In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix chunk number of the first chunk in a local quota file
Mounting a crafted OCFS2 image can corrupt kernel memory. When the
local quota file header of such an image claims zero chunks, the first
quota entry allocated during the mount gets a chunk number taken from a
kernel pointer, and releasing that entry clears a bit far outside the
chunk bitmap.
The write will corrupt the data stored at that address, and the
corruption may lead to a system crash or damage unrelated data.
Mounting requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so it takes an untrusted image, such
as removable media or a loop mount of a file from elsewhere.
Since the chunk number comes from a kernel pointer, the address of the
bit that gets cleared differs from boot to boot, and the issue has been
reported under several titles:
- BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KASAN: use-after-free Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KASAN: slab-use-after-free Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KFENCE: use-after-free write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
Note that none of these is a use-after-free in the quota code: the
chunk and its buffer head are alive. The bit that gets cleared lies
far outside the bitmap. KASAN and KFENCE name each report based on the
object occupying that address, which explains why the same issue is
reported under so many different titles. In the report I sent, the
address fell in a free page, which KASAN labels use-after-free.
There are known reproducers. Both a syzkaller and a C reproducer are
available from the Google Drive link [1] in my report thread. The
issue was found by our modified syzkaller, not a theoretical thing
found by an LLM. I have not seen it outside fuzzing, so it is not
affecting me in the real world.
The local quota file in OCFS2 is divided into chunks, and each chunk
begins with a header block holding a bitmap of the quota entries that
chunk has handed out. Chunks are numbered from zero, and that number is
used to convert the file offset of an entry back into a bit position in
the bitmap. ocfs2_local_quota_add_chunk() appends a new chunk to the
in-memory list and numbers it one past the chunk that was last:
list_add_tail(&chunk->qc_chunk, &oinfo->dqi_chunk);
chunk->qc_num = list_entry(chunk->qc_chunk.prev,
struct ocfs2_quota_chunk,
qc_chunk)->qc_num + 1;
The predecessor is looked up after the new chunk is added to the list, so
if the list was empty, the prev pointer is the list head itself. The head
is the dqi_chunk member of struct ocfs2_mem_dqinfo and is not a chunk, so
reading qc_num through it lands 16 bytes past the start of the head, on
the dqi_gqinode pointer that follows it. The first chunk of the file is
then numbered with the lower half of a kernel pointer instead of 0.
The list is empty when the local quota file header claims the file has no
chunks. ocfs2_local_read_info() takes dqi_chunks from that header without
validating it, so an image with dqi_chunks == 0 takes this path when the
first quota entry is allocated.
ocfs2_create_local_dquot() turns the bad number into a file offset with
ol_dqblk_off(), which shifts a 32-bit block number left by the block size
bits, so the top bits of such a large block number are lost.
ocfs2_local_release_dquot() turns the offset back into a bit index with
ol_dqblk_chunk_off(), using the full chunk number, so the lost bits push
that index far outside the bitmap, and clearing it corrupts unrelated
memory.
Compute the chunk number before putting the chunk on the list, and use 0
when the list is empty.
ocfs2: fix chunk number of the first chunk in a local quota file
Mounting a crafted OCFS2 image can corrupt kernel memory. When the
local quota file header of such an image claims zero chunks, the first
quota entry allocated during the mount gets a chunk number taken from a
kernel pointer, and releasing that entry clears a bit far outside the
chunk bitmap.
The write will corrupt the data stored at that address, and the
corruption may lead to a system crash or damage unrelated data.
Mounting requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so it takes an untrusted image, such
as removable media or a loop mount of a file from elsewhere.
Since the chunk number comes from a kernel pointer, the address of the
bit that gets cleared differs from boot to boot, and the issue has been
reported under several titles:
- BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KASAN: use-after-free Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KASAN: slab-use-after-free Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
- KFENCE: use-after-free write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot
Note that none of these is a use-after-free in the quota code: the
chunk and its buffer head are alive. The bit that gets cleared lies
far outside the bitmap. KASAN and KFENCE name each report based on the
object occupying that address, which explains why the same issue is
reported under so many different titles. In the report I sent, the
address fell in a free page, which KASAN labels use-after-free.
There are known reproducers. Both a syzkaller and a C reproducer are
available from the Google Drive link [1] in my report thread. The
issue was found by our modified syzkaller, not a theoretical thing
found by an LLM. I have not seen it outside fuzzing, so it is not
affecting me in the real world.
