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Solution
The project is archived and currently no permanent solution is scheduled for release. See workaround section.
Workaround
Three independent fixes: * Set TEMP (or pass -Djava.io.tmpdir) to a directory the service account owns and that is not world-writable. * Harden the systemd unit with PrivateTmp=yes, so /tmp is namespaced per service. * At the code level, extract into a directory owned by the service account and refuse to reuse a pre-existing extraction root that the service does not own, instead of forceMkdir-ing into whatever is already there.
Fri, 06 Nov 2026 20:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In all versions of PyTorch's TorchServe, a predictable extraction directory in /tmp lets a local user swap the model handler and run code as the TorchServe service account leading to local privilege escalation. | |
| Title | pytorch/serve: Local privilege escalation through insecure temporary path | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-379 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Akrites
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-06T20:18:25.863Z
Reserved: 2026-11-06T17:53:03.966Z
Link: CVE-2026-123974
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Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-06T20:17:20.633
Modified: 2026-11-06T20:17:20.633
Link: CVE-2026-123974
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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