| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Foxit PDF Editor/Reader does not perform sufficient verification of the JPEG2000 image metadata in the PDF file, which leads to out-of-bounds write in the heap buffer during decoding, potentially causing the program to crash and introducing the risk of arbitrary code execution. |
| SGLang contains an arbitrary code execution vulnerability caused by the ZMQ message decoder unconditionally deserializing PickleWrapper payloads via pickle.loads() in _maybe_unwrap_pickle without type allowlisting or authentication; this vulnerability persists via the msgpack path even when SGLANG_USE_PICKLE_IPC is disabled, and becomes remotely exploitable if data-parallel attention is enabled with a non-loopback --dist-init-addr setting. |
| A use-after-free vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s handling of PDF annotations. Reentrant annotation deletion triggered by embedded JavaScript can cause the application to access an annotation object after it has been released, resulting in a use-after-free condition and application crash. |
| IBM DataPower Gateway 10.5.0.0 through 10.5.0.22, 10.6.1 through 10.6.6, 10.6.0.0 through 10.6.0.10, and 11.0.0.0 through 11.0.0.2 could allow a remote attacker to bypass authentication by forging valid JSON Web Signatures due to improper verification of cryptographic signatures. |
| A use-after-free vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s JavaScript handling of PDF annotations. Reentrant page-event processing during annotation enumeration may release the associated page object, which is subsequently accessed, resulting in an application crash. |
| A heap-based out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s rendering of Circle annotations with malformed Cloudy appearance streams in specially crafted PDF files. Insufficient validation of the appearance geometry can result in memory corruption and application crashes. |
| A heap-based out-of-bounds write vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader’s WebP image decoding due to improper handling of bitmap stride and target buffer formats. Successful exploitation could result in an application crash. |
| A path traversal vulnerability exists in Foxit PDF Editor/Reader's handling of embedded PDF resources. Insufficient validation of resource file paths may allow files to be written outside their intended locations, potentially enabling arbitrary code execution. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.10, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, offscreen rendering frame data received from the GPU process was not fully validated by the main process. A compromised GPU process could cause the main process to read out-of-bounds memory while producing paint event images, disclosing memory or crashing the app. This issue is fixed in 39.8.10, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.7, 40.9.0, 41.2.0, and 42.0.0-beta.1, serial-port and media permission checks made from an iframe passed the top-level frame origin to session.setPermissionCheckHandler instead of the requesting iframe origin. Origin-based handler logic could grant a cross-origin iframe device access intended only for the top-level origin. This issue is fixed in 39.8.7, 40.9.0, 41.2.0, and 42.0.0-beta.1. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, the native autofill popup could be positioned by a cross-origin iframe outside that iframe's bounds, over the embedding page's UI, enabling clickjacking or spoofing of trusted UI. Apps are only affected if they embed untrusted content in iframes within windows that also display trusted UI. Apps that do not embed untrusted third-party content are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.2, and 42.0.0-beta.5, apps that expose Promise-returning functions to web content via contextBridge may be vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. Untrusted web content could obtain access to the isolated preload world and, through it, every capability the preload script has. In renderers without a sandbox, or with nodeIntegration enabled, this may escalate to Node.js access. Apps are affected if they expose Promise-returning functions via contextBridge, the standard pattern for wrapping ipcRenderer.invoke, in windows that load untrusted content. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.9, 40.9.2, 41.2.2, and 42.0.0-beta.5. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, extension tab and scripting APIs were not scoped to the extension's own session. A malicious or compromised extension loaded into one session could navigate, script, and read from windows belonging to a different session. Apps are only affected if they load Chrome extensions via session.loadExtension and rely on separate sessions to isolate that extension from other content. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.6, 40.9.0, 41.1.1, and 42.0.0-beta.1, shell.openPath() did not reject paths containing embedded null bytes. Apps that perform string-only validation of file paths, for example checking the file extension, before passing them to shell.openPath() could be bypassed, allowing an attacker-controlled path to open a different file than the one that passed validation. Apps are only affected if they pass paths derived from untrusted input to shell.openPath() and rely on string-based validation without a filesystem check. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.6, 40.9.0, 41.1.1, and 42.0.0-beta.1. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.10, 40.9.3, 41.4.0, and 42.0.0, a custom scheme registered with supportFetchAPI: true but without corsEnabled: true was not subject to CORS enforcement. A page loaded from a remote origin could therefore fetch() or XMLHttpRequest that scheme cross-origin and read the full response body, rather than the read being blocked. Apps that serve sensitive data from such a scheme and load remote or untrusted content in a renderer are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.10, 40.9.3, 41.4.0, and 42.0.0. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, when following HTTP redirects, net.fetch() and net.request() did not restrict which schemes a redirect could target. A remote server could redirect a request to a local resource, and if the app returns or forwards the response body, local file contents could be disclosed. Apps are only affected if they make net requests to attacker-influenced URLs with redirects followed and expose the response body. This issue is fixed in versions 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 40.10.6, 41.9.1, 42.5.1, and 43.0.0, when a custom protocol handler returned a ProtocolResponse with a url and no session, Electron made the upstream request through defaultSession instead of the session that handled the protocol. A cached response could then be reused across otherwise isolated session partitions. Apps that use ProtocolResponse.url, omit ProtocolResponse.session, and rely on separate sessions to isolate content are affected. This issue is fixed in versions 40.10.6, 41.9.1, 42.5.1, and 43.0.0. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3, some window options supplied by web content in the window.open() features string were applied to the new BrowserWindow without an allowlist. Untrusted content could set window options it should not control, including options that cause the main process to access attacker-chosen file or network paths, when untrusted content can call window.open() and the app does not override child window options via setWindowOpenHandler or overrideBrowserWindowOptions. This issue is fixed in 39.8.8, 40.9.0, 41.2.1, and 42.0.0-beta.3. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.10, 41.10.3, and 42.0.1, a sandboxed iframe without the allow-popups keyword could still open a new window or trigger setWindowOpenHandler with no user interaction because new-window navigations taking the OpenURL path did not apply the iframe sandbox popup restriction. Apps that embed untrusted content in sandboxed iframes and rely on the absence of allow-popups to prevent window creation are affected, while apps that deny window creation in setWindowOpenHandler or do not embed untrusted content in sandboxed iframes are not affected. This issue is fixed in 39.8.10, 41.10.3, and 42.0.1. |
| Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. Prior to 39.8.7, 40.9.0, 41.2.0, and 42.0.0-beta.1, the mode option of webContents.openDevTools() was not sanitized before use by the DevTools frontend. If an attacker can influence this value, script under their control may run in the DevTools context, which in unsandboxed configurations has access to Node.js, including when untrusted input reaches the mode argument of openDevTools() or untrusted content calls openDevTools() on a webview it embeds. This issue is fixed in 39.8.7, 40.9.0, 41.2.0, and 42.0.0-beta.1. |
