Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy.

The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes.

This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.

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Solution

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Workaround

Check the value your proxy_auth_fun is about to return for CR, LF and NUL bytes and return {error, Reason} instead when one is present. The callback runs in the application, so the check can be made there.

History

Mon, 26 Oct 2026 14:00:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy. The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
Title CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney
First Time appeared Benoitc
Benoitc hackney
Weaknesses CWE-113
CPEs cpe:2.3:a:benoitc:hackney:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Benoitc
Benoitc hackney
References
Metrics cvssV4_0

{'score': 2.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N'}


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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: EEF

Published:

Updated: 2026-10-26T13:48:46.589Z

Reserved: 2026-10-26T10:15:01.166Z

Link: CVE-2026-112880

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-10-26T14:16:28.440

Modified: 2026-10-26T14:16:28.440

Link: CVE-2026-112880

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses