| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SMB3: Add missing locks to protect deferred close file list
cifs_del_deferred_close function has a critical section which modifies
the deferred close file list. We must acquire deferred_lock before
calling cifs_del_deferred_close function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: ocb: don't leave if not joined
If there's no OCB state, don't ask the driver/mac80211 to
leave, since that's just confusing. Since set/clear the
chandef state, that's a simple check. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/DOE: Fix memory leak with CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS=y
After a pci_doe_task completes, its work_struct needs to be destroyed
to avoid a memory leak with CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS=y. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Handle lock during peer_id find
ath12k_peer_find_by_id() requires that the caller hold the
ab->base_lock. Currently the WBM error path does not hold
the lock and calling that function, leads to the
following lockdep_assert()in QCN9274:
[105162.160893] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[105162.160916] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath12k/peer.c:71 ath12k_peer_find_by_id+0x52/0x60 [ath12k]
[105162.160933] Modules linked in: ath12k(O) qrtr_mhi qrtr mac80211 cfg80211 mhi qmi_helpers libarc4 nvme nvme_core [last unloaded: ath12k(O)]
[105162.160967] CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Tainted: G W O 6.1.0-rc2+ #3
[105162.160972] Hardware name: Intel(R) Client Systems NUC8i7HVK/NUC8i7HVB, BIOS HNKBLi70.86A.0056.2019.0506.1527 05/06/2019
[105162.160977] RIP: 0010:ath12k_peer_find_by_id+0x52/0x60 [ath12k]
[105162.160990] Code: 07 eb 0f 39 68 24 74 0a 48 8b 00 48 39 f8 75 f3 31 c0 5b 5d c3 48 8d bf b0 f2 00 00 be ff ff ff ff e8 22 20 c4 e2 85 c0 75 bf <0f> 0b eb bb 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 41 54 4c 8d a7 98 f2 00
[105162.160996] RSP: 0018:ffffa223001acc60 EFLAGS: 00010246
[105162.161003] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9f0573940000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[105162.161008] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffffa3951c8e RDI: ffffffffa39a96d7
[105162.161013] RBP: 000000000000000a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[105162.161017] R10: ffffa223001acb40 R11: ffffffffa3d57c60 R12: ffff9f057394f2e0
[105162.161022] R13: ffff9f0573940000 R14: ffff9f04ecd659c0 R15: ffff9f04d5a9b040
[105162.161026] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f0575600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[105162.161031] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[105162.161036] CR2: 00001d5c8277a008 CR3: 00000001e6224006 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[105162.161041] Call Trace:
[105162.161046] <IRQ>
[105162.161051] ath12k_dp_rx_process_wbm_err+0x6da/0xaf0 [ath12k]
[105162.161072] ? ath12k_dp_rx_process_err+0x80e/0x15a0 [ath12k]
[105162.161084] ? __lock_acquire+0x4ca/0x1a60
[105162.161104] ath12k_dp_service_srng+0x263/0x310 [ath12k]
[105162.161120] ath12k_pci_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x1c/0x70 [ath12k]
[105162.161133] __napi_poll+0x22/0x260
[105162.161141] net_rx_action+0x2f8/0x380
[105162.161153] __do_softirq+0xd0/0x4c9
[105162.161162] irq_exit_rcu+0x88/0xe0
[105162.161169] common_interrupt+0xa5/0xc0
[105162.161174] </IRQ>
[105162.161179] <TASK>
[105162.161184] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
Handle spin lock/unlock in WBM error path to hold the necessary lock
expected by ath12k_peer_find_by_id().
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.0-03171-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Prevent access to vCPU events before init
Another day, another syzkaller bug. KVM erroneously allows userspace to
pend vCPU events for a vCPU that hasn't been initialized yet, leading to
KVM interpreting a bunch of uninitialized garbage for routing /
injecting the exception.
