| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net_sched: sch_sfq: don't allow 1 packet limit
The current implementation does not work correctly with a limit of
1. iproute2 actually checks for this and this patch adds the check in
kernel as well.
This fixes the following syzkaller reported crash:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210:6
index 65535 is out of range for type 'struct sfq_head[128]'
CPU: 0 PID: 2569 Comm: syz-executor101 Not tainted 5.10.0-smp-DEV #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x125/0x19f lib/dump_stack.c:120
ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:148 [inline]
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xed/0x120 lib/ubsan.c:347
sfq_link net/sched/sch_sfq.c:210 [inline]
sfq_dec+0x528/0x600 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:238
sfq_dequeue+0x39b/0x9d0 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:500
sfq_reset+0x13/0x50 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:525
qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
tbf_reset+0x3d/0x100 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:319
qdisc_reset+0xfe/0x510 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1026
dev_reset_queue+0x8c/0x140 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1296
netdev_for_each_tx_queue include/linux/netdevice.h:2350 [inline]
dev_deactivate_many+0x6dc/0xc20 net/sched/sch_generic.c:1362
__dev_close_many+0x214/0x350 net/core/dev.c:1468
dev_close_many+0x207/0x510 net/core/dev.c:1506
unregister_netdevice_many+0x40f/0x16b0 net/core/dev.c:10738
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x2be/0x310 net/core/dev.c:10695
unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2893 [inline]
__tun_detach+0x6b6/0x1600 drivers/net/tun.c:689
tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:705 [inline]
tun_chr_close+0x104/0x1b0 drivers/net/tun.c:3640
__fput+0x203/0x840 fs/file_table.c:280
task_work_run+0x129/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:185
exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:33 [inline]
do_exit+0x5ce/0x2200 kernel/exit.c:931
do_group_exit+0x144/0x310 kernel/exit.c:1046
__do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1057 [inline]
__se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1055 [inline]
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3b/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1055
do_syscall_64+0x6c/0xd0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb
RIP: 0033:0x7fe5e7b52479
Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x7fe5e7b5244f.
RSP: 002b:00007ffd3c800398 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000e7
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fe5e7b52479
RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: 00000000000000e7 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0 R08: ffffffffffffffb8 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe5e7bcd2d0
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fe5e7bcdd20 R15: 00007fe5e7b24270
The crash can be also be reproduced with the following (with a tc
recompiled to allow for sfq limits of 1):
tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 1: root tbf rate 1Kbit burst 100b lat 1s
../iproute2-6.9.0/tc/tc qdisc add dev dummy0 handle 2: parent 1:10 sfq limit 1
ifconfig dummy0 up
ping -I dummy0 -f -c2 -W0.1 8.8.8.8
sleep 1
Scenario that triggers the crash:
* the first packet is sent and queued in TBF and SFQ; qdisc qlen is 1
* TBF dequeues: it peeks from SFQ which moves the packet to the
gso_skb list and keeps qdisc qlen set to 1. TBF is out of tokens so
it schedules itself for later.
* the second packet is sent and TBF tries to queues it to SFQ. qdisc
qlen is now 2 and because the SFQ limit is 1 the packet is dropped
by SFQ. At this point qlen is 1, and all of the SFQ slots are empty,
however q->tail is not NULL.
At this point, assuming no more packets are queued, when sch_dequeue
runs again it will decrement the qlen for the current empty slot
causing an underflow and the subsequent out of bounds access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix read pointer after free in ath12k_mac_assign_vif_to_vdev()
In ath12k_mac_assign_vif_to_vdev(), if arvif is created on a different
radio, it gets deleted from that radio through a call to
ath12k_mac_unassign_link_vif(). This action frees the arvif pointer.
Subsequently, there is a check involving arvif, which will result in a
read-after-free scenario.
Fix this by moving this check after arvif is again assigned via call to
ath12k_mac_assign_link_vif().
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.3.1-00173-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: core: Fix assumption that Resolution Multipliers must be in Logical Collections
A report in 2019 by the syzbot fuzzer was found to be connected to two
errors in the HID core associated with Resolution Multipliers. One of
the errors was fixed by commit ea427a222d8b ("HID: core: Fix deadloop
in hid_apply_multiplier."), but the other has not been fixed.
