| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking
catc_probe() fills three URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without
verifying the endpoint descriptors:
- usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) and usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) for TX/RX
- usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, 2) for interrupt status
A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types
that differ from what the driver assumes.
Add a catc_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic constants
throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and usb_check_int_endpoints()
calls after usb_set_interface() to verify endpoint types before use,
rejecting devices with mismatched descriptors at probe time.
Similar to
- commit 90b7f2961798 ("net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking")
which fixed the issue in rtl8150. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: timer: don't re-enter an instance callback that is still running
The userspace-driven timer (utimer) TRIGGER ioctl calls
snd_timer_interrupt() directly with no serialization, so two threads
triggering the same utimer can run snd_timer_interrupt() on one
snd_timer concurrently.
snd_timer_process_callbacks() drops timer->lock around each instance
callback and marks the in-flight callback with the single
SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_CALLBACK bit; snd_timer_close_locked() waits on that
bit to drain an in-flight callback before freeing the instance. The bit
cannot represent two concurrent callbacks: when a second interrupt
re-queues an instance whose callback is still running, both run at once,
the first to finish clears the bit, and the close-path drain then frees
the instance (and its callback_data) while the other callback is still
live - a use-after-free reachable by any user able to open
/dev/snd/timer, both via a user timer instance and via a sequencer queue
timer bound to the utimer.
snd_timer_interrupt() sets IFLG_CALLBACK before dropping timer->lock, so
a concurrent interrupt already observes it under the lock. Skip
re-queuing an instance (and its slaves) to the ack/sack list while its
callback is in flight; the accumulated pticks are delivered on the next
tick, so no event is lost. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix lifetime issue of amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid()
The vm pointer returned from amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() is only
valid while the lock is still being held. Once xa_unlock_irqrestore is
called and returned, the pointer is no longer under lock and is subject
to modification. Since, the caller still dereferences vm->task_info in
amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_vm() after the lock is removed, this causes a
use after unlock problem.
Remove the lifetime issue present in amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid()
through removing the amdgpu_vm_get_vm_from_pasid() function from
amdgpu_vm.c and making the relevant code inline to hold the lock while
it is still in use.
(cherry picked from commit 9d01579f3f868b333acc901815972685989092c7) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: defer link RX stats percpu free to RCU
sta_remove_link() frees a removed MLO link's RX stats percpu buffer right
away, but defers only the link container to RCU:
sta_info_free_link(&alloc->info);
kfree_rcu(alloc, rcu_head);
The RX fast path reads link_sta under rcu_read_lock and writes the percpu
stats. A reader that resolved link_sta before the removal keeps the
pointer. The container stays alive from the kfree_rcu, so the read still
works. But the percpu block it points to is already freed. This needs
uses_rss. That is when pcpu_rx_stats exists.
The full STA teardown frees the deflink stats only after
synchronize_net(). The link removal path had no such barrier. The race is
hard to win in practice, but the free should still wait for RCU.
Free the link together with its data from a single RCU callback, so the
percpu block is reclaimed only after readers drain. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: close UDP tunnel sockets during netns teardown
proc_sctp_do_udp_port() starts per-net SCTP UDP tunneling sockets when
net.sctp.udp_port is set, and stops/restarts them when the sysctl value
changes. The netns exit path does not stop these sockets, so a namespace
can be torn down while its SCTP UDP tunnel sockets are still installed.
Close the UDP tunnel sockets from sctp_ctrlsock_exit() after unregistering
the per-net sysctl table. This prevents new sysctl writes from racing in
while the sockets are being released, and closes the sockets before the
control socket is destroyed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/checksum: Fix csum_partial() without vector facility
Currently csum_partial() calls csum_copy() with copy=false and dst=NULL.
On machines without the vector facility, csum_copy() falls back to
cksm(dst, ...), causing the checksum to be calculated from address zero
instead of the source buffer.
The VX implementation already checksums data loaded from src. Make the
fallback do the same by passing src to cksm(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sync: extend conn_hash lookup critical sections
Using RCU-protected pointers outside the critical sections without
refcount is incorrect and may result to UAF.
Extend critical section to cover both hci_conn_hash lookup and use of
the returned conn.
Add surrounding rcu_read_lock() also when return value is not used, in
preparation for RCU lockdep requirement to hci_lookup_le_connect().
This avoids concurrent deletion of the conn before we are done
dereferencing it.