In one case the injection code and the hyp disagree on whether the vCPU
has a 32bit EL1 and put the vCPU into an illegal mode for AArch64,
tripping the BUG() in exception_target_el() during the next injection:
kernel BUG at arch/arm64/kvm/inject_fault.c:40!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 318 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-00104-g10fd0285305d #6 PREEMPT
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 21402009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c
lr : pend_serror_exception+0x18/0x13c
sp : ffff800082f03a10
x29: ffff800082f03a10 x28: ffff0000cb132280 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff0000c2a99c20 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: 0000000000008000 x22: 0000000000000002 x21: 0000000000000004
x20: 0000000000008000 x19: ffff0000c2a99c20 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 00000000200000c0
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : ffff800082f03af8 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : ffff800080f621f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 000000000040009b x1 : 0000000000000003 x0 : ffff0000c2a99c20
Call trace:
exception_target_el+0x88/0x8c (P)
kvm_inject_serror_esr+0x40/0x3b4
__kvm_arm_vcpu_set_events+0xf0/0x100
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0x180/0x9d4
kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x60c/0x9f4
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xac/0x104
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x110
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x34/0xf0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
Code: f946bc01 b4fffe61 9101e020 17fffff2 (d4210000)
Reject the ioctls outright as no sane VMM would call these before
KVM_ARM_VCPU_INIT anyway. Even if it did the exception would've been
thrown away by the eventual reset of the vCPU's state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: Fix resource leak in ksmbd_session_rpc_open()
When ksmbd_rpc_open() fails then it must call ksmbd_rpc_id_free() to
undo the result of ksmbd_ipc_id_alloc(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipmi: Rework user message limit handling
The limit on the number of user messages had a number of issues,
improper counting in some cases and a use after free.
Restructure how this is all done to handle more in the receive message
allocation routine, so all refcouting and user message limit counts
are done in that routine. It's a lot cleaner and safer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: wed: use proper wed reference in mt76 wed driver callabacks
MT7996 driver can use both wed and wed_hif2 devices to offload traffic
from/to the wireless NIC. In the current codebase we assume to always
use the primary wed device in wed callbacks resulting in the following
crash if the hw runs wed_hif2 (e.g. 6GHz link).
[ 297.455876] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 000000000000080a
[ 297.464928] Mem abort info:
[ 297.467722] ESR = 0x0000000096000005
[ 297.471461] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 297.476766] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 297.479809] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 297.482940] FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
[ 297.487809] Data abort info:
[ 297.490679] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 297.496156] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 297.501196] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[ 297.506500] user pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000107480000
[ 297.512927] [000000000000080a] pgd=08000001097fb003, p4d=08000001097fb003, pud=08000001097fb003, pmd=0000000000000000
[ 297.523532] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP
[ 297.715393] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G O 6.12.50 #0
[ 297.723908] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
[ 297.727384] Hardware name: Banana Pi BPI-R4 (2x SFP+) (DT)
[ 297.732857] Workqueue: nf_ft_offload_del nf_flow_rule_route_ipv6 [nf_flow_table]
[ 297.740254] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 297.747205] pc : mt76_wed_offload_disable+0x64/0xa0 [mt76]
[ 297.752688] lr : mtk_wed_flow_remove+0x58/0x80
[ 297.757126] sp : ffffffc080fe3ae0
[ 297.760430] x29: ffffffc080fe3ae0 x28: ffffffc080fe3be0 x27: 00000000deadbef7
[ 297.767557] x26: ffffff80c5ebca00 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: ffffff80c85f4c00
[ 297.774683] x23: ffffff80c1875b78 x22: ffffffc080d42cd0 x21: ffffffc080660018
[ 297.781809] x20: ffffff80c6a076d0 x19: ffffff80c6a043c8 x18: 0000000000000000
[ 297.788935] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000001 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 297.796060] x14: 0000000000000019 x13: ffffff80c0ad8ec0 x12: 00000000fa83b2da
[ 297.803185] x11: ffffff80c02700c0 x10: ffffff80c0ad8ec0 x9 : ffffff81fef96200
[ 297.810311] x8 : ffffff80c02700c0 x7 : ffffff80c02700d0 x6 : 0000000000000002
[ 297.817435] x5 : 0000000000000400 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 297.824561] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000800 x0 : ffffff80c6a063c8
[ 297.831686] Call trace:
[ 297.834123] mt76_wed_offload_disable+0x64/0xa0 [mt76]
[ 297.839254] mtk_wed_flow_remove+0x58/0x80
[ 297.843342] mtk_flow_offload_cmd+0x434/0x574
[ 297.847689] mtk_wed_setup_tc_block_cb+0x30/0x40
[ 297.852295] nf_flow_offload_ipv6_hook+0x7f4/0x964 [nf_flow_table]
[ 297.858466] nf_flow_rule_route_ipv6+0x438/0x4a4 [nf_flow_table]
[ 297.864463] process_one_work+0x174/0x300
[ 297.868465] worker_thread+0x278/0x430
[ 297.872204] kthread+0xd8/0xdc
[ 297.875251] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 297.878820] Code: 928b5ae0 8b000273 91400a60 f943fa61 (79401421)
[ 297.884901] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Fix the issue detecting the proper wed reference to use running wed
callabacks. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/ivpu: Fix page fault in ivpu_bo_unbind_all_bos_from_context()
Don't add BO to the vdev->bo_list in ivpu_gem_create_object().
