| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: properly handle refcounted PUD mappings on fork
copy_huge_pud() copies device-DAX entries without taking a folio reference
or updating mapcounts and the child's RSS.
For example, MADV_GUARD_INSTALL sets VM_MAYBE_GUARD on a device-DAX VMA,
forcing copy_page_range() to traverse the whole VMA on fork. Any remaining
huge PUDs are then copied without accounting for the new mappings.
Unmapping them in the child decrements accounting that was never added.
Use vm_normal_page_pud() to identify refcounted mappings. Take a folio
reference and add the child's PUD rmap and RSS accounting before installing
the copied entry. Pass src and dst VMAs consistently instead of src and
dst MM. Move the TODO. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cipso: fix optlen corruption in cipso_v4_delopt()
cipso_v4_delopt() recomputes the option length by walking the option
buffer after the CIPSO option has been moved out. The walk then reads
the stale bytes at the tail of the buffer as option data, and a crafted
setsockopt(IP_OPTIONS) buffer can make it treat one of them as an option
length, increasing opt->opt.optlen beyond the valid option data.
The corrupted length stays on the socket and is later used as the copy
length by getsockopt(IP_OPTIONS) and by the udp/raw/ping sendmsg paths,
where it exceeds the size of the buffers they copy into.
Compute the new length from the intact options before the move and
subtract the CIPSO length, and fill the padding with IPOPT_END. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: don't allow compression on volumes with clusters larger than 4K
On a volume made with "mkntfs -c 8192", a user can set
FILE_ATTR_COMPRESSED on an empty file through system.ntfs_attrib.
Writing to the file and reading it back after dropping the page cache
then crashes:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ntfs_read_compressed_block+0xa2c/0x2040
Read of size 8192 at addr ffff88804355a000 by task dd/106
The read path only handles clusters up to 4K. It copies each cluster
out of a single page, and a compression block of 16 8K clusters does
not fit in the 64K ntfs_compression_buffer. Loading an inode already
rejects compressed data on such volumes.
Reject the flag change the same way. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (pmbus/q54sj108a2) Add missing NULL pointer check
When CONFIG_DEBUG_FS is enabled and per-client PMBus debugfs directory
creation fails during pmbus_do_probe(), q54sj108a2_probe() passes the NULL
pointer returned by pmbus_get_debugfs_dir() to debugfs_create_dir()
without validation, creating its debugfs directory at the debugfs root
instead of under the client directory.
If pmbus_init_debugfs() fails to create the client directory, data->debugfs
is left as NULL or an ERR_PTR, which pmbus_get_debugfs_dir() converts to
NULL. Passing a NULL parent to debugfs_create_dir() places q54sj108a2_dir
in the root of the debugfs filesystem and populates it with attribute files
whose private data pointers reference psu->debugfs_entries. Because this
root-level directory is outside the client debugfs hierarchy, PMBus core
cleanup does not remove it on device unbind, leaking the debugfs entries
and causing a use-after-free of the devm-allocated struct q54sj108a2_data
if the orphaned files are accessed via q54sj108a2_debugfs_read() or
q54sj108a2_debugfs_write() after device removal.
Fix the problem by adding the missing NULL pointer check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (coretemp) Set nr_cores only after core_data allocation succeeds
In init_temp_data(), pdata->nr_cores is populated from
topology_num_cores_per_package() before allocating pdata->core_data. If
that allocation fails, init_temp_data() returns NULL with
pdata->core_data still NULL and pdata->nr_cores set to a positive value.
coretemp_add_core() logs the error without failing coretemp_cpu_online(),
so the CPU still comes online with pdata->hwmon_dev registered. When the
CPU is later taken offline (or the module is unloaded),
coretemp_cpu_offline() calls get_temp_data(pd, cpu), which loops up to
pdata->nr_cores and dereferences the NULL pdata->core_data pointer.
