| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Reject monmaps advertising zero monitors
A message of type CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP contains a monmap that is sent from a
monitor to the client. This monmap contains information about the
existing monitors in the cluster. Currently, a monmap indicating that
there are zero monitors in the cluster is treated as valid. However, it
is impossible to have zero monitors in the cluster and still receive a
valid monmap from a monitor. Therefore, such a monmap must be corrupted
and should be treated as invalid. Furthermore, a monmap with a monitor
count of zero can subsequently crash the client when attempting to open
a session with a monitor in __open_session(). This happens because the
"BUG_ON(monc->monmap->num_mon < 1)" assertion in pick_new_mon() is
triggered.
This patch extends a check in ceph_monmap_decode() to also reject
arriving mon_maps with num_mon == 0 rather than only with
num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON.
[ idryomov: drop "log output for unusual values of num_mon" part ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown
ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing
the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs
file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed
monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free.
Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients.
debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so
the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/super: fix emergency thaw double-unlock of s_umount
do_thaw_all() iterates over all superblocks via __iterate_supers()
with SUPER_ITER_EXCL, which acquires s_umount exclusively before
calling the callback and releases it afterwards. However, the
callback do_thaw_all_callback() calls thaw_super_locked() which
unconditionally releases s_umount on every code path. This results
in a second unlock attempt in __iterate_supers() that corrupts the
rwsem state, triggering a DEBUG_RWSEMS warning:
[ 182.601148] sysrq: Emergency Thaw of all frozen filesystems
[ 182.601865] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 182.602375] DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE)): count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff99b1011e5870, owner = 0x0, curr 0xffff99b101b06c80, list not empty
[ 182.603817] WARNING: kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1412 at up_write+0xa3/0x170, CPU#2: kworker/2:1/53
[ 182.604578] Modules linked in:
[ 182.604864] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-00001-gbd3bd93ea98a-dirty #4 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 182.605711] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1kylin1 04/01/2014
[ 182.606417] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all
[ 182.606750] RIP: 0010:up_write+0xaf/0x170
[ 182.607076] Code: 19 3a 92 48 0f 44 c2 48 8b 55 08 48 8b 55 00 4c 8b 45 08 48 8b 55 00 48 8d 3d ad 91 e0 01 48 8b 4d 20 50 48 c7 c6 f0 8c 26 92 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e8 d7 93 4e 00 58 eb 81 48 83 7f 18 00 48 c7 c2 8d
[ 182.608563] RSP: 0018:ffffb670001d7e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 182.609007] RAX: ffffffff92349e8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff99b1011e5870
[ 182.609595] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff92268cf0 RDI: ffffffff92914d10
[ 182.610283] RBP: ffff99b1011e5870 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff99b101b06c80
[ 182.610847] R10: ffff99b10139a808 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: 0000000000000000
[ 182.611414] R13: ffffffff90cf74d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff99b1011e5800
[ 182.612009] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff99b1eaaee000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 182.612670] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 182.613146] CR2: 00000000005c631c CR3: 00000000013ee000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 182.613722] Call Trace:
[ 182.613946] <TASK>
[ 182.614130] __iterate_supers+0x128/0x150
[ 182.614463] do_thaw_all+0x1b/0x30
[ 182.614759] process_scheduled_works+0xbb/0x3f0
[ 182.615150] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.615499] worker_thread+0x129/0x270
[ 182.615816] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.616201] kthread+0xe2/0x120
[ 182.616469] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.616792] ret_from_fork+0x15b/0x240
[ 182.617115] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.617426] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 182.617761] </TASK>
[ 182.617968] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 182.618412] Emergency Thaw complete
Fix this by switching to SUPER_ITER_UNLOCKED and acquiring s_umount
in the callback via super_lock_excl() before calling
thaw_super_locked(). This matches the locking pattern expected by
thaw_super_locked() and eliminates the double unlock.
While at it, remove the dead 'return;' at the end of
do_thaw_all_callback(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: preserve ACL_DONT_CACHE state in forget_cached_acl()
The ACL_DONT_CACHE state is meant to be a constant state for the inode
for filesystems that want to opt out of posix acl caching.
Commit facd61053cff1 ("fuse: fixes after adapting to new posix acl api")
used this facility to opt out of posix acl caching for fuse inodes with
fuse server that does not negotiate FUSE_POSIX_ACL (fc->posix_acl).
The commit also takes care to gate the forget_all_cached_acls() call in
fuse_set_acl() on fc->posix_acl because there is no need for it, but
there are other placed in fuse code which call forget_all_cached_acls()
unconditional to fc->posix_acl and those cause the loss of the
ACL_DONT_CACHE state.
