| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/edid: In connector_bad_edid() cap num_of_ext by num_blocks read
In commit e11f5bd8228f ("drm: Add support for DP 1.4 Compliance edid
corruption test") the function connector_bad_edid() started assuming
that the memory for the EDID passed to it was big enough to hold
`edid[0x7e] + 1` blocks of data (1 extra for the base block). It
completely ignored the fact that the function was passed `num_blocks`
which indicated how much memory had been allocated for the EDID.
Let's fix this by adding a bounds check.
This is important for handling the case where there's an error in the
first block of the EDID. In that case we will call
connector_bad_edid() without having re-allocated memory based on
`edid[0x7e]`. |
| Side-channel information leakage in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 140.0.7339.207 allowed a remote attacker to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm: Ensure input to pfn_to_kaddr() is treated as a 64-bit type
On 64-bit platforms, the pfn_to_kaddr() macro requires that the input
value is 64 bits in order to ensure that valid address bits don't get
lost when shifting that input by PAGE_SHIFT to calculate the physical
address to provide a virtual address for.
One such example is in pvalidate_pages() (used by SEV-SNP guests), where
the GFN in the struct used for page-state change requests is a 40-bit
bit-field, so attempts to pass this GFN field directly into
pfn_to_kaddr() ends up causing guest crashes when dealing with addresses
above the 1TB range due to the above.
Fix this issue with SEV-SNP guests, as well as any similar cases that
might cause issues in current/future code, by using an inline function,
instead of a macro, so that the input is implicitly cast to the
expected 64-bit input type prior to performing the shift operation.
While it might be argued that the issue is on the caller side, other
archs/macros have taken similar approaches to deal with instances like
this, such as ARM explicitly casting the input to phys_addr_t:
e48866647b48 ("ARM: 8396/1: use phys_addr_t in pfn_to_kaddr()")
A C inline function is even better though.
[ mingo: Refined the changelog some more & added __always_inline. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Add oversize check before call kvcalloc()
Commit 7661809d493b ("mm: don't allow oversized kvmalloc() calls") add the
oversize check. When the allocation is larger than what kmalloc() supports,
the following warning triggered:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8408 at mm/util.c:597 kvmalloc_node+0x108/0x110 mm/util.c:597
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8408 Comm: syz-executor221 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:kvmalloc_node+0x108/0x110 mm/util.c:597
Call Trace:
kvmalloc include/linux/mm.h:806 [inline]
kvmalloc_array include/linux/mm.h:824 [inline]
kvcalloc include/linux/mm.h:829 [inline]
check_btf_line kernel/bpf/verifier.c:9925 [inline]
check_btf_info kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10049 [inline]
bpf_check+0xd634/0x150d0 kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13759
bpf_prog_load kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2301 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0x11181/0x126e0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4587
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x78/0x90 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: Fix DSP oops stack dump output contents
Fix @buf arg given to hex_dump_to_buffer() and stack address used
in dump error output. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: schedutil: Use kobject release() method to free sugov_tunables
The struct sugov_tunables is protected by the kobject, so we can't free
it directly. Otherwise we would get a call trace like this:
ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: timer_list hint: delayed_work_timer_fn+0x0/0x30
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 720 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 PID: 720 Comm: a.sh Tainted: G W 5.14.0-rc1-next-20210715-yocto-standard+ #507
Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT)
pstate: 40400009 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
pc : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
lr : debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
sp : ffff80001ecaf910
x29: ffff80001ecaf910 x28: ffff00011b10b8d0 x27: ffff800011043d80
x26: ffff00011a8f0000 x25: ffff800013cb3ff0 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff80001142aa68 x22: ffff800011043d80 x21: ffff00010de46f20
x20: ffff800013c0c520 x19: ffff800011d8f5b0 x18: 0000000000000010
x17: 6e6968207473696c x16: 5f72656d6974203a x15: 6570797420746365
x14: 6a626f2029302065 x13: 303378302f307830 x12: 2b6e665f72656d69
x11: ffff8000124b1560 x10: ffff800012331520 x9 : ffff8000100ca6b0
x8 : 000000000017ffe8 x7 : c0000000fffeffff x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : ffff800011d8c000 x4 : ffff800011d8c740 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffff0001108301c0 x1 : ab3c90eedf9c0f00 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
