| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Take trace_array reference before accessing its ftrace_ops
The trace instance files set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace was
updated to work with specific trace instances (trace_arrays). The issue is
that when these files are opened, there is a small race window where it
will use the ftrace_ops from the inode->private pointer to get a reference
to the trace_array and then take its reference. The problem is that the
ftrace_ops itself could be freed. If the rmdir on the instance happens at
the same time the set_ftrace_filter file is opened, the rmdir could have
also freed the ftrace_ops and referencing it will cause a use-after-free
bug and crash the kernel.
Instead, pass in the trace_array as the file private data (NULL for the
top level instance), and then pass both the trace_array and the ftrace_ops
to the ftrace_regex_open() function. If the trace_array is NULL, then it
just uses the ftrace_ops without the need to take its reference (like
normal). If the ftrace_ops is NULL, that is only the case for the top
level instance and the global_ops can be used.
This allows the trace_array to have its reference incremented before
touching the ftrace_ops that could also be freed when the instance is. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Prevent rcuwait use-after-free during requeue PI
On PREEMPT_RT, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI can trigger a KASAN report
(slab-out-of-bounds) in futex_requeue_pi_complete() invocation of
rcuwait_wake_up().
The futex_q used by futex_wait_requeue_pi() is allocated on the waiter's
stack. An early wakeup can race with a PI requeue as follows:
waiter requeue task
------ ------------
futex_wait_requeue_pi()
futex_do_wait()
schedule()
futex_requeue
futex_proxy_trylock_atomic()
futex_requeue_pi_prepare()
Q_REQUEUE_PI_NONE -> Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS
* timeout/ signal wakes waiter *
futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync()
Q_REQUEUE_PI_IN_PROGRESS -> Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT
requeue_pi_wake_futex
futex_requeue_pi_complete()
cmpxchg Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT -> Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED
rcuwait_wait_event()
if (atomic_read(&q->requeue_state) != Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT)
break /* no schedule() */
/* q.pi_state->owner == current */
futex_private_hash_put()
/* return from syscall */
rcuwait_wake_up(&q->requeue_wait)
/* q is gone */
futex_requeue_pi_complete() publishes Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED before
calling rcuwait_wake_up(). The waiter observes this state in
rcuwait_wait_event() before invoking schedule() in rcuwait_wait_event().
Here, the waiter is free leave the syscall before requeue task can
complete the wake.
To address this race skip rcuwait_wake_up() in the Q_REQUEUE_PI_LOCKED
case.
This state is only published by requeue_pi_wake_futex(), which saves
q->task before futex_requeue_pi_complete() and wakes the waiter via
wake_up_state().
This wake is intended to wake the waiter from its futex_do_wait() sleep.
If the waiter is still sleeping there, it can not get into the
Q_REQUEUE_PI_WAIT state (and require this removed wake).
Should the waiter be woken up from futex_do_wait() by other means (as in
this example) and sleep in futex_requeue_pi_wakeup_sync() then the
wake_up_state() from requeue_pi_wake_futex() will wake it, too.
Should the waiter task terminate before wake_up_state() had a chance to
wake the task then the task pointer does not become invalid because the
futex_hash_bucket::lock is held and the task pointer is RCU protected.
[bigeasy: Updated comment and commit message] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: bsg: Fix TOCTOU in io_uring passthrough command setup
scsi_bsg_uring_cmd() reads bsg_uring_cmd from the shared mmap'd SQE.
Userspace can change a field after we check it and before we use it.
request_len is the sharp case: it can grow past sizeof(scmd->cmnd) after
the bound check and overflow scmd->cmnd in copy_from_user().
