FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec("echo `date` \"- {FASTNETMON] - " . $msg . " \" >> " . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon's C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters.
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Fixes
Solution
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Workaround
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References
History
Tue, 26 May 2026 16:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Title | OS Command Injection in FastNetMon Juniper Plugin | |
| First Time appeared |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
|
| Weaknesses | CWE-78 | |
| Vendors & Products |
Pavel-odintsov
Pavel-odintsov fastnetmon |
Tue, 26 May 2026 15:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 contains an OS command injection vulnerability in the Juniper router integration plugin. The _log() function in src/juniper_plugin/fastnetmon_juniper.php (lines 117-118) constructs shell commands by concatenating the $msg parameter directly into exec() calls: exec("echo `date` \"- {FASTNETMON] - " . $msg . " \" >> " . $FILE_LOG_TMP). The $msg variable contains unsanitized data derived from command-line arguments argv[1] through argv[3], which represent the attack IP address, direction, and power. While FastNetMon's C++ core currently passes IP addresses via inet_ntoa() (which only produces safe dotted-decimal notation), the PHP script performs no input validation or shell escaping. If the script is invoked directly, by another orchestration system, or if future code changes pass string-sourced IPs, arbitrary commands can be injected. The correct fix is to replace exec() with file_put_contents() or use escapeshellarg() on all parameters. | |
| References |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: mitre
Published:
Updated: 2026-05-26T14:49:49.999Z
Reserved: 2026-05-22T00:00:00.000Z
Link: CVE-2026-48687
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-05-26T16:16:26.800
Modified: 2026-05-26T16:16:26.800
Link: CVE-2026-48687
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-05-26T16:30:10Z
Weaknesses
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