debug_print_object+0xb8/0x100
__debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x1c0/0x230
debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x20/0x88
slab_free_freelist_hook+0x154/0x1c8
kfree+0x114/0x5d0
sugov_exit+0xbc/0xc0
cpufreq_exit_governor+0x44/0x90
cpufreq_set_policy+0x268/0x4a8
store_scaling_governor+0xe0/0x128
store+0xc0/0xf0
sysfs_kf_write+0x54/0x80
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x128/0x1c0
new_sync_write+0xf0/0x190
vfs_write+0x2d4/0x478
ksys_write+0x74/0x100
__arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x54/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x64/0x158
el0_svc+0x2c/0xb0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb8
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
irq event stamp: 5518
hardirqs last enabled at (5517): [<ffff8000100cbd7c>] console_unlock+0x554/0x6c8
hardirqs last disabled at (5518): [<ffff800010fc0638>] el1_dbg+0x28/0xa0
softirqs last enabled at (5504): [<ffff8000100106e0>] __do_softirq+0x4d0/0x6c0
softirqs last disabled at (5483): [<ffff800010049548>] irq_exit+0x1b0/0x1b8
So split the original sugov_tunables_free() into two functions,
sugov_clear_global_tunables() is just used to clear the global_tunables
and the new sugov_tunables_free() is used as kobj_type::release to
release the sugov_tunables safely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac80211: limit injected vht mcs/nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap
Limit max values for vht mcs and nss in ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap
routine in order to fix the following warning reported by syzbot:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 10717 at include/net/mac80211.h:989 ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 10717 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.14.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_rate_set_vht include/net/mac80211.h:989 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ieee80211_parse_tx_radiotap+0x101e/0x12d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:2244
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000186f3e8 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: 0000000000000618 RBX: ffff88804ef76500 RCX: ffffc900143a5000
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffffff888f478e RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000ffffffff R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000100
R10: ffffffff888f46f9 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffff8
R13: ffff88804ef7653c R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000004
FS: 00007fbf5718f700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000001b2de23000 CR3: 000000006a671000 CR4: 00000000001506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Call Trace:
ieee80211_monitor_select_queue+0xa6/0x250 net/mac80211/iface.c:740
netdev_core_pick_tx+0x169/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:4089
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f9/0x3710 net/core/dev.c:4165
__bpf_tx_skb net/core/filter.c:2114 [inline]
__bpf_redirect_no_mac net/core/filter.c:2139 [inline]
__bpf_redirect+0x5ba/0xd20 net/core/filter.c:2162
____bpf_clone_redirect net/core/filter.c:2429 [inline]
bpf_clone_redirect+0x2ae/0x420 net/core/filter.c:2401
bpf_prog_eeb6f53a69e5c6a2+0x59/0x234
bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:717 [inline]
__bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:624 [inline]
bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:631 [inline]
bpf_test_run+0x381/0xa30 net/bpf/test_run.c:119
bpf_prog_test_run_skb+0xb84/0x1ee0 net/bpf/test_run.c:663
bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3307 [inline]
__sys_bpf+0x2137/0x5df0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4605
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4691 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4689
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665f9 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac80211-hwsim: fix late beacon hrtimer handling
Thomas explained in https://lore.kernel.org/r/87mtoeb4hb.ffs@tglx
that our handling of the hrtimer here is wrong: If the timer fires
late (e.g. due to vCPU scheduling, as reported by Dmitry/syzbot)
then it tries to actually rearm the timer at the next deadline,
which might be in the past already:
1 2 3 N N+1
| | | ... | |
^ intended to fire here (1)
^ next deadline here (2)
^ actually fired here
The next time it fires, it's later, but will still try to schedule
for the next deadline (now 3), etc. until it catches up with N,
but that might take a long time, causing stalls etc.
Now, all of this is simulation, so we just have to fix it, but
note that the behaviour is wrong even per spec, since there's no
value then in sending all those beacons unaligned - they should be
aligned to the TBTT (1, 2, 3, ... in the picture), and if we're a
bit (or a lot) late, then just resume at that point.
