| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: stmmac: restore NET_IP_ALIGN in the RX DMA offset
Since the RX path was converted to zero-copy, the page pool page is handed
to the stack directly as the skb head, and the offset the DMA engine writes
at is what determines the alignment of the packet headers.
Before the conversion the payload was copied into an skb obtained from
napi_alloc_skb(), which reserves NET_SKB_PAD + NET_IP_ALIGN. The
conversion moved the headroom into stmmac_rx_offset() but did not carry
over NET_IP_ALIGN, so on architectures where NET_IP_ALIGN is 2 the IP
header now lands misaligned:
64 (NET_SKB_PAD) + 14 (ethernet) + 20 (IP) = 98
Same for the XDP branch:
256 (XDP_PACKET_HEADROOM) + 14 (ethernet) + 20 (IP) = 290
On ARM32 this is fatal, because ldm and ldrd trap on unaligned addresses
even when CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS is set.
Any received echo request panics the machine, e.g:
Unhandled fault: alignment exception (0x001) at 0x81873062
Internal error: : 1 [#1] SMP ARM
Hardware name: Altera SOCFPGA Arria10
PC is at icmp_echo+0x38/0xa8
LR is at icmp_rcv+0x22c/0x370
Call trace:
icmp_echo from icmp_rcv+0x22c/0x370
icmp_rcv from ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2c/0x224
ip_protocol_deliver_rcu from ip_local_deliver+0xc8/0x1a0
ip_local_deliver from ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x3c/0x50
ip_sublist_rcv_finish from ip_list_rcv_finish+0x110/0x118
ip_list_rcv_finish from ip_list_rcv+0xc8/0xdc
ip_list_rcv from __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x170/0x1c0
...
napi_complete_done from stmmac_napi_poll_rx+0xcb0/0x1030
Code: e24dd068 e59020a0 e28dc010 e0822001 (e8920003)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
The faulting instruction is the ldm of *icmp_hdr(skb) in icmp_echo().
Fix by adding NET_IP_ALIGN back to the RX offset, which restores the
alignment the stack used to get.
Note that commit a955318fe67e ("stmmac: align RX buffers") made a similar
change in 2021 and was reverted by commit 12d125b4574b ("stmmac: Revert
"stmmac: align RX buffers"") because it caused packet corruption. That
patch raised the offset from 0 without adjusting the buffer size
accounting, so the DMA engine could arguably write past the end of the RX
buffers, though this was never root caused.
Commit df542f669307 ("net: stmmac: Switch to zero-copy in non-XDP RX
path") since derives the page pool allocation from stmmac_rx_offset(), so
the extra bytes are accounted for. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Reject page faults from non-fault-mode scratch VMs
Having scratch enabled does not make a VM capable of handling recoverable
page faults. Allowing scratch VMs through the ASID lookup also admits
dma-fence mode VMs.
If such a VM faults on an already valid VMA, the handler reports success
without fixing the fault, causing the GPU to retry indefinitely.
Only allow fault-mode VMs through the ASID lookup. Fault-mode VMs using
scratch remain supported, while faults from 3D VMs are rejected.
(cherry picked from commit bfb24a06405b652d37831f3fb66b71d33a6605de) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-multi-modify
ftrace_direct_multi_init() assigns kthread_run()'s return value to
simple_tsk without an IS_ERR() check. When kthread_run() fails it
returns ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM), but init still returns 0, so the module loads
with simple_tsk holding an error pointer. On unload,
ftrace_direct_multi_exit() then passes that ERR_PTR to kthread_stop(),
leading to a null-pointer-dereference.
