Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse "..". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing ".." segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.
Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SANKO | Net::BitTorrent | unaffected |
|
No data.
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment is a feature of OpenCVE that uses AI to automatically link vendors and products to CVEs. Learn more on GitHub.
| Vendors | Products |
|---|---|
|
Sanko
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|
Net::bittorrent
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|
No advisories yet.
Solution
Upgrade to version 2.1.0 or later.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
Mon, 20 Jul 2026 07:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata. Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse "..". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing ".." segments therefore resolves outside the download directory. Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host. | Net::BitTorrent versions before 2.1.0 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata. Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse "..". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing ".." segments therefore resolves outside the download directory. Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host. |
| Title | Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata | Net::BitTorrent versions before 2.1.0 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata |
| References |
|
Wed, 01 Jul 2026 10:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| First Time appeared |
Sanko
Sanko net::bittorrent |
|
| Vendors & Products |
Sanko
Sanko net::bittorrent |
Tue, 30 Jun 2026 14:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
|
Tue, 30 Jun 2026 11:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata. Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse "..". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing ".." segments therefore resolves outside the download directory. Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host. | |
| Title | Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 | |
| References |
|
Projects
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CPANSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-20T06:42:11.512Z
Reserved: 2026-06-23T18:20:33.513Z
Link: CVE-2026-57079
Vulnrichment
Updated: 2026-06-30T13:51:56.088Z
NVD
No data.
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-07-01T10:01:57Z