| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rds: fix uninitialized trans dereference in CM event handler
rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() assigns trans only when the RDMA
device is an InfiniBand CA (RDMA_NODE_IB_CA). On any other device
type, e.g. an iWARP RNIC such as siw, trans stays uninitialized, but
the event switch dereferences it: unconditionally in the
RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST case via trans->cm_handle_connect(),
and (with a connection context) in the ROUTE_RESOLVED and
ESTABLISHED cases.
An RDS listener on an iWARP device therefore crashes the kernel as
soon as a connect request arrives: with CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_ZERO
the wild load becomes a NULL dereference at offset 0xa0
(&trans->cm_handle_connect) in the iw_cm_wq workqueue.
GCC masks the bug in default builds by folding the uninitialized
load into &rds_ib_transport; Clang-built kernels take the real
uninitialized path and oops.
The active side can land on a non-IB device too: the id that
rds_ib_conn_path_connect() creates is not restricted to a node type,
so rdma_resolve_addr() binds it to whichever device serves the local
address, and an iWARP RNIC on the same netdev qualifies. The crash
there is different: resolving a route on an iWARP id never fills in
cm_id->route.path_rec, and the ROUTE_RESOLVED case writes
path_rec[0].sl before it calls into the transport.
The iWARP transport was dropped long ago and IB is the only
transport left, so make that explicit: initialize trans to
&rds_ib_transport at declaration, drop the conditional assignment,
reject a connect request that arrives on a non-IB device, and drop a
connection whose address resolved to one instead of resolving a
route on it. The rejection is limited to RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST
on purpose: a non-zero return from the handler makes rdma_cm destroy
the id the event was delivered on, which is right for the request's
freshly created id but would free a connection id that RDS still owns
for any other event. On the active side the id stays ic->i_cm_id and
the connection's shutdown destroys it, so that case returns 0.
[achender: reject only on RDMA_CM_EVENT_CONNECT_REQUEST instead of
bailing out for every event on a non-IB device, so that rdma_cm does
not destroy connection ids RDS still tracks; drop a connection whose
address resolved to a non-IB device before a route is resolved on it;
changelog adjusted] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: revalidate output stream after association connect wait
When message interleaving is enabled, the first send waits for association
establishment before building its data chunks. The wait drops the socket
lock, and handshake processing can reduce the output stream count to the
peer-advertised inbound stream count. sctp_stream_init() then frees the
extension of every removed stream.
The sender resumes with the stream that it checked before the wait. If the
peer removed that stream, sctp_outq_tail() later dereferences its NULL
extension. Fatal-oops policies then panic the host.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x38-0x3f]
RIP: sctp_outq_tail+0x49e/0xaa0
Call Trace:
sctp_primitive_SEND
sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc
sctp_sendmsg
A range check alone is insufficient. Stream reconfiguration can grow the
output count again while the lock is released without recreating extensions
freed by the earlier shrink. The stream can then be in range while its
extension remains NULL. The send-buffer wait has the same issue.
Factor the range and extension checks into a helper and repeat both after
each send-path wait that drops the socket lock. Once the lock is
reacquired, the validation remains stable through data creation and
queueing.
If validation fails after the connect wait, the auto-created association is
already established. Return ESRCH so the existing caller path keeps it
under state-machine ownership instead of freeing it directly, which would
leave protocol, counter and socket state inconsistent. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: bsg: Pass reply_len to bsg_setup_queue() to fit UFS ARPMB replies
bsg-lib allocates a 96-byte (SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE) reply buffer per
job, but struct ufs_rpmb_reply is 104 bytes: a 40-byte struct
ufs_bsg_reply followed by a 64-byte EHS. When an Advanced RPMB command
returns an EHS, ufshcd_advanced_rpmb_req_handler() copies it right after
the 40-byte header and writes 8 bytes past the end of the buffer.