Check the return value of kthread_run() with IS_ERR(); on failure,
unregister the ftrace direct call and propagate the error code. |
| Cocos AI is a confidential computing system for running AI workloads inside trusted execution environments. In versions up to and including 0.8.2, the intra-handshake attested TLS (aTLS) AMD SEV-SNP verification path does not enforce attestation freshness when the expected reportData value is nil, empty, or omitted, leaving the SEV-SNP policy ReportData unset so the verifier accepts unrelated or stale Evidence not bound to the current connection. A relying party that uses this path without an expected reportData as a trust or authorization decision can be induced to trust an unintended attestation context; a supplied non-empty reportData is still validated. The issue is fixed in version 0.9.0. |
| PJSIP is a free and open source multimedia communication library written in C. In 2.17 and earlier, the PJSIP AVI parser in pjmedia/src/pjmedia/avi_player.c uses an input-file video chunk length as the number of bytes copied into a frame buffer whose capacity is derived from the declared media dimensions. A crafted AVI file can therefore cause an attacker-controlled out-of-bounds write past the heap allocation when an application plays the file or pulls its frames. The existing size assertion does not protect production release builds, where assertions are disabled. Typical local playback can crash the process, while applications that accept untrusted AVI sources expose a stronger memory-corruption condition. No fixed version is available as of this review. |
| A protection mechanism failure in the object-document mapper's encryption configuration generation can cause fields that an application declared for client-side field-level encryption to be written and kept in cleartext, without any error or warning. A party holding ordinary read access to the database can then read values that were intended to be protected from that party. This may result in unintended disclosure of sensitive information. |
| Cotonti 1.0.0 passes the base64-decoded cb parameter to unserialize() without allowed_classes restriction in the comments plugin EditAction. Registered users with comment write permissions can instantiate arbitrary PHP objects and potentially achieve file write or code execution through gadget chains. |
| Dell OpenManage Server Administrator, versions prior to 11.1.0.3, contains an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Remote execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: acomp - allocate async request context when cloning
ACOMP_REQUEST_ON_STACK() reserves only enough storage for the
synchronous fallback. When an async implementation is selected, callers
clone that stack request before retrying, but acomp_request_clone()
currently copies only the stack-sized object. The clone therefore has no
storage for the async provider request context, and providers such as QAT
write past the allocation through acomp_request_ctx(). KASAN does report
a slab OOB write.
Allocate a zeroed clone large enough for the runtime acomp request size,
copy only the bytes present in the source object, and preserve the
existing fallback-on-allocation-failure behavior. Use the runtime reqsize
because an implementation may adjust it during tfm initialization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: fq_codel: clamp default quantum and mtu
fq_codel_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without
clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0
accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which
overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_codel_dequeue(),
causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_codel_change()
and constrain to [256, FQ_CODEL_QUANTUM_MAX].
The same unclamped psched_mtu() is assigned to q->cparams.mtu a bit
below, and fq_codel_change() never updates it. codel_should_drop()
tests "*backlog <= params->mtu"; with mtu == 0x80000000 (~2 GiB) and
the default 32 MiB memory_limit, the test is always true, so CoDel is
silently and completely disabled (no drops, no ECN). Declare a single
clamped mtu and assign both q->quantum and q->cparams.mtu from it,
which also removes the double psched_mtu() call.
Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus
hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy
device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires
CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_skbmod: fix length calculations and avoid invalid header warnings
syzbot reported a warning in skb_network_header_len() triggered
by tcf_skbmod_act():
!skb_transport_header_was_set(skb)
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 skb_network_header_len include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55 tcf_skbmod_act+0xfe8/0x1810 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55
There are a few issues in tcf_skbmod_act():
1. Calling skb_network_header_len() assumes skb->transport_header is set,
which is not guaranteed when tcf_skbmod_act() runs at TC ingress.
2. Unconditionally calling skb_mac_header_len() at the beginning of
tcf_skbmod_act() triggers a warning on L3 devices (e.g. TUN) where the
MAC header is unset, evaluating to an underflowed garbage length.
3. On TC ingress, skb->data points to the network header. Adding the MAC
header length to the IP header length causes skb_ensure_writable() to
request more bytes than the actual IP packet length, dropping valid
short packets (e.g. 28-byte UDP/IPv4 packets).
