In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length
svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv() validates only an upper bound on the
wire-supplied opaque length before handing the buffer to
gss_unwrap():
if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
goto unwrap_failed;
offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
...
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf);
The wire value `len` flows unchanged as the upper bound into the
krb5 unwrap path, so a len in [0, 16] passes this check and is
handed to gss_unwrap(). For a krb5 v2 context that lands in
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), which reads the 16-byte RFC 4121 token
header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 and then calls rotate_left()
before any integrity check. With a sub-header length the header
reads run past the token, and _rotate_left()'s `shift %= buf->len`
path can divide by zero when buf->len has been driven to zero by
the truncated token. A header-only token (len == 16) is equally
invalid: with a non-zero RRC field and the opaque blob ending at
the XDR buffer boundary, rotate_left() builds a zero-length
subbuffer, reaching the same division.
Reject the token at the server entry point before it reaches the
krb5 unwrap core. A valid sealed RFC 4121 token must contain
the 16-byte header plus at least some encrypted payload.
Fix by adding a minimum-length check immediately after the
existing upper-bound check:
if (len <= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
goto unwrap_failed;
SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length
svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv() validates only an upper bound on the
wire-supplied opaque length before handing the buffer to
gss_unwrap():
if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr))
goto unwrap_failed;
offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr);
...
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf);
The wire value `len` flows unchanged as the upper bound into the
krb5 unwrap path, so a len in [0, 16] passes this check and is
handed to gss_unwrap(). For a krb5 v2 context that lands in
gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), which reads the 16-byte RFC 4121 token
header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 and then calls rotate_left()
before any integrity check. With a sub-header length the header
reads run past the token, and _rotate_left()'s `shift %= buf->len`
path can divide by zero when buf->len has been driven to zero by
the truncated token. A header-only token (len == 16) is equally
invalid: with a non-zero RRC field and the opaque blob ending at
the XDR buffer boundary, rotate_left() builds a zero-length
subbuffer, reaching the same division.
Reject the token at the server entry point before it reaches the
krb5 unwrap core. A valid sealed RFC 4121 token must contain
the 16-byte header plus at least some encrypted payload.
Fix by adding a minimum-length check immediately after the
existing upper-bound check:
if (len <= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)
goto unwrap_failed;
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Sat, 12 Sep 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Weaknesses | CWE-369 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
threat_severity
|
cvssV3_1
|
Fri, 11 Sep 2026 23:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length svcauth_gss_unwrap_priv() validates only an upper bound on the wire-supplied opaque length before handing the buffer to gss_unwrap(): if (len > xdr_stream_remaining(xdr)) goto unwrap_failed; offset = xdr_stream_pos(xdr); ... maj_stat = gss_unwrap(ctx, offset, offset + len, buf); The wire value `len` flows unchanged as the upper bound into the krb5 unwrap path, so a len in [0, 16] passes this check and is handed to gss_unwrap(). For a krb5 v2 context that lands in gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(), which reads the 16-byte RFC 4121 token header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 and then calls rotate_left() before any integrity check. With a sub-header length the header reads run past the token, and _rotate_left()'s `shift %= buf->len` path can divide by zero when buf->len has been driven to zero by the truncated token. A header-only token (len == 16) is equally invalid: with a non-zero RRC field and the opaque blob ending at the XDR buffer boundary, rotate_left() builds a zero-length subbuffer, reaching the same division. Reject the token at the server entry point before it reaches the krb5 unwrap core. A valid sealed RFC 4121 token must contain the 16-byte header plus at least some encrypted payload. Fix by adding a minimum-length check immediately after the existing upper-bound check: if (len <= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN) goto unwrap_failed; | |
| Title | SUNRPC: svcauth_gss: enforce krb5 token minimum length | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-11T19:44:24.572Z
Reserved: 2026-09-11T19:38:34.723Z
Link: CVE-2026-89550
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-11T20:19:38.500
Modified: 2026-09-11T20:19:38.500
Link: CVE-2026-89550
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-09-12T10:45:13Z
Weaknesses