This is not only a functional bug. Properly timed, a get_acl() from this
fuse filesystem can return a stale cached value, as was observed in tests,
because set_acl() does not invalidate the unintentional acl cache.
We could fix this in fuse, but it actually makes no sense for the vfs
helper forget_cached_acl() to invalidate the ACL_DONT_CACHE state, so
let it not do that to fix fuse and future users of ACL_DONT_CACHE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Add global mutex to serialize trace_parser access
In ftrace, the trace_parser structure is allocated and initialized when
a trace file is opened, and is subsequently used across write and release
handlers to parse user input.
The affected handler paths and their specific functions are:
- Open paths: ftrace_regex_open(), ftrace_graph_open()
- Write paths: ftrace_regex_write(), ftrace_graph_write()
- Release paths: ftrace_regex_release(), ftrace_graph_release()
If userspace opens a trace file descriptor and shares it across multiple
threads, concurrent write calls will race on the parser's internal state,
specifically the 'idx', 'cont', and 'buffer' fields, leading to corrupted
input or undefined behavior.
Fix this by adding a global mutex, parser_lock, to serialize all access
to trace_parser across write and release paths, preventing concurrent
corruption of parser state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phonet: pep: fix use-after-free in pep_get_sb()
pep_get_sb() doesn't consider that pskb_may_pull() might have relocated
the skb data, and continue to access the older pointer, causing UAF.
Reproduced under KASAN:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
Read of size 1 at addr ff11000105510f50 by task repro/157
pep_get_sb+0x234/0x3b0
pipe_handler_do_rcv+0x5f7/0xa10
pep_do_rcv+0x203/0x410
__sk_receive_skb+0x471/0x4a0
phonet_rcv+0x5b3/0x6c0
__netif_receive_skb+0xcc/0x1d0
Refetch the header with skb_header_pointer() after pskb_may_pull(), so
the possibly stale pointer is no longer dereferenced. There are better
ways to solve this, but, this is the less instrusive one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink
A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and
the sticky underlay netns geneve->net. They differ once the device is
created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in.
The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev),
so a caller privileged there but not in geneve->net can rewrite a geneve
device whose underlay lives in geneve->net.
geneve_changelink() applies the new configuration against geneve->net:
geneve_link_config() and the geneve_quiesce()/geneve_unquiesce() pair
reopen the underlay sockets in that netns (geneve_sock_add() uses
geneve->net), so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series
applies here.
Gate geneve_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of
the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and
the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for
changelink" series.
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: Use sender devcom for MPV master-up
After PCIe DPC recovery, mlx5 reloads the affected functions and
replays multiport affiliation events. In the reported failure, the
first relevant device error was:
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: DPC: containment event
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Fatal)
pcieport 0000:10:01.1: [ 5] SDES (First)
mlx5 recovered the PCI functions and resumed 0000:11:00.1. During
that resume, RDMA multiport binding replayed
MLX5_DRIVER_EVENT_AFFILIATION_DONE and mlx5e sent
MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP. The host then panicked with:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
RIP: mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready+0x5/0x40 [mlx5_core]
RDI: 0000000000000000
Call trace included:
mlx5_devcom_comp_set_ready
mlx5e_devcom_event_mpv
mlx5_devcom_send_event
mlx5_ib_bind_slave_port
mlx5r_mp_probe
mlx5_pci_resume
MPV devcom registration publishes mlx5e private data to the component
peer list before mlx5e_devcom_init_mpv() stores the returned component
device in priv->devcom. A concurrent master-up event can therefore
reach a peer whose private data is visible but whose priv->devcom
backpointer is still NULL.
MPV_DEVCOM_MASTER_UP already carries the sender/master mlx5e private
data as event_data. The ready bit is stored on the shared devcom
component, not on an individual peer. Use the sender devcom when
marking the MPV component ready.
This preserves the readiness transition while avoiding a NULL
dereference of the peer devcom pointer during affiliation replay after
PCI error recovery. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hip04: fix RX buffer leak on build_skb failure
When build_skb() fails in hip04_rx_poll(), the driver jumps to the
refill path without releasing the current RX buffer and its DMA mapping.
Installing a replacement buffer then overwrites the slot references and
leaks both resources.
Keep the current slot intact and return budget so NAPI retries the same
buffer. Also free a newly allocated RX fragment when dma_map_single()
fails.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix PTP Call Trace during PTP release
If a PF reset occurs when the PTP state is ICE_PTP_UNINIT, then
ice_ptp_rebuild() will update the state to ICE_PTP_ERROR. This will
result in the following PTP release call trace during driver unload:
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:52!
ice_ptp_release+0x332/0x3c0 [ice]
ice_deinit_features.part.0+0x10e/0x120 [ice]
ice_remove+0x100/0x220 [ice]
This was observed when passing PF1 through to a VM. ice_ptp_init()
fails because ctrl_pf is NULL and sets the state to ICE_PTP_UNINIT.
Fix by detecting the ICE_PTP_UNINIT state in ice_ptp_rebuild() and
returning without error, preventing the invalid state transition to
ICE_PTP_ERROR. The only valid path to ICE_PTP_ERROR is from
ICE_PTP_RESETTING after a failed rebuild. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
super: fix emergency thaw deadlock on frozen block devices
do_thaw_all_callback() calls bdev_thaw() while holding sb->s_umount
exclusively. If the block device was frozen via bdev_freeze() dropping
the last block layer freeze reference calls fs_bdev_thaw() which
reacquires s_umount:
do_thaw_all_callback(sb)
super_lock_excl(sb) # holds sb->s_umount
bdev_thaw(sb->s_bdev)
mutex_lock(&bdev->bd_fsfreeze_mutex)
# bd_fsfreeze_count drops 1 -> 0
bd_holder_ops->thaw == fs_bdev_thaw
get_bdev_super(bdev)
bdev_super_lock(bdev, true)
super_lock(sb, true)
down_write(&sb->s_umount) # same task: deadlock
The emergency thaw worker deadlocks against itself holding both
s_umount and bd_fsfreeze_mutex. That fscks any subsequent unmount,
freeze, or thaw of that filesystem and block device.
[ 81.878470] sysrq: Show Blocked State
[ 81.880140] task:kworker/0:1 state:D stack:0 pid:11 tgid:11 ppid:2 task_flags:0x4208060 flags:0x00080000
[ 81.884876] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all
[ 81.886656] Call Trace:
[ 81.887759] <TASK>
[ 81.888763] __schedule+0x579/0x1420
[ 81.890372] schedule+0x3a/0x100
[ 81.891794] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x15/0x30
[ 81.893848] rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x1ea/0x900
[ 81.895191] ? __pfx_do_thaw_all_callback+0x10/0x10
[ 81.896528] down_write+0xbd/0xc0
[ 81.897505] super_lock+0x91/0x180
[ 81.898457] ? __mutex_lock+0xa99/0x1140
[ 81.900748] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x1f/0x400
[ 81.902069] bdev_super_lock+0x5b/0x150
[ 81.903132] get_bdev_super+0x10/0x60
[ 81.904042] fs_bdev_thaw+0x23/0xf0
[ 81.904755] bdev_thaw+0x82/0x100
[ 81.905484] do_thaw_all_callback+0x2c/0x50
[ 81.906298] __iterate_supers+0x5d/0x130
[ 81.907067] do_thaw_all+0x20/0x40
[ 81.907739] process_one_work+0x206/0x5e0
[ 81.908545] worker_thread+0x1e2/0x3c0
[ 81.909339] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 81.910171] kthread+0xf4/0x130
[ 81.910799] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 81.911528] ret_from_fork+0x2e2/0x3b0
[ 81.912259] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 81.913010] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 81.913806] </TASK>
bdev_super_lock() even documents the violated requirement with
lockdep_assert_not_held(&sb->s_umount).
Acquiring bd_fsfreeze_mutex under s_umount also inverts the
bd_fsfreeze_mutex vs. s_umount ordering established by
bdev_{freeze,thaw}() and can thus ABBA against a concurrent block-layer
freeze even when the recursive path isn't hit.
Fix this by not holding s_umount around the bdev_thaw() loop at all. Pin
the superblock with an active reference instead as
filesystems_freeze_callback() does. The active reference keeps the
superblock from being shut down and so ->s_bdev stays valid without
holding s_umount. The block-layer-held freeze is dropped by
fs_bdev_thaw() with FREEZE_MAY_NEST | FREEZE_HOLDER_USERSPACE exactly as
a regular unfreeze would and thaw_super_locked() handles
filesystem-level freezes as before.
The emergency thaw path has deadlocked like this in one form or
another for a long long time but the current exclusively-held
shape dates back to commit [1] where thaw_bdev() already ended in
thaw_super() with s_umount held by do_thaw_all_callback(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rbd: Reset positive result codes to zero in object map update path
In a reply message to an RBD request, a positive result code indicates
a data payload, which is not allowed for writes. While
rbd_osd_req_callback() already resets a positive result code for writes
to zero, rbd_object_map_callback() does not. This allows a corrupted
reply to an object map update to trigger the rbd_assert(*result < 0) in
__rbd_obj_handle_request(). This happens, because
rbd_object_map_callback() calls rbd_obj_handle_request() ->
__rbd_obj_handle_request() and passes this positive result code. From
__rbd_obj_handle_request(), rbd_obj_advance_write() is called, which
leaves the positive result code unchanged and returns true. Therefore,
the if(done && *result) branch is executed in __rbd_obj_handle_request()
and the assertion triggers.
This patch fixes the issue by adjusting the logic in the
rbd_object_map_callback() path. A positive result code for an object map
update is now reset to zero (similar to rbd_osd_req_callback()), and the
message is subsequently handled the same way as if the result code was
zero from the beginning. Additionally, a WARN_ON_ONCE() is added for
this case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: defer destroy_previous_session() until after NTLM authentication
In ntlm_authenticate(), destroy_previous_session() is called using a
user pointer resolved from the client-supplied NTLM blob username field
before the NTLMv2 response is validated. An authenticated attacker can
set the NTLM blob username to match a victim account and set
PreviousSessionId to the victim's session ID; destroy_previous_session()
destroys the victim's session while ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob()
subsequently rejects the request with -EPERM.
Move destroy_previous_session() and the prev_id assignment to after
ksmbd_decode_ntlmssp_auth_blob() returns success and use sess->user
rather than the pre-authentication lookup result. This matches the
ordering already used by krb5_authenticate(), where
destroy_previous_session() is called only after
ksmbd_krb5_authenticate() returns success. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: fix Rx queue stall on alloc failure
When the system is under extreme memory pressure, page allocations can
fail during the Rx buffer refill loop. If the number of buffers posted
to hardware falls below a critical low threshold and the refill loop
exits due to allocation failures, the queue can stall:
1. The device drops incoming packets because there are no descriptors.
2. Since no packets are processed, no Rx completions are generated.
3. Because no completions occur, NAPI is never scheduled, preventing
the refill loop from running again even after memory is freed.
This results in a permanent queue stall.
Resolve this by introducing a starvation recovery timer for each Rx queue.
If the number of buffers posted to hardware falls below a critical low
threshold, start a timer to periodically reschedule NAPI. Once NAPI runs
and successfully refills the queue above the threshold, the timer is
not rescheduled.
The threshold is set to 32 because a single maximum-sized Receive Segment
Coalescing (RSC) packet can consume up to 19 descriptors in the Rx path.
Lower thresholds (such as 8 or 16) would be insufficient to process a
complete maximum-sized RSC packet, risking packet drops or unexpected
hardware behavior under memory pressure. Setting the threshold to 32
guarantees a safe margin to handle at least one full RSC packet. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: reject out-of-range ptype in ice_parser_profile_init
set_bit(rslt->ptype, prof->ptypes) operates on a DECLARE_BITMAP of
ICE_FLOW_PTYPE_MAX (1024) bits. Nothing prevents a malicious VF from
providing ptype >= 1024 through VIRTCHNL, resulting in a write past
the end of the bitmap and a kernel page fault.
Reproduced with a custom kernel module injecting a crafted
VIRTCHNL_OP_ADD_RSS_CFG on E810-C QSFP (8086:1592),
FW 4.91 0x800214af 1.3909.0, ICE COMMS DDP 1.3.53.0,
kernel 7.1.0-rc1.
crash_parser: ice_parser_profile_init @ ffffffffc0d61b60
crash_parser: setting ptype=0xffff (max valid=1023)
crash_parser: calling ice_parser_profile_init -- expect OOB crash!
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 56 UID: 0 PID: 165011 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S U OE 7.1.0-rc1 #1
Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB
RIP: 0010:ice_parser_profile_init+0x2d/0x1d0 [ice]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __pfx_ice_parser_profile_init+0x10/0x10 [ice]
crash_init+0x127/0xff0 [crash_parser]
do_one_initcall+0x45/0x310
do_init_module+0x64/0x270
init_module_from_file+0xcc/0xf0
idempotent_init_module+0x17b/0x280
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x6e/0xe0
Bail out early with -EINVAL when ptype is out of range. |
| The Code Embed WordPress plugin prior to version 2.6.1 is vulnerable to stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) through the external URL embed feature in post content. The vulnerable code scans rendered content for URL embed tokens, fetches the remote URL, and inserts the remote response body into the page without output sanitization or an `unfiltered_html` capability check. This allows a Contributor attacker to submit a pending post containing an inert-looking URL token that executes attacker-controlled JavaScript when an Administrator or Editor previews or reviews the post. This is distinct from CVE-2026-2512, which affected custom field meta values up to version 2.5.1. This vector affects version 2.6 and uses the documented external URL embed feature in post content. This particular issue is patched in version 2.6.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag
llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the
AEAD request as
assoclen += datalen - authlen;
where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen
(4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies
that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A
secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes
datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to
aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so
crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that
only spans the real frame.
