| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Improper neutralization of input during web page generation ('cross-site scripting') vulnerability in Progress MOVEit Transfer (Ad Hoc module).
This issue affects MOVEit Transfer: before 2025.1.6 and from 2026.0.0 before 2026.0.4. |
| Incorrect Authorization vulnerability in Progress MOVEit Transfer (Client Certificates module).
This issue affects MOVEit Transfer: before 2025.1.6 and from 2026.0.0 before 2026.0.4. |
| The Tutor LMS – eLearning and online course solution plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to DOM-Based Cross-Site Scripting via the 'redirect_url' parameter in versions up to, and including, 4.0.8 This is due to insufficient input validation in the Topbar component's back button handler. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts that execute in the victim's browser whenever the victim accesses a page that includes the malicious payload. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: Fix _gaccess_shadow_fault()
In some circumstances, it is possible that the page of nested guest
memory that is being shadowed is not present at all in the parent guest
gmap. dat_entry_walk() will not find any leaf entry and return with
-ENOENT, which will erroneously be propagated all the way to userspace.
Fix by manually calling gmap_link() on the memory of the nested guest
that is being shadowed if the mapping was not already present. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Validate the SVE vector length in pkvm_vcpu_init_sve()
pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clamps only the upper bound of the host-provided
sve_max_vl, so an invalid vector length reaches sve_state_size_from_vl()
and the WARN_ON() there, which is fatal at EL2. The existing
!sve_state_size test rejects such a length, but only after the macro has
run.
Check sve_vl_valid() before deriving the state size. A valid length
cannot yield a zero size, so the !sve_state_size test goes with it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Do not clear VM-wide SVE feature on vCPU init failure
pkvm_vcpu_init_sve() clears KVM_ARM_VCPU_SVE in kvm->arch.vcpu_features
when it fails, but vcpu_has_sve() tests KVM_ARCH_FLAG_GUEST_HAS_SVE,
which is left set. Later vCPUs on that VM then skip the SVE setup and
register with a NULL sve_state, which the guest's first FP access hands
to sve_load_state().
Return the error without touching vcpu_features. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
squashfs: Add dictionary size range check to prevent shift-out-of-bounds
When an abnormal SquashFS image (COMP_OPTS flag is 1 but dictionary size
is 0) is mounted, and performs shift operations using dictionarysize, the
shift exponent is -1, causing a shift-out-of-bounds.
Detail as below:
squashfs_comp_opts(msblk, buffer, length)
squashfs_xz_comp_opts()
if (comp_opts)
n = ffs(opts->dict_size) - 1;<----opts->dict_size=0, n=-1
if (opts->dict_size != (1 << n) && opts->dict_size !=
(1 << n) + (1 << (n + 1))) <----shift-out-of-bounds
Fix it by adding a dictionary size range check before the shift operation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: block: Fix zones_cond out-of-bounds write on zone report
blk_revalidate_disk_zones() sizes the zones_cond array from the disk
capacity and zone size, but the index used by blk_revalidate_zone_cond()
comes from the device-driven report_zones() walk and is never checked
against the array size. A device reporting more zones than fit the array
makes blk_zone_set_cond() write out of bounds.
One way to reach this is a zone count exceeding 32 bits: both
blk_revalidate_zone_args.nr_zones and struct zoned_disk_info.nr_zones are
unsigned int, so a disk advertising more than UINT_MAX zones (e.g. 2^32 +
1024 zones of one 512-byte logical block) gets its zone count truncated to
a small value, undersizing the array while the report walk keeps counting
upward.
Check the index against the array size before storing the zone condition,
and refuse to revalidate when the zone count does not fit 32 bits. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: sd_zbc: Reject disks with too many zones
sd_zbc_read_zones() computes the number of zones with 64-bit arithmetic and
stores the result in the unsigned int nr_zones field of struct
zoned_disk_info, silently truncating counts that exceed 32 bits. The
truncated count is later used to size per-zone resources, while the device
may still report more zones than fit.
Moreover, sd_zbc_report_zones() counts the reported zones with a signed int
zone_idx, which overflows past INT_MAX. Reject devices reporting more than
INT_MAX zones at scan time; such a device is not realistic for any medium
that exists today, and accepting it produces inconsistent zone bookkeeping. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Fix skb leak in nxp_process_fw_dump()
When CONFIG_DEV_COREDUMP=n, hci_devcd_append() returns -EOPNOTSUPP
without freeing its skb argument. This leaks the cloned skb and also
prevents nxp_set_ind_reset() from being called to perform recovery.
