| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| WeeChat (Wee Enhanced Environment for Chat) is a free chat client. In versions 4.3.0 through 4.9.0, the WeeChat relay module's WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression function relay_websocket_inflate() has no upper bound on output size. An authenticated relay user can send a small compressed WebSocket frame (~100 bytes) that decompresses to gigabytes, exhausting all server memory and crashing the entire WeeChat process. The api protocol enables permessage-deflate and requires authentication before WebSocket upgrade. Version 4.9.1 patches the issue. |
| Carbone is vulnerable to Denial of Service due to lack of protection against zip bombs when processing .docx files. The library uses yazl for zip decompression without validating entry sizes, allowing an attacker to supply a malicious .docx file containing a zip bomb that decompresses to a significantly larger size, causing excessive memory consumption and crashing the application server.
The issue was fixed in versions: 3.8.2, 4.26.3 and 5.4.4. The fix is available across all distribution types. |
| Wazuh 4.4.0 before 4.14.7 contains a denial of service vulnerability in the fdecompress_files() function within cluster.py that allows authenticated cluster peers to exhaust memory by supplying a malicious synchronization archive without decompressed size limits. Attackers holding a valid cluster Fernet key can upload a small, highly compressed zip bomb archive that forces wazuh-clusterd on the master node to decompress the full payload into memory, causing memory exhaustion and service disruption. |
| Pillow is a Python imaging library. Versions 10.3.0 through 12.1.1 did not limit the amount of GZIP-compressed data read when decoding a FITS image, making them vulnerable to decompression bomb attacks. A specially crafted FITS file could cause unbounded memory consumption, leading to denial of service (OOM crash or severe performance degradation). If users are unable to immediately upgrade, they should only open specific image formats, excluding FITS, as a workaround. |
| httplib2 is a comprehensive HTTP client library for Python. Prior to 0.32.0, httplib2 performs unbounded decompression of HTTP response bodies encoded with Content-Encoding: gzip or deflate in _decompressContent in httplib2/init.py, allowing a malicious or compromised HTTP server to return a small compressed payload that expands to an arbitrarily large size in memory and causes MemoryError or OOM-kill in the client process. This issue is fixed in version 0.32.0. |
| Tanium addressed a compression bomb vulnerability in Findings. |
| Tanium addressed a compression bomb vulnerability in Threat Response. |
| Grav is a file-based Web platform. Prior to 2.0.1, Grav ZipArchiver::extract() in system/src/Grav/Common/Filesystem/ZipArchiver.php passes archives to ZipArchive::extractTo() without enforcing the system.gpm.archive uncompressed-size, file-count, or nesting-depth limits. Code using Archiver::create('zip') to extract an attacker-controlled archive can exhaust disk space or inodes and make the site unavailable. This issue is fixed in version 2.0.1. |
| Improper handling of highly compressed data in the GZIP auto-decompression handler in Amazon ion-java before 1.12.0 might allow remote actors to cause a denial of service via a crafted compressed Ion document that expands to an arbitrarily large size upon decompression.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to version 1.12.0 and configure withGzipDecompressionEnabled(false) and/or set an explicit withMaximumBufferSize() when parsing untrusted input. |
| Memory Allocation with Excessive Size Value vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server's mod_http leads to denial of service via malicious HTTP requests.
This issue affects Apache HTTP Server: from 2.4.17 through 2.4.67. |
| urllib3 is an HTTP client library for Python. From 2.6.0 to before 2.7.0, urllib3 could decompress the whole response instead of the requested portion (1) during the second HTTPResponse.read(amt=N) call when the response was decompressed using the official Brotli library or (2) when HTTPResponse.drain_conn() was called after the response had been read and decompressed partially (compression algorithm did not matter here). These issues could cause urllib3 to fully decode a small amount of highly compressed data in a single operation. This could result in excessive resource consumption (high CPU usage and massive memory allocation for the decompressed data) on the client side. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.7.0. |
| The undici WebSocket client is vulnerable to a denial-of-service attack via unbounded memory consumption during permessage-deflate decompression. When a WebSocket connection negotiates the permessage-deflate extension, the client decompresses incoming compressed frames without enforcing any limit on the decompressed data size. A malicious WebSocket server can send a small compressed frame (a "decompression bomb") that expands to an extremely large size in memory, causing the Node.js process to exhaust available memory and crash or become unresponsive.
