OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.

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History

Fri, 23 Oct 2026 23:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
First Time appeared Open-reception
Open-reception appointment-booking-software
Vendors & Products Open-reception
Open-reception appointment-booking-software

Fri, 23 Oct 2026 20:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 2.0.0, the account-confirmation link in emails is built from the request Host header, with no allowlist. The unauthenticated POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation rotates a pending invitee's confirmation token and emails a link whose host comes from the request. An attacker who sends one resend-confirmation with Host: attacker.example and a pending invitee's email causes that invitee to receive a confirmation email whose only link points to the attacker. If the invitee clicks, the one-time confirmation token reaches the attacker, who then confirms the account on the real tenant domain and registers a passkey they control, taking over the account before the legitimate invitee ever uses it. All released versions through v1.1.0 are affected; no patched version exists yet. Reaching the app with a spoofed Host depends on the front proxy: the stock Caddy catch-all forwards it, while an operator who configures explicit per-tenant proxy blocks is not affected (see Details 4). The invite path builds links from the trusted tenant.domain (invite/+server.ts:204-210); the resend-confirmation path builds them from the request Host. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.0.
Title OpenReception: Confirmation-email links built from the request Host enable pending-account takeover via `POST /api/auth/resend-confirmation`
Weaknesses CWE-640
References
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 8.3, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L'}


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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: GitHub_M

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-23T20:27:36.090Z

Reserved: 2026-06-29T17:09:25.872Z

Link: CVE-2026-58202

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-10-23T21:17:24.473

Modified: 2026-10-23T21:17:24.473

Link: CVE-2026-58202

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-10-23T22:45:14Z

Weaknesses