READ_ONCE() the SQE fields we check or use into locals before use. |
| SigNoz versions 0.88.0 through 0.141.0 fail to apply authorization wrappers to trace-funnel analytics endpoints in the HTTP handler. Unauthenticated attackers can submit arbitrary funnel definitions to retrieve trace analytics including identifiers, durations, span counts, service topology, and error activity without credentials. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio-ap: Fix control domain removal in vfio_ap_mdev_cfg_remove
The vfio_ap_config_remove function uses the bitmap_andnot function to clear
bits from the matrix_mdev->matrix.adm bitmap (specifies the control domains
assigned to the mdev). This prevents the explicitly unplugged control
domains from being removed the KVM guest. The bitmap_and function is used
instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvdimm/btt: reject an arena whose nfree is below the lane count
The BTT info block's nfree field, the number of reserve free blocks, is
read from the medium without validation. btt_freelist_init() and
btt_rtt_init() size the per-lane freelist[] and rtt[] arrays by nfree,
but the I/O path indexes them by the lane from nd_region_acquire_lane(),
which is bounded by nd_region->num_lanes (ND_MAX_LANES), not by nfree.
A crafted or foreign arena whose nfree is below the lane count makes
freelist[lane]/rtt[lane] run past the allocation: an out-of-bounds write.
btt.rst documents the nlanes = min(nfree, num_cpus) invariant, which the
code does not currently honor: num_lanes is ND_MAX_LANES regardless of
nfree. Reject an arena whose nfree is below num_lanes at discovery,
before the per-lane arrays are allocated, enforcing that invariant. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/migrate_device: avoid out-of-bounds writes for compound folios
migrate_device_range() and migrate_device_pfns() clear the entries
following a compound folio so that the PFN arrays retain their
page-granular representation.
If a compound folio extends beyond the end of the caller-provided range,
the loops clear all following folio entries without limiting them to the
number of slots remaining in the npages-sized array, causing an
out-of-bounds write.
Do not proceed with a compound folio if its page-granular representation
does not fit entirely in the remaining PFN array. If this happens, drop
any reference and lock acquired for the folio, clear the remaining
entries, and stop collecting.
Observed with a KASAN x86 QEMU kernel using the HMM migrate_anon_huge_zero
selftest. Closing /dev/hmm_dmirror0 after migrating an anonymous huge
page to device memory exercises:
dmirror_fops_release()
-> dmirror_device_evict_chunk()
-> migrate_device_range() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-fc: fix double free of fabrics options when nvme_add_ctrl() fails
nvmf_create_ctrl() owns the fabrics options and frees them whenever
->create_ctrl() returns an error, so a transport must not free them on
its own error paths. nvme-fc tracks this by testing ctrl->ctrl.opts in
nvme_fc_ctrl_free(), which requires nvme_fc_init_ctrl() to clear that
pointer on every error exit.
The coupling is implicit, and commit 1a9e218195a5 ("nvme: split device
add from initialization") broke it by adding a second error exit. When
nvme_add_ctrl() fails, nvme_fc_init_ctrl() jumps to out_put_ctrl:, past
the "ctrl->ctrl.opts = NULL" that only sits on the fail_ctrl: path, so
nvme_fc_ctrl_free() frees the options and nvmf_create_ctrl() frees them
a second time:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in nvmf_free_options+0x30/0x190
nvmf_free_options+0x30/0x190 drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c:1284
nvmf_create_ctrl drivers/nvme/host/fabrics.c:1374 [inline]
Freed by task 5534:
nvme_fc_ctrl_free drivers/nvme/host/fc.c:2374 [inline]
nvme_fc_init_ctrl+0xe17/0x1450 drivers/nvme/host/fc.c:3605
nvme_add_ctrl() fails when dev_set_name() cannot allocate, so this is
reachable under memory pressure or fault injection. Without KASAN the
options are freed twice.
Rather than clear the pointer on the second exit as well, derive
ownership the way nvme-tcp, nvme-rdma and nvme-loop do, from list
membership: their free_ctrl leaves the options alone unless the
controller made it onto the transport list.
The list cannot simply be populated on the success path as it is there.
nvme-fc runs the initial connect synchronously via flush_delayed_work(),
and the controller has to be reachable on rport->ctrl_list for the whole
of it: nvme_fc_unregister_remoteport() needs to find it to signal
connectivity loss, nvme_fc_match_disconn_ls() matches an incoming
Disconnect Association LS against ctrl->association_id, which is only
assigned during that window, nvme_fc_resume_controller() needs it on
remoteport re-registration, and nvme_fc_existing_controller() uses it to
reject a duplicate connect racing the one in flight.
