| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Hold qpair lock when sending NVMe LS reject
qla_nvme_ls_reject_iocb() allocates from and advances the request ring
through __qla2x00_alloc_iocbs() (which assumes the hardware_lock is
held) and qla2x00_start_iocbs() (which advances the ring and rings the
request-in doorbell), but takes no lock itself. Two of its callers
invoke it without the producer lock held:
- qla_nvme_xmt_ls_rsp(), the NVMe-FC .xmt_ls_rsp transport callback, on
its error path, and
- qla2xxx_process_purls_pkt(), run from the purex work/DPC context.
Both use ha->base_qpair, whose qp_lock_ptr is hardware_lock, so they can
run concurrently with normal I/O submission on the base ring and corrupt
the ring producer state, leading to duplicated or dropped commands. The
third caller, qla2xxx_process_purls_iocb(), runs inside
qla24xx_process_response_queue() with the qpair lock already held and is
safe; that is also why the lock cannot be taken inside the helper itself
(it would recursively re-acquire hardware_lock on the response path).
Take qp_lock_ptr around the two unlocked callers and document the helper
as caller-locked. Both run in process context, so spin_lock_irqsave() is
used and nothing in the locked region sleeps. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Clamp MSI-X derived queue counts to avoid truncation
ha->msix_count is u16, but ha->max_req_queues, ha->max_rsp_queues and
ha->max_qpairs are u8. Deriving the queue count as
"ha->max_req_queues = ha->msix_count - 1" therefore truncates: a board
(or a misconfigured/malicious hot-plugged device) advertising 257 MSI-X
vectors yields msix_count - 1 == 256, which truncates to 0. An MSI-X
count of 1 zeroes it as well, and in target mode the subsequent
"ha->max_req_queues--" then underflows 0 to 255.
When the count is 0, qla2x00_alloc_queues() calls
kzalloc_objs(struct req_que *, 0), which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR. That is
not NULL, so the allocation check passes and the following
"ha->req_q_map[0] = req" dereferences ZERO_SIZE_PTR, corrupting memory
or crashing the kernel.
Add qla_calc_queue_count() to clamp the derived value into
[1, QLA_MAX_QUEUES - 1] so it always fits in u8 and is never zero, and
use it at all three derivation sites (qla25xx_iospace_config(),
qla83xx_iospace_config() and qla24xx_enable_msix()). Also guard the
target-mode decrement so it cannot reintroduce a zero (which would in
turn underflow max_qpairs). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Serialize flash version read in reset handler
The "update cache versions without reset" sysfs reset operation (0x20261)
calls get_flash_version(), which reads hardware flash registers, without
holding ha->optrom_mutex. The VPD update path serializes the same call
under optrom_mutex, so this reset path can interleave its flash register
accesses with a concurrent VPD or optrom flash operation and corrupt the
reads.
Hold ha->optrom_mutex across the get_flash_version() call to match the
VPD update path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix cs84xx use-after-free on host teardown
qla84xx_put_chip() drops the last reference to ha->cs84xx and frees it via
__qla84xx_chip_release() without clearing ha->cs84xx. During teardown it ran
before scsi_remove_host(), which is what removes the 84xx_fw_version host
sysfs attribute. A concurrent read of that attribute in the window between
the two calls executes qla24xx_84xx_fw_version_show(), which dereferences
the freed ha->cs84xx, resulting in a use-after-free.
Move qla84xx_put_chip() to after scsi_remove_host() in both
qla2x00_remove_one() and qla2x00_disable_board_on_pci_error(). Once
scsi_remove_host() returns, the sysfs attribute is gone and kernfs has
drained any in-flight show(), so no reader can touch cs84xx; the put still
runs before the host and ha are freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix FCE trace use-after-free during firmware dump
qla2x00_free_fce_trace() freed and cleared ha->fce while holding only
fce_mutex. The firmware-dump consumers qla27xx_fwdt_entry_t264() and
qla25xx_copy_fce() read ha->fce (NULL check followed by a copy of the
buffer) under hardware_lock and never take fce_mutex. A debugfs FCE
disable could therefore free the DMA buffer between a dump's NULL check
and its copy, resulting in a use-after-free.
Unpublish ha->fce under hardware_lock, then release the lock and free
the DMA buffer (dma_free_coherent() may sleep). A concurrent dump either
completes its check and copy with the buffer still valid, or observes
ha->fce == NULL and skips it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Zero mailbox struct in qla2x00_get_firmware_state()
The mbx_cmd_t is allocated on the stack but left uninitialized.
qla2x00_mailbox_command() has several early-return paths (PCI permanent
failure, device failed, EEH busy, ISP abort pending, mailbox access
timeout, purge mbox) that return without writing the input mailbox
registers back into mcp->mb[]. qla2x00_get_firmware_state() then
unconditionally copies mcp->mb[1..6] (and mb[12]) into the caller's
states[] array regardless of the return value.
On such a failure the copied values are uninitialized kernel stack
memory, which is then exposed to userspace via the fw_state and
mpi_fw_state sysfs handlers. Zero the mailbox struct so a failed query
yields deterministic zeroed state instead of leaking stack contents. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Fix FCE trace enable parsing in debugfs
qla2x00_dfs_fce_write() called kstrtoul() with a NULL result pointer,
so a successful parse would dereference NULL and oops. Worse, the int
return value (0 on success, negative errno on failure) was assigned to
the unsigned long enable flag, inverting the intended logic: a valid
number was treated as "disable" while a parse failure enabled FCE.