Let each BSG transport pass its reply buffer size to bsg_setup_queue()
and have ufs_bsg request sizeof(struct ufs_rpmb_reply), so the full
reply reaches user space. Other transports keep SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: xen/scsifront: Check for a NULL shadow entry on a backend response
scsifront_do_response() validates the rqid in a backend response against
VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS before using it to index info->shadow[], but then
dereferences the entry to test ->inflight without checking that the slot
is populated. Shadow slots are NULL before a command is submitted (the
host private area is zeroed at allocation) and are reset to NULL in
_scsifront_put_rqid() once a request completes, so an in-range rqid that
does not correspond to an outstanding request makes the frontend
dereference a NULL pointer.
A malicious or buggy backend can thus crash the guest by returning a
response whose rqid is in range but not in flight -- for example a
spurious response before any command has been issued, or a duplicate of
one already completed. The ring has only VSCSIIF_MAX_REQS (16) slots,
so before the first command every in-range rqid selects a NULL slot.
Reject a response whose shadow slot is not populated. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix status of pending commands flushed on power off
cmd_complete_rsp() receives a struct cmd_lookup and, for a pending
command that has no cmd_complete callback, falls through to
cmd_status_rsp(cmd, data). cmd_status_rsp() reads data as a u8 *, so
the status sent comes from the first byte of match->sk's
representation, not from match->mgmt_status.
commit f53e1c9c726d ("Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix possible crash on
mgmt_index_removed") changed the callers' data from &status to &match
and updated the cmd_complete branch to match->mgmt_status, but left
the fall-through passing data unchanged.
In mgmt_index_removed() match->sk is NULL, so every such command is
answered with status 0x00 (Success) instead of
MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_INDEX. In __mgmt_power_off() it is NULL too,
unless a Set Powered command was pending: then settings_rsp() has
stored that command's socket in match->sk, and the byte sent comes
from the socket pointer. Either way the status the caller set,
MGMT_STATUS_NOT_POWERED (or MGMT_STATUS_INVALID_INDEX when the device
is being unregistered), is lost.
Pass the status the callers set.
This was seen on a QCA9377 laptop: bluetoothd's Start Discovery,
pending when the adapter was powered off, was answered with Command
Status 0x00 and no parameters, and bluetoothd 5.72 crashed on the
zero-length success. BlueZ master has since added the length check
on that path ("adapter: Fix crash on short start discovery reply",
BlueZ a734b06059cb), but userspace should still be told Not Powered,
not Success.
Tested on Ubuntu 7.0.0-31 with a virtual controller (hci_vhci):
power off is held in HCI Write Scan Enable while a Start Discovery is
submitted, and the flush answers it with status 0x00 before this
change and 0x0f (Not Powered) after. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: udp: Create exceptions before socket matching
Currently, when ICMP Fragmentation Needed and Redirect Message packets
are locally delivered and quote a UDP packet, a FIB nexthop exception
(FNHE) is only created if the kernel can match the UDP packet to an
existing socket.
This behavior allows off-path attackers to conduct a side-channel attack
on the FNHE cache in order to discover the ephemeral port used by a
connected UDP socket.
Commit 6457378fe796 ("ipv4: use siphash instead of Jenkins in
fnhe_hashfun()") and commit 67d6d681e15b ("ipv4: make exception cache
less predictible") tried to mitigate such attacks by making it harder
for attackers to discover hash collisions in the FNHE cache and by
randomizing the number of exceptions a hash bucket can hold,
respectively. Unfortunately, both of the mitigations can be bypassed.
Instead, mitigate such attacks by always creating a FNHE, even before
trying to find a matching socket. Do that by calling ipv4_update_pmtu()
and ipv4_redirect(), the helpers used when the quoted packet did not
originate from a socket.
This means that guesses (right or wrong) from an off-path attacker will
always result in a FNHE being created or updated in the cache that the
attacker can observe.
Pass an oif of 0, in a similar fashion to icmp_err(). This is also the
oif used by the socket path for sockets that are not bound to a device.
Note that this does not allow attackers to create FNHEs that they could
not create before, as both helpers can already be reached with little to
no validation. For example, by sending an ICMP error that quotes an ICMP
Echo Reply or one that quotes a UDP source port that matches a wildcard
socket.