When failure happens inside drm_gem_shmem_create(), the BO is not
fully created and ivpu_gem_bo_free() callback will not be called
causing a deleted BO to be left on the list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: fix potential race when tree connecting ipc
Protect access of TCP_Server_Info::hostname when building the ipc tree
name as it might get freed in cifsd thread and thus causing an
use-after-free bug in __tree_connect_dfs_target(). Also, while at it,
update status of IPC tcon on success and then avoid any extra tree
connects. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: Intel: avs: Disable periods-elapsed work when closing PCM
avs_dai_fe_shutdown() handles the shutdown procedure for HOST HDAudio
stream while period-elapsed work services its IRQs. As the former
frees the DAI's private context, these two operations shall be
synchronized to avoid slab-use-after-free or worse errors. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "f2fs: fix to do sanity check on extent cache correctly"
syzbot reports a f2fs bug as below:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3275:19
index 1409 is out of range for type '__le32[923]' (aka 'unsigned int[923]')
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x11c/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:348
inline_data_addr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3275 [inline]
__recover_inline_status fs/f2fs/inode.c:113 [inline]
do_read_inode fs/f2fs/inode.c:480 [inline]
f2fs_iget+0x4730/0x48b0 fs/f2fs/inode.c:604
f2fs_fill_super+0x640e/0x80c0 fs/f2fs/super.c:4601
mount_bdev+0x276/0x3b0 fs/super.c:1391
legacy_get_tree+0xef/0x190 fs/fs_context.c:611
vfs_get_tree+0x8c/0x270 fs/super.c:1519
do_new_mount+0x28f/0xae0 fs/namespace.c:3335
do_mount fs/namespace.c:3675 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3884 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x2d9/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3861
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
The issue was bisected to:
commit d48a7b3a72f121655d95b5157c32c7d555e44c05
Author: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Date: Mon Jan 9 03:49:20 2023 +0000
f2fs: fix to do sanity check on extent cache correctly
The root cause is we applied both v1 and v2 of the patch, v2 is the right
fix, so it needs to revert v1 in order to fix reported issue.
v1:
commit d48a7b3a72f1 ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check on extent cache correctly")
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230109034920.492914-1-chao@kernel.org/
v2:
commit 269d11948100 ("f2fs: fix to do sanity check on extent cache correctly")
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230207134808.1827869-1-chao@kernel.org/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dccp: Fix out of bounds access in DCCP error handler
There was a previous attempt to fix an out-of-bounds access in the DCCP
error handlers, but that fix assumed that the error handlers only want
to access the first 8 bytes of the DCCP header. Actually, they also look
at the DCCP sequence number, which is stored beyond 8 bytes, so an
explicit pskb_may_pull() is required. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: i2c: tc358743: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by orphan timer in probe
The state->timer is a cyclic timer that schedules work_i2c_poll and
delayed_work_enable_hotplug, while rearming itself. Using timer_delete()
fails to guarantee the timer isn't still running when destroyed, similarly
cancel_delayed_work() cannot ensure delayed_work_enable_hotplug has
terminated if already executing. During probe failure after timer
initialization, these may continue running as orphans and reference the
already-freed tc358743_state object through tc358743_irq_poll_timer.
The following is the trace captured by KASAN.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88800ded83c8 by task swapper/1/0
...
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70
print_report+0xcf/0x610
? __pfx_sched_balance_find_src_group+0x10/0x10
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
? __run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
__run_timer_base.part.0+0x7d7/0x8c0
? rcu_sched_clock_irq+0xb06/0x27d0
? __pfx___run_timer_base.part.0+0x10/0x10
? try_to_wake_up+0xb15/0x1960
? tmigr_update_events+0x280/0x740
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x603/0x7e0
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
? sched_balance_trigger+0x98/0x9f0
? sched_tick+0x221/0x5a0
? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x80/0xe0
? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
? tick_nohz_handler+0x339/0x440
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote_up+0x10/0x10
__walk_groups.isra.0+0x42/0x150
tmigr_handle_remote+0x1f4/0x2e0
? __pfx_tmigr_handle_remote+0x10/0x10
? ktime_get+0x60/0x140
? lapic_next_event+0x11/0x20
? clockevents_program_event+0x1d4/0x2a0
? hrtimer_interrupt+0x322/0x780
handle_softirqs+0x16a/0x550
irq_exit_rcu+0xaf/0xe0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80
</IRQ>
...
Allocated by task 141:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90
__kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x198/0x430
devm_kmalloc+0x7b/0x1e0
tc358743_probe+0xb7/0x610 i2c_device_probe+0x51d/0x880
really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x174/0x220
bus_for_each_drv+0x100/0x190
__device_attach+0x206/0x370
bus_probe_device+0x123/0x170
device_add+0xd25/0x1470
i2c_new_client_device+0x7a0/0xcd0
do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300
do_init_module+0x29d/0x7f0
load_module+0x4f48/0x69e0
init_module_from_file+0xe4/0x150
idempotent_init_module+0x320/0x670
__x64_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120
do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 141:
kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3a/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x3f/0x50
kfree+0x137/0x370
release_nodes+0xa4/0x100
devres_release_group+0x1b2/0x380
i2c_device_probe+0x694/0x880
really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0
__driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310
driver_probe_device+0x44/0x120
__device_attach_driver+0x174/0x220
bus_for_each_drv+0x100/0x190
__device_attach+0x206/0x370
bus_probe_device+0x123/0x170
device_add+0xd25/0x1470
i2c_new_client_device+0x7a0/0xcd0
do_one_initcall+0x89/0x300
do_init_module+0x29d/0x7f0
load_module+0x4f48/0x69e0
init_module_from_file+0xe4/0x150
idempotent_init_module+0x320/0x670
__x64_sys_finit_module+0xbd/0x120
do_syscall_64+0xac/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
...
Replace timer_delete() with timer_delete_sync() and cancel_delayed_work()
with cancel_delayed_work_sync() to ensure proper termination of timer and
work items before resource cleanup.
This bug was initially identified through static analysis. For reproduction
and testing, I created a functional emulation of the tc358743 device via a
kernel module and introduced faults through the debugfs interface. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fpga: prevent integer overflow in dfl_feature_ioctl_set_irq()
The "hdr.count * sizeof(s32)" multiplication can overflow on 32 bit
systems leading to memory corruption. Use array_size() to fix that. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
serial: amba-pl011: avoid SBSA UART accessing DMACR register
Chapter "B Generic UART" in "ARM Server Base System Architecture" [1]
documentation describes a generic UART interface. Such generic UART
does not support DMA. In current code, sbsa_uart_pops and
amba_pl011_pops share the same stop_rx operation, which will invoke
pl011_dma_rx_stop, leading to an access of the DMACR register. This
commit adds a using_rx_dma check in pl011_dma_rx_stop to avoid the
access to DMACR register for SBSA UARTs which does not support DMA.
When the kernel enables DMA engine with "CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=y", Linux
SBSA PL011 driver will access PL011 DMACR register in some functions.
For most real SBSA Pl011 hardware implementations, the DMACR write
behaviour will be ignored. So these DMACR operations will not cause
obvious problems. But for some virtual SBSA PL011 hardware, like Xen
virtual SBSA PL011 (vpl011) device, the behaviour might be different.
Xen vpl011 emulation will inject a data abort to guest, when guest is
accessing an unimplemented UART register. As Xen VPL011 is SBSA
compatible, it will not implement DMACR register. So when Linux SBSA
PL011 driver access DMACR register, it will get an unhandled data abort
fault and the application will get a segmentation fault:
Unhandled fault at 0xffffffc00944d048
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x96000000
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x00: ttbr address size fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0
swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000020e2e000
[ffffffc00944d048] pgd=100000003ffff803, p4d=100000003ffff803, pud=100000003ffff803, pmd=100000003fffa803, pte=006800009c090f13
Internal error: ttbr address size fault: 96000000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
...
