounding anything furth ---truncated--- | ||||
| CVE-2026-90415 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cxgb4: free STAG index when TPT entry write fails write_tpt_entry() allocates a new STAG index with c4iw_get_resource() and bumps stats.stag.cur before programming the entry. When write_adapter_mem() fails, it returns the error without releasing the index or reversing the statistic. No MR is inserted into rhp->mrs, so deregistration never reclaims it, leaking the index until device teardown. Record whether this call allocated the index and, on a failed write, return it to tpt_table and decrement stats.stag.cur. Key the rollback on both the write error and that flag, not the error alone: a non-reset update carries a caller-owned STAG that this call did not allocate and must not free. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93039 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: meson: Keep link pointers valid on realloc failure meson_card_reallocate_links() grows the DAI link and private data arrays with two consecutive krealloc() calls and updates the owner pointers only after both calls have succeeded. A successful krealloc() may move the data: it frees the old block and returns a new one. When that happens for the link array and the second krealloc() then fails, card->dai_link still points to the block that krealloc() already freed, and the error path frees the new block too. The probe error path then calls meson_card_clean_references(), which dereferences card->dai_link and kfree()s it again, resulting in a use-after-free and a double free. Commit card->dai_link and card->num_links right after the first krealloc() succeeds, so the pointer always refers to a valid allocation that meson_card_clean_references() can walk and free. krealloc() with __GFP_ZERO zero-initializes the added entries, so walking them on the error path is safe. With both failure paths reduced to a plain return, drop the goto labels and the error message. | ||||
| CVE-2026-93041 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: dw-edma: Serialize abort state updates dw_edma_abort_interrupt() drops vc.lock before changing request and status. issue_pending() can acquire the lock in that small window, observe the old busy state, and skip starting queued descriptors. Then the abort handler overwrites the channel status as idle, leaving the new descriptors stranded for good. Keep descriptor completion and the state transition in the same critical section. | ||||
| CVE-2026-88926 | 2026-09-19 | N/A | ||
| The VikRentItems Flexible Rental Management System WordPress plugin before 1.2.4 does not sanitise and escape some of its parameters before using them in SQL statements, allowing unauthenticated users to perform SQL injection attacks. | ||||
| CVE-2026-88824 | 2026-09-19 | N/A | ||
| The Master Blocks WordPress plugin before 1.5.0 does not have authorisation on one of its REST routes, allowing unauthenticated users to update its settings, including a value that is output unescaped in the admin area, leading to Stored XSS that executes in the session of any administrator visiting a wp-admin page. | ||||
| CVE-2026-85680 | 2026-09-19 | N/A | ||
| The Ultimate Member WordPress plugin before 2.13.1 does not escape a value derived from user supplied profile names before outputting it in the page title, and decodes HTML entities in it after its own sanitisation has already run, allowing unauthenticated attackers who register an account to store JavaScript that will execute when any visitor, including an administrator, views their profile. | ||||
| CVE-2026-84750 | 2026-09-19 | N/A | ||
| The Ultra Addons for Contact Form 7 WordPress plugin before 3.5.51 does not validate the type or extension of files uploaded through one of its form fields, and stores them at a predictable public path with the attacker-chosen extension intact, allowing unauthenticated users to upload arbitrary files. The PHP handler shipped by default with the Debian and Ubuntu Apache packages maps .phar to PHP alongside .php and .phtml, so on that stack the uploaded file is executed and the issue leads to Remote Code Execution and full site takeover. Where the host routes only .php to the PHP handler, the same file is instead served from the site's own origin with its script intact, leading to Stored Cross-Site Scripting. | ||||
| CVE-2026-19860 | 2026-09-19 | N/A | ||
| The JetFormBuilder — Dynamic Blocks Form Builder WordPress plugin before 3.6.5.3 does not sufficiently restrict which PHP functions can be used as a custom field-validation callback, relying on a blocklist that omits a file-deletion function, allowing users able to manage forms to cause arbitrary files on the server to be deleted. The deletion itself is carried out when the form is submitted, which requires no authentication. | ||||
| CVE-2026-16557 | 2026-09-19 | N/A | ||
| The Nimble Page Builder WordPress plugin through 3.3.8 does not perform an authorization check when returning page-builder content through an authenticated AJAX action, allowing any authenticated user (Subscriber+) to disclose the page-builder content of arbitrary non-public (draft, pending, private, scheduled) posts and pages. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90423 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix UAF in ODP init error-handling path rxe_odp_mr_init_user() stores &umem_odp->umem in mr->umem before calling rxe_odp_init_pages(). If rxe_odp_init_pages() fails, rxe_odp_mr_init_user() releases umem_odp and returns an error. rxe_reg_user_mr() then unwinds the error through rxe_cleanup(), rxe_mr_cleanup(), ib_umem_release(mr->umem). There is an IS_ERR_OR_NULL(umem) check at the start of ib_umem_release(). But since mr->umem is NOT reset to NULL in the error handling path of rxe_odp_mr_init_user(), the check passes and it reads already-freed fields like umem->is_dmabuf, causing UAF. Fix the UAF by clearing mr->umem after releasing the failed ODP umem so the MR cleanup path does not release it again. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90426 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Free the error IRQ before tearing down VINTFs tegra241_cmdqv_remove() tears each VINTF down first, then calls free_irq(). Tearing a VINTF down frees vintf0 and clears cmdqv->vintfs[0]. An error in that window makes tegra241_cmdqv_isr() read the stale slot and hand it to tegra241_vintf0_handle_error(), which dereferences a NULL or freed pointer. Free the IRQ before tearing the VINTFs down. free_irq() waits for in-flight handlers to finish and blocks new ones, so no ISR can observe a VINTF as it is torn down. Note: a user-owned VINTF (viommu) could outlive this teardown, which unmaps cmdqv->base and frees cmdqv->vintfs, so a later viommu close then touches freed memory. This is neither introduced nor fixed here: a physical IOMMU is not a pluggable device, so iommufd by design holds no reference on the one behind a viommu, and this teardown is not expected while that viommu is still alive. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90427 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | 7.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Don't fall back to a freed smmu after devm_krealloc() __tegra241_cmdqv_probe() uses devm_krealloc() to grow @smmu into the larger tegra241_cmdqv, which frees the original @smmu once it relocates. A failure after that returned NULL, and the caller then dereferenced the freed @smmu on its fallback path. Return an int and take @smmu by reference instead, then update *smmu to the reallocated pointer after devm_krealloc() succeeds, so the caller and its fallback path both use the live @smmu rather than the freed original. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90428 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Don't run the error ISR before probe sets up vintfs __tegra241_cmdqv_probe() requests the error IRQ before it has allocated the cmdqv->vintfs array and set cmdqv->num_vintfs. A CMDQV left enabled with a latched error across a kexec fires the IRQ as soon as it is requested, and tegra241_cmdqv_isr() then walks the uninitialized cmdqv->vintfs array. Request the IRQ only after cmdqv->vintfs is allocated and zeroed, so that a latched interrupt firing early runs the ISR against a valid array of NULL slots that it safely skips. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92478 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: core: Validate connected lane counts The connected lane count is used by TX equalization code to index arrays sized by UFS_MAX_LANES. Reject zero and out-of-range RX or TX lane counts before they can be propagated. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92480 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: core: Validate string descriptors The string descriptor length includes a two-byte header while the UTF-16 payload starts after it. utf16s_to_utf8s() expects a count of UTF-16 code units, not bytes. Passing the payload byte count can make it read beyond the descriptor buffer. Validate that the payload has an even byte count, pass a code-unit count to the converter, and allocate sufficient UTF-8 output space. The raw string buffer starts after the descriptor header but its size is bLength. Copying bLength bytes from that pointer can read beyond the response buffer. Allocate a zeroed bLength-sized buffer and copy only the UTF-16 payload. This preserves the raw buffer size consumed by the RPMB device-ID ABI while avoiding the overread. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92481 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pinctrl: mediatek: free EINT resources on unbind mtk_eint_do_init() creates an IRQ domain, populates it with a mapping for every EINT line and installs a chained handler on the parent interrupt, but none of these are ever released. This was harmless while the drivers were built-in, but now that they can be built as modules and unbound/rmmod'd it leaves behind a dangling IRQ domain, interrupt mappings whose chip data points at freed memory, and a chained handler that keeps firing into that freed data. The plain allocations in mtk_eint_do_init() already use the device-managed devm_*() helpers, so tear the remaining resources down the same way: register a devm action that detaches the chained handler, waits for any in-flight handler to finish, disposes of the per-line mappings and removes the IRQ domain. This mirrors the device-managed lifecycle adopted for the GPIO chip and keeps the whole EINT setup self-cleaning on unbind. | ||||
| CVE-2026-92483 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-19 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: liveupdate: Remember FLB retrieve() status LUO keeps track of successful retrieve attempts on an FLB. It does so to avoid multiple retrievals of the same FLB. Multiple retrievals cause problems because once the FLB is retrieved, the serialized data structures are likely freed and the FLB is likely in a very different state from what the code expects. All this works well when retrieve succeeds. When it fails, luo_flb_retrieve_one() returns the error immediately, without ever storing anywhere that a retrieve was attempted or what its error code was. If the user attempts to retrieve another file registered with the same FLB, LUO will attempt to call the FLB's retrieve() callback again. The retry is problematic for much of the same reasons listed above. The FLB is likely in a very different state than what the retrieve logic normally expects (e.g. some KHO pages may have already been restored and freed). There is no sane way of attempting the retrieve again. Remember the error retrieve returned and directly return it on a retry. This is done by changing the retrieved bool to a retrieve_status integer. A value of 0 means retrieve was never attempted, a positive value means it succeeded, and a negative value means it failed and the error code is the value. This is similar to commit f85b1c6af5bc ("liveupdate: luo_file: remember retrieve() status") which did the same for LUO files. | ||||