Store the core count in a local variable and assign pdata->nr_cores only
after pdata->core_data is allocated, preserving the invariant that
pdata->nr_cores is zero whenever pdata->core_data is NULL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nVMX: Process each host MSR entry at most once when unwinding failed VM-Entry
Add a missing "break" in the inner for-loop of the open coded mess that
unwinds MSRs back to the pre-VM-Enter state when VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME VM-Fails
due to a consistency check that is caught by hardware but missed by KVM.
I.e. move on to the next MSR in the VM-Entry load list after performing a
write using a value found in the VM-Exit load list. Processing *every*
matching entry in the VM-Exit load list makes the processing quadratic,
which is problematic if the load lists are full of MSRs that are expensive
to emulate. E.g. writing APIC_BASE triggers kvm_recalculate_apic_map() and
a whole pile of unnecessary work.
Functionally, arbitrarily restoring the value of the first matching entry
is "fine", because none of this is architecturally correct: the load lists
are never supposed to have been used in the first place. In practice, it's
likely a moot point as no well-behaved VMM will have multiple, diverging
entries in the load lists. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: cache the mount context for dentry lock callbacks
ocfs2_drop_dentry_lock() drops the inode reference before releasing the
DENTRY lock. This lets inode eviction release the local inode and open
locks before a remote unlink can proceed past the DENTRY lock.
A DLM callback can still arrive before the DENTRY lock has been dropped.
ocfs2_get_dentry_osb() obtains the mount context through dl_inode->i_sb,
which can access a freed inode when the downconvert thread drops the
last inode reference in its post-unlock callback:
Downconvert thread DLM callback thread
------------------ -------------------
ocfs2_process_blocked_lock()
ocfs2_dentry_post_unlock()
ocfs2_dentry_lock_put()
ocfs2_drop_dentry_lock()
iput(dl->dl_inode)
[inode reclaimed after RCU]
ocfs2_blocking_ast()
ocfs2_get_dentry_osb()
dl->dl_inode->i_sb
ocfs2_simple_drop_lockres()
Store the mount context in the DENTRY lock resource's l_priv field and use
the default mount-context lookup. Recover the containing dentry lock with
container_of(), as already done for refcount locks, and remove
ocfs2_get_dentry_osb(). ocfs2_dismount_volume() shuts down the DLM before
freeing the mount context, so callbacks can use it without accessing the
inode. Preserve the existing iput-before-unlock order to avoid delaying
local inode and open lock release until after the DENTRY lock is released. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost-scsi: zero misaligned I/O bounce pages
The misaligned I/O fallback copies the full bounce scatterlist to the
request buffer during completion. If a data-in command transfers less
than requested, part of a newly allocated bounce page can remain unwritten.
Allocate bounce pages with __GFP_ZERO so all bytes copied during completion
have a defined value. This path is already the slow fallback for
misaligned I/O, so the added initialization cost is acceptable.
Found during an LLM-assisted source audit and validated with a QEMU/KVM
vhost-scsi target using misaligned data-in commands. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: fix truncate racing with PMD zapping
zap_huge_pmd_folio() removes the rmap before calling folio_mark_dirty().
If this was the last mapping, truncation can skip unmapping the folio
and proceed without waiting for the PMD lock, racing with dirtying.
ifs_set_range_dirty() can oops if MADV_DONTNEED races with
ftruncate() on XFS, when we get the folio set dirty after it was found
to not be mapped anymore.
Move folio_mark_dirty() and folio_mark_accessed() before rmap removal,
matching the PTE zap path. This keeps the folio mapped while updating
its state, so truncation must wait for the page table lock.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: simplify comment and description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: fix zapping migration entries for device-private THPs
A PMD migration entry can refer to a device-private folio.
zap_huge_pmd_folio() checks the folio type instead of the entry type,
so it treats such a migration entry as a device-private entry.
Installing the migration entry already removed the reverse mapping and
dropped the mapping reference. Zapping it must not repeat those
operations. Concurrent MADV_DONTNEED during migration back to system
memory can trigger this.
Check the PMD entry type using pmd_is_device_private_entry().
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: simplify description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/gup: recheck the PUD under PTL in follow_pud_mask()
follow_pud_mask() reads the PUD without a lock. If it is a leaf, it takes
the lock and calls follow_huge_pud(), which reads the entry again, but
only tests whether it is present.