Keep the insertion where it is and add a fail_unlist: label, falling
into fail_ctrl:, for the error paths that run after it. The earlier
error paths never reach the insertion and keep using fail_ctrl:
directly, so the list is only touched where the controller is actually
on it.
nvme_fc_ctrl_free() cannot use the plain "goto free_ctrl" the other
transports use, because it still has to put_device(), release the rport
reference and free the ida entry for resources taken before the
insertion. Sample list_empty() under rport->lock instead.
ctrl->ctrl.opts also stays valid for the whole teardown now. That is
not the bug being fixed, but it removes some fragility around the old
idiom: nvme_free_ctrl() calls nvme_auth_free() before ->free_ctrl(), and
ctrl_max_dhchaps() dereferences ctrl->opts without a NULL check when
ctrl->dhchap_ctxs is set, which nvme-fc permits since NVMF_ALLOWED_OPTS
allows the dhchap options. The nvme sysfs attributes that dereference
ctrl->opts, such as hostnqn and address, evaluate their is_visible()
test once at device_add() time and stay readable until
cdev_device_del(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: fix race when loading and unloading a table
If the userspace calls two concurrent table load ioctls and one of them
succeeds and the other fails, there is a race condition because
dm_setup_md_queue walks &md->table_devices without any lock. If the walk
races with dm_table_destroy -> free_devices -> dm_put_table_device, there
is access to invalid memory.
Fix this race by extending the lock over the list walk. |
| AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 uses a cryptographically weak pseudo-random number generator when creating account activation / login pairing codes. getRandomCode() in objects/functions.php derives the code entirely from uniqid() (sprintf('%08x%05x', seconds, microseconds)) with a single non-CSPRNG rand() character used only as padding, reducing the code space to roughly 36 x 10^6 (~2^25) values for a known generation second. Because plugin/API/set.json.php?APIName=login_code can be called without authentication, it also serves as an oracle for the server's exact microtime. An unauthenticated remote attacker who guesses a valid, unexpired code (codes expire after 10 minutes) can redeem it at plugin/API/get.json.php?APIName=login_code to obtain the target account's email address and a User::getUserHash(users_id, '+1 year') value, a credential accepted in place of the account password for one year, resulting in account takeover. No patched version is available. |
| Dell OpenManage Server Administrator, versions prior to 11.1.0.3, contains a Use of Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Unauthorized access. |
| A flaw was found in Keycloak. When deployed in stateless mode with MySQL or MariaDB, a mismatch in row-count semantics between the database driver and Keycloak's application logic allows an attacker to bypass replay protection. This vulnerability enables an attacker who intercepts single-use security artifacts, such as JWT client assertions, DPoP proofs, or one-time password (TOTP) codes, to replay them. Successful exploitation grants unauthorized access to the token endpoint or login flow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: rmi: fix OOB access with undersized RMI reports
The hid-rmi driver sizes its writeReport/readReport buffer purely from
the report descriptor supplied by the device, with no minimum bound:
data->input_report_size = hid_report_len(input_report);
data->output_report_size = hid_report_len(output_report);
alloc_size = data->output_report_size + data->input_report_size;
data->writeReport = devm_kzalloc(&hdev->dev, alloc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
data->readReport = data->writeReport + data->output_report_size;
but then reads and writes fixed offsets into it. A device declaring a
1-byte output and a 1-byte input report makes hid_report_len() return 2
for each, so alloc_size is 4, while rmi_set_page() -- reached
unconditionally at probe time through rmi_input_configured() -- stores
writeReport[4] and rmi_hid_read_block() stores writeReport[0..5]. Since
readReport lives at writeReport + output_report_size, those stores also
corrupt the window the next reply is parsed out of.
The read path is worse: the copy length comes from readReport[1], which
the device fills in and can be up to 255, and the copy starts at
&readReport[2] with no regard for input_report_size, so it runs past the
end of the allocation into adjacent slab objects. This does not even
need a lying device -- rmi_f01_probe() issues a fixed 21-byte register
read, so any device declaring an input report smaller than 23 bytes
reads out of bounds even when it answers truthfully. Those bytes become
the register values the RMI core acts on: rmi_f01_probe() prints them to
the kernel log as the product id and exports them through the mode 0444
sysfs attribute of the same name, and rmi_driver_set_irq_bits() sends
them back to the device as the interrupt mask, so an undersized report
descriptor leaks heap contents both to unprivileged userspace and to the
device itself.
The write path has no bound either: rmi_hid_write_block() copies an
unbounded len to &writeReport[4], and the largest caller a device can
drive at probe time is rmi_driver_set_irq_bits(), whose length is
derived from the interrupt source counts the device declares in its Page
Description Table.
Finally, the read loop cannot terminate on a zero-length reply: such a
reply copies nothing and advances neither bytes_read nor bytes_needed,
and because a reply did arrive the one second wait_event_timeout() does
not fire either, so a device answering 0 forever keeps the loop running
inside the probe worker with page_mutex held. khungtaskd does not
notice, because every reply wakes the task.
Reject reports too small for what the driver builds -- 6 output bytes
for the write reports and 3 input bytes for the read handshake -- at
probe time, clamp the write and the read copy to the report sizes the
device declared, and treat a zero-length reply as an error. A device
refused this way is started as an ordinary HID device, like one that
does not carry the RMI report ids at all.
RMI_DEVICE must not be left set in device_flags on that path, because
rmi_input_configured() would then run the RMI setup and reach
rmi_set_page(), which writes the writeReport buffer the refusal just
skipped allocating. The bit can arrive set: rmi_probe() copies
id->driver_data into device_flags before the report checks, and a bind
through the new_id sysfs attribute can supply driver_data with
RMI_DEVICE (BIT(0)) set. Strip the bit where driver_data is copied, so
RMI_DEVICE keeps meaning exactly "this probe validated the reports"; the
three jumps to start that predate this patch are covered as well.
The error path also clears RMI_READ_DATA_PENDING on its way out, because
that flag is what the wait at the top of the loop tests: leaving it set
would make every later wait_event_timeout() return immediately on the
stale reply and kill the read path for the rest of the device's life.
Clamping does not regress working hardware: the read loop already
handles
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: pm8001: Use rollback index when freeing MSI-X vectors
pm8001_request_msix() unwinds previously registered handlers with
free_irq() when request_irq() fails. The rollback loop uses the failing
index i for every iteration instead of the already registered vector
index j.
That passes the wrong IRQ/dev_id pair to free_irq() and leaves the
earlier handlers installed. Use j for both pci_irq_vector() and the
matching irq_vector entry in the rollback loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: megaraid_sas: Limit NVMe request size to the PRP chain frame
megasas_make_prp_nvme() builds a command's PRP list in cmd->sg_frame, a
DMA pool buffer of instance->max_chain_frame_sz bytes, spending one
entry per NVMe page of the transfer plus one per page of the buffer for
the chain pointer. The loop runs until the transfer is described and
never checks the buffer bound.
max_hw_sectors comes straight from the MDTS the firmware reports for the
drive. On drives with a large MDTS the only thing keeping the list
inside the buffer was the block layer default of 1280 KiB, which needs
320 entries, which fit into a 4 KiB frame as that holds 512. But since
commit 9b8b84879d4a ("block: Increase BLK_DEF_MAX_SECTORS_CAP") that
default is 4 MiB, and such a transfer needs 1025 entries, so the list
runs a full page past the end of the frame:
sd 1:0:1:0: [sdb] tag#630 page boundary ptr_sgl: 0x00000000ba62d13f
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff663bcb81e7c000
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
RIP: 0010:megasas_build_and_issue_cmd_fusion+0xeaa/0x1870 [megaraid_sas]
If the page after the frame happens to be mapped, the overrun does not
fault but silently corrupts the neighbouring pool entry, which is
another in-flight command's PRP list.