Therefore, change the code to use hrtimer_forward_now() which will
ensure that the next firing of the timer would be at N+1 (in the
picture), i.e. the next interval point after the current time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: fix svm_migrate_fini warning
Device manager releases device-specific resources when a driver
disconnects from a device, devm_memunmap_pages and
devm_release_mem_region calls in svm_migrate_fini are redundant.
It causes below warning trace after patch "drm/amdgpu: Split
amdgpu_device_fini into early and late", so remove function
svm_migrate_fini.
BUG: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/amd/-/issues/1718
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3646 at drivers/base/devres.c:795
devm_release_action+0x51/0x60
Call Trace:
? memunmap_pages+0x360/0x360
svm_migrate_fini+0x2d/0x60 [amdgpu]
kgd2kfd_device_exit+0x23/0xa0 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_amdkfd_device_fini_sw+0x1d/0x30 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0x45/0x290 [amdgpu]
amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x12/0x30 [amdgpu]
drm_dev_release+0x20/0x40 [drm]
release_nodes+0x196/0x1e0
device_release_driver_internal+0x104/0x1d0
driver_detach+0x47/0x90
bus_remove_driver+0x7a/0xd0
pci_unregister_driver+0x3d/0x90
amdgpu_exit+0x11/0x20 [amdgpu] |
| NVIDIA Container Toolkit for Linux contains a Time-of-Check Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability when used with default configuration, where a crafted container image could gain access to the host file system. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, denial of service, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, and data tampering. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Fix vector state restore in rt_sigreturn()
The RISC-V Vector specification states in "Appendix D: Calling
Convention for Vector State" [1] that "Executing a system call causes
all caller-saved vector registers (v0-v31, vl, vtype) and vstart to
become unspecified.". In the RISC-V kernel this is called "discarding
the vstate".
Returning from a signal handler via the rt_sigreturn() syscall, vector
discard is also performed. However, this is not an issue since the
vector state should be restored from the sigcontext, and therefore not
care about the vector discard.
The "live state" is the actual vector register in the running context,
and the "vstate" is the vector state of the task. A dirty live state,
means that the vstate and live state are not in synch.
When vectorized user_from_copy() was introduced, an bug sneaked in at
the restoration code, related to the discard of the live state.
An example when this go wrong:
1. A userland application is executing vector code
2. The application receives a signal, and the signal handler is
entered.
3. The application returns from the signal handler, using the
rt_sigreturn() syscall.
4. The live vector state is discarded upon entering the
rt_sigreturn(), and the live state is marked as "dirty", indicating
that the live state need to be synchronized with the current
vstate.
5. rt_sigreturn() restores the vstate, except the Vector registers,
from the sigcontext
6. rt_sigreturn() restores the Vector registers, from the sigcontext,
and now the vectorized user_from_copy() is used. The dirty live
state from the discard is saved to the vstate, making the vstate
corrupt.
7. rt_sigreturn() returns to the application, which crashes due to
corrupted vstate.
Note that the vectorized user_from_copy() is invoked depending on the
value of CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V_UCOPY_THRESHOLD. Default is 768, which
means that vlen has to be larger than 128b for this bug to trigger.
The fix is simply to mark the live state as non-dirty/clean prior
performing the vstate restore. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/bpf: Fix IP after emitting call depth accounting
Adjust the IP passed to `emit_patch` so it calculates the correct offset
for the CALL instruction if `x86_call_depth_emit_accounting` emits code.
Otherwise we will skip some instructions and most likely crash. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bcachefs: kvfree bch_fs::snapshots in bch2_fs_snapshots_exit
bch_fs::snapshots is allocated by kvzalloc in __snapshot_t_mut.
It should be freed by kvfree not kfree.