Also note that in the good case (matched socket) the above scheme comes
at the cost of an extra route lookup, as the no socket helpers perform
their own lookup before the one performed by ipv4_sk_update_pmtu() /
ipv4_sk_redirect(). When the two resolve to different nexthops, it also
results in two exceptions being created for the same destination IP. One
in the FNHE cache of the nexthop resolved by the no socket helpers and
another in the FNHE cache of the nexthop used by the socket. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: do not warn on route notification size race
Commit 680aea08e78c ("net: ipv4: Emit notification when fib hardware
flags are changed") added asynchronous route notifications for hardware
flag changes.
fib_alias_hw_flags_set() sizes the skb with fib_nlmsg_size() and later
fills it with fib_dump_info() while holding only RCU. With nexthop
compatibility mode enabled, a concurrent replacement can grow the group
between these independent snapshots. fib_dump_info() can then
legitimately return -EMSGSIZE, so the warning does not prove a sizing bug.
Remove the warning. The existing error path still frees the skb and
reports the error to listeners. |
| IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.4 could allow a remote authenticated attacker to cause a denial of service due to allocation of resources without limits or throttling. |
| libcurl's TFTP state machine fails to validate state transitions against the
requested transfer direction, accepting opening server responses for both
reads and writes interchangeably. A malicious TFTP server can respond to a
download request in a way that forces the client into transmit mode, prompting
libcurl to consume and transmit data from the handle's persistent
`CURLOPT_READDATA` pointer - including data remaining from unrelated prior
operations, such as an HTTP POST request executed on a reused handle. |
| When an FTP wildcard `LIST` operation fails, libcurl omits the restoration
path meant for successful listings, leaving the write callback set to the
internal listing parser and the write callback data pointing directly to the
easy handle. Subsequent reuse of this handle triggers an immediate crash, and
cloning it via `curl_easy_duphandle()` copies this corrupted state into the
duplicate. If the original handle is subsequently freed, executing a transfer
on the cloned handle causes a heap use-after-free read against the dangling
handle reference; alternatively, reusing the original or cloned handle while
changing only `CURLOPT_WRITEDATA` (and omitting `CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION`)
results in type confusion, forcing the internal parser to interpret incoming
server response bytes into memory at the application-supplied write data
pointer. |
| Crypt::Age versions before 0.004 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via an unbounded number of recipient stanzas, each costing an X25519 scalar multiplication in unwrap_file_key.
The header parser accepts any number of recipient stanzas, and unwrap_file_key tries every identity against every X25519 stanza. Each attempt runs a scalar multiplication, an HKDF and a ChaCha20-Poly1305 open. The header MAC cannot be checked first, because its key comes from the file key, which only a successful unwrap produces.
Each stanza is 98 bytes of attacker-chosen header and buys one scalar multiplication per identity held, and the file is rejected only after every one of them has run. A caller reaches this through decrypt, decrypt_file or decrypt_filehandle whenever it decrypts a file it did not write. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfs: use nfsi->rwsem to protect traversal of the file lock list
Lingfeng identified a bug and suggested two solutions, but both appear
to have issues.
Generally, we cannot release flc_lock while iterating over the file lock
list to avoid use-after-free (UAF) problems with file locks. However,
functions like nfs_delegation_claim_locks and nfs4_reclaim_locks cannot
adhere to this rule because recover_lock or nfs4_lock_delegation_recall
may take a long time. To resolve this, NFS switches to using nfsi->rwsem
for the same protection, and nfs_reclaim_locks follows this approach.
Although nfs_delegation_claim_locks uses so_delegreturn_mutex instead,
this is inadequate since a single inode can have multiple nfs4_state
instances. Therefore, the fix is to also use nfsi->rwsem in this case.
Furthermore, after commit c69899a17ca4 ("NFSv4: Update of VFS byte range
lock must be atomic with the stateid update"), the functions
nfs4_locku_done and nfs4_lock_done also break this rule because they
call locks_lock_inode_wait without holding nfsi->rwsem. Simply adding
this protection could cause many deadlocks, so instead, the call to
locks_lock_inode_wait is moved into _nfs4_proc_setlk. Regarding the bug
fixed by commit c69899a17ca4 ("NFSv4: Update of VFS byte range
lock must be atomic with the stateid update"), it has been resolved
after commit 0460253913e5 ("NFSv4: nfs4_do_open() is incorrectly triggering
state recovery") because all slots are drained before calling
nfs4_do_reclaim, which prevents concurrent stateid changes along this path.
