| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| JupyterLab is an extensible environment for interactive and reproducible computing, based on the Jupyter Notebook Architecture. From 4.0.0 to 4.5.6, the allow-list of extensions that can be installed from PyPI Extension Manager (allowed_extensions_uris) is not correctly enforced by JupyterLab. The PyPI Extension Manager was not contained to packages listed on the default PyPI index. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.7. |
| xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) `DOMParser` and `XMLSerializer` module. In @xmldom/xmldom prior to versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13 and xmldom version 0.6.0 and prior, the package allows attacker-controlled processing instruction data to be serialized into XML without validating or neutralizing the PI-closing sequence ?>. As a result, an attacker can terminate the processing instruction early and inject arbitrary XML nodes into the serialized output. This issue has been patched in versions @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.9.10 and 0.8.13. |
| When an SSH server authentication callback returned PartialSuccessError with non-nil Permissions, those permissions were silently discarded, potentially dropping certificate restrictions such as force-command after a second factor succeeded. Returning non-nil Permissions with PartialSuccessError now results in a connection error. |
| Jupyter Server is the backend for Jupyter web applications. In versions 2.17.0 and earlier, a path traversal vulnerability in the REST API allows an authenticated user to escape the configured root_dir and access sibling directories whose names begin with the same prefix as the root_dir. For example, with a root_dir named "test", the API permits access to a sibling directory named "testtest" through a crafted request to the /api/contents endpoint using encoded path components. An attacker can read, write, and delete files in affected sibling directories. Multi-tenant deployments using predictable naming schemes are particularly at risk, as a user with a directory named "user1" could access directories for user10 through user19 and beyond. A user who can choose a single-character folder name could gain access to a significant number of sibling directories.
Version 2.18.0 contains a fix. As a workaround, ensure folder names do not share a common prefix with any sibling directory. |
| In versions 3.0.0a1 through 3.2.0 of Mistune, there is a ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service) vulnerability in `LINK_TITLE_RE` that allows an attacker who can supply Markdown for parsing to cause denial of service. The regular expression used for parsing link titles contains overlapping alternatives that can trigger catastrophic backtracking. In both the double-quoted and single-quoted branches, a backslash followed by punctuation can be matched either as an escaped punctuation sequence or as two ordinary characters, creating an ambiguous pattern inside a repeated group. If an attacker supplies Markdown containing repeated ! sequences with no closing quote, the regex engine explores an exponential number of backtracking paths. This is reachable through normal Markdown parsing of inline links and block link reference definitions. A small crafted input can therefore cause significant CPU consumption and make applications using Mistune unresponsive. |
| If one side of the TLS connection sends multiple key update messages post-handshake in a single record, the connection can deadlock, causing uncontrolled consumption of resources. This can lead to a denial of service. This only affects TLS 1.3. |
| A vulnerability in the `_create_model_version()` handler of `mlflow/server/handlers.py` in mlflow/mlflow versions 3.9.0 and earlier allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to read arbitrary files from the server's filesystem. The issue arises when a `CreateModelVersion` request includes the tag `mlflow.prompt.is_prompt`, which bypasses source path validation. This enables an attacker to store an arbitrary local filesystem path as the model version source. The `get_model_version_artifact_handler()` function later uses this source to serve files without verifying the model version's prompt status, leading to a complete confidentiality compromise. This issue is fixed in version 3.10.0. |
| In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.85, MLS wire decoder allocates attacker-declared opaque length before bounds check. |
| In Eclipse SW360 versions 19.0.0, 19.1.0, 19.2.0, 20.0.0, 20.1.0, if the system is configured to use file system storage with config key enable.attachment.store.to.file.system, the attacker can manipulate the filename upon upload and can essentially cause arbitrary file path traversal.
The immediate workaround is to disable enable.attachment.store.to.file.system or update to fixed versions. |
| An Improper Authorization vulnerability affecting 3DPassport in 3DSwymer from Release 3DEXPERIENCE R2023x through Release 3DEXPERIENCE R2026x could allow an attacker to gain access to some user accounts. |
| An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::Resource.get_class, Resolv::DNS::Resource::Generic.create, and Resolv::DNS::SvcParam::Generic.create generate a new class for each unknown DNS resource record (type, class) pair, or each unknown SvcParamKey, encountered while decoding a response. Each generated class was permanently registered both as a constant on Resource (or SvcParam::Generic) and as an entry in a class-lookup hash (ClassHash), and thus the class remained reachable through that constant after the response was discarded. Type and class are each 16-bit values, and thus an attacker controlling DNS responses (a spoofed response, or a malicious or hijacked upstream DNS server) has roughly 2^32 distinct (type, class) pairs to choose from. A single response of a few hundred kilobytes carrying tens of thousands of distinct unknown types permanently grows process memory by tens of megabytes; repeated responses accumulate without bound and are never reclaimed by garbage collection, because the constant keeps each class alive. Any code path that calls Resolv::DNS::Message.decode on attacker-influenced DNS responses is affected. resolv is a default gem, and thus this is reachable from a plain Ruby installation without any additional dependency. |
