| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
leds: trigger: Unregister sysfs attributes before calling deactivate()
Triggers which have trigger specific sysfs attributes typically store
related data in trigger-data allocated by the activate() callback and
freed by the deactivate() callback.
Calling device_remove_groups() after calling deactivate() leaves a window
where the sysfs attributes show/store functions could be called after
deactivation and then operate on the just freed trigger-data.
Move the device_remove_groups() call to before deactivate() to close
this race window.
This also makes the deactivation path properly do things in reverse order
of the activation path which calls the activate() callback before calling
device_add_groups(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: fix infinite loop when replaying fast_commit
When doing fast_commit replay an infinite loop may occur due to an
uninitialized extent_status struct. ext4_ext_determine_insert_hole() does
not detect the replay and calls ext4_es_find_extent_range(), which will
return immediately without initializing the 'es' variable.
Because 'es' contains garbage, an integer overflow may happen causing an
infinite loop in this function, easily reproducible using fstest generic/039.
This commit fixes this issue by unconditionally initializing the structure
in function ext4_es_find_extent_range().
Thanks to Zhang Yi, for figuring out the real problem! |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sysctl: always initialize i_uid/i_gid
Always initialize i_uid/i_gid inside the sysfs core so set_ownership()
can safely skip setting them.
Commit 5ec27ec735ba ("fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c: fix the default values of
i_uid/i_gid on /proc/sys inodes.") added defaults for i_uid/i_gid when
set_ownership() was not implemented. It also missed adjusting
net_ctl_set_ownership() to use the same default values in case the
computation of a better value failed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: Avoid using corrupted block bitmap buffer
When the filesystem block bitmap is corrupted, we detect the corruption
while loading the bitmap and fail the allocation with error. However the
next allocation from the same bitmap will notice the bitmap buffer is
already loaded and tries to allocate from the bitmap with mixed results
(depending on the exact nature of the bitmap corruption). Fix the
problem by using BH_verified bit to indicate whether the bitmap is valid
or not. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: check dot and dotdot of dx_root before making dir indexed
Syzbot reports a issue as follows:
============================================
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed11022e24fe
PGD 23ffee067 P4D 23ffee067 PUD 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 5079 Comm: syz-executor306 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5-g55027e689933 #0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
make_indexed_dir+0xdaf/0x13c0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2341
ext4_add_entry+0x222a/0x25d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2451
ext4_rename fs/ext4/namei.c:3936 [inline]
ext4_rename2+0x26e5/0x4370 fs/ext4/namei.c:4214
[...]
============================================
The immediate cause of this problem is that there is only one valid dentry
for the block to be split during do_split, so split==0 results in out of
bounds accesses to the map triggering the issue.
do_split
unsigned split
dx_make_map
count = 1
split = count/2 = 0;
continued = hash2 == map[split - 1].hash;
---> map[4294967295]
The maximum length of a filename is 255 and the minimum block size is 1024,
so it is always guaranteed that the number of entries is greater than or
equal to 2 when do_split() is called.
But syzbot's crafted image has no dot and dotdot in dir, and the dentry
distribution in dirblock is as follows:
bus dentry1 hole dentry2 free
|xx--|xx-------------|...............|xx-------------|...............|
0 12 (8+248)=256 268 256 524 (8+256)=264 788 236 1024
So when renaming dentry1 increases its name_len length by 1, neither hole
nor free is sufficient to hold the new dentry, and make_indexed_dir() is
called.
In make_indexed_dir() it is assumed that the first two entries of the
dirblock must be dot and dotdot, so bus and dentry1 are left in dx_root
because they are treated as dot and dotdot, and only dentry2 is moved
to the new leaf block. That's why count is equal to 1.
Therefore add the ext4_check_dx_root() helper function to add more sanity
checks to dot and dotdot before starting the conversion to avoid the above
issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: make sure the first directory block is not a hole
The syzbot constructs a directory that has no dirblock but is non-inline,
i.e. the first directory block is a hole. And no errors are reported when
creating files in this directory in the following flow.
ext4_mknod
...
ext4_add_entry
// Read block 0
ext4_read_dirblock(dir, block, DIRENT)
bh = ext4_bread(NULL, inode, block, 0)
if (!bh && (type == INDEX || type == DIRENT_HTREE))
// The first directory block is a hole
// But type == DIRENT, so no error is reported.