Also, make sure to hold hdev->lock when accessing hdev->accept_list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Fix buffer over-read in cca_cipher2protkey
Add validation of both the actual key buffer size and token length
fields in all the cca_check_sec*token() functions. Additionally check
in cca_gencipherkey() for possible underflow with returned key size.
The CCA token structures contain user-controlled len fields that
were used in operations without proper validation against both the
actual buffer size and minimum token structure size. An attacker
could set this field larger than the actual buffer size, leading to
reading beyond buffer boundaries. This may result in a kernel crash or
exposure of memory via sending this as part of a request down to the
crypto card. Also an attacker could have used a very small len value
and thus enforce a buffer under-run which may produce similar effects
as a over-read.
So now a key must
- key buf length must be at least sizeof the token struct
- the key len field inside the token must fit into the range of
sizeof key token struct ... key buf length |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/vm: Fix BO prefetch with CONSULT_MEM_ADVISE_PREF_LOC
When prefetch region is DRM_XE_CONSULT_MEM_ADVISE_PREF_LOC for a BO VMA,
the code used it as an index into region_to_mem_type[], causing an
out-of-bounds access since the value is -1.
Resolve the preferred location for BO VMAs directly: local VRAM on dGFX
(using the BO's tile placement) or system memory on iGPU.
Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product
Security.
v2:
-Fix null dereference
(cherry picked from commit d9a4906ac03be9f6ed3f3b45c56c866b867fd75b) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: airoha: Fix DMA direction for NPU mailbox buffer
airoha_npu_send_msg() always maps the mailbox buffer with DMA_TO_DEVICE,
but some callers expect the NPU to write response data back into the
same buffer:
- airoha_npu_wlan_msg_get() (NPU_OP_GET): NPU writes response into
the buffer, then the caller reads it via memcpy()
- airoha_npu_ppe_stats_setup() (NPU_OP_SET): NPU writes back
npu_stats_addr field in the response
On non-cache-coherent architectures like EN7581 (Cortex-A53 without
hardware cache coherency for NPU DMA), DMA_TO_DEVICE unmap is a no-op
— it does not invalidate the CPU cache. If the NPU-written cache line
is still present in the CPU cache when the caller reads the buffer,
the CPU observes stale data instead of the NPU response.
This is a timing-sensitive bug: small mailbox buffers (~24 bytes)
typically fit in a single cache line and may survive in the cache
until the caller reads them, producing silent data corruption rather
than a crash. The bug is more likely to trigger when the caller reads
the response immediately after dma_unmap_single() without intervening
cache-evicting operations.
Fix by using DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL for both map and unmap, which ensures
dma_unmap_single() invalidates the CPU cache on non-coherent systems.
The mailbox buffers are small so there is no performance concern. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: clear mode callbacks after failed mode setup
xfrm_state_gc_task can run long after a failed IPTFS state setup. In the
reproduced case, __xfrm_init_state() cached x->mode_cbs, IPTFS setup
returned -ENOMEM before publishing mode_data, and the temporary module
reference from xfrm_get_mode_cbs() was dropped immediately. The dead state
then kept x->mode_cbs until deferred GC ran after xfrm_iptfs had been
unloaded.
Clear x->mode_cbs when mode init or clone fails before publishing
mode_data. Those states never installed mode-specific state or the
long-term IPTFS module pin, so deferred GC has nothing mode-specific to
destroy and must not retain a callback table pointer past the temporary
lookup reference.
The buggy scenario involves two paths, with each column showing the order
within that path:
failed setup path:
1. cache x->mode_cbs
2. mode setup fails before mode_data
3. drop the temporary module ref
4. dead state keeps x->mode_cbs cached
GC/unload path:
1. xfrm_state_put() queues GC work
2. xfrm_iptfs unloads later
3. xfrm_state_gc_task runs
4. GC dereferences stale x->mode_cbs
This also covers the failed clone path where clone_state() returns before
publishing mode_data.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION_STACKTRACE_FILTER=y
failslab_stacktrace_filter matched xfrm_iptfs frames
ack_error=-12
FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure
BUG: unable to handle page fault
Workqueue: events xfrm_state_gc_task
RIP: xfrm_state_gc_task+0x142/0x650
Modules linked in: esp4_offload xfrm_user [last unloaded: xfrm_iptfs]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception |
| A security flaw has been discovered in eyaushev swagger-testcase-mcp 5babb27c951fb404bc2b25ec80593616e49054e5. This vulnerability affects the function loadSource of the file src/utils/swagger-parser.ts of the component fetch_swagger. Performing a manipulation results in server-side request forgery. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. This product adopts a rolling release strategy to maintain continuous delivery. Therefore, version details for affected or updated releases cannot be specified. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rds: tcp: unregister sysctl before tearing down listen socket
rds_tcp_exit_net() frees the per-netns RDS TCP listen socket via
rds_tcp_kill_sock() before unregistering the per-netns sysctl table. Since
rds_tcp_skbuf_handler() derives the netns from
rtn->rds_tcp_listen_sock->sk, a concurrent sysctl write can race with
netns teardown and dereference the freed socket/sk.
