| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (coretemp) Fix core_data leak on CPUs without PTS
pdata->core_data is allocated in init_temp_data() when the first core
temp_data of a package is created, but it is only released from
destroy_temp_data(), and only in the branch that handles the package
temp_data.
Package temp_data is created solely when the CPU supports
X86_FEATURE_PTS. On a CPU without it, coretemp_cpu_online() never calls
coretemp_add_core() with pkg_flag set, so pdata->pkg_data stays NULL.
coretemp_cpu_offline() then skips the removal of the package interface,
destroy_temp_data() is never called for package data, and the array is
still allocated when coretemp_device_remove() frees the platform data
that pointed at it.
Release the array in coretemp_device_remove(). destroy_temp_data() sets
pdata->core_data to NULL when it frees it, so the added kfree() is a
no-op on CPUs that do have PTS.
Tested on an Intel Core i5-1135G7. The driver was instrumented to log
every allocation and release of pdata->core_data, and the PTS check in
coretemp_cpu_online() was patched out to emulate a CPU without package
thermal support. Without this change the array was allocated and never
released, and coretemp_device_remove() still saw a non-NULL pointer.
With it the array is released and the pointer accounting balances. On an
unmodified build the release still happens via the package temp_data and
the added kfree() sees NULL, with no slab warnings over repeated module
load and unload cycles. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix request buffer leak in smb2_new_read_req()
smb2_new_read_req() allocates the request buffer with
smb2_plain_req_init() but only publishes it to the caller with
*buf = req at the very end of the function. Two error returns sit in
between:
rc = smb2_plain_req_init(SMB2_READ, io_parms->tcon, server,
(void **) &req, total_len);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (server == NULL)
return -ECONNABORTED;
[...]
rdata->mr = smbd_register_mr(server->smbd_conn,
&rdata->subreq.io_iter,
true, need_invalidate);
if (!rdata->mr)
return -EAGAIN;
On either of them the buffer is neither released nor handed back, so
it is leaked. The caller cannot clean up after it: smb2_async_readv()
does 'goto out' on a non-zero return, which skips the
cifs_small_buf_release(buf) at async_readv_out, and buf has not been
assigned at that point in any case.
The write path has never had this problem. smb2_async_writev()
registers the memory region inline and jumps to its release label
instead of returning:
wdata->mr = smbd_register_mr(...);
if (!wdata->mr) {
rc = -EAGAIN;
goto async_writev_out;
}
Commit b7972092199f ("cifs: smbd: Retry on memory registration
failure") changed both sides from -ENOBUFS to -EAGAIN in a single
patch, which puts the two shapes next to each other.
Only the -EAGAIN return is reachable in practice, because
smb2_plain_req_init() calls smb2_reconnect() first and that already
fails with -EIO when server is NULL, before anything is allocated.
Both returns are given the same treatment here rather than leaving
one of them correct only by accident.
Because -EAGAIN is a replayable error, the failure also reaches the
retry block at the end of smb2_async_readv(), which marks the
subrequest NETFS_SREQ_NEED_RETRY, so a failing registration can be
retried rather than ending the I/O, and every attempt that reaches it
leaks another buffer. smb2_should_replay() short-circuits on
tcon->retry, so on a hard mount the attempt count is not bounded by
the retrans setting.
Only the asynchronous read path is affected. The synchronous
SMB2_read() caller passes rdata == NULL and the memory registration
block is guarded on rdata.
The memory registration failure path was pointed out by the Sashiko
AI reviewer while it was reviewing an unrelated patch to
smb2_async_readv(). |
| A flaw was found in RESTEasy's IIOImageProvider, which decodes attacker-supplied image request bodies without enforcing any limit on the declared image dimensions or pixel count. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a small crafted image declaring enormous dimensions to trigger a very large memory allocation, exhausting the JVM heap and resulting in a denial of service. |
| net_icmpv6_send_error() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv6.c implemented only one of the three RFC 4443 section 2.4 suppression rules (do not answer an ICMPv6 error with an ICMPv6 error). It did not check whether the triggering packet's source address identifies a single node (rule e.6) or whether the packet was sent to a multicast destination (rule e.3, whose only exceptions are Packet Too Big and Parameter Problem Code 2). Of the five call sites, only the port-unreachable path in subsys/net/ip/connection.c carried an equivalent guard of its own; the extension-header, unknown-next-header and fragmentation paths in subsys/net/ip/ipv6.c and subsys/net/ip/ipv6_fragment.c had none.