Fix by guarding the hci_devcd_append(hdev, skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC))
call with IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEV_COREDUMP). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: mgmt: Dequeue pending mesh_send_sync entries on cancel
In send_cancel(), pending mesh_tx objects are removed from the
hdev->mesh_pending list and freed via mesh_send_complete(). However, if
a mesh transmission was already queued onto hdev->cmd_sync_work_list via
mesh_next(), the queued entry retains a raw pointer to mesh_tx.
When hci_cmd_sync_work later processes the entry, it attempts to execute
mesh_send_sync and its destroy callback mesh_send_start_complete using
the already freed mesh_tx pointer, leading to a use-after-free.
Fix this by invoking hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() for mesh_send_sync on the
target mesh_tx before completing it. If the entry is found and dequeued,
its destroy callback will complete and free the object; otherwise,
mesh_send_complete() is called directly.
Additionally, ensure the transmission queue advances after cancellation
or errors. In mesh_send_start_complete(), call mesh_next() on error
unless err is -ECANCELED, because hci_cmd_sync_dequeue() holds
hdev->cmd_sync_work_lock and calling mesh_next() synchronously would
deadlock. Instead, advance the queue in send_cancel() once the lock is
released and if no transmission is in progress. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: fix manual hash table handle IDR aliasing
A u32 hash table created with an explicit handle ('tc filter add ...
handle 801: u32 divisor N') keys its IDR entry on the raw handle, while
the destroy paths free it under handle2id(handle). The two key domains
disagree for handles in the 0x800..0xFFF htid range:
handle2id() folds them back into the auto-allocated id space (1..0x7FF).
A manual table therefore leaves its raw-keyed IDR entry unreachable on
delete (a permanent leak), and its delete can drop the idr entry of an
unrelated live auto table. A later auto allocation can then hand out a
handle that aliases the live manual table; u32_lookup_ht() first-match
routes lookups and TCA_U32_LINK for that htid to the wrong table.
Key the divisor-path alloc on handle2id(handle) so allocation and
removal share one key domain. A manual handle that maps onto an id
already in use is rejected with -ENOSPC, and auto allocation skips ids
held by live manual tables.
Conditions to recreate:
ip link add test0 type dummy
tc qdisc add dev test0 clsact
tc filter add dev test0 ingress protocol ip pref 1 \
handle 801: u32 divisor 16
tc filter add dev test0 ingress protocol ip pref 2 u32 divisor 16
tc -d filter show dev test0 ingress | grep 'fh 801:'
# unpatched: two live tables with handle 0x80100000 (the pref 2 root
# hnode is auto-allocated id 1); patched: the auto hnode takes id 2.
Also tested with a poc with a live u32 table on the block, add/delete a manual
table 'handle 901: u32 divisor 1' twice; unpatched, the re-add fails with
-ENOSPC because the raw key leaked on the first delete. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Make post-verification instruction rewrites killable
After do_check() returns, the verifier runs several instruction rewrite
passes. Some of them patch or remove one instruction at a time. Each
operation moves the remaining instruction and auxiliary-data arrays and
adjusts all branch offsets, making the overall work quadratic in the
program length.
A privileged loader can submit 131072 unconditional jumps by zero followed
by a valid return. Verification finishes quickly, but bpf_opt_remove_nops()
then spends a long time removing each jump separately. Since this
post-verification work neither checks for signals nor reschedules, a pending
SIGKILL cannot terminate the task until the rewrite finishes.
Make bpf_patch_insn_data() and verifier_remove_insns() common cancellation
and rescheduling points. These helpers run from BPF_PROG_LOAD process
context, and bpf_patch_insn_data() can already sleep while reallocating
auxiliary data.
Report interrupted constant blinding as -EINTR and propagate it through
both JIT paths, including kernels that permit interpreter fallback.
Other blinding failures retain the existing fallback behavior.