Fix these by:
- Using skb_network_offset(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr/ipv6hdr) for
SKBMOD_F_ECN so that the required length is correctly calculated on
both ingress (offset == 0) and egress (offset == mac_len).
- Setting max_edit_len to ETH_HLEN for Ethernet header modifications
after validating ARPHRD_ETHER. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: use wq_has_sleeper() in rds_cong_map_updated()
rds_cong_map_updated() runs after a peer's congestion map has been
rewritten (by rds_tcp_cong_recv() and rds_ib_cong_recv(), or the
clear-all in the loopback and IB send-completion paths). It bumps
rds_cong_generation and then checks waitqueue_active() on
map->m_waitq and on rds_poll_waitq to decide whether anyone needs
waking. atomic_inc() carries no ordering and waitqueue_active() is a
plain load, so nothing orders the map and generation stores before
the wait queue reads. The waiters do the mirror image: rds_cong_wait()
adds itself to m_waitq and then tests the port bit, and rds_poll()
registers on rds_poll_waitq and then reads the generation. That is
the store-buffering pattern described above waitqueue_active() in
include/linux/wait.h - the updater can observe an empty wait queue
while the waiter still observes the port as congested, and no wake-up
is issued.
rds_cong_wait() is an interruptible sleep with no timeout, so a
sender blocked on a congested port stays blocked until the next
congestion update from that peer arrives or a signal is delivered.
A poll() waiter misses the map-updated notification the same way.
Use wq_has_sleeper(), which is waitqueue_active() preceded by the
required full barrier, as rds_tcp_state_change() already does for
the same pattern. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Cap MSI-X vectors to the device MSI-X table size
mana_gd_query_max_resources() sizes gc->num_msix_usable from resp.max_msix
and the CPU count, but never from the device MSI-X table. On a 1792 vCPU
M-series VM that yields 1793 while the table has 1024 entries, and
mana_gd_setup_remaining_irqs() then walks indices 1..1792, running off the
end of the region mapped by msix_map_region():
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ff8e347f8b99800c
RIP: 0010:msix_prepare_msi_desc+0x7a/0x90
RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: ff4330cb164ea780 RCX: ff8e347f8b998000
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__msi_domain_alloc_irqs+0x13a/0x440
msi_domain_alloc_irq_at+0x149/0x1b0
mana_gd_setup+0x351/0x890
mana_gd_probe+0x274/0x390
</TASK>
RAX is index 1024 * PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE, one entry past the table.
msi_insert_desc() does range check the index, but only against the MSI
domain hwsize, which matches the table only for devices on an MSI parent
domain. With a global PCI/MSI domain hwsize is MSI_XA_DOMAIN_SIZE, so
nothing bounds the request.
Cap num_msix_usable with pci_msix_vec_count(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: access chan->conn safely in get/setsockopt
Since commit b66774b48dd9 ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref")
l2cap_chan::conn has held reference and remains non-NULL also after the
corresponding hci_conn is deleted. In this state accessing various
fields eg. hci_conn::hdev is invalid, which leads to KASAN crash in
l2cap_sock_setsockopt() access of conn->hcon->hdev.
Check l2cap_chan::conn.hcon corresponds to an alive hci_conn before
trying to use it in l2cap_sock.c. Hold l2cap_chan_lock() in
getsockopt/setsockopt to ensure it stays alive, and to avoid data races
in l2cap_chan fields. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: Fix the condition to enable over-io-uring
The existing condition in fuse_uring_cmd() is there only to avoid
disabling io-uring for connections that already run with it, missing
was a condition to refuse any IORING_OP_URING_CMD if the
connection/channel didn't get enabled because of missing FUSE_INIT
reply flag FUSE_OVER_IO_URING. Without the reply flag the barrier in
fuse_uring_ready() doesn't work and IO could already be going on and
cause deadlock states (at a minimum one between fch->bg_lock and
queue->lock).
The change itself is trivial, but brings behavior change,
FUSE_OVER_IO_URING has to be set in the FUSE_INIT_REPLY by fuse servers
to accept any IORING_OP_URING_CMD. Libfuse does that and the only
non-libfuse implementation I found (fractal-fuse) also does it.
Qemu patches for fuse-io-uring are not merged yet, as far as I know.
Moved up is the smp_load_acquire(&fch->initialized) check, as a
fuse-server implementation might try to setup io-uring before FUSE_INIT
is processed and might have gotten -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EAGAIN.
Also fixed is a stale comment that explains the handling of the
FUSE_OVER_IO_URING flag in early RFC versions.
If there should be a report from any library or application we
probably need to revert this commit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sparx5: fix sleep in atomic context in MAC table access
sparx5_set_rx_mode() runs with netif_addr_lock_bh held and iterates
dev->mc via __dev_mc_sync(), which per address calls sparx5_mc_sync() /
sparx5_mc_unsync() -> sparx5_mact_learn() / sparx5_mact_forget(). These
take sparx5->lock, a mutex, and then poll the MAC access command
register with readx_poll_timeout(). A mutex may block, which is not
allowed from atomic context.
Convert the driver to the new .ndo_set_rx_mode_async callback introduced
in commit 3554b4345d85 ("net: introduce ndo_set_rx_mode_async and
netdev_rx_mode_work"). The async callback is invoked from process
context, so the mutex and sleeping completion poll can remain.
Observed with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING, CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK,
CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES and CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP enabled:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:591
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 217, name: ip
preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
Call trace:
__might_resched+0x144/0x248
__might_sleep+0x48/0x7c
__mutex_lock+0x74/0x850
mutex_lock_nested+0x24/0x30
sparx5_mact_learn+0x78/0x100
sparx5_mc_sync+0x40/0x54
__hw_addr_sync_dev+0xc4/0x170
sparx5_set_rx_mode+0x4c/0x58
__dev_set_rx_mode+0x64/0xa4
__dev_open+0x1ec/0x26c |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix password encoding bounds check
The password PSWD_ENCODINGS parser reads password_obj[elem + pos_values]
while copying the supported password encodings from the ACPI package.
The outer loop only guarantees that elem is within password_obj_count.
The encoding count is bounded by MAX_ENCODINGS_SIZE, but that does not
guarantee that the ACPI package contains enough entries for all
elem + pos_values accesses.
A malformed package can therefore declare a non-zero encoding count
without providing enough string objects, causing the parser to read past
the ACPI package array and pass an out-of-bounds string pointer and
length to hp_convert_hexstr_to_str().
Add the same computed-index bounds check used by the other offset-based
package parsing loops before reading password_obj[elem + pos_values]. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ksmbd_alloc_user()
ksmbd_alloc_user() copies resp->hash_sz bytes out of the mountd IPC
login response with
user->passkey_sz = resp->hash_sz;
user->passkey = kmalloc(resp->hash_sz, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP);
if (user->passkey)
memcpy(user->passkey, resp->hash, resp->hash_sz);
resp->hash_sz is a __u16 supplied by the response, but resp->hash[] is
only KSMBD_REQ_MAX_HASH_SZ bytes. A malformed or malicious login
response can set hash_sz well beyond that (up to 65535), so the memcpy()
reads past the end of the response object. ipc_validate_msg() does not
bound hash_sz, so reject any response whose hash_sz exceeds the on-stack
hash[] buffer before allocating and copying.