After that, we get a directory block without '.' and '..' but with a valid
dentry. This may cause some code that relies on dot or dotdot (such as
make_indexed_dir()) to crash.
Therefore when ext4_read_dirblock() finds that the first directory block
is a hole report that the filesystem is corrupted and return an error to
avoid loading corrupted data from disk causing something bad. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/DPC: Fix use-after-free on concurrent DPC and hot-removal
Keith reports a use-after-free when a DPC event occurs concurrently to
hot-removal of the same portion of the hierarchy:
The dpc_handler() awaits readiness of the secondary bus below the
Downstream Port where the DPC event occurred. To do so, it polls the
config space of the first child device on the secondary bus. If that
child device is concurrently removed, accesses to its struct pci_dev
cause the kernel to oops.
That's because pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus() neglects to hold a
reference on the child device. Before v6.3, the function was only
called on resume from system sleep or on runtime resume. Holding a
reference wasn't necessary back then because the pciehp IRQ thread
could never run concurrently. (On resume from system sleep, IRQs are
not enabled until after the resume_noirq phase. And runtime resume is
always awaited before a PCI device is removed.)
However starting with v6.3, pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus() is also
called on a DPC event. Commit 53b54ad074de ("PCI/DPC: Await readiness
of secondary bus after reset"), which introduced that, failed to
appreciate that pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus() now needs to hold a
reference on the child device because dpc_handler() and pciehp may
indeed run concurrently. The commit was backported to v5.10+ stable
kernels, so that's the oldest one affected.
Add the missing reference acquisition.
Abridged stack trace:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000091400c0
CPU: 15 PID: 2464 Comm: irq/53-pcie-dpc 6.9.0
RIP: pci_bus_read_config_dword+0x17/0x50
pci_dev_wait()
pci_bridge_wait_for_secondary_bus()
dpc_reset_link()
pcie_do_recovery()
dpc_handler() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
kobject_uevent: Fix OOB access within zap_modalias_env()
zap_modalias_env() wrongly calculates size of memory block to move, so
will cause OOB memory access issue if variable MODALIAS is not the last
one within its @env parameter, fixed by correcting size to memmove. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: nexthop: Initialize all fields in dumped nexthops
struct nexthop_grp contains two reserved fields that are not initialized by
nla_put_nh_group(), and carry garbage. This can be observed e.g. with
strace (edited for clarity):
# ip nexthop add id 1 dev lo
# ip nexthop add id 101 group 1
# strace -e recvmsg ip nexthop get id 101
...
recvmsg(... [{nla_len=12, nla_type=NHA_GROUP},
[{id=1, weight=0, resvd1=0x69, resvd2=0x67}]] ...) = 52
The fields are reserved and therefore not currently used. But as they are, they
leak kernel memory, and the fact they are not just zero complicates repurposing
of the fields for new ends. Initialize the full structure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix a segment issue when downgrading gso_size
Linearize the skb when downgrading gso_size because it may trigger a
BUG_ON() later when the skb is segmented as described in [1,2]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-pci: add missing condition check for existence of mapped data
nvme_map_data() is called when request has physical segments, hence
the nvme_unmap_data() should have same condition to avoid dereference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched: act_ct: take care of padding in struct zones_ht_key
Blamed commit increased lookup key size from 2 bytes to 16 bytes,
because zones_ht_key got a struct net pointer.