Also, nfs_delegation_claim_locks does not cause this concurrency either
since when _nfs4_proc_setlk is called with NFS_DELEGATED_STATE, no RPC is
sent, so nfs4_lock_done is not called. Therefore,
nfs4_lock_delegation_recall from nfs_delegation_claim_locks is the first
time the stateid is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_compat: ebtables emulation must reject non-bridge targets
xtables targets return netfilter verdicts: NF_ACCEPT, NF_DROP, and so
on. ebtables targets return incompatible verdicts: EBT_ACCEPT,
EBT_DROP, ... We cannot allow fallback to NFPROTO_UNSPEC.
ebtables doesn't permit this since
11ff7288beb2 ("netfilter: ebtables: reject non-bridge targets")
but that commit missed the nft_compat layer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_pedit: fix TOCTOU heap OOB write in tc offload
There is a TOCTOU race condition in flower lockless approach between sizing
a flow_rule buffer and filling it.
zdi-disclosures@trendmicro.com reports:
The cls_flower classifier operates with TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED
(fl_change runs without RTNL), while RTM_NEWACTION holds RTNL, so the
independent locking domains make the race reachable in practice. KASAN
confirms:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tcf_pedit_offload_act_setup+0x81b/0x930
Write of size 4 at addr ffff888001f27520 by task poc-toctou/312
The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
allocated 288-byte region [ffff888001f27400, ffff888001f27520)
(cache kmalloc-512)
Note: The result is a heap OOB write attacker-controlled content into the
adjacent slab object (requires CAP_NET_ADMIN).
The fix introduces reading tcfp_nkeys under act->tcfa_lock in all places
using a new tcf_pedit_nkeys_locked() which replaces the old tcf_pedit_nkeys().
Additionally we close the remaining TOCTOU window between the sizing read and
the fill reads by more careful accounting.
Rather than silently truncating the key count, which leads to incorrect
action semantics offloaded to hardware and secondary OOB writes if
the remaining capacity is zero or consumed by prior actions, we enforce
remaining capacity checks and return -ENOSPC if the required space exceeds
the remaining capacity. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/vcn: set no_user_fence for VCN v2.0 enc/dec rings
VCN encoder and decoder rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes,
reject CS submissions with user fences.
(cherry picked from commit e2b5499fca55f1a32960a311bbb62e35891eaf73) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/vcn: set no_user_fence for VCN v3.0 enc/dec rings
VCN encoder and decoder rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes,
reject CS submissions with user fences.
(cherry picked from commit 663bed3c7b8b9a7624b0d95d300ddae034ad0614) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/jpeg: set no_user_fence for JPEG v2.0 ring
JPEG rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS
submissions with user fences.
(cherry picked from commit 96179da0c6b059eb31706a0abe8dd6381c533143) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/jpeg: set no_user_fence for JPEG v2.5 ring
JPEG rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS
submissions with user fences.
(cherry picked from commit 3216a7f4e2642bda5fd14f57586e835ae9202587) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/jpeg: set no_user_fence for JPEG v4.0 ring
JPEG rings do not support 64-bit user fence writes, reject CS
submissions with user fences.
(cherry picked from commit 8d0cac9478a3f046279c657d6a2545de49ae675a) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
srcu: Use irq_work to start GP in tiny SRCU
Tiny SRCU's srcu_gp_start_if_needed() directly calls schedule_work(),
which acquires the workqueue pool->lock.
This causes a lockdep splat when call_srcu() is called with a scheduler
lock held, due to:
call_srcu() [holding pi_lock]
srcu_gp_start_if_needed()
schedule_work() -> pool->lock
workqueue_init() / create_worker() [holding pool->lock]
wake_up_process() -> try_to_wake_up() -> pi_lock
Also add irq_work_sync() to cleanup_srcu_struct() to prevent a
use-after-free if a queued irq_work fires after cleanup begins.
Tested with rcutorture SRCU-T and no lockdep warnings.
[ Thanks to Boqun for similar fix in patch "rcu: Use an intermediate irq_work
to start process_srcu()" ] |