[ 2030.238706] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.240549] Read of size 65535 at addr ffff888121bb6680 by task kworker/4:1/18611
[ 2030.242296]
[ 2030.242710] CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18611 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-next-20260623-virtme #96 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 2030.242732] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
[ 2030.242743] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work
[ 2030.242763] Call Trace:
[ 2030.242769] <TASK>
[ 2030.242776] dump_stack_lvl+0xa2/0xd0
[ 2030.242794] print_address_description+0x77/0x200
[ 2030.242815] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242831] print_report+0x58/0x70
[ 2030.242848] kasan_report+0x117/0x150
[ 2030.242869] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242888] kasan_check_range+0x3c7/0x3f0
[ 2030.242908] ? ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242925] __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70
[ 2030.242942] ksmbd_alloc_user+0x278/0x680
[ 2030.242960] ksmbd_login_user+0xc3/0x120
[ 2030.242978] ntlm_authenticate+0x5e6/0x1b00
[ 2030.243017] ? __pfx_ntlm_authenticate+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243035] ? ksmbd_session_lookup+0x188/0x1d0
[ 2030.243054] ? __pfx_ksmbd_session_lookup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243090] ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x7b/0x140
[ 2030.243108] smb2_sess_setup+0x1e4a/0x27b0
[ 2030.243126] ? copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x199/0x300
[ 2030.243156] ? __pfx_smb2_sess_setup+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243173] ? get_smb2_cmd_val+0xe3/0x1c0
[ 2030.243208] handle_ksmbd_work+0x954/0x1280
[ 2030.243230] ? __pfx_handle_ksmbd_work+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243249] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243270] ? process_scheduled_works+0xa07/0x1490
[ 2030.243291] process_scheduled_works+0xa70/0x1490
[ 2030.243320] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243340] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x130/0x300
[ 2030.243358] ? lock_is_held_type+0x7b/0x110
[ 2030.243388] worker_thread+0x932/0xe20
[ 2030.243415] kthread+0x38a/0x470
[ 2030.243431] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243451] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243467] ret_from_fork+0x484/0x910
[ 2030.243485] ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243501] ? __switch_to+0xc77/0x12c0
[ 2030.243523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 2030.243540] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 2030.243564] </TASK>
[ 2030.243570]
[ 2030.290164] Allocated by task 19279:
[ 2030.290911] kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 2030.292179] __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90
[ 2030.293217] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3ff/0x6b0
[ 2030.294467] handle_generic_event+0x59b/0x750
[ 2030.295345] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x238/0x340
[ 2030.296553] genl_rcv_msg+0x606/0x7b0
[ 2030.297129] netlink_rcv_skb+0x22b/0x4a0
[ 2030.298500] genl_rcv+0x2d/0x40
[ 2030.299273] netlink_unicast+0x7ba/0x930
[ 2030.300019] netlink_sendmsg+0x8c3/0xb00
[ 2030.301073] __sock_sendmsg+0xec/0x140
[ 2030.301579] __sys_sendto+0x357/0x470
[ 2030.302255] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe3/0x100
[ 2030.303425] do_syscall_64+0x135/0x460
[ 2030.304763] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[ 2030.305594]
[ 2030.305819] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888121bb6640
[ 2030.305819] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
[ 2030.309595] The buggy address
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Do not skip lock checks for single-byte ranges
check_lock_range() uses inclusive ranges. Its callers pass the end
offset as start + length - 1, so start == end represents a valid
single-byte range rather than an empty range.
The start == end shortcut therefore skips mandatory byte-range lock
checks for one-byte reads, writes, copychunk operations and one-byte
truncate ranges. A conflicting lock covering that byte is not checked
and the operation is allowed to proceed.
Remove the shortcut. The truncate size == inode->i_size case is already
handled by only calling check_lock_range() when the new size differs
from the current file size. |
| Capsule is a multi-tenancy and policy-based framework for Kubernetes. Prior to 0.13.7, ForbiddenListSpec.ExactMatch in pkg/api/forbidden_list.go sorts denied metadata keys case-insensitively and then uses sort.SearchStrings, which assumes byte-order sorting. When an administrator's forbidden list mixes capitalized and lowercase keys or otherwise has different case-insensitive and byte ordering, the binary search can return false for a key that is present. An authenticated tenant owner can then pass the missed key through api.ValidateForbidden and bypass configured namespace, Service, or delegated node metadata restrictions, potentially influencing cluster policies, network exposure, or scheduling outside the tenant boundary. Uniformly lowercase lists whose two orderings coincide are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.13.7. |