| An issue was discovered in the resolv gem before 0.7.2 for Ruby. Resolv::DNS::MessageEncoder wrote a DNS label's length into a single octet without checking its range. A label longer than 255 octets had its length stored modulo 256 but the label data was written unchanged, and thus the bytes on the wire described a different name than the one the application asked to encode. RFC 1035 section 2.3.4 limits a label to 63 octets, and the two high bits of the length octet are reserved for compression pointers. put_string packed the length with put_pack("C", d.length) and put_label used it for labels, and thus any value from 0 to 255 could end up as a label length octet, including the reserved 0x40-0xBF range and the 0xC0-0xFF pointer range. Resolv::DNS::Name.create did not check per-label or total name length either, and thus an attacker-controlled hostname reached the encoder unchanged. An application that resolves an attacker-controlled hostname sends a query whose wire bytes name a domain the attacker chose. A hostname suffix that the application validates against an allowlist becomes padding that never appears on the wire, and thus allowlist and egress checks can be bypassed. The recursive resolver caches the response under the attacker's name, and DNS logs record that name rather than the one the application asked for. A label length whose low octet lands in the 0xC0-0xFF range produces a length octet that conforming parsers read as the start of a compression pointer, with the following attacker-controlled byte as the offset. |
| The proxy middleware in mcp-use's inspector forwards requests to a destination the caller names. mountMcpProxy in libraries/typescript/packages/inspector/src/server/proxy/mcp-proxy.ts read the target from the X-Target-URL header or the __mcp_target parameter and proxied to it without inspecting the host, so loopback, link-local and private addresses were all accepted, as were names that resolve to them, and the validation was not reapplied to a redirect the destination returned. A caller could therefore make the server issue requests to addresses reachable only from the host it runs on and read the responses. The current code calls isSafeProxyTarget, which checks the resolved address against private, loopback and link-local ranges before proxying and bounds the number of redirects followed. |
| The mcp-router CLI served its MCP aggregator on every interface and enforced authentication only when the operator asked for it. The serve command in apps/cli/src/commands/serve.ts defaulted its host to the all-interfaces address on a fixed port, and required a token only when the corresponding flag was supplied, so a default invocation exposed the aggregator, and every MCP server it fronted, to anyone able to reach the port. Release 0.6.3 defaults the host to the loopback address and refuses to start without a token whenever the host it is given is not a loopback address; no earlier release carries either check. |
| ToolUniverse ran caller-supplied Python inside a sandbox that could be escaped, on a server that required no authentication. The executor behind the python_code_executor tool, in python_executor_tool.py, inspected the submitted source for a denied list of attribute names and calls but left the attribute-lookup builtins available and did not stop a dunder attribute reached through a string lookup or through a module already permitted, so a caller could walk from a literal's class to its base and enumerate subclasses to obtain a reference to the process and subprocess modules. A per-call argument also let the caller widen the import allow-list before the inspection ran. The HTTP and MCP servers in http_api_server.py and smcp_server.py bound to every interface with debugging enabled and no authentication, so any caller able to reach the port executed code as the server process. Version 1.3.0 adds bearer-token authentication, defaults the bind address to loopback, and hardens the attribute checks. |
| The execute_ruby tool is documented as a read-only Ruby sandbox and is enforced by a pattern denylist together with replacements for the process-spawning methods on Kernel. The pseudo-terminal library's spawn entry points are neither in the denylist nor replaced, so a normal tool call could reach them and start a shell, executing commands as the account running the server and outside the guarded methods. The denylist was introduced with the tool in 1.4.0 and never covered those entry points through 1.6.0. Version 1.6.1 restricts the requires the sandbox permits to a data-only list and blocks dynamic dispatch to execution entry points; 2.0.0 removes the tool. |
| tiger-slack started its MCP HTTP transport without enabling the host allow-list the underlying SDK provides. mcp/src/httpServer.ts called the shared httpServerFactory helper and never set the DNS-rebinding-protection option, so the transport accepted a request whatever host it named, and a page in a browser could point a name it controlled at the address the server was bound to and drive the locally reachable Slack MCP server through the visitor's browser. The fix passes the option explicitly alongside a dependency update; the update alone would not have closed it. The repository publishes no release that brackets the fix, so the affected boundary is the commit preceding it. |
| The Dash MCP server bound its listener to the loopback address but never checked the host a request named. src/mcp_server_dash.py constructed the server for its network mode with the interface restricted to loopback and no transport-security settings, so a name that had been pointed at the loopback address still reached the listener while carrying the attacker's host name. A page in a visitor's browser could therefore drive the local server and invoke its company-search and file-detail tools under the Dropbox credential the server holds. Only the network mode was reachable this way; the standard input mode was not. The fix supplies transport-security settings that enable host checking and allow only the loopback name and port, rejecting other hosts before a tool runs. The repository publishes no versions, so the affected boundary is the commit preceding the fix. |
| The OpenFaaS gateway registers GET /system/telemetry in gateway/main.go and, when basic_auth is enabled, wraps each administrative /system/* handler in auth.DecorateWithBasicAuth. TelemetryHandler was left out of that wrap block from 0.27.11, which introduced the route, until 0.27.14, which added it. On an affected gateway the route therefore reaches the forwarding proxy with no credential check and returns whatever the configured provider serves for /system/telemetry, so any client that can reach the gateway port can read the provider's telemetry regardless of the basic_auth setting. The exposed content depends on the provider, and covers resource and invocation metrics for faasd and pod or cluster state for faas-netes. |
| In MongoDB Connector for BI, mongodrdl may write a TLS private-key password to standard error when the password is supplied through both the connection URI and the corresponding command-line option. A local user with access to the captured command output and encrypted key file may use the disclosed password to access the associated TLS client key. |
