| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 remote code execution was possible via argument injection in Mercurial VCS root settings |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 remote code execution was possible via path traversal in project import archives |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 remote code execution was possible via path traversal in the external artifact cache |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.8 disclosure of password parameter values to project viewers was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 missing authorization in the Kubernetes integration allowed project viewers to use stored credentials |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 XXE via Maven settings file upload was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 XXE in the .NET build steps auto-discovery was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 stored XSS in the Promote build dialog was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 stored XSS on the Docker Container Info tab was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 privilege escalation to system administrator was possible after disabling per-project permissions |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 improper authorization allowed viewing build process details via agent stacktraces |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3 improper authorization allowed project viewers to change project IDs |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3, 2025.11.7 stored XSS in the Shared Resources build feature was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1.3 privilege escalation was possible via Basic authentication with a restricted access token |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4 reflected XSS in build problem details was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4, 2025.11.8 reflected XSS on the build feature parameters page was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2, 2026.1.4 reflected XSS in the build log tree view was possible |
| In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.2 privilege escalation of project-scoped access tokens via concurrent project deletion was possible |
| In ConnectWise Automate versions prior to
2026.11, a condition in Web Control Center (WCC2) authorization handling could
allow an authenticated contact user to access information associated with other
clients on the same Automate server through API requests. This may result in
disclosure of information outside the user’s assigned access scope. The issue
is limited to information disclosure and does not extend existing modification
or command execution permissions. This issue is resolved in ConnectWise
Automate 2026.11. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path
The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a
malicious AP in two ways:
1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to
hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer. All of
rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute
length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len;
and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes
datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8;
for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len).
A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows
these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in
aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le()
length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from
the rx skb. Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;
this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the
unconditional iv[3] access within the frame.
2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through
the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking
whether decryptor() returned NULL. On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast
protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path
always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a
use-after-free read/write, and the caller's error path frees the frame
a second time, drifting free_recvframe_cnt. Bail out immediately when
decryptor() fails, freeing the temporary mgmt_DATA buffer first.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |