| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: intel/ipu6: fix async notifier cleanup leak on parse error
isys_notifier_init() calls v4l2_async_nf_init() and then adds fwnode
remote subdevs in a loop with v4l2_async_nf_add_fwnode_remote(). If an
endpoint parse or add fails partway through the loop, it jumps to
err_parse and returns without calling v4l2_async_nf_cleanup(), leaking
every v4l2_async_connection already added to the notifier's waiting
list.
The register-failure path just below already cleans up correctly, and
the caller only tears the notifier down (isys_notifier_cleanup()) once
isys_notifier_init() has returned success. Clean up the notifier on the
parse error path too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: platform: mtk-mdp3: fix NULL deref on failed SCP lookup
Add the missing sanity check after looking up the SCP to avoid
dereferencing a NULL-pointer in case its driver has not yet been bound. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: rtl2832_sdr: use vb2_video_unregister_device() on remove to fix DMA leak
rtl2832_sdr_remove() runs on USB disconnect and clears dev->udev to
NULL before any pending streaming teardown has run. When user space
later closes its file descriptor, vb2 calls rtl2832_sdr_stop_streaming()
which in turn calls rtl2832_sdr_free_stream_bufs(). That helper releases
each coherent buffer with:
usb_free_coherent(dev->udev, dev->buf_size,
dev->buf_list[dev->buf_num],
dev->dma_addr[dev->buf_num]);
usb_free_coherent() returns immediately when its dev argument is NULL,
so every DMA stream buffer that was live at disconnect is silently
leaked. The URBs allocated in rtl2832_sdr_alloc_urbs() outlive the
device for the same reason.
The rtl2832_sdr driver uses vb2_fop_release() in its file_operations,
so replace video_unregister_device(&dev->vdev) with
vb2_video_unregister_device(&dev->vdev) and move it before clearing
dev->udev. vb2_video_unregister_device() releases the vb2 queue, which
synchronously runs rtl2832_sdr_stop_streaming() if streaming is active,
so URBs and coherent DMA stream buffers are freed while dev->udev is
still valid.
vb2_video_unregister_device() locks vdev->queue->lock (vb_queue_lock)
internally, and stop_streaming() locks v4l2_lock, so the previous outer
mutex_lock(&dev->vb_queue_lock) / mutex_lock(&dev->v4l2_lock) pair
around the unregister sequence would self-deadlock and has been removed.
A short v4l2_lock critical section around dev->udev = NULL remains so
any ioctl path that still holds the file descriptor sees coherent state.
Issue identified by automated review of the INV-003 series at
https://sashiko.dev/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: s2255: bound JPEG frame size before copying into the buffer
s2255_fillbuff() memcpy()s vc->jpg_size bytes of a captured JPEG/MJPEG
frame into the vb2 plane. vc->jpg_size is taken verbatim from the
S2255_MARKER_FRAME header the device sends (pdword[4] in save_frame())
and, unlike the frame payload length just above it, is never bounded:
payload = le32_to_cpu(pdword[3]);
if (payload > vc->req_image_size) /* payload is checked ... */
return -EINVAL;
vc->pkt_size = payload;
vc->jpg_size = le32_to_cpu(pdword[4]); /* ... jpg_size is not */
A malicious or malfunctioning device can therefore report a jpg_size
larger than the destination vb2 plane, and the memcpy() writes past it.
jpg_size is a signed int, so a value with the top bit set also turns
into a huge length.
Reject a frame whose jpg_size is negative or exceeds the plane size
before copying it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: s2255: check firmware size before reading trailing marker
s2255_probe() reads a 4-byte marker and version from the last 8 bytes
of the firmware blob (fw->data[fw_size - 8] and [fw_size - 4]). If the
firmware file is shorter than 8 bytes, fw_size - 8 underflows and the
access reads out of bounds. Validate the firmware size before indexing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: tda18250: fix possible integer overflow
Integer overflow may occur, when variable exp equals to zero. Result
of shift 1 << (exp - 1) may then leads to undefined behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: v4l2-async: avoid deleting unlinked ASC entry on link error
v4l2_async_match_notify() creates ancillary media links before adding
asc->asc_subdev_entry to sd->asc_list.
If ancillary link creation fails, the function jumps to
err_call_unbind while asc_subdev_entry has not been linked yet. Async
connections are zero-allocated, so the list entry still has NULL next
and prev pointers on this path. Calling list_del() on it can therefore
dereference NULL instead of returning the original link creation error.