The local quota file in OCFS2 is divided into chunks, and each chunk
begins with a header block holding a bitmap of the quota entries that
chunk has handed out. Chunks are numbered from zero, and that number is
used to convert the file offset of an entry back into a bit position in
the bitmap. ocfs2_local_quota_add_chunk() appends a new chunk to the
in-memory list and numbers it one past the chunk that was last:
list_add_tail(&chunk->qc_chunk, &oinfo->dqi_chunk);
chunk->qc_num = list_entry(chunk->qc_chunk.prev,
struct ocfs2_quota_chunk,
qc_chunk)->qc_num + 1;
The predecessor is looked up after the new chunk is added to the list, so
if the list was empty, the prev pointer is the list head itself. The head
is the dqi_chunk member of struct ocfs2_mem_dqinfo and is not a chunk, so
reading qc_num through it lands 16 bytes past the start of the head, on
the dqi_gqinode pointer that follows it. The first chunk of the file is
then numbered with the lower half of a kernel pointer instead of 0.
The list is empty when the local quota file header claims the file has no
chunks. ocfs2_local_read_info() takes dqi_chunks from that header without
validating it, so an image with dqi_chunks == 0 takes this path when the
first quota entry is allocated.
ocfs2_create_local_dquot() turns the bad number into a file offset with
ol_dqblk_off(), which shifts a 32-bit block number left by the block size
bits, so the top bits of such a large block number are lost.
ocfs2_local_release_dquot() turns the offset back into a bit index with
ol_dqblk_chunk_off(), using the full chunk number, so the lost bits push
that index far outside the bitmap, and clearing it corrupts unrelated
memory.
Compute the chunk number before putting the chunk on the list, and use 0
when the list is empty.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix chunk number of the first chunk in a local quota file Mounting a crafted OCFS2 image can corrupt kernel memory. When the local quota file header of such an image claims zero chunks, the first quota entry allocated during the mount gets a chunk number taken from a kernel pointer, and releasing that entry clears a bit far outside the chunk bitmap. The write will corrupt the data stored at that address, and the corruption may lead to a system crash or damage unrelated data. Mounting requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, so it takes an untrusted image, such as removable media or a loop mount of a file from elsewhere. Since the chunk number comes from a kernel pointer, the address of the bit that gets cleared differs from boot to boot, and the issue has been reported under several titles: - BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request in ocfs2_local_release_dquot - KASAN: use-after-free Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot - KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot - KASAN: slab-use-after-free Write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot - KFENCE: use-after-free write in ocfs2_local_release_dquot Note that none of these is a use-after-free in the quota code: the chunk and its buffer head are alive. The bit that gets cleared lies far outside the bitmap. KASAN and KFENCE name each report based on the object occupying that address, which explains why the same issue is reported under so many different titles. In the report I sent, the address fell in a free page, which KASAN labels use-after-free. There are known reproducers. Both a syzkaller and a C reproducer are available from the Google Drive link [1] in my report thread. The issue was found by our modified syzkaller, not a theoretical thing found by an LLM. I have not seen it outside fuzzing, so it is not affecting me in the real world. The local quota file in OCFS2 is divided into chunks, and each chunk begins with a header block holding a bitmap of the quota entries that chunk has handed out. Chunks are numbered from zero, and that number is used to convert the file offset of an entry back into a bit position in the bitmap. ocfs2_local_quota_add_chunk() appends a new chunk to the in-memory list and numbers it one past the chunk that was last: list_add_tail(&chunk->qc_chunk, &oinfo->dqi_chunk); chunk->qc_num = list_entry(chunk->qc_chunk.prev, struct ocfs2_quota_chunk, qc_chunk)->qc_num + 1; The predecessor is looked up after the new chunk is added to the list, so if the list was empty, the prev pointer is the list head itself. The head is the dqi_chunk member of struct ocfs2_mem_dqinfo and is not a chunk, so reading qc_num through it lands 16 bytes past the start of the head, on the dqi_gqinode pointer that follows it. The first chunk of the file is then numbered with the lower half of a kernel pointer instead of 0. The list is empty when the local quota file header claims the file has no chunks. ocfs2_local_read_info() takes dqi_chunks from that header without validating it, so an image with dqi_chunks == 0 takes this path when the first quota entry is allocated. ocfs2_create_local_dquot() turns the bad number into a file offset with ol_dqblk_off(), which shifts a 32-bit block number left by the block size bits, so the top bits of such a large block number are lost. ocfs2_local_release_dquot() turns the offset back into a bit index with ol_dqblk_chunk_off(), using the full chunk number, so the lost bits push that index far outside the bitmap, and clearing it corrupts unrelated memory. Compute the chunk number before putting the chunk on the list, and use 0 when the list is empty. | |
| Title | ocfs2: fix chunk number of the first chunk in a local quota file | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-19T14:41:03.138Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.414Z
Link: CVE-2026-99430
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-19T15:17:56.240
Modified: 2026-11-19T15:17:56.240
Link: CVE-2026-99430
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.