KASAN reports the race as:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rds_tcp_skbuf_handler+0x2aa/0x2e0
rds_tcp_skbuf_handler net/rds/tcp.c:721
proc_sys_call_handler fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c
vfs_write fs/read_write.c
__x64_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c
Fix this by unregistering the RDS TCP sysctl table before calling
rds_tcp_kill_sock(). unregister_net_sysctl_table() prevents new sysctl
handlers from starting and waits for in-flight handlers to finish, so
the listen socket can then be released safely. The fix was tested
against the linked reproducer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: Fix MCIA register buffer overflow on 32 dword reads
The MCIA register can return up to 32 dwords (128 bytes) when the device
advertises the mcia_32dwords capability, but struct
mlx5_ifc_mcia_reg_bits only defines dword_0..11, leaving room for just
12 dwords (48 bytes) of data.
mlx5_query_mcia() clamps the read size to mlx5_mcia_max_bytes() and then
memcpy()s that many bytes out of the register, potentially reading past
the end of the 'out' buffer. On kernels built with FORTIFY_SOURCE this
is caught as a buffer overflow while reading the module EEPROM via
ethtool:
detected buffer overflow in memcpy
kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1048!
RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0x13/0x20
Call Trace:
mlx5_query_mcia.isra.0+0x200/0x210 [mlx5_core]
mlx5_query_module_eeprom_by_page+0x4a/0xa0 [mlx5_core]
mlx5e_get_module_eeprom_by_page+0xbb/0x120 [mlx5_core]
eeprom_prepare_data+0xf3/0x170
ethnl_default_doit+0xf1/0x3b0
Extend the mcia_reg layout to 32 dwords. |
| `xml.parsers.expat` and `xml.etree.ElementTree` use insufficient entropy for Expat hash-flooding protection, which allows a crafted XML document to trigger hash flooding.\r\n\r\nFully mitigating this vulnerability requires both updating libexpat to 2.8.0 or later and applying this patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: serialize qdisc_rtab_list against concurrent get/put
qdisc_get_rtab() and qdisc_put_rtab() mutate the process-global singly
linked list qdisc_rtab_list and a plain non-atomic 'int refcnt' with no
lock. This was only safe because every caller historically held the RTNL
mutex, which serialized all rate-table lookups, inserts and frees.
That invariant no longer holds. cls_flower sets
TCF_PROTO_OPS_DOIT_UNLOCKED, so tc_new_tfilter() keeps rtnl_held == false
for it and sets TCA_ACT_FLAGS_NO_RTNL. That flag propagates through
tcf_exts_validate_ex() -> tcf_action_init() -> tcf_action_init_1() ->
tcf_police_init(), which calls qdisc_get_rtab()/qdisc_put_rtab() with the
RTNL mutex NOT held. Two RTM_NEWTFILTER requests on different CPUs, each
adding a flower filter with a police action carrying the same rate, then
race on qdisc_rtab_list and on the non-atomic refcnt, leading to a
use-after-free / double-free of the kmalloc-2k struct qdisc_rate_table.
qdisc_rtab_list is a single global (not per-netns), so the corrupted
object is shared system-wide.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160
qdisc_put_rtab+0x12f/0x160
tcf_police_init+0xda9/0x1590
tcf_action_init_1+0x460/0x6b0
tcf_action_init+0x439/0xa40
tcf_exts_validate_ex+0x42d/0x550
fl_change+0xddd/0x7da0
tc_new_tfilter+0xaa7/0x2420
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x95e/0xe90
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048
Protect qdisc_rtab_list and the refcount with a dedicated spinlock. The
(sleeping, GFP_KERNEL) allocation in qdisc_get_rtab() is performed before
taking the lock; if a concurrent inserter added an identical table in the
meantime the freshly allocated one is freed under the lock, so no
duplicate is leaked. qdisc_put_rtab() now decrements the refcount and
unlinks under the same lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lib/crypto: mpi: Fix integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl()
Yiming reports an integer underflow in mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() when
subtracting "lzeros" from the unsigned "nbytes".