Or umount will triger:
[ 406.829178 ] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffe7b487148008
[ 406.830676 ] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 406.831643 ] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 406.832487 ] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 406.832898 ] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[ 406.833512 ] CPU: 2 PID: 1754 Comm: umount Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.7.0-rc7-custom+ #90
[ 406.834746 ] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014
[ 406.835796 ] RIP: 0010:kfree+0x62/0x140
[ 406.836197 ] Code: 80 48 01 d8 0f 82 e9 00 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 00 00 80 48 2b 15 78 9f 1f 01 48 01 d0 48 c1 e8 0c 48 c1 e0 06 48 03 05 56 9f 1f 01 <48> 8b 50 08 48 89 c7 f6 c2 01 0f 85 b0 00 00 00 66 90 48 8b 07 f6
[ 406.837810 ] RSP: 0018:ffffb9d641607e48 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 406.838213 ] RAX: ffffe7b487148000 RBX: ffffb9d645200000 RCX: ffffb9d641607dc4
[ 406.838738 ] RDX: 000065bb00000000 RSI: ffffffffc0d88b84 RDI: ffffb9d645200000
[ 406.839217 ] RBP: ffff9a4625d00068 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
[ 406.839650 ] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 000000000000001f R12: ffff9a4625d4da80
[ 406.840055 ] R13: ffff9a4625d00000 R14: ffffffffc0e2eb20 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 406.840451 ] FS: 00007f0a264ffb80(0000) GS:ffff9a4e2d500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 406.840851 ] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 406.841125 ] CR2: ffffe7b487148008 CR3: 000000018c4d2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 406.841464 ] Call Trace:
[ 406.841583 ] <TASK>
[ 406.841682 ] ? __die+0x1f/0x70
[ 406.841828 ] ? page_fault_oops+0x159/0x470
[ 406.842014 ] ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x310
[ 406.842198 ] ? exc_page_fault+0x1ed/0x200
[ 406.842382 ] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
[ 406.842574 ] ? bch2_fs_release+0x54/0x280 [bcachefs]
[ 406.842842 ] ? kfree+0x62/0x140
[ 406.842988 ] ? kfree+0x104/0x140
[ 406.843138 ] bch2_fs_release+0x54/0x280 [bcachefs]
[ 406.843390 ] kobject_put+0xb7/0x170
[ 406.843552 ] deactivate_locked_super+0x2f/0xa0
[ 406.843756 ] cleanup_mnt+0xba/0x150
[ 406.843917 ] task_work_run+0x59/0xa0
[ 406.844083 ] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x197/0x1a0
[ 406.844302 ] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x16/0x40
[ 406.844510 ] do_syscall_64+0x4e/0xf0
[ 406.844675 ] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76
[ 406.844907 ] RIP: 0033:0x7f0a2664e4fb |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: use OPTION_MPTCP_MPJ_SYNACK in subflow_finish_connect()
subflow_finish_connect() uses four fields (backup, join_id, thmac, none)
that may contain garbage unless OPTION_MPTCP_MPJ_SYNACK has been set
in mptcp_parse_option() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: core: fix transmit-buffer reset and memleak
Commit 761ed4a94582 ("tty: serial_core: convert uart_close to use
tty_port_close") converted serial core to use tty_port_close() but
failed to notice that the transmit buffer still needs to be freed on
final close.
Not freeing the transmit buffer means that the buffer is no longer
cleared on next open so that any ioctl() waiting for the buffer to drain
might wait indefinitely (e.g. on termios changes) or that stale data can
end up being transmitted in case tx is restarted.
Furthermore, the buffer of any port that has been opened would leak on
driver unbind.
Note that the port lock is held when clearing the buffer pointer due to
the ldisc race worked around by commit a5ba1d95e46e ("uart: fix race
between uart_put_char() and uart_shutdown()").
Also note that the tty-port shutdown() callback is not called for
console ports so it is not strictly necessary to free the buffer page
after releasing the lock (cf. d72402145ace ("tty/serial: do not free
trasnmit buffer page under port lock")). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: liteuart: fix minor-number leak on probe errors
Make sure to release the allocated minor number before returning on
probe errors. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
IB/hfi1: Fix leak of rcvhdrtail_dummy_kvaddr
This buffer is currently allocated in hfi1_init():
if (reinit)
ret = init_after_reset(dd);
else
ret = loadtime_init(dd);
if (ret)
goto done;
/* allocate dummy tail memory for all receive contexts */
dd->rcvhdrtail_dummy_kvaddr = dma_alloc_coherent(&dd->pcidev->dev,
sizeof(u64),
&dd->rcvhdrtail_dummy_dma,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dd->rcvhdrtail_dummy_kvaddr) {
dd_dev_err(dd, "cannot allocate dummy tail memory\n");
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
The reinit triggered path will overwrite the old allocation and leak it.
