| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpib: fix use-after-free in IO ioctl handlers
The IBRD, IBWRT, IBCMD, and IBWAIT ioctl handlers use a gpib_descriptor
pointer after board->big_gpib_mutex has been released. A concurrent
IBCLOSEDEV ioctl can free the descriptor via close_dev_ioctl() during
this window, causing a use-after-free.
The IO handlers (read_ioctl, write_ioctl, command_ioctl) explicitly
release big_gpib_mutex before calling their handler. wait_ioctl() is
called with big_gpib_mutex held, but ibwait() releases it internally
when wait_mask is non-zero. In all four cases, the descriptor pointer
obtained from handle_to_descriptor() becomes unprotected.
Fix this by introducing a kernel-only descriptor_busy reference count
in struct gpib_descriptor. Each handler atomically increments
descriptor_busy under file_priv->descriptors_mutex before releasing the
lock, and decrements it when done. close_dev_ioctl() checks
descriptor_busy under the same lock and rejects the close with -EBUSY
if the count is non-zero.
A reference count rather than a simple flag is necessary because
multiple handlers can operate on the same descriptor concurrently
(e.g. IBRD and IBWAIT on the same handle from different threads).
A separate counter is needed because io_in_progress can be cleared from
unprivileged userspace via the IBWAIT ioctl (through general_ibstatus()
with set_mask containing CMPL), which would allow an attacker to bypass
a check based solely on io_in_progress. The new descriptor_busy
counter is only modified by the kernel IO paths.
The lock ordering is consistent (big_gpib_mutex -> descriptors_mutex)
and the handlers only hold descriptors_mutex briefly during the lookup,
so there is no deadlock risk and no impact on IO throughput. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ti-adc161s626: use DMA-safe memory for spi_read()
Add a DMA-safe buffer and use it for spi_read() instead of a stack
memory. All SPI buffers must be DMA-safe.
Since we only need up to 3 bytes, we just use a u8[] instead of __be16
and __be32 and change the conversion functions appropriately. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: validate doorbell_offset in user queue creation
amdgpu_userq_get_doorbell_index() passes the user-provided
doorbell_offset to amdgpu_doorbell_index_on_bar() without bounds
checking. An arbitrarily large doorbell_offset can cause the
calculated doorbell index to fall outside the allocated doorbell BO,
potentially corrupting kernel doorbell space.
Validate that doorbell_offset falls within the doorbell BO before
computing the BAR index, using u64 arithmetic to prevent overflow.
(cherry picked from commit de1ef4ffd70e1d15f0bf584fd22b1f28cbd5e2ec) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: mpu3050: Move iio_device_register() to correct location
iio_device_register() should be at the end of the probe function to
prevent race conditions.
Place iio_device_register() at the end of the probe function and place
iio_device_unregister() accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usbtmc: Flush anchored URBs in usbtmc_release
When calling usbtmc_release, pending anchored URBs must be flushed or
killed to prevent use-after-free errors (e.g. in the HCD giveback
path). Call usbtmc_draw_down() to allow anchored URBs to be completed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmem: zynqmp_nvmem: Fix buffer size in DMA and memcpy
Buffer size used in dma allocation and memcpy is wrong.
It can lead to undersized DMA buffer access and possible
memory corruption. use correct buffer size in dma_alloc_coherent
and memcpy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt: discard stale unicode buffer on alt screen exit after resize
When enter_alt_screen() saves vc_uni_lines into vc_saved_uni_lines and
sets vc_uni_lines to NULL, a subsequent console resize via vc_do_resize()
skips reallocating the unicode buffer because vc_uni_lines is NULL.
However, vc_saved_uni_lines still points to the old buffer allocated for
the original dimensions.
When leave_alt_screen() later restores vc_saved_uni_lines, the buffer
dimensions no longer match vc_rows/vc_cols. Any operation that iterates
over the unicode buffer using the current dimensions (e.g. csi_J clearing
the screen) will access memory out of bounds, causing a kernel oops:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0x0000002000000020
RIP: 0010:csi_J+0x133/0x2d0
The faulting address 0x0000002000000020 is two adjacent u32 space
characters (0x20) interpreted as a pointer, read from the row data area
past the end of the 25-entry pointer array in a buffer allocated for
80x25 but accessed with 240x67 dimensions.