For this to happen, the scatterlist "sgl" needs to occupy more bytes
than the "nbytes" parameter and the first "nbytes + 1" bytes of the
scatterlist must be zero. Under these conditions, the while loop
iterating over the scatterlist will count more zeroes than "nbytes",
subtract the number of zeroes from "nbytes" and cause the underflow.
When commit 2d4d1eea540b ("lib/mpi: Add mpi sgl helpers") originally
introduced the bug, it couldn't be triggered because all callers of
mpi_read_raw_from_sgl() passed a scatterlist whose length was equal to
"nbytes".
However since commit 63ba4d67594a ("KEYS: asymmetric: Use new crypto
interface without scatterlists"), the underflow can now actually be
triggered. When invoking a KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT system call with a
larger "out_len" than "in_len" and filling the "in" buffer with zeroes,
crypto_akcipher_sync_prep() will create an all-zero scatterlist used for
both the "src" and "dst" member of struct akcipher_request and thereby
fulfil the conditions to trigger the bug:
sys_keyctl()
keyctl_pkey_e_d_s()
asymmetric_key_eds_op()
software_key_eds_op()
crypto_akcipher_sync_encrypt()
crypto_akcipher_sync_prep()
crypto_akcipher_encrypt()
rsa_enc()
mpi_read_raw_from_sgl()
To the user this will be visible as a DoS as the kernel spins forever,
causing soft lockup splats as a side effect.
Fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openvswitch: cap upcall PID array size and pre-size vport replies
The vport netlink reply helpers allocate a fixed-size skb with
nlmsg_new(NLMSG_DEFAULT_SIZE, ...) but serialize the full upcall PID
array via ovs_vport_get_upcall_portids(). Since
ovs_vport_set_upcall_portids() accepts any non-zero multiple of
sizeof(u32) with no upper bound, a CAP_NET_ADMIN user can install a PID
array large enough to overflow the reply buffer, causing nla_put() to
fail with -EMSGSIZE and hitting BUG_ON(err < 0). On systems with
unprivileged user namespaces enabled (e.g., Ubuntu default), this is
reachable via unshare -Urn since OVS vport mutation operations use
GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM.
kernel BUG at net/openvswitch/datapath.c:2414!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc7-00195-geb216e422044 #1
RIP: 0010:ovs_vport_cmd_set+0x34c/0x400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1116)
genl_rcv_msg (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1194)
netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550)
genl_rcv (net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219)
netlink_unicast (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344)
netlink_sendmsg (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894)
__sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2206)
__x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2209)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Reject attempts to set more PIDs than nr_cpu_ids in
ovs_vport_set_upcall_portids(), and pre-compute the worst-case reply
size in ovs_vport_cmd_msg_size() based on that bound, similar to the
existing ovs_dp_cmd_msg_size(). nr_cpu_ids matches the cap already
used by the per-CPU dispatch configuration on the datapath side
(ovs_dp_cmd_fill_info() serialises at most nr_cpu_ids PIDs), so the
two sides stay consistent. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Use kvfree instead of kfree in amdgpu_gmc_get_nps_memranges()
amdgpu_discovery_get_nps_info() internally allocates memory for ranges
using kvcalloc(), which may use vmalloc() for large allocation. Using
kfree() to release vmalloc memory will lead to a memory corruption.
Use kvfree() to safely handle both kmalloc and vmalloc allocations.
Compile tested only. Issue found using a prototype static analysis tool
and code review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: prevent infinite loops caused by the next valid being the same
When processing valid within the range [valid : pos), if valid cannot
be retrieved correctly, for example, if the retrieved valid value is
always the same, this can trigger a potential infinite loop, similar
to the hung problem reported by syzbot [1].
Adding a check for the valid value within the loop body, and terminating
the loop and returning -EINVAL if the value is the same as the current
value, can prevent this.
[1]
INFO: task syz.4.21:6056 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Call Trace:
rwbase_write_lock+0x14f/0x750 kernel/locking/rwbase_rt.c:244
inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1027 [inline]
ntfs_file_write_iter+0xe6/0x870 fs/ntfs3/file.c:1284 |