Cap max_hw_sectors at what the chain frame can describe, less one page
for transfers that do not start on a page boundary and so need one entry
more. This is the megaraid_sas counterpart of commit 04631f55afc5
("scsi: mpt3sas: Limit NVMe request size to 2 MiB"), but derives the
limit from max_chain_frame_sz rather than hardcoding it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: bsg: Cap io_uring sense copy to max_response_len
Completion copied scmd->sense_len to the user response buffer without
honoring max_response_len. After a valid sense, the midlayer sets
sense_len to the real length (up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE), so a smaller
user buffer was overrun. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_action_frame_parse()
rtw_action_frame_parse() takes a frame_len parameter but never
actually checks it before indexing into the frame body:
const u8 *frame_body = frame + sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr);
...
c = frame_body[0];
...
a = frame_body[1];
frame_body already points 24 bytes (sizeof(struct
ieee80211_hdr_3addr)) into frame, so reading frame_body[0] and
frame_body[1] requires frame_len >= 26. A management action frame
shorter than that (e.g. exactly 24 bytes, the minimum a malicious
peer can send) causes a 1-2 byte out-of-bounds read.
This is reachable from rtw_cfg80211_monitor_if_xmit_entry() and
cfg80211_rtw_mgmt_tx() in ioctl_cfg80211.c, both of which pass
attacker/user-influenced frame buffers and lengths straight through.
Add the missing length check before frame_body is dereferenced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read / stack overflow in rtw_get_wps_attr()
rtw_get_wps_attr() walks WPS attributes inside a WPS IE taken from
a wireless management frame. For each candidate attribute it only
checks that the fixed 4-byte attribute header (2-byte ID + 2-byte
length) fits inside the IE:
if (attr_ptr + 4 > wps_ie + wps_ielen)
break;
u16 attr_id = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr);
u16 attr_data_len = get_unaligned_be16(attr_ptr + 2);
u16 attr_len = attr_data_len + 4;
attr_data_len (and therefore attr_len) is read directly from the
wire and is never checked against the remaining bytes in the IE
before being used as the size of:
memcpy(buf_attr, attr_ptr, attr_len);
Since attr_len is fully attacker controlled (0 to 65535+4), this is
both a heap OOB read of wps_ie, and, more seriously, a stack buffer
overflow at several call sites where buf_attr is a single-byte
stack variable, e.g. rtw_get_wps_attr_content()'s callers passing
WPS_ATTR_SELECTED_REGISTRAR into a stack "u8 sr"/"u8
selected_registrar" (drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_cfg80211.c,
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_mlme_ext.c). A crafted WPS IE in a
beacon or probe response processed during scanning can therefore
smash the stack of the parsing thread.
rtw_get_wps_attr_content() itself has no independent length check
and simply trusts the attr_len it gets back from rtw_get_wps_attr(),
so fixing the bound here also fixes that caller.
The "attr_ptr + 4 > wps_ie + wps_ielen" header check above was added
by commit 1463ca3ec6601 ("staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in
rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr()"), which
bounded the fixed header but never extended the check to cover the
variable-length attribute data that follows it. Add that missing
check before attr_len is used as a memcpy() length or accepted as a
match. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_midi2: fix use-after-free in string attribute show path
f_midi2_opts_str_show() takes the string lock internally, but its
callers dereference the opts->info.<field> pointer before calling it,
outside the lock. This races with f_midi2_opts_str_store(), which
frees the old string under opts->lock when the attribute is written
concurrently, the show path can read a pointer that gets freed
before the lock inside str_show() is even taken.
Change f_midi2_opts_str_show() to take a pointer to the string field,
matching the existing pattern in f_midi2_opts_str_store(), and
dereference it only after the lock is held. Update all three callers
(iface_name, block name, and the EP string option macro) accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: qcom-pmic: cancel reset_work on stop
pdphy_stop() disables IRQs but leaves reset_work pending. If the IRQ
handler schedules it just before disable_irq(), the work runs after
remove() frees the struct via devm.
Call cancel_work_sync() after disabling IRQs to close the window.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