Fix this by checking whether the console dimensions changed while in the
alternate screen. If they did, free the stale saved buffer instead of
restoring it. The unicode screen will be lazily rebuilt via
vc_uniscr_check() when next needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: tegra - Add missing CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC
The tegra crypto driver failed to set the CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC on its
asynchronous algorithms, causing the crypto API to select them for users
that request only synchronous algorithms. This causes crashes (at
least). Fix this by adding the flag like what the other drivers do.
Also remove the unnecessary CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_* flags, since those just
get ignored and overridden by the registration function anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommupt: Fix short gather if the unmap goes into a large mapping
unmap has the odd behavior that it can unmap more than requested if the
ending point lands within the middle of a large or contiguous IOPTE.
In this case the gather should flush everything unmapped which can be
larger than what was requested to be unmapped. The gather was only
flushing the range requested to be unmapped, not extending to the extra
range, resulting in a short invalidation if the caller hits this special
condition.
This was found by the new invalidation/gather test I am adding in
preparation for ARMv8. Claude deduced the root cause.
As far as I remember nothing relies on unmapping a large entry, so this is
likely not a triggerable bug. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate owner of durable handle on reconnect
Currently, ksmbd does not verify if the user attempting to reconnect
to a durable handle is the same user who originally opened the file.
This allows any authenticated user to hijack an orphaned durable handle
by predicting or brute-forcing the persistent ID.
According to MS-SMB2, the server MUST verify that the SecurityContext
of the reconnect request matches the SecurityContext associated with
the existing open.
Add a durable_owner structure to ksmbd_file to store the original opener's
UID, GID, and account name. and catpure the owner information when a file
handle becomes orphaned. and implementing ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner()
to validate the identity of the requester during SMB2_CREATE (DHnC). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: validate rec->used in journal-replay file record check
check_file_record() validates rec->total against the record size but
never validates rec->used. The do_action() journal-replay handlers read
rec->used from disk and use it to compute memmove lengths:
DeleteAttribute: memmove(attr, ..., used - asize - roff)
CreateAttribute: memmove(..., attr, used - roff)
change_attr_size: memmove(..., used - PtrOffset(rec, next))
When rec->used is smaller than the offset of a validated attribute, or
larger than the record size, these subtractions can underflow allowing
us to copy huge amounts of memory in to a 4kb buffer, generally
considered a bad idea overall.
This requires a corrupted filesystem, which isn't a threat model the
kernel really needs to worry about, but checking for such an obvious
out-of-bounds value is good to keep things robust, especially on journal
replay
Fix this up by bounding rec->used correctly.
This is much like commit b2bc7c44ed17 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds
read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot") which checked different values in this
same switch statement. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()
Both ACE-walk loops in smb_check_perm_dacl() only guard against an
under-sized remaining buffer, not against an ACE whose declared
`ace->size` is smaller than the struct it claims to describe:
if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size)
break;
ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size);
if (ace_size > aces_size)
break;
The first check only requires the 4-byte ACE header to be in bounds;
it does not require access_req (4 bytes at offset 4) to be readable.
An attacker who has set a crafted DACL on a file they own can declare
ace->size == 4 with aces_size == 4, pass both checks, and then
granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); /* upper loop */
compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid); /* lower loop */
reads access_req at offset 4 (OOB by up to 4 bytes) and ace->sid at
offset 8 (OOB by up to CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
* 4 bytes).
Tighten both loops to require
ace_size >= offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE
which is the smallest valid on-wire ACE layout (4-byte header +
4-byte access_req + 8-byte sid base with zero sub-auths). Also
reject ACEs whose sid.num_subauth exceeds SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES
before letting compare_sids() dereference sub_auth[] entries.
parse_sec_desc() already enforces an equivalent check (lines 441-448);
smb_check_perm_dacl() simply grew weaker validation over time.
Reachability: authenticated SMB client with permission to set an ACL
on a file. On a subsequent CREATE against that file, the kernel
walks the stored DACL via smb_check_perm_dacl() and triggers the
OOB read. Not pre-auth, and the OOB read is not reflected to the
attacker, but KASAN reports and kernel state corruption are
possible. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but
it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
32-bit builds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()
ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each
response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields
from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int
arithmetic. Three cases can overflow:
KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST:
msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz;
KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST:
msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) +
resp->payload_sz;
KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:
msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) +
resp->ngroups * sizeof(gid_t);
resp->payload_sz is __u32 and resp->ngroups is __s32. Each addition
can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes
signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX
before the multiply. A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to
equal entry->msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and
downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp->payload_sz,
kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext->ngroups) then trust the
unverified length.
Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST
paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional
payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte
chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is
unworkable on the response side. For LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT, reject
resp->ngroups outside the signed [0, NGROUPS_MAX] range up front and
report the error from ipc_validate_msg() so it fires at the IPC
boundary; with that bound the subsequent multiplication and addition
stay well below UINT_MAX. The now-redundant ngroups check and
pr_err in ksmbd_alloc_user() are removed.
This is the response-side analogue of aab98e2dbd64 ("ksmbd: fix
integer overflows on 32 bit systems"), which hardened the request
side. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate num_aces and harden ACE walk in smb_inherit_dacl()
smb_inherit_dacl() trusts the on-disk num_aces value from the parent
directory's DACL xattr and uses it to size a heap allocation:
aces_base = kmalloc(sizeof(struct smb_ace) * num_aces * 2, ...);
num_aces is a u16 read from le16_to_cpu(parent_pdacl->num_aces)
without checking that it is consistent with the declared pdacl_size.
An authenticated client whose parent directory's security.NTACL is
tampered (e.g. via offline xattr corruption or a concurrent path that
bypasses parse_dacl()) can present num_aces = 65535 with minimal
actual ACE data. This causes a ~8 MB allocation (not kzalloc, so
uninitialized) that the subsequent loop only partially populates, and
may also overflow the three-way size_t multiply on 32-bit kernels.
Additionally, the ACE walk loop uses the weaker
offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) minimum size check rather than
the minimum valid on-wire ACE size, and does not reject ACEs whose
declared size is below the minimum.
Reproduced on UML + KASAN + LOCKDEP against the real ksmbd code path.
A legitimate mount.cifs client creates a parent directory over SMB
(ksmbd writes a valid security.NTACL xattr), then the NTACL blob on
the backing filesystem is rewritten to set num_aces = 0xFFFF while
keeping the posix_acl_hash bytes intact so ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr()'s
hash check still passes. A subsequent SMB2 CREATE of a child under
that parent drives smb2_open() into smb_inherit_dacl() (share has
"vfs objects = acl_xattr" set), which fails the page allocator:
WARNING: mm/page_alloc.c:5226 at __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x46c/0x9c0
Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
__alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x46c/0x9c0
___kmalloc_large_node+0x68/0x130
__kmalloc_large_node_noprof+0x24/0x70
__kmalloc_noprof+0x4c9/0x690
smb_inherit_dacl+0x394/0x2430
smb2_open+0x595d/0xabe0
handle_ksmbd_work+0x3d3/0x1140
With the patch applied the added guard rejects the tampered value
with -EINVAL before any large allocation runs, smb2_open() falls back
to smb2_create_sd_buffer(), and the child is created with a default
SD. No warning, no splat.
Fix by:
1. Validating num_aces against pdacl_size using the same formula
applied in parse_dacl().
2. Replacing the raw kmalloc(sizeof * num_aces * 2) with
kmalloc_array(num_aces * 2, sizeof(...)) for overflow-safe
allocation.
3. Tightening the per-ACE loop guard to require the minimum valid
ACE size (offsetof(smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE) and
rejecting under-sized ACEs, matching the hardening in
smb_check_perm_dacl() and parse_dacl().
v1 -> v2:
- Replace the synthetic test-module splat in the changelog with a
real-path UML + KASAN reproduction driven through mount.cifs and
SMB2 CREATE; Namjae flagged the kcifs3_test_inherit_dacl_old name
in v1 since it does not exist in ksmbd.
- Drop the commit-hash citation from the code comment per Namjae's
review; keep the parse_dacl() pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: fix TOCTOU race on mmap'd vnet_hdr in tpacket_snd()
In tpacket_snd(), when PACKET_VNET_HDR is enabled, vnet_hdr points
directly into the mmap'd TX ring buffer shared with userspace. The
kernel validates the header via __packet_snd_vnet_parse() but then
re-reads all fields later in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). A concurrent
userspace thread can modify the vnet_hdr fields between validation
and use, bypassing all safety checks.