Call trace:
pl011_stop_rx+0x70/0x80
tty_port_shutdown+0x7c/0xb4
tty_port_close+0x60/0xcc
uart_close+0x34/0x8c
tty_release+0x144/0x4c0
__fput+0x78/0x220
____fput+0x1c/0x30
task_work_run+0x88/0xc0
do_notify_resume+0x8d0/0x123c
el0_svc+0xa8/0xc0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa4/0x130
el0t_64_sync+0x1a0/0x1a4
Code: b9000083 b901f001 794038a0 8b000042 (b9000041)
---[ end trace 83dd93df15c3216f ]---
note: bootlogd[132] exited with preempt_count 1
/etc/rcS.d/S07bootlogd: line 47: 132 Segmentation fault start-stop-daemon
This has been discussed in the Xen community, and we think it should fix
this in Linux. See [2] for more information.
[1] https://developer.arm.com/documentation/den0094/c/?lang=en
[2] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2022-11/msg00543.html |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix monitor mode bringup crash
When the interface is brought up in monitor mode, it leads
to NULL pointer dereference crash. This crash happens when
the packet type is extracted for a SKB. This extraction
which is present in the received msdu delivery path,is
not needed for the monitor ring packets since they are
all RAW packets. Hence appending the flags with
"RX_FLAG_ONLY_MONITOR" to skip that extraction.
Observed calltrace:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
0000000000000064
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
CM = 0, WnR = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000048517000
[0000000000000064] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in: ath11k_pci ath11k qmi_helpers
CPU: 2 PID: 1781 Comm: napi/-271 Not tainted
6.1.0-rc5-wt-ath-656295-gef907406320c-dirty #6
Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. IPQ8074/AP-HK10-C2 (DT)
pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : ath11k_hw_qcn9074_rx_desc_get_decap_type+0x34/0x60 [ath11k]
lr : ath11k_hw_qcn9074_rx_desc_get_decap_type+0x5c/0x60 [ath11k]
sp : ffff80000ef5bb10
x29: ffff80000ef5bb10 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff000007baafa0
x26: ffff000014a91ed0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff800002b77378 x22: ffff000014a91ec0 x21: ffff000006c8d600
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800002b77740 x18: 0000000000000006
x17: 736564203634343a x16: 656e694c20657079 x15: 0000000000000143
x14: 00000000ffffffea x13: ffff80000ef5b8b8 x12: ffff80000ef5b8c8
x11: ffff80000a591d30 x10: ffff80000a579d40 x9 : c0000000ffffefff
x8 : 0000000000000003 x7 : 0000000000017fe8 x6 : ffff80000a579ce8
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 3a35ec12ed7f8900 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000052
Call trace:
ath11k_hw_qcn9074_rx_desc_get_decap_type+0x34/0x60 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_rx_deliver_msdu.isra.42+0xa4/0x3d0 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_rx_mon_deliver.isra.43+0x2f8/0x458 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_rx_process_mon_rings+0x310/0x4c0 [ath11k]
ath11k_dp_service_srng+0x234/0x338 [ath11k]
ath11k_pcic_ext_grp_napi_poll+0x30/0xb8 [ath11k]
__napi_poll+0x5c/0x190
napi_threaded_poll+0xf0/0x118
kthread+0xf4/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Tested-on: QCN9074 hw1.0 PCI WLAN.HK.2.7.0.1-01744-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block/rq_qos: protect rq_qos apis with a new lock
commit 50e34d78815e ("block: disable the elevator int del_gendisk")
move rq_qos_exit() from disk_release() to del_gendisk(), this will
introduce some problems:
1) If rq_qos_add() is triggered by enabling iocost/iolatency through
cgroupfs, then it can concurrent with del_gendisk(), it's not safe to
write 'q->rq_qos' concurrently.
2) Activate cgroup policy that is relied on rq_qos will call
rq_qos_add() and blkcg_activate_policy(), and if rq_qos_exit() is
called in the middle, null-ptr-dereference will be triggered in
blkcg_activate_policy().
3) blkg_conf_open_bdev() can call blkdev_get_no_open() first to find the
disk, then if rq_qos_exit() from del_gendisk() is done before
rq_qos_add(), then memory will be leaked.
This patch add a new disk level mutex 'rq_qos_mutex':
1) The lock will protect rq_qos_exit() directly.
2) For wbt that doesn't relied on blk-cgroup, rq_qos_add() can only be
called from disk initialization for now because wbt can't be
destructed until rq_qos_exit(), so it's safe not to protect wbt for
now. Hoever, in case that rq_qos dynamically destruction is supported
in the furture, this patch also protect rq_qos_add() from wbt_init()
directly, this is enough because blk-sysfs already synchronize
writers with disk removal.