Make sure rhashtable_lookup() is not using the padding bytes
which are not initialized.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rht_ptr_rcu include/linux/rhashtable.h:376 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:607 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:646 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in rhashtable_lookup_fast include/linux/rhashtable.h:672 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tcf_ct_flow_table_get+0x611/0x2260 net/sched/act_ct.c:329
rht_ptr_rcu include/linux/rhashtable.h:376 [inline]
__rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:607 [inline]
rhashtable_lookup include/linux/rhashtable.h:646 [inline]
rhashtable_lookup_fast include/linux/rhashtable.h:672 [inline]
tcf_ct_flow_table_get+0x611/0x2260 net/sched/act_ct.c:329
tcf_ct_init+0xa67/0x2890 net/sched/act_ct.c:1408
tcf_action_init_1+0x6cc/0xb30 net/sched/act_api.c:1425
tcf_action_init+0x458/0xf00 net/sched/act_api.c:1488
tcf_action_add net/sched/act_api.c:2061 [inline]
tc_ctl_action+0x4be/0x19d0 net/sched/act_api.c:2118
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x12fc/0x1410 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6647
netlink_rcv_skb+0x375/0x650 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6665
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1331 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0xf52/0x1260 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1357
netlink_sendmsg+0x10da/0x11e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1901
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745
____sys_sendmsg+0x877/0xb60 net/socket.c:2597
___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2651
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2680 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2689 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2687 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x4a0 net/socket.c:2687
x64_sys_call+0x2dd6/0x3c10 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:47
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Local variable key created at:
tcf_ct_flow_table_get+0x4a/0x2260 net/sched/act_ct.c:324
tcf_ct_init+0xa67/0x2890 net/sched/act_ct.c:1408 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
protect the fetch of ->fd[fd] in do_dup2() from mispredictions
both callers have verified that fd is not greater than ->max_fds;
however, misprediction might end up with
tofree = fdt->fd[fd];
being speculatively executed. That's wrong for the same reasons
why it's wrong in close_fd()/file_close_fd_locked(); the same
solution applies - array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds) could differ
from fd only in case of speculative execution on mispredicted path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gem: Fix Virtual Memory mapping boundaries calculation
Calculating the size of the mapped area as the lesser value
between the requested size and the actual size does not consider
the partial mapping offset. This can cause page fault access.
Fix the calculation of the starting and ending addresses, the
total size is now deduced from the difference between the end and
start addresses.
Additionally, the calculations have been rewritten in a clearer
and more understandable form.
[Joonas: Add Requires: tag]
Requires: 60a2066c5005 ("drm/i915/gem: Adjust vma offset for framebuffer mmap offset")
(cherry picked from commit 97b6784753da06d9d40232328efc5c5367e53417) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: restrict NL80211_ATTR_TXQ_QUANTUM values
syzbot is able to trigger softlockups, setting NL80211_ATTR_TXQ_QUANTUM
to 2^31.
We had a similar issue in sch_fq, fixed with commit
d9e15a273306 ("pkt_sched: fq: do not accept silly TCA_FQ_QUANTUM")
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [kworker/1:0:24]
Modules linked in:
irq event stamp: 131135
hardirqs last enabled at (131134): [<ffff80008ae8778c>] __exit_to_kernel_mode arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:85 [inline]
hardirqs last enabled at (131134): [<ffff80008ae8778c>] exit_to_kernel_mode+0xdc/0x10c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:95
hardirqs last disabled at (131135): [<ffff80008ae85378>] __el1_irq arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:533 [inline]
hardirqs last disabled at (131135): [<ffff80008ae85378>] el1_interrupt+0x24/0x68 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:551
softirqs last enabled at (125892): [<ffff80008907e82c>] neigh_hh_init net/core/neighbour.c:1538 [inline]
softirqs last enabled at (125892): [<ffff80008907e82c>] neigh_resolve_output+0x268/0x658 net/core/neighbour.c:1553
softirqs last disabled at (125896): [<ffff80008904166c>] local_bh_disable+0x10/0x34 include/linux/bottom_half.h:19
CPU: 1 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/1:0 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-gfda5695d692c #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: mld mld_ifc_work
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __list_del include/linux/list.h:195 [inline]
pc : __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline]
pc : list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline]
pc : fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline]
pc : ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x6b8/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854
lr : __list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline]
lr : list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline]
lr : fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline]
lr : ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x67c/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854
sp : ffff800093d36700
x29: ffff800093d36a60 x28: ffff800093d36960 x27: dfff800000000000
x26: ffff0000d800ad50 x25: ffff0000d800abe0 x24: ffff0000d800abf0
x23: ffff0000e0032468 x22: ffff0000e00324d4 x21: ffff0000d800abf0
x20: ffff0000d800abf8 x19: ffff0000d800abf0 x18: ffff800093d363c0
x17: 000000000000d476 x16: ffff8000805519dc x15: ffff7000127a6cc8
x14: 1ffff000127a6cc8 x13: 0000000000000004 x12: ffffffffffffffff
x11: ffff7000127a6cc8 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffff80009287aa08 x4 : 0000000000000008 x3 : ffff80008034c7fc
x2 : ffff0000e0032468 x1 : 00000000da0e46b8 x0 : ffff0000e0032470
Call trace:
__list_del include/linux/list.h:195 [inline]
__list_del_entry include/linux/list.h:218 [inline]
list_move_tail include/linux/list.h:310 [inline]
fq_tin_dequeue include/net/fq_impl.h:112 [inline]
ieee80211_tx_dequeue+0x6b8/0x3b4c net/mac80211/tx.c:3854
wake_tx_push_queue net/mac80211/util.c:294 [inline]
ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x118/0x274 net/mac80211/util.c:315
drv_wake_tx_queue net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:1350 [inline]
schedule_and_wake_txq net/mac80211/driver-ops.h:1357 [inline]
ieee80211_queue_skb+0x18e8/0x2244 net/mac80211/tx.c:1664
ieee80211_tx+0x260/0x400 net/mac80211/tx.c:1966
ieee80211_xmit+0x278/0x354 net/mac80211/tx.c:2062
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xab8/0x122c net/mac80211/tx.c:4338
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xe0/0x438 net/mac80211/tx.c:4532
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4917 [inline]
xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3531 [inline]
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x27c/0x938 net/core/dev.c:3547
__dev_queue_xmit+0x1678/0x33fc net/core/dev.c:4341
dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline]
neigh_resolve_output+0x558/0x658 net/core/neighbour.c:1563
neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline]
ip6_fini
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: emux: improve patch ioctl data validation
In load_data(), make the validation of and skipping over the main info
block match that in load_guspatch().
In load_guspatch(), add checking that the specified patch length matches
the actually supplied data, like load_data() already did. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86: stop playing stack games in profile_pc()
The 'profile_pc()' function is used for timer-based profiling, which
isn't really all that relevant any more to begin with, but it also ends
up making assumptions based on the stack layout that aren't necessarily
valid.
Basically, the code tries to account the time spent in spinlocks to the
caller rather than the spinlock, and while I support that as a concept,
it's not worth the code complexity or the KASAN warnings when no serious
profiling is done using timers anyway these days.
And the code really does depend on stack layout that is only true in the
simplest of cases. We've lost the comment at some point (I think when
the 32-bit and 64-bit code was unified), but it used to say:
Assume the lock function has either no stack frame or a copy
of eflags from PUSHF.
which explains why it just blindly loads a word or two straight off the
stack pointer and then takes a minimal look at the values to just check
if they might be eflags or the return pc:
Eflags always has bits 22 and up cleared unlike kernel addresses
but that basic stack layout assumption assumes that there isn't any lock
debugging etc going on that would complicate the code and cause a stack
frame.
It causes KASAN unhappiness reported for years by syzkaller [1] and
others [2].
With no real practical reason for this any more, just remove the code.
Just for historical interest, here's some background commits relating to
this code from 2006:
0cb91a229364 ("i386: Account spinlocks to the caller during profiling for !FP kernels")
31679f38d886 ("Simplify profile_pc on x86-64")
and a code unification from 2009:
ef4512882dbe ("x86: time_32/64.c unify profile_pc")
but the basics of this thing actually goes back to before the git tree. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/iucv: Avoid explicit cpumask var allocation on stack
For CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y kernel, explicit allocation of cpumask
variable on stack is not recommended since it can cause potential stack
overflow.
Instead, kernel code should always use *cpumask_var API(s) to allocate
cpumask var in config-neutral way, leaving allocation strategy to
CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK.
Use *cpumask_var API(s) to address it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/dpaa2: Avoid explicit cpumask var allocation on stack
For CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y kernel, explicit allocation of cpumask
variable on stack is not recommended since it can cause potential stack
overflow.
Instead, kernel code should always use *cpumask_var API(s) to allocate
cpumask var in config-neutral way, leaving allocation strategy to
CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK.
Use *cpumask_var API(s) to address it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pinctrl: fix deadlock in create_pinctrl() when handling -EPROBE_DEFER
In create_pinctrl(), pinctrl_maps_mutex is acquired before calling
add_setting(). If add_setting() returns -EPROBE_DEFER, create_pinctrl()
calls pinctrl_free(). However, pinctrl_free() attempts to acquire
pinctrl_maps_mutex, which is already held by create_pinctrl(), leading to
a potential deadlock.
This patch resolves the issue by releasing pinctrl_maps_mutex before
calling pinctrl_free(), preventing the deadlock.
This bug was discovered and resolved using Coverity Static Analysis
Security Testing (SAST) by Synopsys, Inc. |