The non-TPACKET path (packet_snd()) already correctly copies vnet_hdr
to a stack-local variable. All other vnet_hdr consumers in the kernel
(tun.c, tap.c, virtio_net.c) also use stack copies. The TPACKET TX
path is the only caller of virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() that reads directly
from user-controlled shared memory.
Fix this by copying vnet_hdr from the mmap'd ring buffer to a
stack-local variable before validation and use, consistent with the
approach used in packet_snd() and all other callers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy PDH cert to userspace if PSP command failed
When retrieving the PDH cert, don't attempt to copy the blobs to userspace
if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
Read of size 2084 at addr ffff8885c4ab8aa0 by task syz.0.186/21033
CPU: 51 UID: 0 PID: 21033 Comm: syz.0.186 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.84.12-0 11/17/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x3d3/0x7c0 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2347
sev_ioctl+0x2a2/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2568
vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy ID to userspace if PSP command failed
When retrieving the ID for the CPU, don't attempt to copy the ID blob to
userspace if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an
invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying
the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated
buffer and leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
Read of size 64 at addr ffff8881867f5960 by task syz.0.906/24388
CPU: 130 UID: 0 PID: 24388 Comm: syz.0.906 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
sev_ioctl_do_get_id2+0x361/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2222
sev_ioctl+0x25f/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2575
vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: virt_wifi: remove SET_NETDEV_DEV to avoid use-after-free
Currently we execute `SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, &priv->lowerdev->dev)` for
the virt_wifi net devices. However, unregistering a virt_wifi device in
netdev_run_todo() can happen together with the device referenced by
SET_NETDEV_DEV().
It can result in use-after-free during the ethtool operations performed
on a virt_wifi device that is currently being unregistered. Such a net
device can have the `dev.parent` field pointing to the freed memory,
but ethnl_ops_begin() calls `pm_runtime_get_sync(dev->dev.parent)`.
Let's remove SET_NETDEV_DEV for virt_wifi to avoid bugs like this:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __pm_runtime_resume+0xe2/0xf0
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810cfc46f8 by task pm/606
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70
print_report+0x170/0x4f3
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
kasan_report+0xda/0x110
? __pm_runtime_resume+0xe2/0xf0
? __pm_runtime_resume+0xe2/0xf0
__pm_runtime_resume+0xe2/0xf0
ethnl_ops_begin+0x49/0x270
ethnl_set_features+0x23c/0xab0
? __pfx_ethnl_set_features+0x10/0x10
? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x11/0x20
? local_clock_noinstr+0xf/0xf0
? local_clock+0x10/0x30
? kasan_save_track+0x25/0x60
? __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.isra.0+0x150/0x2c0
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x1e7/0x2c0
? __pfx_genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x10/0x10
? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0
genl_rcv_msg+0x411/0x660
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_ethnl_set_features+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x121/0x380
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10
genl_rcv+0x23/0x30
netlink_unicast+0x60f/0x830
? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10
? __pfx___alloc_skb+0x10/0x10
netlink_sendmsg+0x6ea/0xbc0
? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
? __futex_queue+0x10b/0x1f0
____sys_sendmsg+0x7a2/0x950
? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x26b/0x430
? __pfx_____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_copy_msghdr_from_user+0x10/0x10
___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x180
? __pfx____sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_futex_wait+0x10/0x10
? fdget+0x2e4/0x4a0
__sys_sendmsg+0x11f/0x1c0
? __pfx___sys_sendmsg+0x10/0x10
do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570
? exc_page_fault+0x66/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
This fix may be combined with another one in the ethtool subsystem:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260322075917.254874-1-alex.popov@linux.com/T/#u |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: reject oversized dirents in page cache
fuse_add_dirent_to_cache() computes a serialized dirent size from the
server-controlled namelen field and copies the dirent into a single
page-cache page. The existing logic only checks whether the dirent fits
in the remaining space of the current page and advances to a fresh page
if not. It never checks whether the dirent itself exceeds PAGE_SIZE.
As a result, a malicious FUSE server can return a dirent with
namelen=4095, producing a serialized record size of 4120 bytes. On 4 KiB
page systems this causes memcpy() to overflow the cache page by 24 bytes
into the following kernel page.
Reject dirents that cannot fit in a single page before copying them into
the readdir cache. |
