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Search Results (2 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2024-5617 | 1 Wso2 | 4 Wso2 Api Manager, Wso2 Carbon Identity Management, Wso2 Carbon User Manager Kernel and 1 more | 2026-11-02 | 4.8 Medium |
| The account lock feature fails to correctly enforce account lockouts on the primary user store when users with identical usernames exist in both primary and secondary user stores. This occurs because the lock condition is only applied to the secondary user store account in such scenarios, allowing continued authentication attempts against the primary user store account. This functional flaw enables brute force attacks. By systematically attempting different passwords against the primary user store account, an attacker can potentially gain unauthorized access to sensitive information or accounts, as the intended account lockout mechanism does not prevent repeated login attempts. | ||||
| CVE-2025-13394 | 1 Wso2 | 56 Api Control Plane, Api Manager, Enterprise Integrator and 53 more | 2026-08-12 | 5.4 Medium |
| The Ajax processor within the Carbon console fails to adequately protect state-changing operations from Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. Specifically, it utilizes the HTTP GET method for these operations, and while the SameSite=Lax cookie attribute is employed for mitigation, this mechanism is bypassed as it permits cookies to be sent with cross-origin top-level navigation requests, including GET requests. This allows an attacker to trick an authenticated user's browser into unknowingly executing unintended actions. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform unauthorized state-altering requests on behalf of authenticated users. This could lead to consequences such as data modification, account changes, or other actions that could result in data compromise or loss of user control over their account. However, this attack is only feasible if the Carbon console and related services are exposed to the public internet, which is not recommended according to WSO2's security guidelines. | ||||
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