An unauthenticated attacker with access to the same link can exploit this in two ways. Sending a single IPv6 packet to the link-local all-nodes group ff02::1 carrying an unrecognized next-header value, with the source address spoofed to a chosen victim, causes every Zephyr node on the link to emit an ICMPv6 Parameter Problem message to that victim — a reflector with an amplification factor equal to the number of nodes. Alternatively, sending a unicast packet whose source address is a multicast address causes the node to transmit its ICMPv6 error to that multicast address, turning one unicast packet into a link-flooded multicast frame. Packets addressed to ff02::1 are accepted unconditionally by ipv6_input(), and no check rejects a multicast source address, so no special configuration is required.
The impact is degraded availability of the shared link and of the reflection victim, together with the ability for the attacker to hide its own address behind the responding nodes. The effect is amplified on constrained mesh links such as 802.15.4/Thread, where link-local multicast is flooded hop by hop. There is no memory-safety consequence: the error packet itself is well formed, it is simply emitted in cases where the protocol forbids it.
The fix adds both suppression checks at the single choke point in net_icmpv6_send_error(), before any reply packet is allocated, preserving the RFC-mandated exceptions for NET_ICMPV6_PACKET_TOO_BIG and Parameter Problem Code 2. Note that the IPv4 counterpart net_icmpv4_send_error() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c still checks only for a broadcast destination and retains an equivalent gap for multicast destinations and non-unique sources. |
| NanoMQ is an MQTT broker. Prior to 0.24.14, NanoMQ's MQTT v5 property decoder in nng/src/supplemental/mqtt/mqtt_codec.c uses property_append() to walk the entire linked list for each property added by decode_buf_properties(). A remote unauthenticated client can supply a PUBLISH or SUBSCRIBE packet containing many User Properties, causing O(N²) linked-list insertion and CPU work that makes the broker unresponsive; repeated packets can sustain the denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 0.24.14. |
| Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. From 8.0.0 until 8.0.6, DNS-over-HTTP/2 processing in rust/src/http2/http2.rs retains previously processed HTTP/2 DATA frame contents instead of clearing the internal buffer. Multiple DATA frames with the EndOfStream flag set can grow the buffer to its 65 KiB limit while causing all prior contents to be processed again, producing quadratic CPU complexity, degraded packet processing, loss of monitoring visibility, or denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 8.0.6. |
| Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. From 8.0.0 until 8.0.6, the HTTP/1 parser limits decompression work per transaction but does not limit how many small brotli compression bombs a single flow can submit. With response-body-decompress-layer-limit enabled, repeated compressed responses make the decompression paths in rust/htp perform expensive work for every transaction, degrading packet processing and potentially causing loss of monitoring visibility or denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 8.0.6. |
| Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. Prior to 7.0.17 and 8.0.6, the SMB parser can retain force-completed transactions on flows where Suricata sees payload in only one direction, including async-oneside flows, because cleanup waits for inspection in the unseen direction. The transaction creation paths in rust/src/smb can exceed the intended SMB_MAX_TX bound, and cleanup repeatedly scans the growing list. Sustained one-directional SMB traffic can therefore cause unbounded per-flow state and CPU and memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in versions 8.0.6 and 7.0.17. |
| Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. From 8.0.5 until 8.0.6, the FTP parser in src/app-layer-ftp.c can continue allocating transactions after app-layer.protocols.ftp.max-tx is reached while processing one large chunk of FTP command data. The oversized transaction list is repeatedly processed with quadratic complexity after the too_many_transactions event, allowing crafted FTP traffic to degrade packet processing, reduce monitoring visibility, or cause denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 8.0.6. |
| Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. From 8.0.0 until 8.0.6, AppLayerParserSetTransactionInspectId() in src/app-layer-parser.c uses an inverted guard and marks only already-inspected transactions as inspected. On flows passed by a pass rule or pass-the-flow exception policy, detection is skipped, so completed transactions remain unmarked, are never freed, and are repeatedly rescanned. The per-flow list can grow without bound with quadratic cleanup cost, causing CPU and memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 8.0.6. |
| Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. From 7.0.0 until 7.0.17 and 8.0.6, the MQTT parser in rust/src/mqtt/mqtt.rs permits repeated PUBREC or PUBREL messages to be appended to one transaction without a limit. Crafted MQTT traffic can grow transaction state indefinitely, consuming CPU and memory and causing slowdown or denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 8.0.6 and 7.0.17. |
