The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user.
Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.
Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference.
Project Subscriptions
No data.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
Disable Docker Model Runner or only run trusted containers on Docker Desktop instances where Model Runner is enabled.
References
| Link | Providers |
|---|---|
| https://docs.docker.com/desktop/release-notes/#4710 |
|
History
Fri, 22 May 2026 21:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Docker
Docker docker Desktop |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Docker
Docker docker Desktop |
Fri, 22 May 2026 20:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | The MLX inference backend in Docker Model Runner on macOS uses the MLX-LM library, which unconditionally imports and executes arbitrary Python files from model directories via the model_file configuration field in config.json. When a model's config.json specifies a model_file pointing to a Python file, MLX-LM uses importlib to load and execute it with no trust_remote_code gate or equivalent safety check. The MLX backend runs without sandboxing, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the Docker host as the Docker Desktop user. Any container on the Docker network can trigger this by calling the model-runner.docker.internal API to pull a malicious model from an attacker-controlled OCI registry and request inference. | |
| Title | Docker Model Runner container-to-host code execution via MLX-LM model_file importlib loading | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-829 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Projects
Sign in to view the affected projects.
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Docker
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-22T19:28:38.857Z
Reserved: 2026-04-08T17:43:50.508Z
Link: CVE-2026-5843
No data.
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-22T21:30:16Z
Weaknesses