Fix by moving the allocation to hfi1_alloc_devdata() and the deallocation
to hfi1_free_devdata(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: Fix nsfd startup race (again)
Commit bd5ae9288d64 ("nfsd: register pernet ops last, unregister first")
has re-opened rpc_pipefs_event() race against nfsd_net_id registration
(register_pernet_subsys()) which has been fixed by commit bb7ffbf29e76
("nfsd: fix nsfd startup race triggering BUG_ON").
Restore the order of register_pernet_subsys() vs register_cld_notifier().
Add WARN_ON() to prevent a future regression.
Crash info:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000012
CPU: 8 PID: 345 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.4.144-... #1
pc : rpc_pipefs_event+0x54/0x120 [nfsd]
lr : rpc_pipefs_event+0x48/0x120 [nfsd]
Call trace:
rpc_pipefs_event+0x54/0x120 [nfsd]
blocking_notifier_call_chain
rpc_fill_super
get_tree_keyed
rpc_fs_get_tree
vfs_get_tree
do_mount
ksys_mount
__arm64_sys_mount
el0_svc_handler
el0_svc |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmem: Fix shift-out-of-bound (UBSAN) with byte size cells
If a cell has 'nbits' equal to a multiple of BITS_PER_BYTE the logic
*p &= GENMASK((cell->nbits%BITS_PER_BYTE) - 1, 0);
will become undefined behavior because nbits modulo BITS_PER_BYTE is 0, and we
subtract one from that making a large number that is then shifted more than the
number of bits that fit into an unsigned long.
UBSAN reports this problem:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/nvmem/core.c:1386:8
shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'unsigned long'
CPU: 6 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u16:0 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3+ #9
Hardware name: Google Lazor (rev3+) with KB Backlight (DT)
Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x170
show_stack+0x24/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c
dump_stack+0x18/0x38
ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x54
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x180/0x194
__nvmem_cell_read+0x1ec/0x21c
nvmem_cell_read+0x58/0x94
nvmem_cell_read_variable_common+0x4c/0xb0
nvmem_cell_read_variable_le_u32+0x40/0x100
a6xx_gpu_init+0x170/0x2f4
adreno_bind+0x174/0x284
component_bind_all+0xf0/0x264
msm_drm_bind+0x1d8/0x7a0
try_to_bring_up_master+0x164/0x1ac
__component_add+0xbc/0x13c
component_add+0x20/0x2c
dp_display_probe+0x340/0x384
platform_probe+0xc0/0x100
really_probe+0x110/0x304
__driver_probe_device+0xb8/0x120
driver_probe_device+0x4c/0xfc
__device_attach_driver+0xb0/0x128
bus_for_each_drv+0x90/0xdc
__device_attach+0xc8/0x174
device_initial_probe+0x20/0x2c
bus_probe_device+0x40/0xa4
deferred_probe_work_func+0x7c/0xb8
process_one_work+0x128/0x21c
process_scheduled_works+0x40/0x54
worker_thread+0x1ec/0x2a8
kthread+0x138/0x158
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Fix it by making sure there are any bits to mask out. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8712: fix use-after-free in rtl8712_dl_fw
Syzbot reported use-after-free in rtl8712_dl_fw(). The problem was in
race condition between r871xu_dev_remove() ->ndo_open() callback.
It's easy to see from crash log, that driver accesses released firmware
in ->ndo_open() callback. It may happen, since driver was releasing
firmware _before_ unregistering netdev. Fix it by moving
unregister_netdev() before cleaning up resources.
Call Trace:
...
rtl871x_open_fw drivers/staging/rtl8712/hal_init.c:83 [inline]
rtl8712_dl_fw+0xd95/0xe10 drivers/staging/rtl8712/hal_init.c:170
rtl8712_hal_init drivers/staging/rtl8712/hal_init.c:330 [inline]
rtl871x_hal_init+0xae/0x180 drivers/staging/rtl8712/hal_init.c:394
netdev_open+0xe6/0x6c0 drivers/staging/rtl8712/os_intfs.c:380
__dev_open+0x2bc/0x4d0 net/core/dev.c:1484
Freed by task 1306:
...
release_firmware+0x1b/0x30 drivers/base/firmware_loader/main.c:1053
r871xu_dev_remove+0xcc/0x2c0 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c:599
usb_unbind_interface+0x1d8/0x8d0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:458 |