| Suricata is a network Intrusion Detection System, Intrusion Prevention System and Network Security Monitoring engine. From 8.0.0 until 8.0.6, the DHCP parser in rust/src/dhcp/dhcp.rs creates stateless transactions without recording their packet direction with AppLayerTxData::for_direction(), so a sensor that observes only one direction cannot mark the unseen direction inspected or free completed transactions. The RDP parser in rust/src/rdp/rdp.rs has the same direction-state defect. The per-flow transaction list can grow without bound and cleanup repeatedly scans it, causing increasing CPU and memory consumption and eventual denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 8.0.6. |
| Apache Karaf's XmlUtils cached XML parser/transformer factories in static ThreadLocal fields on long-lived container threads. Because a ThreadLocal value outlives the OSGi bundle that created it, repeated bundle or feature install, update, or refresh operations can leave successive bundle ClassLoader's pinned in memory and unreachable for garbage collection, leading to unbounded Metaspace growth and eventual denial of service of the Karaf instance. |
| A vulnerability was identified in O-RAN-SC SMO OAM 2025-06-10. This affects an unknown part of the component VES Collector. The manipulation leads to allocation of resources. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is publicly available and might be used. The project was informed of the problem early through a bug report but has not responded yet. |
| Autobahn Python is a WebSocket and WAMP implementation for Python that supports Twisted and asyncio. Prior to 26.7.1, WebSocket endpoints that accept permessage-deflate and rely on maxMessagePayloadSize enforce that limit against the compressed frame length before inflation but do not recheck the decompressed message size before delivery. A remote unauthenticated client can send a valid compressed frame below the configured wire-size limit that expands beyond the application message limit, causing oversized data to be allocated, joined, validated, and passed to application callbacks. This can create resource-exhaustion pressure, but the advisory does not establish confidentiality or integrity impact. This issue is fixed in version 26.7.1. |
| c-ares is an asynchronous resolver library. Prior to 1.34.7, ares_dns_parse() trusts the attacker-controlled ANCOUNT, NSCOUNT, and ARCOUNT fields before confirming that the DNS response contains enough bytes for the claimed records. Because process_answer() invokes parsing before transaction ID and question validation, a malicious DNS response can cause ares_dns_record_rr_prealloc() and ares_array_set_size() to reserve disproportionate heap memory for a tiny message. Repeated responses create large allocation and release cycles that can degrade or deny name resolution, without causing memory corruption or information disclosure. This issue is fixed in version 1.34.7. |
| The Really Simple Security WordPress plugin before 9.8.3 does not validate a client-supplied address value before using it as a storage key in one of its own options, allowing unauthenticated attackers to grow that option without bound and to slow the site's handling of missing pages. |
| MKP is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes. Prior to 0.4.1, cmd/server/main.go exposes the default HTTP endpoint and pkg/mcp/server.go registers the unauthenticated get_resource tool, which accepts attacker-controlled limitBytes and tailLines values for the pods logs subresource. buildPodLogOpts() in pkg/k8s/subresource.go parses those values as unbounded int64 parameters, and defaultGetPodLogs() copies the returned Kubernetes log stream through io.Copy into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without an application-side cap. A remote attacker who can reach the default port 8080 MCP endpoint and select a pod with sufficiently large accumulated logs can send one tools/call request that causes large allocations and additional response copies, while the request-frequency limiter does not constrain per-request volume. This can exhaust process memory, terminate the MKP server, and deny the MCP service; observed testing showed more than one GiB of RSS growth while handling a 128 MiB requested stream. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.1. |
| `fulgur` converts untrusted HTML/CSS into PDF, commonly on a server that processes input supplied by many tenants. In versions prior to 0.19.0, a body-direct child whose CSS-resolved height greatly exceeds the page height was sliced into one fragment per page with no upper bound. This is fixed in version 0.19.0. A `MAX_PAGES` cap bounds the slice loop — halting it even for a `+inf` height — and non-finite layout heights are sanitized so they can no longer drive the loop. As a workaround, validate or constrain untrusted CSS (in particular `height` / `vh` on body-level elements) before passing HTML to fulgur. |
| `fulgur` converts untrusted HTML/CSS into PDF, commonly on a server that processes input supplied by many tenants. In versions prior to 0.19.0, a body-direct child whose CSS-resolved height greatly exceeds the page height was sliced into one fragment per page with no upper bound. This is fixed in 0.19.0. A `MAX_PAGES` cap bounds the slice loop — halting it even
for a `+inf` height — and non-finite layout heights are sanitized so they can no longer drive the loop. As a workaround, validate or constrain untrusted CSS (in particular `height` / `vh` on body-level elements) before passing HTML to fulgur. |