The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any
IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is
shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.
Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault
in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mctp: serial: handle zero-length frames to prevent rx buffer overflow
The MCTP serial receive state machine reads a frame length byte in
mctp_serial_push_header() case 2 and validates it upper-bound-only:
if (c > MCTP_SERIAL_FRAME_MTU) {
dev->rxstate = STATE_ERR;
} else {
dev->rxlen = c;
dev->rxpos = 0;
dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
...
}
A length of zero passes this check, so rxlen is set to 0 and the state
machine advances to STATE_DATA. In mctp_serial_push() STATE_DATA, the
incoming byte is stored and rxpos incremented before the terminator is
dev->rxbuf[dev->rxpos] = c;
dev->rxpos++;
dev->rxstate = STATE_DATA;
if (dev->rxpos == dev->rxlen) {
dev->rxpos = 0;
dev->rxstate = STATE_TRAILER;
}
With rxlen == 0 the "rxpos == rxlen" terminator can never fire (rxpos is
already 1 on the first data byte), so subsequent bytes are written past
the end of the fixed 74-byte rxbuf, which is the last member of the
netdev private area. Every following data byte is an attacker-controlled
1-byte out-of-bounds heap write, and the overflow continues until a
frame (0x7e) or escape byte resets the parser -- effectively unbounded.
Reaching this requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach the N_MCTP line
discipline and bring the resulting mctpserialN netdev up, after which
the bytes arrive via the tty receive path.
Route a zero-length frame straight to STATE_TRAILER instead of
STATE_DATA. The trailer/framing bytes are still consumed, and the frame
resolves to a zero-length skb that the MCTP core rejects; the parser
never enters STATE_DATA with rxlen == 0, so the out-of-bounds write can
no longer occur.
KASAN, on a frame of 0x7e 0x01 0x00 followed by data bytes (before this
change):
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/mctp/mctp-serial.c:370
index 74 is out of range for type 'u8 [74]'
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
Write of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/u16:0
mctp_serial_tty_receive_buf
tty_ldisc_receive_buf
flush_to_ldisc
Allocated by task 152:
alloc_netdev_mqs
mctp_serial_open
v2: route zero-length frames to STATE_TRAILER instead of STATE_ERR so
the trailer/framing bytes are still consumed (Jeremy Kerr).
Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: fix peer refcount leak in TCP error paths
When either the TCP RX or TX error path calls ovpn_peer_hold() followed
by schedule_work(&peer->tcp.defer_del_work), and the work item is already
pending from the other path, schedule_work() returns false and the work
runs only once. Since ovpn_tcp_peer_del_work() calls ovpn_peer_put()
exactly once, the extra reference taken by the losing path is never
dropped, leaking the peer object.
The race window:
CPU0 (strparser/RX error): CPU1 (tcp_tx_work/TX error):
ovpn_peer_hold() <- refcnt+1 ovpn_peer_hold() <- refcnt+2
schedule_work() <- queued schedule_work() <- NO-OP
(work already pending)
ovpn_tcp_peer_del_work runs:
ovpn_peer_del()
ovpn_peer_put() <- refcnt+1
<- peer never freed
Fix by checking the return value of schedule_work() in both paths and
calling ovpn_peer_put() to drop the extra reference if the work was
already pending. ovpn_peer_hold() is kept unconditional in the TX path
as it cannot fail at that point. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pppoe: reload header pointer after dev_hard_header()
pppoe_sendmsg() saves a pointer to the PPPoE header before calling
dev_hard_header(). Device header callbacks are allowed to reallocate the
skb head, invalidating pointers into it.
This can happen when a send is blocked in copy_from_user() while the first
non-Ethernet port is added to an empty team device. The team's delegated
GRE header callback then expands the skb head. PPPoE subsequently writes
six bytes through the stale pointer into the freed head.
Reload the PPPoE header through the skb's network-header offset after
device header creation. pskb_expand_head() updates that offset when it
relocates the head. |