This error arises because hid_apply_multipler() assumes that every
Resolution Multiplier control is contained in a Logical Collection,
i.e., there's no way the routine can ever set multiplier_collection to
NULL. This is in spite of the fact that the function starts with a
big comment saying:
* "The Resolution Multiplier control must be contained in the same
* Logical Collection as the control(s) to which it is to be applied.
...
* If no Logical Collection is
* defined, the Resolution Multiplier is associated with all
* controls in the report."
* HID Usage Table, v1.12, Section 4.3.1, p30
*
* Thus, search from the current collection upwards until we find a
* logical collection...
The comment and the code overlook the possibility that none of the
collections found may be a Logical Collection.
The fix is to set the multiplier_collection pointer to NULL if the
collection found isn't a Logical Collection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: qcom: scm: Cleanup global '__scm' on probe failures
If SCM driver fails the probe, it should not leave global '__scm'
variable assigned, because external users of this driver will assume the
probe finished successfully. For example TZMEM parts ('__scm->mempool')
are initialized later in the probe, but users of it (__scm_smc_call())
rely on the '__scm' variable.
This fixes theoretical NULL pointer exception, triggered via introducing
probe deferral in SCM driver with call trace:
qcom_tzmem_alloc+0x70/0x1ac (P)
qcom_tzmem_alloc+0x64/0x1ac (L)
qcom_scm_assign_mem+0x78/0x194
qcom_rmtfs_mem_probe+0x2d4/0x38c
platform_probe+0x68/0xc8 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: state: fix out-of-bounds read during lookup
lookup and resize can run in parallel.
The xfrm_state_hash_generation seqlock ensures a retry, but the hash
functions can observe a hmask value that is too large for the new hlist
array.
rehash does:
rcu_assign_pointer(net->xfrm.state_bydst, ndst) [..]
net->xfrm.state_hmask = nhashmask;
While state lookup does:
h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, daddr, saddr, tmpl->reqid, encap_family);
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h, bydst) {
This is only safe in case the update to state_bydst is larger than
net->xfrm.xfrm_state_hmask (or if the lookup function gets
serialized via state spinlock again).
Fix this by prefetching state_hmask and the associated pointers.
The xfrm_state_hash_generation seqlock retry will ensure that the pointer
and the hmask will be consistent.
The existing helpers, like xfrm_dst_hash(), are now unsafe for RCU side,
add lockdep assertions to document that they are only safe for insert
side.
xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr() uses the spinlock rather than RCU.
AFAICS this is an oversight from back when state lookup was converted to
RCU, this lock should be replaced with RCU in a future patch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: do proper folio cleanup when cow_file_range() failed
[BUG]
When testing with COW fixup marked as BUG_ON() (this is involved with the
new pin_user_pages*() change, which should not result new out-of-band
dirty pages), I hit a crash triggered by the BUG_ON() from hitting COW
fixup path.
This BUG_ON() happens just after a failed btrfs_run_delalloc_range():
BTRFS error (device dm-2): failed to run delalloc range, root 348 ino 405 folio 65536 submit_bitmap 6-15 start 90112 len 106496: -28
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1444!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 434621 Comm: kworker/u24:8 Tainted: G OE 6.12.0-rc7-custom+ #86
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs]
pc : extent_writepage_io+0x2d4/0x308 [btrfs]
lr : extent_writepage_io+0x2d4/0x308 [btrfs]
Call trace:
extent_writepage_io+0x2d4/0x308 [btrfs]
extent_writepage+0x218/0x330 [btrfs]
extent_write_cache_pages+0x1d4/0x4b0 [btrfs]
btrfs_writepages+0x94/0x150 [btrfs]
do_writepages+0x74/0x190
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x88/0xc8
start_delalloc_inodes+0x180/0x3b0 [btrfs]
btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x174/0x280 [btrfs]
shrink_delalloc+0x114/0x280 [btrfs]
flush_space+0x250/0x2f8 [btrfs]
btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x180/0x228 [btrfs]
process_one_work+0x164/0x408
worker_thread+0x25c/0x388
kthread+0x100/0x118
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Code: aa1403e1 9402f3ef aa1403e0 9402f36f (d4210000)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[CAUSE]
That failure is mostly from cow_file_range(), where we can hit -ENOSPC.
Although the -ENOSPC is already a bug related to our space reservation
code, let's just focus on the error handling.
For example, we have the following dirty range [0, 64K) of an inode,
with 4K sector size and 4K page size:
0 16K 32K 48K 64K
|///////////////////////////////////////|
|#######################################|
Where |///| means page are still dirty, and |###| means the extent io
tree has EXTENT_DELALLOC flag.
- Enter extent_writepage() for page 0
- Enter btrfs_run_delalloc_range() for range [0, 64K)
- Enter cow_file_range() for range [0, 64K)
- Function btrfs_reserve_extent() only reserved one 16K extent
So we created extent map and ordered extent for range [0, 16K)
0 16K 32K 48K 64K
|////////|//////////////////////////////|
|<- OE ->|##############################|
And range [0, 16K) has its delalloc flag cleared.
But since we haven't yet submit any bio, involved 4 pages are still
dirty.
- Function btrfs_reserve_extent() returns with -ENOSPC
Now we have to run error cleanup, which will clear all
EXTENT_DELALLOC* flags and clear the dirty flags for the remaining
ranges:
0 16K 32K 48K 64K
|////////| |
| | |
Note that range [0, 16K) still has its pages dirty.
- Some time later, writeback is triggered again for the range [0, 16K)
since the page range still has dirty flags.
- btrfs_run_delalloc_range() will do nothing because there is no
EXTENT_DELALLOC flag.
- extent_writepage_io() finds page 0 has no ordered flag
Which falls into the COW fixup path, triggering the BUG_ON().
Unfortunately this error handling bug dates back to the introduction of
btrfs. Thankfully with the abuse of COW fixup, at least it won't crash
the kernel.
[FIX]
Instead of immediately unlocking the extent and folios, we keep the extent
and folios locked until either erroring out or the whole delalloc range
finished.
When the whole delalloc range finished without error, we just unlock the
whole range with PAGE_SET_ORDERED (and PAGE_UNLOCK for !keep_locked
cases)
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: do proper folio cleanup when run_delalloc_nocow() failed
[BUG]
With CONFIG_DEBUG_VM set, test case generic/476 has some chance to crash
with the following VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO():
BTRFS error (device dm-3): cow_file_range failed, start 1146880 end 1253375 len 106496 ret -28
BTRFS error (device dm-3): run_delalloc_nocow failed, start 1146880 end 1253375 len 106496 ret -28
page: refcount:4 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000592787cc index:0x12 pfn:0x10664
aops:btrfs_aops [btrfs] ino:101 dentry name(?):"f1774"
flags: 0x2fffff80004028(uptodate|lru|private|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0xfffff)
page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_locked(folio))
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/page-writeback.c:2992!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 3943513 Comm: kworker/u24:15 Tainted: G OE 6.12.0-rc7-custom+ #87
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS unknown 2/2/2022
Workqueue: events_unbound btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space [btrfs]
pc : folio_clear_dirty_for_io+0x128/0x258
lr : folio_clear_dirty_for_io+0x128/0x258
Call trace:
folio_clear_dirty_for_io+0x128/0x258
btrfs_folio_clamp_clear_dirty+0x80/0xd0 [btrfs]
__process_folios_contig+0x154/0x268 [btrfs]
extent_clear_unlock_delalloc+0x5c/0x80 [btrfs]
run_delalloc_nocow+0x5f8/0x760 [btrfs]
btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0xa8/0x220 [btrfs]
writepage_delalloc+0x230/0x4c8 [btrfs]
extent_writepage+0xb8/0x358 [btrfs]
extent_write_cache_pages+0x21c/0x4e8 [btrfs]
btrfs_writepages+0x94/0x150 [btrfs]
do_writepages+0x74/0x190
filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x88/0xc8
start_delalloc_inodes+0x178/0x3a8 [btrfs]
btrfs_start_delalloc_roots+0x174/0x280 [btrfs]
shrink_delalloc+0x114/0x280 [btrfs]
flush_space+0x250/0x2f8 [btrfs]
btrfs_async_reclaim_data_space+0x180/0x228 [btrfs]
process_one_work+0x164/0x408
worker_thread+0x25c/0x388
kthread+0x100/0x118
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Code: 910a8021 a90363f7 a9046bf9 94012379 (d4210000)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[CAUSE]
The first two lines of extra debug messages show the problem is caused
by the error handling of run_delalloc_nocow().
E.g. we have the following dirtied range (4K blocksize 4K page size):
0 16K 32K
|//////////////////////////////////////|
| Pre-allocated |
And the range [0, 16K) has a preallocated extent.
- Enter run_delalloc_nocow() for range [0, 16K)
Which found range [0, 16K) is preallocated, can do the proper NOCOW
write.
- Enter fallback_to_fow() for range [16K, 32K)
Since the range [16K, 32K) is not backed by preallocated extent, we
have to go COW.
- cow_file_range() failed for range [16K, 32K)
So cow_file_range() will do the clean up by clearing folio dirty,
unlock the folios.
Now the folios in range [16K, 32K) is unlocked.
- Enter extent_clear_unlock_delalloc() from run_delalloc_nocow()
Which is called with PAGE_START_WRITEBACK to start page writeback.
But folios can only be marked writeback when it's properly locked,
thus this triggered the VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO().
Furthermore there is another hidden but common bug that
run_delalloc_nocow() is not clearing the folio dirty flags in its error
handling path.
This is the common bug shared between run_delalloc_nocow() and
cow_file_range().
[FIX]
- Clear folio dirty for range [@start, @cur_offset)
Introduce a helper, cleanup_dirty_folios(), which
will find and lock the folio in the range, clear the dirty flag and
start/end the writeback, with the extra handling for the
@locked_folio.
- Introduce a helper to clear folio dirty, start and end writeback
- Introduce a helper to record the last failed COW range end
This is to trace which range we should skip, to avoid double
unlocking.
- Skip the failed COW range for the e
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rdma/cxgb4: Prevent potential integer overflow on 32bit
The "gl->tot_len" variable is controlled by the user. It comes from
process_responses(). On 32bit systems, the "gl->tot_len + sizeof(struct
cpl_pass_accept_req) + sizeof(struct rss_header)" addition could have an
integer wrapping bug. Use size_add() to prevent this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir"
The current directory offset allocator (based on mtree_alloc_cyclic)
stores the next offset value to return in octx->next_offset. This
mechanism typically returns values that increase monotonically over
time. Eventually, though, the newly allocated offset value wraps
back to a low number (say, 2) which is smaller than other already-
allocated offset values.
Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com> reports that, after commit 64a7ce76fb90
("libfs: fix infinite directory reads for offset dir"), if a
directory's offset allocator wraps, existing entries are no longer
visible via readdir/getdents because offset_readdir() stops listing
entries once an entry's offset is larger than octx->next_offset.
These entries vanish persistently -- they can be looked up, but will
never again appear in readdir(3) output.
The reason for this is that the commit treats directory offsets as
monotonically increasing integer values rather than opaque cookies,
and introduces this comparison:
if (dentry2offset(dentry) >= last_index) {
On 64-bit platforms, the directory offset value upper bound is
2^63 - 1. Directory offsets will monotonically increase for millions
of years without wrapping.
On 32-bit platforms, however, LONG_MAX is 2^31 - 1. The allocator
can wrap after only a few weeks (at worst).
Revert commit 64a7ce76fb90 ("libfs: fix infinite directory reads for
offset dir") to prepare for a fix that can work properly on 32-bit
systems and might apply to recent LTS kernels where shmem employs
the simple_offset mechanism. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_set_pipapo: fix initial map fill
The initial buffer has to be inited to all-ones, but it must restrict
it to the size of the first field, not the total field size.
After each round in the map search step, the result and the fill map
are swapped, so if we have a set where f->bsize of the first element
is smaller than m->bsize_max, those one-bits are leaked into future
rounds result map.
This makes pipapo find an incorrect matching results for sets where
first field size is not the largest.
Followup patch adds a test case to nft_concat_range.sh selftest script.
Thanks to Stefano Brivio for pointing out that we need to zero out
the remainder explicitly, only correcting memset() argument isn't enough. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: mm: Fix the out of bound issue of vmemmap address
In sparse vmemmap model, the virtual address of vmemmap is calculated as:
((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - (phys_ram_base >> PAGE_SHIFT)).
And the struct page's va can be calculated with an offset:
(vmemmap + (pfn)).
However, when initializing struct pages, kernel actually starts from the
first page from the same section that phys_ram_base belongs to. If the
first page's physical address is not (phys_ram_base >> PAGE_SHIFT), then
we get an va below VMEMMAP_START when calculating va for it's struct page.
For example, if phys_ram_base starts from 0x82000000 with pfn 0x82000, the
first page in the same section is actually pfn 0x80000. During
init_unavailable_range(), we will initialize struct page for pfn 0x80000
with virtual address ((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - 0x2000), which is
below VMEMMAP_START as well as PCI_IO_END.
This commit fixes this bug by introducing a new variable
'vmemmap_start_pfn' which is aligned with memory section size and using
it to calculate vmemmap address instead of phys_ram_base. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/bnxt_re: Fix max SGEs for the Work Request
Gen P7 supports up to 13 SGEs for now. WQE software structure
can hold only 6 now. Since the max send sge is reported as
13, the stack can give requests up to 13 SGEs. This is causing
traffic failures and system crashes.
Use the define for max SGE supported for variable size. This
will work for both static and variable WQEs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: guard XDP xmit NDO on existence of xdp queues
In GVE, dedicated XDP queues only exist when an XDP program is installed
and the interface is up. As such, the NDO XDP XMIT callback should
return early if either of these conditions are false.
In the case of no loaded XDP program, priv->num_xdp_queues=0 which can
cause a divide-by-zero error, and in the case of interface down,
num_xdp_queues remains untouched to persist XDP queue count for the next
interface up, but the TX pointer itself would be NULL.
The XDP xmit callback also needs to synchronize with a device
transitioning from open to close. This synchronization will happen via
the GVE_PRIV_FLAGS_NAPI_ENABLED bit along with a synchronize_net() call,
which waits for any RCU critical sections at call-time to complete. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm array: fix releasing a faulty array block twice in dm_array_cursor_end
When dm_bm_read_lock() fails due to locking or checksum errors, it
releases the faulty block implicitly while leaving an invalid output
pointer behind. The caller of dm_bm_read_lock() should not operate on
this invalid dm_block pointer, or it will lead to undefined result.
For example, the dm_array_cursor incorrectly caches the invalid pointer
on reading a faulty array block, causing a double release in
dm_array_cursor_end(), then hitting the BUG_ON in dm-bufio cache_put().
Reproduce steps:
1. initialize a cache device
dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0"
dmsetup create cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/sdc 8192"
dmsetup create corig --table "0 524288 linear /dev/sdc $262144"
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/cmeta bs=4k count=1
dmsetup create cache --table "0 524288 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0"
2. wipe the second array block offline
dmsteup remove cache cmeta cdata corig
mapping_root=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=192 \
2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"')
ablock=$(dd if=/dev/sdc bs=1c count=8 skip=$((4096*mapping_root+2056)) \
2>/dev/null | hexdump -e '1/8 "%u\n"')
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdc bs=4k count=1 seek=$ablock
3. try reopen the cache device
dmsetup create cmeta --table "0 8192 linear /dev/sdc 0"
dmsetup create cdata --table "0 65536 linear /dev/sdc 8192"
dmsetup create corig --table "0 524288 linear /dev/sdc $262144"
dmsetup create cache --table "0 524288 cache /dev/mapper/cmeta \
/dev/mapper/cdata /dev/mapper/corig 128 2 metadata2 writethrough smq 0"
Kernel logs:
(snip)
device-mapper: array: array_block_check failed: blocknr 0 != wanted 10
device-mapper: block manager: array validator check failed for block 10
device-mapper: array: get_ablock failed
device-mapper: cache metadata: dm_array_cursor_next for mapping failed
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm-bufio.c:638!
Fix by setting the cached block pointer to NULL on errors.
In addition to the reproducer described above, this fix can be
verified using the "array_cursor/damaged" test in dm-unit:
dm-unit run /pdata/array_cursor/damaged --kernel-dir <KERNEL_DIR> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Add a lock when accessing the buddy trim function
When running YouTube videos and Steam games simultaneously,
the tester found a system hang / race condition issue with
the multi-display configuration setting. Adding a lock to
the buddy allocator's trim function would be the solution.
<log snip>
[ 7197.250436] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000108
[ 7197.250447] RIP: 0010:__alloc_range+0x8b/0x340 [amddrm_buddy]
[ 7197.250470] Call Trace:
[ 7197.250472] <TASK>
[ 7197.250475] ? show_regs+0x6d/0x80
[ 7197.250481] ? die_addr+0x37/0xa0
[ 7197.250483] ? exc_general_protection+0x1db/0x480
[ 7197.250488] ? drm_suballoc_new+0x13c/0x93d [drm_suballoc_helper]
[ 7197.250493] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30
[ 7197.250498] ? __alloc_range+0x8b/0x340 [amddrm_buddy]
[ 7197.250501] ? __alloc_range+0x109/0x340 [amddrm_buddy]
[ 7197.250506] amddrm_buddy_block_trim+0x1b5/0x260 [amddrm_buddy]
[ 7197.250511] amdgpu_vram_mgr_new+0x4f5/0x590 [amdgpu]
[ 7197.250682] amdttm_resource_alloc+0x46/0xb0 [amdttm]
[ 7197.250689] ttm_bo_alloc_resource+0xe4/0x370 [amdttm]
[ 7197.250696] amdttm_bo_validate+0x9d/0x180 [amdttm]
[ 7197.250701] amdgpu_bo_pin+0x15a/0x2f0 [amdgpu]
[ 7197.250831] amdgpu_dm_plane_helper_prepare_fb+0xb2/0x360 [amdgpu]
[ 7197.251025] ? try_wait_for_completion+0x59/0x70
[ 7197.251030] drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes.part.0+0x2f/0x1e0
[ 7197.251035] drm_atomic_helper_prepare_planes+0x5d/0x70
[ 7197.251037] drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x84/0x160
[ 7197.251040] drm_atomic_nonblocking_commit+0x59/0x70
[ 7197.251043] drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x720/0x850
[ 7197.251047] ? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10
[ 7197.251049] drm_ioctl_kernel+0xb9/0x120
[ 7197.251053] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 7197.251056] drm_ioctl+0x2d4/0x550
[ 7197.251058] ? __pfx_drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x10/0x10
[ 7197.251063] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4e/0x90 [amdgpu]
[ 7197.251186] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xa0/0xf0
[ 7197.251190] x64_sys_call+0x143b/0x25c0
[ 7197.251193] do_syscall_64+0x7f/0x180
[ 7197.251197] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 7197.251199] ? amdgpu_display_user_framebuffer_create+0x215/0x320 [amdgpu]
[ 7197.251329] ? drm_internal_framebuffer_create+0xb7/0x1a0
[ 7197.251332] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
(cherry picked from commit 3318ba94e56b9183d0304577c74b33b6b01ce516) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: fix page fault due to max surface definition mismatch
DC driver is using two different values to define the maximum number of
surfaces: MAX_SURFACES and MAX_SURFACE_NUM. Consolidate MAX_SURFACES as
the unique definition for surface updates across DC.
It fixes page fault faced by Cosmic users on AMD display versions that
support two overlay planes, since the introduction of cursor overlay
mode.
[Nov26 21:33] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000051d0f08b
[ +0.000015] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ +0.000006] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ +0.000005] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ +0.000007] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ +0.000006] CPU: 4 PID: 71 Comm: kworker/u32:6 Not tainted 6.10.0+ #300
[ +0.000006] Hardware name: Valve Jupiter/Jupiter, BIOS F7A0131 01/30/2024
[ +0.000007] Workqueue: events_unbound commit_work [drm_kms_helper]
[ +0.000040] RIP: 0010:copy_stream_update_to_stream.isra.0+0x30d/0x750 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000847] Code: 8b 10 49 89 94 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8b 50 08 49 89 94 24 00 01 00 00 8b 40 10 41 89 84 24 08 01 00 00 49 8b 45 78 48 85 c0 74 0b <0f> b6 00 41 88 84 24 90 64 00 00 49 8b 45 60 48 85 c0 74 3b 48 8b
[ +0.000010] RSP: 0018:ffffc203802f79a0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ +0.000009] RAX: 0000000051d0f08b RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: ffff9f964f0a8070
[ +0.000004] RDX: ffff9f9710f90e40 RSI: ffff9f96600c8000 RDI: ffff9f964f000000
[ +0.000004] RBP: ffffc203802f79f8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000005] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f96600c8000
[ +0.000004] R13: ffff9f9710f90e40 R14: ffff9f964f000000 R15: ffff9f96600c8000
[ +0.000004] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f9970000000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000005] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000005] CR2: 0000000051d0f08b CR3: 00000002e6a20000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ +0.000005] Call Trace:
[ +0.000011] <TASK>
[ +0.000010] ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
[ +0.000012] ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x2d0
[ +0.000014] ? exc_page_fault+0x7e/0x180
[ +0.000009] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[ +0.000013] ? copy_stream_update_to_stream.isra.0+0x30d/0x750 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000739] ? dc_commit_state_no_check+0xd6c/0xe70 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000470] update_planes_and_stream_state+0x49b/0x4f0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000450] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000009] ? commit_minimal_transition_state+0x239/0x3d0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000446] update_planes_and_stream_v2+0x24a/0x590 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000464] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000009] ? sort+0x31/0x50
[ +0.000007] ? amdgpu_dm_atomic_commit_tail+0x159f/0x3a30 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000508] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000009] ? amdgpu_crtc_get_scanout_position+0x28/0x40 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000377] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000009] ? drm_crtc_vblank_helper_get_vblank_timestamp_internal+0x160/0x390 [drm]
[ +0.000058] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? dma_fence_default_wait+0x8c/0x260
[ +0.000010] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? wait_for_completion_timeout+0x13b/0x170
[ +0.000006] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f
[ +0.000005] ? dma_fence_wait_timeout+0x108/0x140
[ +0.000010] ? commit_tail+0x94/0x130 [drm_kms_helper]
[ +0.000024] ? process_one_work+0x177/0x330
[ +0.000008] ? worker_thread+0x266/0x3a0
[ +0.000006] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000004] ? kthread+0xd2/0x100
[ +0.000006] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000006] ? ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
[ +0.000004] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ +0.000005] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ +0.000011] </TASK>
(cherry picked from commit 1c86c81a86c60f9b15d3e3f43af0363cf56063e7) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix vlan_get_tci() vs MSG_PEEK
Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.
