| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0597, Vim's Python omni-completion executes reconstructed function and class definitions from the current buffer with exec() as part of populating the completion dictionary. Python evaluates function default values, parameter annotations, and class base expressions at definition time, so a hostile buffer can execute attacker-controlled Python expressions during omni-completion. The existing g:pythoncomplete_allow_import mitigation (GHSA-52mc-rq6p-rc7c) does not cover this path, because the attacker-controlled code is not a harvested import/from statement. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0597. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0561, the Python omni-completion script in python3complete.vim for Vim with the +python3 interpreter enabled (and the legacy pythoncomplete.vim for builds with the +python interpreter) executes the import and from statements found in the current buffer through Python's import machinery. Because the buffer's working directory is on sys.path, opening a hostile .py file with a sibling Python package and invoking omni-completion runs that package's top-level code as the editing user. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0561. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0495, a Vimscript code injection vulnerability exists in s:NetrwBookHistSave() in the netrw plugin (runtime/pack/dist/opt/netrw/autoload/netrw.vim) when serializing browsed directory paths to the history file ~/.vim/.netrwhist. A directory name derived from the filesystem is interpolated into a single-quoted Vimscript string literal without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing a crafted directory name to break out of the string context and execute arbitrary Vimscript, including shell commands via system() and :!, the next time the history file is sourced. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0495. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0496, a code injection vulnerability exists in s:stepmatch() in the cucumber filetype plugin (runtime/ftplugin/cucumber.vim) on Vim builds with +ruby support. Step-definition patterns read from .rb files under the repository's features/*/ or stories/*/ directories are embedded into a Ruby Kernel.eval argument without sufficient escaping, allowing a crafted pattern in an attacker-controlled repository to execute arbitrary Ruby (and through it arbitrary shell commands) when the user invokes a step-jump mapping ([d, ]d). This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0496. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0565, the update_snapshot() function in src/terminal.c copies the visible terminal screen into the scrollback buffer when a snapshot is taken. For each screen cell it walks the cell's chars[] array with no upper bound, stopping only when it encounters a NUL terminator. When a cell legitimately fills all VTERM_MAX_CHARS_PER_CELL (6) slots — a base character plus five combining marks — the bundled libvterm returns the array without a terminating NUL, so the loop reads past the fixed six-element array and appends the out-of-bounds values to a buffer reserved for only six characters. A program whose output is rendered inside a :terminal window can trigger this with a short byte sequence and no Vim scripting, leading to a crash. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0565. |
| The UNIX editor Vim prior to version 9.1.0678 has a use-after-free error in argument list handling. When adding a new file to the argument list, this triggers `Buf*` autocommands. If in such an autocommand the buffer that was just opened is closed (including the window where it is shown), this causes the window structure to be freed which contains a reference to the argument list that we are actually modifying. Once the autocommands are completed, the references to the window and argument list are no longer valid and as such cause an use-after-free. Impact is low since the user must either intentionally add some unusual autocommands that wipe a buffer during creation (either manually or by sourcing a malicious plugin), but it will crash Vim. The issue has been fixed as of Vim patch v9.1.0678. |
| When switching to other buffers using the :all command and visual mode still being active, this may cause a heap-buffer overflow, because Vim does not properly end visual mode and therefore may try to access beyond the end of a line in a buffer. In Patch 9.1.1003 Vim will correctly reset the visual mode before opening other windows and buffers and therefore fix this bug. In addition it does verify that it won't try to access a position if the position is greater than the corresponding buffer line. Impact is medium since the user must have switched on visual mode when executing the :all ex command. The Vim project would like to thank github user gandalf4a for reporting this issue. The issue has been fixed as of Vim patch v9.1.1003 |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.1.2132, a heap buffer overflow vulnerability exists in Vim's tag file resolution logic when processing the 'helpfile' option. The vulnerability is located in the get_tagfname() function in src/tag.c. When processing help file tags, Vim copies the user-controlled 'helpfile' option value into a fixed-size heap buffer of MAXPATHL + 1 bytes (typically 4097 bytes) using an unsafe STRCPY() operation without any bounds checking. This issue has been patched in version 9.1.2132. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0450, a heap buffer overflow exists in read_compound() in src/spellfile.c when loading a crafted spell file (.spl) with UTF-8 encoding active. An attacker-controlled length field in the spell file's compound section overflows a 32-bit signed integer multiplication, causing a small buffer to be allocated for a write loop that runs many iterations, overflowing the heap. Because the 'spelllang' option can be set from a modeline, a text file modeline can trigger spell file loading if a malicious .spl file has been planted on the runtimepath. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0450. |