This does not reduce the quadratic cost of the rewrite passes, but it makes
the work preemptible and allows a killed loader to be torn down promptly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Restrict CO-RE poisoning to relocatable instructions
CO-RE relocation records can name any instruction offset. When a
relocation cannot be resolved, bpf_core_patch_insn() currently poisons its
target before checking whether that instruction is a valid relocation
target. Malformed metadata can therefore replace jumps, calls, exits,
register-source arithmetic, or non-immediate loads instead of failing at
the relocation step.
Handle poisoning only after the instruction has passed the same class and
operand-form checks used for a resolved relocation. Route invalid forms
through the existing diagnostic and return a hard error. Keep poisoning
supported instructions, including both halves of a plain ldimm64, so an
unresolved relocation in dead code remains valid.
Extend bpf_core_poison_insn() to poison both halves of ldimm64, and return
its status directly from each validated instruction case. This avoids
routing the success path through a common label and leaves the helper free
to report errors.
The shared relocation code applies this restriction to both libbpf and
in-kernel CO-RE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: act_ct: don't WARN on benign flow_offload_alloc() failure
flow_offload_alloc() returns NULL when the conntrack entry is dying
(e.g. raced with a conntrack flush) or when the GFP_ATOMIC allocation
fails; both are expected under load and neither is a kernel bug. This
path runs from softirq on every committed packet, so with
panic_on_warn=1 an unprivileged user can panic the box just by racing
a conntrack flush against a `tc ... action ct commit` classifier.
Reproduced with a custom repro under QEMU: a small, fixed set of UDP
flows through `tc filter ... action ct commit` on lo, raced against
threads flooding bare ctnetlink CT_DELETE (flush) requests. Hits
WARNING: net/sched/act_ct.c:437 (tcf_ct_flow_table_add(), inlined
into tcf_ct_act() in this build) within ~15s on the unpatched kernel;
same setup is clean on the patched kernel. The fix itself is
behavior-preserving: both branches already did `goto err_alloc`
before and after, only the WARN is removed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gue: reject invalid REMCSUM offsets
The REMCSUM option carries an absolute checksum start and checksum field
offset. gue_remcsum() passes them to skb_remcsum_process(), whose
partial path stores offset - start in the u16 skb->csum_offset variable.
If offset is less than start, this underflows.
A forwarded packet can retain CHECKSUM_PARTIAL and reach a NETIF_F_HW_CSUM
driver which trusts the metadata, leading skb_copy_and_csum_dev() to write
two bytes about 64 KiB beyond the destination buffer.
Reject reversed tuples in validate_gue_flags(), after the existing length
validation, so all GUE parsers enforce the ordering in one place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: unregister net_devices in case of probe failure
If register_netdev() fails for one of the MTK_MAX_DEVS devices in
mtk_probe(), the error path jumps to err_deinit_ppe, skipping
mtk_unreg_dev(). The previously registered net_devices are then freed by
mtk_free_dev() while still in NETREG_REGISTERED state, hitting the
BUG_ON(dev->reg_state != NETREG_UNREGISTERED).
Route the register_netdev() failure to err_unreg_netdev so the net_devices
registered so far are properly unregistered before being freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: Handle maximum standalone channels
Standalone channels use one NAPI vector for each Tx and Rx queue.
fbnic's allocation path excludes FBNIC_MAX_TXQS from that layout. A
64-Tx/64-Rx configuration therefore records 128 vectors but allocates
only 64, leaving NULL entries that resource setup dereferences.
Include the maximum vector count in standalone allocation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: avoid livelock while updating retransmit path
sctp_assoc_update_retran_path() can loop forever when every remaining
transport, including retran_path, is SCTP_UNCONFIRMED: the state check
runs before the wraparound test, so the loop cannot observe that it has
completed a full pass.
Fix this by considering a transport only when it is not UNCONFIRMED,
then checking whether the walk has returned to retran_path. This makes
the full-pass termination independent of the transport state while
preserving the existing fallback selection semantics.
Also restore the NULL guard around the retran_path assignment. In the
all-UNCONFIRMED case there is no eligible replacement transport, and
installing NULL would leave later retransmit-path users and the debug
print with a NULL path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done()
catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from
each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len > urb->actual_length, ignores the
header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the
bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes
skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer.
A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and
eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom
of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from
the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path.
Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header
that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an
Ethernet header.
A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one,
previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() and counted as
received; it is now counted in rx_length_errors and ends the walk. |