Rework vlan_get_tci() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.
Add a const qualifier to skb argument.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8da482 len:32 put:14 head:ffff88807a1d5800 data:ffff88807a1d5810 tail:0x14 end:0x140 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5880 Comm: syz-executor172 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3-syzkaller-00762-g9268abe611b0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 9e 6c 26 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 3a 5a 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003baf5b8 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 8565c1eec37aa000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802616fb50 R08: ffffffff817f0a4c R09: 1ffff92000775e50
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52000775e51 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807a1d5800 R14: ffff88807a1d5810 R15: 0000000000000014
FS: 00007fa03261f6c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffd65753000 CR3: 0000000031720000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
vlan_get_tci+0x272/0x550 net/packet/af_packet.c:565
packet_recvmsg+0x13c9/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3616
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1066
____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2814
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2856 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2951
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3025 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3048 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3041
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: fix vlan_get_protocol_dgram() vs MSG_PEEK
Blamed commit forgot MSG_PEEK case, allowing a crash [1] as found
by syzbot.
Rework vlan_get_protocol_dgram() to not touch skb at all,
so that it can be used from many cpus on the same skb.
Add a const qualifier to skb argument.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8a8ccd05 len:29 put:14 head:ffff88807fc8e400 data:ffff88807fc8e3f4 tail:0x11 end:0x140 dev:<NULL>
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:206 !
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5892 Comm: syz-executor883 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-syzkaller-00054-gd6ef8b40d075 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024
RIP: 0010:skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:206 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_under_panic+0x14b/0x150 net/core/skbuff.c:216
Code: 0b 8d 48 c7 c6 86 d5 25 8e 48 8b 54 24 08 8b 0c 24 44 8b 44 24 04 4d 89 e9 50 41 54 41 57 41 56 e8 5a 69 79 f7 48 83 c4 20 90 <0f> 0b 0f 1f 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3
RSP: 0018:ffffc900038d7638 EFLAGS: 00010282
RAX: 0000000000000087 RBX: dffffc0000000000 RCX: 609ffd18ea660600
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff88802483c8d0 R08: ffffffff817f0a8c R09: 1ffff9200071ae60
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200071ae61 R12: 0000000000000140
R13: ffff88807fc8e400 R14: ffff88807fc8e3f4 R15: 0000000000000011
FS: 00007fbac5e006c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b8700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fbac5e00d58 CR3: 000000001238e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
skb_push+0xe5/0x100 net/core/skbuff.c:2636
vlan_get_protocol_dgram+0x165/0x290 net/packet/af_packet.c:585
packet_recvmsg+0x948/0x1ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3552
sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1033 [inline]
sock_recvmsg+0x22f/0x280 net/socket.c:1055
____sys_recvmsg+0x1c6/0x480 net/socket.c:2803
___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline]
do_recvmmsg+0x426/0xab0 net/socket.c:2940
__sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3014 [inline]
__do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3037 [inline]
__se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3030 [inline]
__x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3030
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: fix mbss changed flags corruption on 32 bit systems
On 32-bit systems, the size of an unsigned long is 4 bytes,
while a u64 is 8 bytes. Therefore, when using
or_each_set_bit(bit, &bits, sizeof(changed) * BITS_PER_BYTE),
the code is incorrectly searching for a bit in a 32-bit
variable that is expected to be 64 bits in size,
leading to incorrect bit finding.
