| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. Versions prior to 3.2.10, 3.3.12 and 3.4.13 contain a heap out-of-bounds write in Imf_4_0::SampleCountChannel::set(int r, unsigned int newNumSamples[]). The row-based sample-count setter computes the target Y coordinate with dataWindow.min.x instead of dataWindow.min.y. For a valid deep image data window where min.x != min.y, a valid row index can be translated into an invalid Y coordinate, causing writes before the allocated _numSamples buffer. The vulnerability is reachable through the public OpenEXRUtil DeepImage API and can lead to heap corruption and process crashes. This issue has been fixed in versions 3.2.10, 3.3.12 and 3.4.13. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Remote Desktop Client allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Multiple DrayTek VigorSwitch models contain a buffer overflow vulnerability in the diag_logmail function. The vulnerability is caused by concatenating multiple smtpReceiver email addresses into a fixed-size buffer without checking the remaining buffer size. A remote attacker can trigger this vulnerability via crafted input, causing a denial of service or potentially executing arbitrary commands. Exploitation requires valid administrative credentials for the device's web management interface. |
| Dool in versions up to 1.3.8 is vulnerable to a CSV injection vulnerability when exporting data to a CSV file, as it fails to sanitize cell content beginning with special formula characters like =, +, -, or @. A local attacker can exploit this by running a process with a crafted name starting with =, which injects malicious formulas into the CSV output that execute when a victim opens the file in a spreadsheet application.
The issue was addressed by pull request #117 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Ensure index for read/write regions are within range
The introduction of the capability chain rightly clamped the
region indexes to the range of the capabilities itself, but
neglected to do so for the existing read/write regions which
should also be enforced. |
| Multiple flaws have been identified in `named` related to the handling of DNS messages whose CLASS is not Internet (`IN`) — for example, `CHAOS` or `HESIOD`, or DNS messages that specify meta-classes (`ANY` or `NONE`) in the question section. Specially crafted requests reaching the affected code paths — recursion, dynamic updates (`UPDATE`), zone change notifications (`NOTIFY`), or processing of `IN`-specific record types in non-`IN` data — can cause assertion failures in `named`.
This issue affects BIND 9 versions 9.11.0 through 9.16.50, 9.18.0 through 9.18.48, 9.20.0 through 9.20.22, 9.21.0 through 9.21.21, 9.11.3-S1 through 9.16.50-S1, 9.18.11-S1 through 9.18.48-S1, and 9.20.9-S1 through 9.20.22-S1. |
| url.Parse insufficiently validated the host/authority component and accepted some invalid URLs. |
| Improper isolation of shared resources within the CPU operation cache on Zen 2-based products could allow an attacker to corrupt instructions executed at a different privilege level, potentially resulting in privilege escalation. |
| Buffer overflow in ANGLE in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Buffer overflow in ANGLE in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in WMM_param_handler()
WMM_param_handler() copies a fixed-size WMM parameter element out of a
received information element without checking that the element is long
enough, causing an out-of-bounds read for a short WMM IE.
The handler reads sizeof(struct WMM_para_element) (18) bytes at
pIE->data + 6, so it requires pIE->length to be at least 24
(WLAN_WMM_LEN), but it never validates the length. Two of its three
callers reach it after matching only the WMM OUI: OnAssocRsp() in
rtw_mlme_ext.c matches a 6-byte OUI, and join_cmd_hdl() matches a
4-byte OUI, before calling the handler. A vendor-specific IE carrying
the WMM OUI but a length between 6 and 23, placed in an association
response or in the IE blob handed to join_cmd_hdl(), passes the OUI
check and then makes the memcmp() and memcpy() at pIE->data + 6 read
past the end of the element. OnAssocRsp() parses a frame received from
the AP, so this is reachable from a remote peer.
The remaining caller in rtw_wlan_util.c already guards the handler with
"pIE->length == WLAN_WMM_LEN". Move the equivalent check into the
handler itself so every caller is covered; the sibling IE handlers in
the same parsing loop (HT_caps_handler(), HT_info_handler(),
ERP_IE_handler()) likewise bound their accesses by pIE->length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: reject negative CO-RE accessor indices in bpf_core_parse_spec()
CO-RE accessor strings are colon-separated indices that describe a path
from a root BTF type to a target field, e.g. "0:1:2" walks through
nested struct members. bpf_core_parse_spec() parses each component with
sscanf("%d"), so negative values like -1 are silently accepted. The
subsequent bounds checks (access_idx >= btf_vlen(t)) only guard the
upper bound and always pass for negative values because C integer
promotion converts the __u16 btf_vlen result to int, making the
comparison (int)(-1) >= (int)(N) false for any positive N.
When -1 reaches btf_member_bit_offset() it gets cast to u32 0xffffffff,
producing an out-of-bounds read far past the members array. A crafted
BPF program with a negative CO-RE accessor on any struct that exists in
vmlinux BTF (e.g. task_struct) crashes the kernel deterministically
during BPF_PROG_LOAD on any system with CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y
(default on major distributions). The bug is reachable with CAP_BPF:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed11818b6626
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 85 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6 #18 PREEMPT(full)
RIP: 0010:bpf_core_parse_spec (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:354)
RAX: 00000000ffffffff
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bpf_core_calc_relo_insn (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:1321)
bpf_core_apply (kernel/bpf/btf.c:9507)
check_core_relo (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:19475)
bpf_check (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:26031)
bpf_prog_load (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3089)
__sys_bpf (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6228)
</TASK>
CO-RE accessor indices are inherently non-negative (struct member index,
array element index, or enumerator index), so reject them immediately
after parsing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP
TLS expects that it owns the receive queue of the TCP socket.
