A topology's `topology.blobstore.map` lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the
supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without
normalisation, in both `AsyncLocalizer` and `Container.createBlobstoreLinks`, and the symlink helper
force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link.
A submitter could therefore use `../` segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary
path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include
recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker
launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the
isolation that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` is intended to provide.
Mitigation
Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites.
Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may
reject submissions whose `topology.blobstore.map` entries contain path separators or `..` segments before
they reach Nimbus.
Credit
The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
Project Subscriptions
No data.
No advisories yet.
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Mon, 14 Sep 2026 21:00:00 +0000
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cvssV3_1
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Mon, 14 Sep 2026 14:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | Description A topology's `topology.blobstore.map` lets the submitter choose a local name for each blob that the supervisor localises. That name was used to build a path under the topology's working directory without normalisation, in both `AsyncLocalizer` and `Container.createBlobstoreLinks`, and the symlink helper force-deletes whatever already exists at the target before creating the link. A submitter could therefore use `../` segments to direct that delete-and-symlink operation at an arbitrary path, as the supervisor user, on every node the topology is scheduled onto. The consequences include recursive deletion of supervisor-owned content and planting a symlink that causes a subsequent worker launch to execute attacker-chosen code as another tenant's operating-system user, which defeats the isolation that `supervisor.run.worker.as.user` is intended to provide. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the resolved target must lie inside the expected root at both call sites. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict topology submission to trusted principals, and may reject submissions whose `topology.blobstore.map` entries contain path separators or `..` segments before they reach Nimbus. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm. | |
| Title | Apache Storm Nimbus: Path Traversal as the Supervisor User via Unsanitised Blobstore Map Local Name | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 | |
| References |
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: apache
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-14T19:56:39.893Z
Reserved: 2026-08-29T10:07:21.703Z
Link: CVE-2026-82427
Updated: 2026-09-14T15:13:37.932Z
Status : Deferred
Published: 2026-09-14T15:17:09.553
Modified: 2026-09-14T20:58:48.430
Link: CVE-2026-82427
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.