Solution: Ensure that the size of the bits variable is correctly
adjusted for each architecture.
Call Trace:
? show_regs+0x54/0x58
? __warn+0x6b/0xd4
? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211]
? report_bug+0x113/0x150
? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30
? handle_bug+0x27/0x44
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x50
? handle_exception+0xf6/0xf6
? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30
? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211]
? exc_overflow+0x30/0x30
? ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0xcc/0xd4 [mac80211]
? ieee80211_mesh_work+0xff/0x260 [mac80211]
? cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x72/0x98 [cfg80211]
? process_one_work+0xf1/0x1fc
? worker_thread+0x2c0/0x3b4
? kthread+0xc7/0xf0
? mod_delayed_work_on+0x4c/0x4c
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x14/0x14
? ret_from_fork+0x24/0x38
? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x14/0x14
? ret_from_fork_asm+0xf/0x14
? entry_INT80_32+0xf0/0xf0
[restore no-op path for no changes] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: set ATTR_CTIME flags when setting mtime
David reported that the new warning from setattr_copy_mgtime is coming
like the following.
[ 113.215316] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 113.215974] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31 at fs/attr.c:300 setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.219192] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 31 Comm: kworker/1:1 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc1+ #234
[ 113.220127] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
[ 113.221530] Workqueue: ksmbd-io handle_ksmbd_work [ksmbd]
[ 113.222220] RIP: 0010:setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.222833] Code: 24 28 49 8b 44 24 30 48 89 53 58 89 43 6c 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc 48 89 df e8 77 d6 ff ff e9 cd fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 be fe ff ff 66 0
[ 113.225110] RSP: 0018:ffffaf218010fb68 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 113.225765] RAX: 0000000000000120 RBX: ffffa446815f8568 RCX: 0000000000000003
[ 113.226667] RDX: ffffaf218010fd38 RSI: ffffa446815f8568 RDI: ffffffff94eb03a0
[ 113.227531] RBP: ffffaf218010fb90 R08: 0000001a251e217d R09: 00000000675259fa
[ 113.228426] R10: 0000000002ba8a6d R11: ffffa4468196c7a8 R12: ffffaf218010fd38
[ 113.229304] R13: 0000000000000120 R14: ffffffff94eb03a0 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 113.230210] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa44739d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 113.231215] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 113.232055] CR2: 00007efe0053d27e CR3: 000000000331a000 CR4: 00000000000006b0
[ 113.232926] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 113.233812] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 113.234797] Call Trace:
[ 113.235116] <TASK>
[ 113.235393] ? __warn+0x73/0xd0
[ 113.235802] ? setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.236299] ? report_bug+0xf3/0x1e0
[ 113.236757] ? handle_bug+0x4d/0x90
[ 113.237202] ? exc_invalid_op+0x13/0x60
[ 113.237689] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 113.238185] ? setattr_copy+0x1ee/0x200
[ 113.238692] btrfs_setattr+0x80/0x820 [btrfs]
[ 113.239285] ? get_stack_info_noinstr+0x12/0xf0
[ 113.239857] ? __module_address+0x22/0xa0
[ 113.240368] ? handle_ksmbd_work+0x6e/0x460 [ksmbd]
[ 113.240993] ? __module_text_address+0x9/0x50
[ 113.241545] ? __module_address+0x22/0xa0
[ 113.242033] ? unwind_next_frame+0x10e/0x920
[ 113.242600] ? __pfx_stack_trace_consume_entry+0x10/0x10
[ 113.243268] notify_change+0x2c2/0x4e0
[ 113.243746] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x27/0x730
[ 113.244339] ? set_file_basic_info+0x130/0x2b0 [ksmbd]
[ 113.244993] set_file_basic_info+0x130/0x2b0 [ksmbd]
[ 113.245613] ? process_scheduled_works+0xbe/0x310
[ 113.246181] ? worker_thread+0x100/0x240
[ 113.246696] ? kthread+0xc8/0x100
[ 113.247126] ? ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40
[ 113.247606] ? ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 113.248132] smb2_set_info+0x63f/0xa70 [ksmbd]
ksmbd is trying to set the atime and mtime via notify_change without also
setting the ctime. so This patch add ATTR_CTIME flags when setting mtime
to avoid a warning. |