Do not delete asc_subdev_entry from err_call_unbind. There is no list
insertion to undo on this path; the bound callback and sub-device
registration are the operations that need to be rolled back. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: v4l2-fwnode: Fix fwnode leak in v4l2_fwnode_parse_link
In v4l2_fwnode_parse_link(), the remote endpoint fwnode reference is
acquired using fwnode_graph_get_remote_endpoint(). This reference is
properly released in the error paths, but it is leaked on the success
path.
Add the missing fwnode_handle_put() before returning 0 to prevent the
reference leak.
[Sakari Ailus: Fix subject prefix and coding style a little.] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: video-i2c: fix kthread error pointer left in kthread_vid_cap on failure
kthread_run() returns an ERR_PTR on failure, not NULL.
When start_streaming() fails, data->kthread_vid_cap is left holding
this error pointer instead of being cleared.
This causes two subsequent bugs:
1. A future call to start_streaming() sees a non-NULL kthread_vid_cap
and returns 0 (success) immediately, without actually starting the
capture thread.
2. A call to stop_streaming() checks 'kthread_vid_cap == NULL' which
is false for an error pointer, and proceeds to call kthread_stop()
on the error pointer, leading to a kernel crash.
Fix this by resetting kthread_vid_cap to NULL on failure before
jumping to the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: qcom: iris: use disable_irq() during power-off
The IRQ is registered as a threaded IRQ.
Using disable_irq_nosync() in iris_vpu_power_off() does not wait
for an already queued threaded IRQ handler to complete before
returning.
As a result, a threaded IRQ handler may still run after the VPU has
been powered down and access hardware registers after power-off.
Replace disable_irq_nosync() with disable_irq() so the power-off path
waits for any in-flight threaded IRQ handler to complete before
returning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: chips-media: wave5: Add timeout while stop_streaming
When stop_streaming is called, an infinite loop may occur in some cases.
Add a bounded poll of the queue status: loop until the queues drain,
sleeping briefly between polls, and bail out once VPU_DEC_STOP_TIMEOUT
elapses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: chips-media: wave5: Defer job_finish() only when a DEC_PIC was queued
Decoder instances sharing a VPU also share one v4l2_m2m job slot, released
when the running context calls v4l2_m2m_job_finish(). While draining,
device_run() defers job_finish() once EOS is sent (sent_eos), expecting a
later finish_decode() (from a DEC_PIC completion IRQ) to release the slot.
But the m2m core checks job_ready() only when a job is queued, not when it
is dispatched. A job queued while draining can run after finish_decode()
has already moved the instance to STOP and sent EOS. device_run() then runs
in STOP, issues no DEC_PIC, yet still skips job_finish() - so no IRQ, no
finish_decode(), and the shared slot is leaked, stalling every instance.
With several v4l2h264dec instances in parallel, GStreamer hangs at EOS.
Track whether the run actually queued a DEC_PIC (cmd_issued) and defer
job_finish() only then. Otherwise finish the job immediately |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: chips-media: wave5: Resume device before setting EOS flag
Setting the EOS flag talks to the firmware via send_firmware_command(),
which accesses VPU registers. Both the STREAMOFF path
(wave5_vpu_dec_job_abort()) and the V4L2_DEC_CMD_STOP path
(wave5_vpu_dec_stop()) can run while the device is runtime suspended, so
those register accesses hit powered-down hardware and the SoC raises an
asynchronous SError, panicking the kernel:
SError Interrupt on CPU3, code 0x00000000bf000000 -- SError
send_firmware_command+0x2c/0x160 [wave5]
wave5_vpu_dec_set_bitstream_flag+0x6c/0x80 [wave5]
wave5_vpu_dec_update_bitstream_buffer+0x80/0xec [wave5]
wave5_vpu_dec_job_abort+0x44/0xa0 [wave5]
v4l2_m2m_cancel_job+0x110/0x19c [v4l2_mem2mem]
v4l2_m2m_streamoff+0x24/0x140 [v4l2_mem2mem]
Resume the device with pm_runtime_resume_and_get() around the EOS
firmware command and release it with pm_runtime_put_autosuspend(),
matching the runtime PM handling already done in
wave5_vpu_dec_device_run(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers
The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE
(256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not
zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before
handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp().
qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied
value:
if (len == 1)
opt |= BIT_0;
if (opt & BIT_0)
len = *sfp;
*sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow
up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool
buffer. Since only a small prefix was written
(e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU
status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and
writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device
flash.
Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C handlers
so any bytes beyond the initialized data are zero rather than stale heap
contents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Bound i2c->length in I2C bsg handlers
struct qla_i2c_access carries a 16-bit length field alongside a fixed
64-byte buffer:
struct qla_i2c_access {
uint16_t device, offset, option, length;
uint8_t buffer[0x40];
} __packed;
qla2x00_write_i2c() and qla2x00_read_i2c() use the user-supplied
i2c->length without any bounds check. i2c is overlaid on a 256-byte
on-stack buffer and sfp is a 256-byte DMA-pool buffer, so a length up to
65535 overruns both:
- write: memcpy(sfp, i2c->buffer, i2c->length) over-reads the stack and
over-writes the sfp heap buffer, and qla2x00_write_sfp() then DMAs
i2c->length bytes out of the 256-byte buffer.
- read: qla2x00_read_sfp() DMAs i2c->length bytes into the 256-byte sfp,
then memcpy(i2c->buffer, sfp, i2c->length) overflows the 64-byte
buffer inside the on-stack array.
A caller holding CAP_SYS_RAWIO can use this to corrupt the heap and the
kernel stack. Reject requests whose length exceeds the buffer before any
copy or DMA transfer in both handlers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix BSG job leak on validate flash image error path
qla28xx_validate_flash_image() returns QLA_SUCCESS (0) unconditionally,
telling the FC BSG transport (fc_bsg_host_dispatch()) that the driver
owns and will complete the request. But bsg_job_done() is guarded by "if
(!rval)", so on the error path (rval == -EINVAL) neither the driver nor
the transport completes the job. The request dangles until it times out,
leaking block layer resources.
Commit c2c68225b145 ("scsi: qla2xxx: Fix bsg_done() causing double
free") added the "if (!rval)" guard to a batch of BSG handlers. That is
correct for handlers that also return the error code (the transport then
completes the job once via fail_host_msg), but this function returns
QLA_SUCCESS unconditionally, so the guard turned a correct single
completion into a leak.
Always call bsg_job_done(): bsg_reply->result is DID_OK and the error is
reported in vendor_rsp[0], and since the function returns 0 the
transport will not complete the job a second time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Zero dport diagnostics buffer to avoid info leak
qla2x00_do_dport_diagnostics() allocates the qla_dport_diag response
buffer with kmalloc_obj() (non-zeroing) and, on success, copies the full
sizeof(*dd) back to user space via sg_copy_from_buffer(). The inbound
sg_copy_to_buffer() only fills as many bytes as the user request payload
provides, and qla26xx_dport_diagnostics() zeroes only dd->buf. The
options and unused[] fields are therefore copied out uninitialized,
leaking kernel heap contents to user space.
Allocate with kzalloc_obj(), matching qla2x00_do_dport_diagnostics_v2(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Bound image count in qla2x00_update_fru_versions()
qla2x00_update_fru_versions() copies the user-supplied BSG request into
a fixed 256-byte stack buffer (bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE]) and then iterates
list->count times over the qla_image_version array embedded in that
buffer, advancing the image pointer each iteration. count is taken
directly from user input with no upper bound, while only (DMA_POOL_SIZE
- sizeof(list->count)) / sizeof(struct qla_image_version) = 6 entries
actually fit. A larger count walks the image pointer off the end of the
stack buffer, reading adjacent kernel stack memory and sending it to the
device via qla2x00_write_sfp().
Reject requests whose declared count does not fit in the buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Serialize flash version read in reset handler
The "update cache versions without reset" sysfs reset operation (0x20261)
calls get_flash_version(), which reads hardware flash registers, without
holding ha->optrom_mutex. The VPD update path serializes the same call
under optrom_mutex, so this reset path can interleave its flash register
accesses with a concurrent VPD or optrom flash operation and corrupt the
reads.
Hold ha->optrom_mutex across the get_flash_version() call to match the
VPD update path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix FCE trace use-after-free during firmware dump
qla2x00_free_fce_trace() freed and cleared ha->fce while holding only
fce_mutex. The firmware-dump consumers qla27xx_fwdt_entry_t264() and
qla25xx_copy_fce() read ha->fce (NULL check followed by a copy of the
buffer) under hardware_lock and never take fce_mutex. A debugfs FCE
disable could therefore free the DMA buffer between a dump's NULL check
and its copy, resulting in a use-after-free.
Unpublish ha->fce under hardware_lock, then release the lock and free
the DMA buffer (dma_free_coherent() may sleep). A concurrent dump either
completes its check and copy with the buffer still valid, or observes
ha->fce == NULL and skips it. |