A leaf can be zapped concurrently and a page fault can fill the empty
entry with a page table.
This currently only applies when device-dax makes use of PUD entries,
and the fault after e.g., MADV_DONTNEED would find THPs to be disabled.
That requires a sequence like
1) Fault in the PUD
2) Disable THP
3) Have GUP race against concurrent MADV_DONTNEED + refault
Which is rather unlikely to happen in practice, which is why we never
received a report about such a problem.
Before commit 1b1676180246 ("mm/gup: handle huge pud for
follow_pud_mask()"), we performed that check in follow_devmap_pud() by
testing for pud_devmap().
Let's fix it by just structuring follow_pud_mask() similar to
follow_pmd_mask(), minus protnone stuff that does not apply and minus
FOLL_SPLIT_PMD handling. That makes it much easier to spot any such
inconsistencies.
Perform the pud_bad() check early in follow_pmd_mask() and just forward
the PUD value. We can drop the pud_present() check in follow_huge_pud(),
just like we have in follow_huge_pmd().
Even though we are performing more changes than strictly necessary, the
fix should be easy to backport. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/gup: fix clearing folios in memfd_pin_folios()
memfd_pin_folios() pins folios obtained directly from the page cache
without checking whether they are uptodate. However, shmem fallocate()
can leave newly allocated folios uncleared and not uptodate. Callers
such as udmabuf can then expose uninitialized memory to userspace.
Clear non-uptodate folios and mark them uptodate under the folio lock
before returning them to the caller.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: simplify description and comment ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-tcp: Validate the queue state under the queue lock in the address attribute
Reading the "address" sysfs attribute calls kernel_getsockname() on the
admin queue socket, which can race with the queue teardown during
connection error recovery: a reader can observe NVME_TCP_Q_LIVE set,
then block on the queue lock while nvme_tcp_free_queue() releases the
socket and clears queue->sock without holding the lock. Once the
reader acquires the lock it dereferences the NULL socket pointer.
Commit 76d54bf20cdc ("nvme-tcp: don't access released socket during
error recovery") had the queue liveness check inside the lock.
Commit 782373ba2766 ("nvme: tcp: avoid race between queue_lock lock
and destroy") moved it back out because the lock itself is destroyed
in nvme_tcp_free_queue(), so a reader arriving late trips
mutex_destroy().
Check the queue liveness inside the queue lock, and clear queue->sock
under the same lock. The teardown clears NVME_TCP_Q_LIVE under the
lock well before the socket is released, so a reader either sees the
bit cleared or a socket that cannot be released while it holds the
lock. To also close the lock lifetime race, the queue locks are now
owned by the controller: they are initialized with the queue array and
only destroyed when the controller is freed, which cannot happen while
a sysfs attribute read is still in progress. The queue count is
computed by the NVME_TCP_OPT_NR_QUEUES() macro from the original
connect options for both initialization and destruction, as reconnects
may shrink ctrl->queue_count. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in XiangLi1999 Diffusion-LM up to 759889d58ef38e2eed41a8c34db8032e072826f4. This issue affects the function main of the file improved-diffusion/scripts/text_sample.py. Such manipulation of the argument out_dir leads to path traversal. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. This product implements a rolling release for ongoing delivery, which means version information for affected or updated releases is unavailable. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| A weakness has been identified in XiangLi1999 Diffusion-LM up to 759889d58ef38e2eed41a8c34db8032e072826f4. This vulnerability affects the function os.system of the file improved-diffusion/scripts/infill.py. This manipulation of the argument notes causes os command injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks. This product follows a rolling release approach for continuous delivery, so version details for affected or updated releases are not provided. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in ninenines cowlib allows unauthenticated remote denial of service via memory exhaustion.
cow_spdy:inflate/2 in cowlib passes peer-supplied compressed bytes directly to zlib:inflate/2 with no output size bound. The SPDY header compression dictionary (?ZDICT) is public, and zlib compresses long runs of repeated bytes at roughly 1024:1, so a few kilobytes of SPDY frame payload can decompress to gigabytes on the BEAM heap, OOM-killing the node. A single unauthenticated SPDY frame is sufficient to trigger the condition. The parsers for syn_stream, syn_reply, and headers frame types are all affected via cow_spdy:parse_headers/2.
This issue affects cowlib: from 0.1.0 before 2.16.1. |
| Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in ninenines cowboy allows denial of service via unbounded buffer accumulation in multipart header parsing.
cowboy_req:read_part/3 in src/cowboy_req.erl accumulates incoming request bytes into a Buffer binary with no upper-bound check. When cow_multipart:parse_headers/2 returns more or {more, Buffer2}, the function reads up to Length bytes (default 64 KB) from the request body and recurses with the enlarged buffer. There is no equivalent of the byte_size(Acc) > Length guard present in the sibling function read_part_body/4. An unauthenticated attacker can send a multipart/form-data request whose body never yields a complete header section — for example, a body that never contains the advertised boundary delimiter, or one whose header lines never contain \r\n\r\n — and force the server process to accumulate memory linearly with the bytes the protocol layer is willing to deliver. A handful of concurrent such uploads is sufficient to exhaust BEAM memory.
The function has had two names. From 0.10.0 to 2.0.0-pre.3 it is cowboy_req:part/3, reached through cowboy_req:part/1 and cowboy_req:part/2. From 2.0.0-pre.4 it is cowboy_req:read_part/3, reached through cowboy_req:read_part/1 and cowboy_req:read_part/2. Both have the same buffer loop.
This issue affects cowboy: from 0.10.0 before 2.15.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
inet: reject unhashed sockets during established lookups
TCP established ehash lookups are lockless. The socket caches involved
use SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so memory can be reused before an RCU reader
that retained its old address has finished.
After a tuple match, __inet_lookup_established() and
__inet6_lookup_established() acquire a reference and repeat the tuple
check. They do not check whether the new object is hashed. If the
address is reused for a socket with the same tuple, the lookup can
acquire a reference to the new object and return it while its nulls node
is unhashed.
A PoC that drives reuse with a SYN cookie request socket reproduced the
crash. The new request socket is unhashed and has a NULL rsk_listener.
A lookup that had loaded the address of the old request socket acquired
the reference published by tcp_get_cookie_sock() and returned the new
object. tcp_v4_rcv() then read sk_state through the NULL listener.
The resulting crash was:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
...
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 7.3.0-00591-g0e135910deec #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
...
RIP: 0010:tcp_v4_rcv+0x44e/0x1280
...
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000024ca8c0 R12: 0000000000000000
...
CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 0000000103d50004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? raw_local_deliver+0xae/0x240
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2d/0x180
ip_local_deliver_finish+0x84/0x100
ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x5f/0x70
ip_sublist_rcv+0x12a/0x1d0
ip_list_rcv+0xfd/0x130
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x223/0x250
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d2/0x2c0
? try_fill_recv+0x39/0x7b0
napi_complete_done+0x74/0x170
virtnet_poll+0x445/0x600
__napi_poll+0x27/0x1e0
net_rx_action+0x2fe/0x3b0
handle_softirqs+0xc2/0x2c0
__irq_exit_rcu+0x74/0xd0
common_interrupt+0x7f/0x90
</IRQ>
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
After taking a reference, check whether the nulls node is unhashed in
both IPv4 and IPv6 established lookups. If it is unhashed or the tuple
no longer matches, drop the reference and restart the lookup.
Lookups racing with the TIME_WAIT hashdance, or with a request being
replaced by its child, now restart and find the new socket instead of
returning the old one.
Request sockets that were never inserted into ehash can have a nonzero
refcount, and a stale lookup can hold a transient reference. Therefore,
when SYN cookie, Fast Open, and request migration paths fail after
setting a nonzero refcount, release the references held by those paths
with reqsk_put() instead of freeing the request directly. |
| In JetBrains Rider before 2026.3 code execution was possible via MSBuild configuration files in parent directories |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.2, 2026.1.6 remote code execution was possible via Git submodule URLs |