| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in miniOrange miniOrange's Google Authenticator miniorange-2-factor-authentication allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects miniOrange's Google Authenticator: from n/a through 6.6.0. |
| Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection') vulnerability in Tribulant Software Newsletters newsletters-lite allows SQL Injection.This issue affects Newsletters: from n/a through 4.18.2. |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2 privilege escalation to system administrator was possible via project administrator roles in simple authorization mode |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1 stored XSS in the Issue Trackers health report was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1 stored XSS in the Maven Build Info project header was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1, 2026.1.5 stored XSS in the Commit Status Publisher settings was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1 missing authorization allowed reading VCS file contents and patches of other projects |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1 stored XSS in recipe export errors was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1, 2026.1.5 stored XSS on the thread dump page was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1 improper authorization allowed using AWS connections of other projects in cloud profiles |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1 stored XSS in the Pull Requests health report for VCS roots was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1, 2026.1.5 stored and reflected XSS in Space project connection dialogs was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2.1, 2026.1.5 stored XSS in the JaCoCo coverage settings was possible |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: TDX: Enable Bus Lock VM exit
Enable Bus Lock VM exit functionality for TDX guests.
Bus Lock VM exit is an existing feature supported by KVM. Userspace can
enable Bus Lock VM exit through KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT when it's
reported as supported. However, KVM reports the support of this CAP
just based on the hardware capability but doesn't differentiate between
VMX and TDX. This leads to the issue that userspace can enable this cap
for TDX guests without getting an error, but the feature is not actually
enabled because KVM doesn't call the TDX module API to program the
relevant TD VMCS fields.
Enable Bus Lock VM exit for TDX guests by programming the
BUS_LOCK_DETECTION control in the TD VMCS and by adding the exit handler.
Note, there is no enumeration bit for this feature by TDX module because
all TDX modules support it and allow to set the TD VMCS as long as the
hardware supports the feature. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Take SRCU in kvm_zap_gfn_range()
kvm_zap_gfn_range() walks memslots and rmaps and may drop mmu_lock to
reschedule. Callers that do not already hold kvm->srcu (or slots_lock)
can race with memslot deletion: synchronize_srcu_expedited() does not
wait, kvm_free_memslot() frees the old slot and its rmap, and the zap
resumes on freed memory.
The VFIO noncoherent-DMA path hits this by zapping the entire GPA
space without SRCU. KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in slot_rmap_walk_next+0x82/0x1c0
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc900005c1008
Call Trace:
slot_rmap_walk_next+0x82/0x1c0
__kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range+0x17a/0x280
kvm_zap_gfn_range+0x2a6/0x6a0
kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x576/0x770
kvm_device_ioctl+0x1ff/0x3b0
Take SRCU inside kvm_zap_gfn_range() so every caller is covered.
Nesting with an existing kvm->srcu critical section is fine; the
helper uses a local index. Drop the now-redundant SRCU pair from
__kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/xen: Enforce 4-byte alignment of vcpu_info registration
Xen's map_guest_area() enforces that vcpu_info is aligned to
sizeof(xen_ulong_t). KVM has no such check, allowing a guest to
register vcpu_info at an arbitrary byte alignment.
Enforce unconditional 4-byte alignment regardless of the current
shinfo mode. This is sufficient because subsequent commits ensure
that all locked atomic operations on vcpu_info fields use at most
32-bit accesses. Return -ENXIO on failure, matching Xen's
map_guest_area() behaviour for unaligned requests.
Originally observed in review of an unrelated patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260604193554.1BA311F00893@smtp.kernel.org/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nSVM: Ignore EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0 when preparing L2 state
Force EFER.LMA=0 if EFER.LME=0 when preparing L2 state for VMRUN, i.e.
mimic real hardware's behavior of ignoring EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0. VMRUN
unfortunately allows the nonsensical combination, i.e. doesn't fail, but
KVM itself has an invariant EFER.LMA can be set et if and only if EFER.LME
is set. Breaking that invariant can lead to a variety of issue,
particularly in MMU code that keys off EFER.LMA when determining whether to
emulate/virtualization 4/5-level paging versus PAE paging. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Trigger new ASID allocation in both VMCBs on pCPU switch
When the pCPU where the VMCB was most recently used is switched, reset
the ASID generation in both VMCBs, triggering new ASID allocation for
the immediate VMRUN as well as the next VMRUN on the other VMCB.
The ASID is shared between vmcb01 and vmcb02, and gets flushed on every
nested transition. However, since pCPU tracking is done per VMCB, it is
possible for one VMCB to allocate a new ASID when migrated to a new
pCPU, and then the other VMCB reuses that ASID on the old pCPU. This can
result in the same ASID being used by multiple vCPUs on the old pCPU.
Example scenario:
- vCPU runs on pCPU A, vmcb01 is active, asid=1.
- vCPU migrates to pCPU B, vmcb01 pCPU changes, new asid=2.
- Another vCPU runs on pCPU A and allocates asid=2 as well.
- vCPU migrates back to pCPU A, and then switches to vmcb02 before it
runs again with vmcb01.
- No pCPU switch is detected for vmcb02, so VMRUN is done with asid=2.
- Two vCPUs end up using asid=2 on the same pCPU.
Keep the VMCB dirtying to the active VMCB only. Clean bits are tracked
by a pCPU for each VMCB, so do not unnecessarily dirty a VMCB if its
pCPU does not change.
Additionally, initialize the tracked pCPU for vmcb02 to -1 on nested
enablement as hardening, so that a new ASID allocation is always
triggered when nested is disabled and re-enabled.
No performance regression was noticed when overcommitting L1 vCPUs in L0
(to force rescheduling), pinning L1 <-> L2 vCPUs, and running CPUID in a
tight loop bouncing between 2 vCPUs in L2.
An alternative (and perhaps more proper) fix would be tracking the ASID
per-VMCB instead (e.g. [1]). However, that's a more involved change, and
it would result in having different ASIDs for L1 and L2 without actually
properly maintaining them. It would probably work because all TLB
flushes target the current VMCB, and the other VMCB is always flushed on
nested transitions, but the code ends up in an arguably more fragile
state. Punt a proper clean fix to an incoming (and overdue) overhaul of
SVM's ASID usage [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250205182402.2147495-2-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260728003557.1136583-1-yosry@kernel.org |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: x86: hdmi: fix chmap array missing terminator entry
had_build_channel_allocation_map() allocates a single struct
snd_pcm_chmap_elem via kzalloc() and stores it as
intelhaddata->chmap->chmap. struct snd_pcm_chmap.chmap is expected to
be a zero-terminated array (see snd_pcm_std_chmaps[]), but
had_register_chmap_ctls() never overrides the TLV callback installed
by snd_pcm_add_chmap_ctls(), so the generic pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv() from
ALSA core is left in place.
pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv() is reachable by any local user via
SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_TLV_READ on the "Playback Channel Map" control and
walks the array with "for (map = info->chmap; map->channels; map++)".
Since the driver's single element is never terminated, this walks
past the allocation. The same pointer is also freed on hot-unplug and
rebuilt on hot-plug under intelhaddata->mutex, while the TLV callback
runs under card->controls_rwsem without that mutex, so the walk can
also race a concurrent free of the array.
Fix this by allocating a second, zeroed element so the array is
properly terminated, and by dropping the inherited TLV callback
entirely at registration time, since the driver never implements one
of its own. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix lack of short-send handling in rxrpc_kernel_send_data()
Fix rxrpc_kernel_send_data() to loop around if it detects a short send.
David Laight suggested doing it here rather than wrapping all the calls in
loops. Further, remove the len argument and use the iterator count instead
and return 0 on success, not the amount copied.
Note this is also a prerequisite for changing the way rxrpc_send_data()
works to return a short send rather than an error if some data was
buffered. |