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Search Results (2 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-49836 | 1 Psd-tools | 1 Psd-tools | 2026-09-11 | N/A |
| psd-tools is a Python package for working with Adobe Photoshop PSD files. Prior to version 1.17.1, `SmartObject.save()` writes an embedded smart object to a path taken verbatim from the PSD file. Because that name is attacker-controlled and unsanitised, a tool that extracts embedded objects from an untrusted `.psd` can be made to write attacker-chosen bytes to an attacker-chosen path (absolute or `../`-traversing), outside its intended output directory. A secondary issue in `SmartObject.open()` for external-kind smart objects allows the attacker-controlled `fullPath` descriptor to be used as an arbitrary file read path, enabling exfiltration of the read content to the controlled write destination. Both issues are fixed in v1.17.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-27809 | 2 Psd-tools, Psd-tools Project | 2 Psd-tools, Psd-tools | 2026-04-17 | 9.1 Critical |
| psd-tools is a Python package for working with Adobe Photoshop PSD files. Prior to version 1.12.2, when a PSD file contains malformed RLE-compressed image data (e.g. a literal run that extends past the expected row size), decode_rle() raises ValueError which propagated all the way to the user, crashing psd.composite() and psd-tools export. decompress() already had a fallback that replaces failed channels with black pixels when result is None, but it never triggered because the ValueError from decode_rle() was not caught. The fix in version 1.12.2 wraps the decode_rle() call in a try/except so the existing fallback handles the error gracefully. | ||||
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