This cannot be guaranteed in case the reader of the TCP socket
entered before the TLS ULP was installed, or uses some non-standard
read API (eg. zerocopy ones). Replace the WARN_ON() and a buggy
early exit (which leaves anchor pointing to a freed skb) with real
error handling. Wipe the parsing state and tell the reader to retry.
We already reload the anchor every time we (re)acquire the socket lock,
so the only condition we need to avoid is an out of bounds read
(not having enough bytes in the socket for previously parsed record len).
If some data was read from under TLS but there's enough in the queue
we'll reload and decrypt what is most likely not a valid TLS record.
Leading to some undefined behavior from TLS perspective (corrupting
a stream? missing an alert? missing an attack?) but no kernel crash
should take place. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: tegra - fix rctx->cryptlen calculation in tegra_gcm_do_one_req()
Perform rctx->cryptlen calculation in tegra_gcm_do_one_req() the same way
it is done in tegra_ccm_crypt_init(). The current formulae may lead to a
crash if a caller does not call tegra_gcm_setauthsize() and so ctx->authsize
remains zero. Then a decrypt operation with incorrect rctx->cryptlen will
lead to a write beyound rctx->dst_sg buffer.
As a follow-up cleanup delete struct tegra_aead_ctx->authsize field since
it appears to be completely unused. Also simplify tegra_ccm_setauthsize()
and tegra_gcm_setauthsize() functions respectively. |
| GNU gzip contains a global buffer overflow vulnerability in the LZH decompression logic caused by improper reuse of shared global state between different decompression formats within a single execution. GNU gzip maintains a global array that is shared across the LZ77, LZW, and LZH decompression routines and is not reinitialized between files processed in the same invocation.
By decompressing a specially crafted LZW file followed by a specially crafted LZH file in a single gzip -d command, an attacker can poison the shared global state and subsequently trigger an out‑of‑bounds read in the LZH decoder. The LZH decompression logic follows stale values left in the shared array, causing reads past the end of the allocated global buffer.
This issue has been fixed in commits 63dbf6b3b9e6e781df1a6a64e609b10e23969681 and e7378c2d421be6a286922374425680bbe9ad8b7d. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/zcrypt: Improve EP11 CPRB length and overflow checks
The xcrb_msg_to_type6_ep11cprb_msgx() function lacks proper input
validation, creating security vulnerabilities:
1. Missing minimum size validation: The ep11_cprb structure and
subsequent payload fields (pld_tag, pld_lenfmt) are copied from
userspace without verifying sufficient buffer length.
2. Arithmetic overflow in length calculations: CEIL4 alignment could
overflow, bypassing size checks and enabling buffer overflows.
3. The payload is asn1 encoded but the function just uses a simple c
struct overlay to access some fields of the payload.
Fix by using size_t for length calculations, adding U32_MAX boundary
checks after alignment, and validating minimum request size and
minimum reply size before copying from userspace. Do a very simple
asn1 parsing of the payload up to the function value field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: revalidate ihl to prevent out-of-bounds access
While the outer IP header is already pulled into the skb head,
we must be careful and revalidate the embedded headers after
reading them from the skb frags to prevent out-of-bounds
access.
One such place reported by Sashiko is ip_vs_nat_icmp() where
local process can change the ihl field and after
skb_ensure_writable() we can see larger value which is a
problem for the ip_send_check(cih) calls.
Add check to drop the packet if the ihl field is changed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: tas2562: Validate values for volume writes
tas2562_volume_control_put() does not do any validation of the control
value written by userspace, it uses it to look up a value in a fixed
size array which can easily be overflowed and then writes whatever value
it gets back to the device. Add validation that we are loading a value
we have in the array. |
| Improper Validation of Specified Index, Position, or Offset in Input vulnerability in Mitsubishi Electric CNC M800V Series M800VW and M800VS, M80V Series M80V and M80VW, M800 Series M800W and M800S, M80 Series M80 and M80W, E80 Series E80, C80 Series C80, and M700V Series M750VW, M720VW, 730VW, M720VS, M730VS, and M750VS, M70V Series M70V, E70 Series E70 allows a remote attacker to cause an out-of-bounds read, resulting in a denial-of-service condition by sending specially crafted packets to TCP port 683. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_u32: skip hash tables in u32_bind_class()
u32_walk() enumerates both struct tc_u_hnode and struct tc_u_knode
through the walker callback. u32_bind_class() unconditionally casts the
passed fh to tc_u_knode and accesses &n->res, so when fh is actually a
tc_u_hnode, which has no tcf_result member, this results in a
slab-out-of-bounds read of res->classid in tc_cls_bind_class().
The issue can be reproduced with the following commands:
tc qdisc add dev lo root handle 1: hfsc
tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:1 hfsc sc rate 1000kbit
tc filter add dev lo parent 1:1 protocol ip prio 1 u32 match u32 0 0 flowid 1:1
tc class add dev lo parent 1: classid 1:2 hfsc sc rate 2000kbit
Fix this by skipping hash tables via the TC_U32_KEY(handle) check. |