| vim is vulnerable to Heap-based Buffer Overflow |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0073, an OS command injection vulnerability exists in the `netrw` standard plugin bundled with Vim. By inducing a user to open a crafted URL (e.g., using the `scp://` protocol handler), an attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Vim process. Version 9.2.0073 fixes the issue. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Versions prior to 9.2.0077 have a heap-buffer-overflow and a segmentation fault (SEGV) exist in Vim's swap file recovery logic. Both are caused by unvalidated fields read from crafted pointer blocks within a swap file. Version 9.2.0077 fixes the issue. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0479, a command injection vulnerability exists in tar#Vimuntar() in
runtime/autoload/tar.vim when decompressing .tgz archives on Unix-like systems. The function builds :!gunzip and :!gzip -d commands using shellescape(tartail) without the {special} flag, allowing a crafted archive filename to trigger Vim cmdline-special expansion and execute shell commands in the user's context. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.2.0479. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0435, an OS command injection vulnerability exists in Vim's :find command-line completion. When the path option contains backtick-enclosed shell commands, those commands are executed during file name completion. Because the path option lacks the P_SECURE flag, it can be set from a modeline, allowing an attacker who controls the contents of a file to execute arbitrary shell commands when the user opens that file in Vim and triggers :find completion. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0435. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to version 9.2.0383, an OS command injection vulnerability exists in the netrw standard plugin bundled with Vim. By inducing a user to open a crafted URL (e.g., using the sftp:// or file:// protocol handlers), an attacker can execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Vim process. This issue has been patched in version 9.2.0383. |
| Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0357, A command injection vulnerability exists in Vim's tag file processing. When resolving a tag, the filename field from the tags file is passed through wildcard expansion to resolve environment variables and wildcards. If the filename field contains backtick syntax (e.g., `command`), Vim executes the embedded command via the system shell with the full privileges of the running user. |
| Vim 7.1.314, 6.4, and other versions allows user-assisted remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via Vim scripts that do not properly sanitize inputs before invoking the execute or system functions, as demonstrated using (1) filetype.vim, (3) xpm.vim, (4) gzip_vim, and (5) netrw. NOTE: the originally reported version was 7.1.314, but the researcher actually found this set of issues in 7.1.298. NOTE: the zipplugin issue (originally vector 2 in this identifier) has been subsumed by CVE-2008-3075. |
| The shellescape function in Vim 7.0 through 7.2, including 7.2a.10, allows user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary code via the "!" (exclamation point) shell metacharacter in (1) the filename of a tar archive and possibly (2) the filename of the first file in a tar archive, which is not properly handled by the VIM TAR plugin (tar.vim) v.10 through v.22, as demonstrated by the shellescape, tarplugin.v2, tarplugin, and tarplugin.updated test cases. NOTE: this issue reportedly exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2008-2712. NOTE: this issue has the same root cause as CVE-2008-3075. NOTE: due to the complexity of the associated disclosures and the incomplete information related to them, there may be inaccuracies in this CVE description and in external mappings to this identifier. |
| The shellescape function in Vim 7.0 through 7.2, including 7.2a.10, allows user-assisted attackers to execute arbitrary code via the "!" (exclamation point) shell metacharacter in (1) the filename of a ZIP archive and possibly (2) the filename of the first file in a ZIP archive, which is not properly handled by zip.vim in the VIM ZIP plugin (zipPlugin.vim) v.11 through v.21, as demonstrated by the zipplugin and zipplugin.v2 test cases. NOTE: this issue reportedly exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2008-2712. NOTE: this issue has the same root cause as CVE-2008-3074. NOTE: due to the complexity of the associated disclosures and the incomplete information related to them, there may be inaccuracies in this CVE description and in external mappings to this identifier. |
| Vim 3.0 through 7.x before 7.2.010 does not properly escape characters, which allows user-assisted attackers to (1) execute arbitrary shell commands by entering a K keystroke on a line that contains a ";" (semicolon) followed by a command, or execute arbitrary Ex commands by entering an argument after a (2) "Ctrl-]" (control close-square-bracket) or (3) "g]" (g close-square-bracket) keystroke sequence, a different issue than CVE-2008-2712. |