The vulnerability exists in the PerMessageDeflate.decompress() method, which accumulates all decompressed chunks in memory and concatenates them into a single Buffer without checking whether the total size exceeds a safe threshold. |
| Malcolm's upload-processing pipeline (scripts/safe-extract.py) enforces entry-count, nesting-depth, and total-uncompressed-byte limits when extracting container archives (zip/tar/rar/7z via libarchive), but those limits are not applied when the uploaded file is a single-stream compressed format (.gz, .bz2, .xz, .lzma, .lz) that isn't a .tar.*-style archive. Any authenticated user permitted to upload PCAP/log files can upload a small, highly compressible file (e.g. a gzip bomb) that decompresses to an effectively unbounded size on disk, exhausting the shared Docker volume used by OpenSearch, Logstash, Arkime, and Zeek, and disrupting the platform for all users. |
| Mattermost versions 11.9.x <= 11.9.0, 11.8.x <= 11.8.4, 11.7.x <= 11.7.7, 10.11.x <= 10.11.22 fail to properly limit resource consumption when processing certain user-supplied input, which allows an authenticated user to cause a denial of service. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00713 |
| Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies.
Req's default response pipeline includes Req.Steps.decode_body/1 and Req.Steps.decompress_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decode_body/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and calls :zip.extract(body, [:memory]) for application/zip, :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]) for application/x-tar, and :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]) for application/gzip / .tgz. Each returns the full decompressed archive contents as a [{name, bytes}] list in memory, with no per-entry or total size cap. decompress_body/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib/:brotli/:ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip inflates through multiple layers without bound.
Both steps are enabled by default, no caller opt-in is required, and the attacker controls the content-type and content-encoding headers on their own server (or on any host reached via Req's automatic redirect following). A sub-megabyte response can expand to multiple gigabytes on the victim, crashing the BEAM process.
This issue affects req: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.1. |
| Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in elixir-tesla tesla allows a denial of service via decompression bomb in HTTP response bodies.
When Tesla.Middleware.DecompressResponse or Tesla.Middleware.Compression is included in a Tesla middleware pipeline, HTTP response bodies are decompressed eagerly with no size limit. The decompress_body/2 function in lib/tesla/middleware/compression.ex passes the entire response body to :zlib.gunzip/1 or :zlib.unzip/1 without any cap on the output size. Additionally, compression_algorithms/1 splits the content-encoding header on commas and decompress_body/2 recurses once per token, applying a decompression pass on each iteration. A server advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip, gzip causes four recursive decompression passes, yielding exponential amplification: each gzip layer can expand its input roughly 1000x, so a payload of a few hundred bytes on the wire inflates to gigabytes of BEAM heap, exhausting memory and crashing or freezing the calling process.
This issue affects tesla: from 0.6.0 before 1.18.3. |
| In JetBrains YouTrack before 2026.2.18177 doS attack was possible via a decompression bomb in the import endpoint |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: Fix possible token leak in mt7996_tx_prepare_skb()
If link_conf or link_sta lookup fails in mt7996_tx_prepare_skb routine,
mt7996 driver leaks an already allocated tx token. Fix the issue
releasing the token in case of error. |
| ffuf is a fast web fuzzer written in Go. Prior to 2.2.0, ffuf allows a malicious target server to cause an out-of-memory denial of service because the response size guard in pkg/runner/simple.go checks only the compressed Content-Length while io.ReadAll reads gzip, brotli, deflate, transparently decompressed, or chunked response bodies without a decompressed-size bound. This issue is fixed in version 2.2.0. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup's WebSocket implementation when using the permessage-deflate extension. The extension's decompression loop (inflate()) processes data in chunks without enforcing an upper boundary limit on the output buffer size. While libsoup limits the incoming compressed frame size via max_incoming_payload_size, it fails to track or limit memory allocation during decompression. A separate check for decompressed size (max_total_message_size) exists but executes only after inflation is complete, and it is entirely disabled by default for client connections. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can exploit this by sending a small, highly compressed payload (a decompression bomb), causing unbounded memory allocation that triggers an Out-of-Memory (OOM) crash and a Denial of Service (DoS). |