3) For iocost and iolatency, in order to synchronize disk removal and
cgroup configuration, the lock is held after blkdev_get_no_open()
from blkg_conf_open_bdev(), and is released in blkg_conf_exit().
In order to fix the above memory leak, disk_live() is checked after
holding the new lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: fix NULL pointer dereference on fastopen early fallback
In case of early fallback to TCP, subflow_syn_recv_sock() deletes
the subflow context before returning the newly allocated sock to
the caller.
The fastopen path does not cope with the above unconditionally
dereferencing the subflow context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ixgbe: Fix panic during XDP_TX with > 64 CPUs
Commit 4fe815850bdc ("ixgbe: let the xdpdrv work with more than 64 cpus")
adds support to allow XDP programs to run on systems with more than
64 CPUs by locking the XDP TX rings and indexing them using cpu % 64
(IXGBE_MAX_XDP_QS).
Upon trying this out patch on a system with more than 64 cores,
the kernel paniced with an array-index-out-of-bounds at the return in
ixgbe_determine_xdp_ring in ixgbe.h, which means ixgbe_determine_xdp_q_idx
was just returning the cpu instead of cpu % IXGBE_MAX_XDP_QS. An example
splat:
==========================================================================
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in
/var/lib/dkms/ixgbe/5.18.6+focal-1/build/src/ixgbe.h:1147:26
index 65 is out of range for type 'ixgbe_ring *[64]'
==========================================================================
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 65 PID: 408 Comm: ksoftirqd/65
Tainted: G IOE 5.15.0-48-generic #54~20.04.1-Ubuntu
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/0W23H8, BIOS 2.5.4 01/13/2020
RIP: 0010:ixgbe_xmit_xdp_ring+0x1b/0x1c0 [ixgbe]
Code: 3b 52 d4 cf e9 42 f2 ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 b9
00 00 00 00 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 08 <44> 0f b7
47 58 0f b7 47 5a 0f b7 57 54 44 0f b7 76 08 66 41 39 c0
RSP: 0018:ffffbc3fcd88fcb0 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: ffff92a253260980 RBX: ffffbc3fe68b00a0 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff928b5f659000 RSI: ffff928b5f659000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffbc3fcd88fce0 R08: ffff92b9dfc20580 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d R11: 3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff928b2f0fa8c0 R14: ffff928b9be20050 R15: 000000000000003c
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92b9dfc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 000000011dd6a002 CR4: 00000000007706e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ixgbe_poll+0x103e/0x1280 [ixgbe]
? sched_clock_cpu+0x12/0xe0
__napi_poll+0x30/0x160
net_rx_action+0x11c/0x270
__do_softirq+0xda/0x2ee
run_ksoftirqd+0x2f/0x50
smpboot_thread_fn+0xb7/0x150
? sort_range+0x30/0x30
kthread+0x127/0x150
? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
</TASK>
I think this is how it happens:
Upon loading the first XDP program on a system with more than 64 CPUs,
ixgbe_xdp_locking_key is incremented in ixgbe_xdp_setup. However,
immediately after this, the rings are reconfigured by ixgbe_setup_tc.
ixgbe_setup_tc calls ixgbe_clear_interrupt_scheme which calls
ixgbe_free_q_vectors which calls ixgbe_free_q_vector in a loop.
ixgbe_free_q_vector decrements ixgbe_xdp_locking_key once per call if
it is non-zero. Commenting out the decrement in ixgbe_free_q_vector
stopped my system from panicing.
I suspect to make the original patch work, I would need to load an XDP
program and then replace it in order to get ixgbe_xdp_locking_key back
above 0 since ixgbe_setup_tc is only called when transitioning between
XDP and non-XDP ring configurations, while ixgbe_xdp_locking_key is
incremented every time ixgbe_xdp_setup is called.
Also, ixgbe_setup_tc can be called via ethtool --set-channels, so this
becomes another path to decrement ixgbe_xdp_locking_key to 0 on systems
with more than 64 CPUs.
Since ixgbe_xdp_locking_key only protects the XDP_TX path and is tied
to the number of CPUs present, there is no reason to disable it upon
unloading an XDP program. To avoid confusion, I have moved enabling
ixgbe_xdp_locking_key into ixgbe_sw_init, which is part of the probe path. |
