Kasa EC70 v4
and EC71 v4 do not logically disable the production debug interface at the
firmware or chip level and do not lock the bootloader. Although the debug traces are physically
severed during manufacturing, an attacker with physical access can restore the
connection, interrupt the boot process, and manipulate boot parameters to enter
a non-standard initialization path that exposes an unauthenticated root shell
during startup.
Successful exploitation may allow an
attacker with physical access to obtain root-level command access during device
startup, resulting in loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for
the affected device. Exploitation requires device disassembly, restoration of
the severed debug connection, and manipulation of the boot process.
and EC71 v4 do not logically disable the production debug interface at the
firmware or chip level and do not lock the bootloader. Although the debug traces are physically
severed during manufacturing, an attacker with physical access can restore the
connection, interrupt the boot process, and manipulate boot parameters to enter
a non-standard initialization path that exposes an unauthenticated root shell
during startup.
Successful exploitation may allow an
attacker with physical access to obtain root-level command access during device
startup, resulting in loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for
the affected device. Exploitation requires device disassembly, restoration of
the severed debug connection, and manipulation of the boot process.
Project Subscriptions
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Advisories
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Fixes
Solution
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Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Thu, 01 Oct 2026 21:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Kasa EC70 v4 and EC71 v4 do not logically disable the production debug interface at the firmware or chip level and do not lock the bootloader. Although the debug traces are physically severed during manufacturing, an attacker with physical access can restore the connection, interrupt the boot process, and manipulate boot parameters to enter a non-standard initialization path that exposes an unauthenticated root shell during startup. Successful exploitation may allow an attacker with physical access to obtain root-level command access during device startup, resulting in loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability for the affected device. Exploitation requires device disassembly, restoration of the severed debug connection, and manipulation of the boot process. | |
| Title | Physical UART Access Leading to an Unauthenticated Root Shell in TP-Link Kasa EC70 and EC71 | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-1191 | |
| References |
| |
| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: TPLink
Published:
Updated: 2026-10-01T21:01:44.613Z
Reserved: 2026-09-28T23:32:02.361Z
Link: CVE-2026-102370
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-10-01T21:17:17.703
Modified: 2026-10-01T21:17:17.703
Link: CVE-2026-102370
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses