| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In proxygen from v2024.10.28.00 until v2026.09.28.00, the HTTPTransaction::onWebTransportUniStream and HTTPTransaction::onWebTransportBidiStream APIs could return stream handles that the stream handler had already freed. HQSession then installed those handles as transport read callbacks, which could lead to use of freed memory. |
| In proxygen from v2024.10.28.00 until v2026.09.28.00, WebTransportImpl::terminateSessionStreams (WebTransportImpl::destroy in releases before v2025.08.18.00) failed to unregister read callbacks for streams that were no longer open before destroying them. The transport could then invoke a read callback that had been freed. |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.13.0 until 2.14.0, PyJWS._load in jwt/api_jws.py is affected because parser catches ValueError but not RecursionError. This occurs when a deeply nested token header reaches json.loads. As a result, RecursionError escapes the documented PyJWT error hierarchy. Consequently, an unauthenticated malformed token can cause a request-level failure and HTTP 500. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.0. |
| The brace-expansion library generates arbitrary strings containing a common prefix and suffix. Prior to 1.1.20, 2.1.6, 3.0.8, and 5.0.11, deeply nested brace groups cause expand_() to recurse once per nesting level at comma-member and single-set expansion sites, exhausting the native stack before output limits can apply and potentially terminating the Node.js process. expand_ performs uncontrolled recursion for nested brace alternatives and single-part sets. deeply nested brace groups supplied as an untrusted pattern. expand_ is affected. expand is affected. Comma members is affected. Single set is affected. native stack exhaustion during nested sub-expansion. process-terminating denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 1.1.20, 2.1.6, 3.0.8, and 5.0.11. |
| A flaw has been found in Ziroom ZHOME A0101 1.0.1.0. This affects an unknown part of the file /api/ZRnetwork/firstSetup_wifi. Executing a manipulation of the argument login_pwd can lead to command injection. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been published and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way. |
| A potential out of bounds write vulnerability could allow a local privileged attacker to execute code in System Management Mode. |
| The ADC API requires each driver to reject a sampling sequence whose destination buffer is too small: the buffer_size field of struct adc_sequence in include/zephyr/drivers/adc.h documents that "the driver must ensure that samples are not written beyond the limit and it must return an error if the buffer turns out to be not large enough". The ADI MAX32 driver did not honour that contract. start_read() in drivers/adc/adc_max32.c compared buffer_size, a byte count, against a sample count ((1 + extra_samplings) channels), ignoring sizeof(uint16_t), so it accepted a buffer half the required size. The samples are then stored through the uint16_t data->buffer by Wrap_MXC_ADC_GetData(), which writes two bytes per sample and advances the pointer by one uint16_t: in adc_max32_start_channel() for synchronous reads, and in adc_max32_isr() for asynchronous ones. A sequence selecting two channels with a two-byte buffer, for example, passes the check and has its second sample written past the end of the buffer.
On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE, adc_read() and adc_read_async() are system calls. The handler in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c copies the sequence in from user memory, verifies only that [buffer, buffer + buffer_size) is writable by the calling thread, and rejects a user-supplied options->callback; it deliberately leaves the size arithmetic to the driver. A user-mode thread that has been granted access to a MAX32 ADC device object therefore fully controls channels, buffer, buffer_size and options->extra_samplings, and can make the driver write twice as many bytes as its buffer holds. Because the check scales with extra_samplings, the overrun equals the length of the buffer itself, up to channels * 65536 bytes past its end, since the sample pointer is only rewound on a repeat sampling, never on the extra samplings of a sequence.
The resulting stores are performed by the driver in kernel mode (in the system call itself, the ADC context timer, or the ADC interrupt handler for asynchronous reads), where the MPU does not restrict the thread's memory domain, so the write walks linearly out of the user partition and into adjacent memory such as other partitions, kernel data or thread stacks. The impact is kernel-memory corruption of attacker-chosen length at an attacker-chosen offset, a plausible privilege-escalation and denial-of-service primitive from an unprivileged user-mode thread. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE are affected only as a caller-side robustness defect, since the application itself supplies the buffer.
The fix replaces that check in start_read() with a call to the new shared helper adc_sequence_validate_buffer() in drivers/adc/adc_common.c, passing sizeof(uint16_t) as the sample size. The helper computes active_channels sizeof(uint16_t) (1 + extra_samplings) and returns -ENOMEM before any sampling is started. |
| Dozzle versions before 11.1.2 fail to sanitize container display names when building ZIP archive entry names in the log download endpoint. Attackers who can label containers can use path traversal sequences to write files outside the extraction directory when users download and extract logs. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected as a duplicate. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected as a duplicate. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected as a duplicate. |
| This CVE ID has been rejected as a duplicate. |
| PyJWT is a Python implementation of JSON Web Token standards. From 2.4.0 until 2.14.0, PyJWT HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key is affected because asymmetric-key guard relies on textual markers that are absent from DER encoding. This occurs when an application mixes HMAC and asymmetric algorithms and supplies a DER public key as the shared verification key. As a result, PyJWT uses public DER bytes as an HMAC secret. Consequently, an attacker who knows the public key can forge authenticated HMAC tokens. This issue is fixed in version 2.14.0. |
| A signed integer overflow in the PCP __pmGetPDU() function can be exploited via crafted network packets during PDU processing or SASL negotiation. This permanently blinds the affected daemon, resulting in a total denial of service (DoS) for subsequent packet reads. |
| An unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass access controls by sending crafted requests to the PCP pmproxy /store endpoint. This allows the attacker to overwrite any PMDA metric, leading to arbitrary code execution and system takeover. |
| A flaw in the PCP linux_sockets module exposes an unsecured internal connection.
An attacker with initial code execution can exploit this to escalate privileges and execute arbitrary commands as root. |
| A command injection flaw in PCP's linux_sockets PMDA allows malicious shell metacharacters via the network.persocket.filter metric.
This failed validation lets attackers execute arbitrary commands as the PMDA user when metrics refresh. |
| ZoneMinder before 1.38.4 fails to apply per-monitor access restrictions in the FramesController index endpoint. Authenticated users with Events view permission can call the frames API to list frame records from monitors they are denied access to, disclosing event and frame metadata across monitor boundaries. |
| @grpc/grpc-js implements the core functionality of gRPC purely in JavaScript, without a C++ addon. Prior to 1.13.6 and 1.14.5, when an application method handler throws an uncaught error, the server includes its error message in the status message sent to the client. The thrown error message is transmitted to the client, causing sensitive information disclosure when the message contains sensitive data. This issue is fixed in versions 1.13.6 and 1.14.5. |
| The userspace verifier z_vrfy_rtio_sqe_copy_in_get_handles() in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c (subsys/rtio/rtio_handlers.c before v4.3.0) validated the RTIO object handle and the sqes input array, but not the handle out-parameter. On the first loop iteration it executed *handle = sqe, storing the kernel address of the newly acquired submission-queue entry through a pointer taken verbatim from user mode, with no K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE check in front of it.
Any user-mode thread that has been granted a struct rtio kernel object can invoke the syscall with an arbitrary address in handle. That is the ordinary way an unprivileged thread uses the RTIO API, for example via sensor_read_async_mempool() or the async ADC helpers, which call rtio_sqe_copy_in_get_handles() internally. The store happens in supervisor mode before any submission-entry validation, so it fires regardless of whether the SQE contents are subsequently rejected. Only builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_RTIO are affected; without CONFIG_USERSPACE the verifier is not compiled and the caller is already privileged.
The write address is fully attacker-chosen and the written value is a pointer into the caller's own RTIO ring, whose contents the caller controls (the following *sqe = sqes[i] copies an attacker-supplied struct rtio_sqe into that slot). This yields a write-what-where primitive placing a pointer to attacker-controlled data at any kernel address, sufficient to corrupt kernel function pointers, thread structures, or memory-domain partition tables, and thus to escalate from user mode to kernel mode, defeating the isolation boundary CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to enforce. At minimum it is a reliable kernel memory-corruption and crash primitive. The reporter reproduced the write on qemu_x86: a K_USER thread changed a supervisor global from NULL to a live kernel SQE pointer.
The fix adds K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(handle, sizeof(*handle)) (guarded by the existing optional-NULL semantics) before the loop, so the destination must lie in the calling thread's writable memory domain or the thread is terminated by K_OOPS. The neighbouring verifier z_vrfy_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer(), which checked its buff/buff_len out-parameters only for read although the implementation writes through them, was hardened separately by bea93400138 ("rtio: syscalls: validate output params as writable"); that residual was materially weaker, since a read check still confines the target to the caller's own memory domain. |
