| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Aimeos Pagible content management system prior to version 0.10.4, the administrative proxy route (`cmsproxy`) is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack via DNS Rebinding. A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exists between the URL validation phase and the actual HTTP request phase, allowing attackers to access internal network resources and cloud metadata endpoints. Version 0.10.4 fixes the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/khugepaged: write all dirty file folios when collapsing
[There is no upstream commit, as this code was removed by upstream
commit 044925f9b565 ("mm: fs: remove filemap_nr_thps*() functions and their users")]
As-is, khugepaged and writable-file opening exclude each other. A file
cannot be open writeable and have THPs (because the filesystem is not aware
of them). khugepaged will never collapse file pages for files that are
opened writeable. On an open(O_RDWR/O_WRONLY), the page cache for that
particular file is dropped. This is fine because nothing could've been
dirtied.
However, there is an edge-case: collapse_file() might not be able to
coexist with concurrent writers, but it can coexist with dirty folios
(from previous writers). Therefore, the following can happen:
open(file, O_RDWR)
write(file)
close(file)
madvise(file_mapping, MADV_COLLAPSE, some non-dirty range)
open(file, O_RDWR)
nr_thps > 0
truncate_inode_pages()
/* THPs are cleared out, but so are the dirty folios */
When this edge-case happens, there is data loss, as the dirty folios are
fully discarded.
Fix it by fully writing back the page cache (and waiting) when collapsing
file THPs. Doing so provides the guarantee that no dirty folio will be
observed while there are active THPs. To fully ensure this is safe, the
invalidate_lock needs to be held while doing the writeout, so that
do_dentry_open()'s page cache truncation excludes this write-and-wait.
As a side effect, move the nr_thps counter bumping outside the i_pages
lock. This is correct since the counter itself is an atomic_t and the
producer <-> consumer correctness is provided by a full memory barrier:
smp_mb() in collapse_file()/memory barrier implied by full ordering in
get_write_access() -> atomic_inc_unless_negative(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
debugobjects: Plug race against a concurrent OOM disable
syzbot reported a puzzling splat:
WARNING: kernel/time/hrtimer.c:443 at stub_timer+0xa/0x20
stub_timer() is installed as timer callback function in
hrtimer_fixup_assert_init(), which is invoked when
debug_object_assert_init() can't find a shadow object. In that case debug
objects emits a warning about it before invoking the fixup.
Though the provided console log lacks this warning and instead has the
following a few seconds before the splat:
ODEBUG: Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled
So the object was looked up in debug_object_assert_init() and the lookup
failed due a concurrent out of memory situation which disabled debug
objects and freed the shadow objects:
debug_object_assert_init()
if (!debug_objects_enabled)
return; obj = alloc();
if (!obj) {
// Out of memory
debug_objects_enabled = false;
free_objects();
obj = lookup_or_alloc();
// The lookup failed because the other side
// removed the objects, so this returns
// an error code as the object in question
// is not statically initialized
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(obj))
return;
if (!obj) {
debug_oom();
return;
}
print(...)
if (!debug_objects_enabled)
return;
fixup(...)
The debug object splat is skipped because debug_objects_enabled is false,
but the fixup callback is invoked unconditionally, which makes the timer
disfunctional.
This is only a problem in debug_object_assert_init() and
debug_object_activate() as both have to handle statically initialized
objects and therefore must handle the error pointer return case
gracefully. All other places only handle the found/not found case and the
NULL pointer return is a signal for OOM. Otherwise they get a valid shadow
object.
Plug the hole by checking whether debug objects are still enabled before
invoking the print and fixup function in those two places. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to get, not find, block 0
Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to use afs_dir_get_block() to get block 0 rather
than afs_dir_find_block() as the latter caches the found block in the
afs_dir_iter and may[*] switch out the page it's on if another
afs_dir_find_block() is done. This parallels what afs_edit_dir_add() does.
[*] There's more than one block per page. |
| The Zephyr ext2 file system validates the on-disk superblock in ext2_verify_disk_superblock() (subsys/fs/ext2/ext2_impl.c) before completing a mount. The validator checked the magic number, block size, revision and feature flags, but did not verify that the on-disk fields s_blocks_per_group and s_inodes_per_group are non-zero. Both fields are read directly from the image and are later used as divisors during mount-time initialization.
During mount, get_ngroups() divides and modulos s_blocks_count by s_blocks_per_group (reached via ext2_fetch_block_group() from ext2_init_fs()), and get_itable_entry() divides (ino - 1) by s_inodes_per_group when fetching the root inode (both in subsys/fs/ext2/ext2_diskops.c). A superblock with either field set to zero therefore causes an integer division by zero during the mount sequence.
An attacker who can present a crafted ext2 image to a device that mounts ext2 — removable media such as an SD card or a USB mass-storage device — can trigger this. On ARMv7-M / ARMv8-M-mainline Cortex-M targets, divide-by-zero trapping is enabled (SCB_CCR_DIV_0_TRP), so the division raises a UsageFault that Zephyr treats as a fatal error, producing a denial of service. The impact is limited to availability; the malformed value is consumed only as a divisor.
The fix rejects a zero s_blocks_per_group or s_inodes_per_group in the superblock validator, returning -EINVAL so the mount fails before any block-group or inode I/O occurs. |
| The UpdateHub management subsystem (subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c) drives every update operation through a single file-scope ctx structure that holds the CoAP block context, payload buffer, status code, socket, and a one-element poll-fd array fds[1]. Access to ctx was not serialized, and prepare_fds() wrote ctx.fds[ctx.nfds] and incremented ctx.nfds with no bounds check.
Two independent paths mutate ctx concurrently: the background autohandler running on the system workqueue, and user-triggered operations reached through the updatehub run shell command, direct API calls, or — since the operations are exposed as syscalls — userspace threads. When a second flow enters prepare_fds() while ctx.nfds is already 1, the write lands one element past the array; by struct layout it overlaps the adjacent ctx.sock/ctx.nfds members. More broadly, the unsynchronized sharing lets two flows interleave connection setup and teardown, double-closing a socket descriptor or scribbling the shared buffers.
The result is corruption of the update subsystem's internal state and denial of service of the firmware-update path; the out-of-bounds write is contained within the ctx structure and there is no demonstrated path to memory outside it or to code execution. Triggering requires a local actor able to invoke update operations (or, with CONFIG_USERSPACE, an unprivileged userspace thread) and to win a timing race against the background handler; remote peers cannot control the race timing. The fix serializes the entry points with a mutex and adds a bounds check to prepare_fds(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uvc: hold opts->lock across XU walks in uvc_function_bind
uvc_function_bind() walks &opts->extension_units twice without holding
opts->lock:
- directly, for the iExtension string-descriptor fixup loop;
- indirectly, four times via uvc_copy_descriptors() (once per speed),
where the helper iterates uvc->desc.extension_units (which aliases
&opts->extension_units) to size and emit XU descriptors.
The configfs side (uvcg_extension_make / uvcg_extension_drop, in
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c) takes opts->lock around its
list_add_tail / list_del operations. A privileged userspace process
that holds the configfs subtree open and writes the gadget UDC name
to bind the function while concurrently rmdir()'ing an extensions
subdir can race uvcg_extension_drop() against the bind-time list walks
and dereference a freed struct uvcg_extension.
Hold opts->lock from the start of the XU string-descriptor fixup
through the last uvc_copy_descriptors() call, releasing on the
descriptor-error path via a new error_unlock label that drops the
lock before falling through to the existing error label. This
matches the locking discipline of the configfs callbacks and removes
the only remaining unsynchronised reader of the XU list during bind.
Reachability: only privileged processes that can mount configfs and
write to gadget UDC files can trigger the race, so this is a
correctness fix rather than a security boundary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: davinci: fix division by zero on missing clock-frequency
When the 'clock-frequency' property is missing from the device tree,
the driver falls back to DAVINCI_I2C_DEFAULT_BUS_FREQ. However, this
macro was defined in kHz (100), whereas the device tree property is
expected in Hz.
The probe function divided the fallback value by 1000, causing
integer truncation that resulted in dev->bus_freq = 0. This triggered
a deterministic division-by-zero kernel panic when calculating clock
dividers later in the probe sequence.
Fix this by redefining DAVINCI_I2C_DEFAULT_BUS_FREQ in Hz (100000)
to match the expected device tree property unit, allowing the existing
division logic to work correctly for both cases. |
| Kernel software installed and running inside a Host VM may post improper commands to the GPU Firmware to trigger a memory write outside the permitted range of memory for the host kernel.
A TOCTOU bug existed where a malicious driver could modify values in memory after firmware validation but before use. |
| Diffusers is the a library for pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, Diffusers' DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained flow can bypass the trust_remote_code guard because download() validates model_index.json and custom pipeline code before later loading from a cached folder that can change, allowing a Hub repository with custom .py pipeline code to execute through the custom pipeline flow without passing custom_pipeline or trust_remote_code=True. This issue is fixed in version 0.38.0. |
| The userspace syscall verifiers z_vrfy_zsock_sendmsg() and z_vrfy_zsock_recvmsg() in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets.c snapshot the caller-supplied struct net_msghdr into a kernel-side copy with k_usermode_from_copy(), but then re-read the still-live user struct for subsequent decisions. The kernel iovec shadow buffer is sized from one read of msg->msg_iovlen, while the population loop is bounded by a second, live read of the same field.
Because msg points into ordinary user memory, a cooperating second thread in the same memory domain can inflate msg->msg_iovlen in the window between the sizing read and the loop test (a classic double-fetch / TOCTOU). The population loop then iterates past the number of net_iovec slots actually allocated, writing attacker-influenced iov_base/iov_len values beyond the end of the kernel-heap shadow buffer. The recvmsg verifier has the same defect on both its inbound and result write-back loops.
The code is reachable from an unprivileged user thread whenever CONFIG_USERSPACE is enabled and the zsock_sendmsg/zsock_recvmsg syscalls are available. A successful race corrupts kernel-managed heap memory across the user-to-kernel privilege boundary, yielding a local privilege-escalation primitive or, at minimum, a kernel-fault denial of service. The fix copies the header once and derives every size, bound, and gate from the snapshot, copying each iovec entry atomically so its base and length can no longer be raced apart. |
| A rogue Velociraptor client can upload a malformed sparse file such that if the GUI attempts to expand the file, a panic occurs which may crash the server process.
The problem is a Divide by Zero bug in the ShouldPadFile() function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: Avoid queue->stopped races and set/read that value under lock
There are several readers of queue->stopped that check the value
under lock, but fuse_uring_commit_fetch() did not and actually
the value was not set under the lock in fuse_uring_abort_end_requests()
either. Especially in fuse_uring_commit_fetch it is important
to check under a lock, because due to races 'struct fuse_req'
might be freed with fuse_request_end, but another thread/cpu
might already do teardown work. |
| A race condition was found in the abrt-dbus D-Bus service's ChownProblemDir method. ChownProblemDir opens the dump directory with DD_OPEN_READONLY and calls dd_chown to change ownership of all files to the caller's uid, succeeding even while post-create event handlers hold a write lock. This allows an attacker to gain filesystem-level control of the dump directory while privileged event scripts are still running. |
| A time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition was found in the abrt-dbus D-Bus service's SetElement method. Between dump directory creation and post-create event execution, any local user can call SetElement to write arbitrary text files into the root-owned dump directory, bypassing package validation and allowing crashes of unpackaged binaries to survive post-create processing. |
| In Zephyr's userspace dynamic-objects subsystem, thread_idx_alloc() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c allocated a new thread permission index from the global _thread_idx_map[] bitmap without holding lists_lock.
On SMP systems, two user-mode threads invoking the k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD) syscall concurrently can both observe the same low free bit, perform the same non-atomic RMW to clear it, and return the identical tidx.
The two newly created K_OBJ_THREAD objects are then assigned the same thread_id, so the two user threads alias a single bit position in every kernel object's perms[] bitfield: any subsequent grant of access on a kernel object to one thread is implicitly a grant to the other, defeating userspace ACL isolation. A secondary lost-update window between the unlocked &=~BIT() in alloc and the locked |= BIT() in thread_idx_free() can also leak entries from the thread-index pool.
The defect is reachable from any user-mode thread via the unrestricted __syscall k_object_alloc and is gated on CONFIG_USERSPACE, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS, and CONFIG_SMP. The flaw was introduced when the per-thread permission index was added in 2018 and is present in every release up to and including v4.4.0. Fixed by holding lists_lock across the bitmap RMW and the permissions clear (and inlining the obj_list traversal that previously took the lock itself). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
idpf: fix double free and use-after-free in aux device error paths
When auxiliary_device_add() fails in idpf_plug_vport_aux_dev() or
idpf_plug_core_aux_dev(), the err_aux_dev_add label calls
auxiliary_device_uninit() and falls through to err_aux_dev_init. The
uninit call will trigger put_device(), which invokes the release
callback (idpf_vport_adev_release / idpf_core_adev_release) that frees
iadev. The fall-through then reads adev->id from the freed iadev for
ida_free() and double-frees iadev with kfree().
Free the IDA slot and clear the back-pointer before uninit, while adev
is still valid, then return immediately.
Commit 65637c3a1811 ("idpf: fix UAF in RDMA core aux dev deinitialization")
fixed the same use-after-free in the matching unplug path in this file but
missed both probe error paths. |
| Race in Chrome for iOS in Google Chrome on iOS prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker to inject arbitrary scripts or HTML (UXSS) via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Velociraptor's NTFS parsing library mishandles several out of bound and memory exhaustion bugs which may be triggered by maliciously crafted NTFS images.
Typically Velociraptor's NTFS parser is used on live NTFS filesystems, limiting the opportunity of attackers corrupting the filesystem. However, in some applications (e.g. dead disk forensics https://docs.velociraptor.app/docs/forensic/deaddisk/ ) Velociraptor may be used on untrusted NTFS image files.
If an attacker is able to inject maliciously corrupted NTFS Volumes they can cause a crash and a Denial of Service. |
| IBM Cognos Analytics 12.1.3 GA Version with build number through 12.1.3-2606251736 could allow an attacker to obtain incorrect report summary results or cause report-processing failures due to a race condition in the Agentic AI assistant's concurrent request-handling logic when multiple authenticated users submit report-related tasks simultaneously. |