Parse the value into enable and propagate parse errors to userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Don't query firmware state while chip is down
qla2x00_fw_state_show() initializes rval to QLA_FUNCTION_FAILED and jumps
to the out: label when the chip is down or EEH is busy. The out: block
then re-issued qla2x00_get_firmware_state() because rval != QLA_SUCCESS,
defeating the chip-down/EEH-busy guards and issuing a mailbox command
(outside optrom_mutex) during ISP reset or PCI error recovery, which can
hang the adapter. It also turned a normal in-lock mailbox failure into a
second unsynchronized mailbox attempt.
Make the out: fallback only mark the firmware state as unknown. The
mailbox is now issued at most once, inside optrom_mutex, and only when
the chip is up and not EEH-busy. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Reject non-SCSI SRB on status IOCB fast path
qla2x00_status_entry() filters out non-TYPE_SRB entries and the
SRB_NVME_CMD, SRB_BIDI_CMD and SRB_TM_CMD types, then falls through to a
SCSI fast path that assumes the command is an SRB_SCSI_CMD. The first
thing on that path, qla_chk_edif_rx_sa_delete_pending(), and the
subsequent handling both evaluate GET_CMD_SP(sp), i.e. sp->u.scmd.cmd.
The srb u union overlays the SCSI command pointer with other command
layouts (bsg_job, iocb_cmd). If firmware delivers an unexpected
STATUS_TYPE IOCB for a non-SCSI handle, sp->u.scmd.cmd can read as a
non-NULL garbage pointer, bypassing the NULL checks in
qla_chk_edif_rx_sa_delete_pending() and at the cp == NULL test, and
leading to a wild pointer dereference.
Reject any SRB whose type is not SRB_SCSI_CMD before entering the fast
path. The outstanding_cmds slot is left untouched so a genuinely
non-SCSI command still completes through its proper handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Quiesce response IRQ before freeing request queue
qla2xxx_delete_qpair() deletes the request queue before the response
queue. qla25xx_delete_req_que() frees the request queue memory
(kfree(req) in qla25xx_free_req_que()), but the response-queue MSI-X is
only released later, in qla25xx_free_rsp_que(). In that window the
response interrupt can still fire, qla2xxx_msix_rsp_q() queues
qpair->q_work, and qla_do_work() -> qla24xx_process_response_queue()
dereferences the now-freed rsp->req (LOGINOUT/CT/ELS entries and the
status path), a use-after-free.
The cancel_work_sync() added for the qpair teardown lives in the
response free path, which runs after the request queue is already freed,
so it does not protect rsp->req.
Release the response-queue interrupt and flush qpair->q_work before
deleting the request queue, so no late completion can reach the freed
request queue. Clearing have_irq makes the subsequent
qla25xx_free_rsp_que() skip its free_irq(), and the firmware
queue-delete order (request then response) is preserved; the
request-delete mailbox completes on the default vector and is unaffected
by dropping the qpair response interrupt early. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Avoid double completion in async IOCB timeout
qla2x00_async_iocb_timeout() tries to abort a timed-out async IOCB. When
qla24xx_async_abort_cmd() fails, both the SRB_LOGIN_CMD path and the
SRB_CTRL_VP/default path scan outstanding_cmds[] for the SRB and then
call sp->done(sp, QLA_FUNCTION_TIMEOUT) unconditionally, without checking
whether the SRB was actually found and removed.
If the response ISR completes the same handle first, it removes the SRB
under qp_lock_ptr and runs sp->done() -> complete(sp->comp). The
submitter qla24xx_control_vp() wakes from wait_for_completion(), clears
sp->comp, drops its reference and returns, reclaiming the on-stack
completion. The timer reference keeps the SRB alive across the timeout
handler, but not the submitter's stack. The timeout then issues a second
sp->done() -> qla_ctrlvp_sp_done(), which evaluates "if (sp->comp)
complete(sp->comp)"; with the pointer loaded before the submitter's NULL
store, complete() writes into the freed stack frame, a use-after-free.
Track whether this path removed the SRB from outstanding_cmds and only
call sp->done() when it did, so the command is completed exactly once by
whichever path owns it. This mirrors the sp_found guard already used in
qla24xx_abort_iocb_timeout(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read
In qla2x00_status_entry(), the FWI2 status path advances sense_data and
shrinks par_sense_len by rsp_info_len:
if (IS_FWI2_CAPABLE(ha)) {
sense_data += rsp_info_len;
par_sense_len -= rsp_info_len;
}
rsp_info_len is a 32-bit value taken directly from the target's FCP
response (sf.rsp_data_len), while par_sense_len is the IOCB data area
size (28 bytes for 24xx, 60 bytes for 29xx). A hostile or buggy target
reporting an rsp_info_len larger than par_sense_len makes the unsigned
subtraction underflow to a huge value and advances sense_data out of
bounds.
The underflowed par_sense_len then defeats the cap in
qla2x00_handle_sense():
if (sense_len > par_sense_len)
sense_len = par_sense_len;
memcpy(cp->sense_buffer, sense_data, sense_len);
so the memcpy reads up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE bytes from the
out-of-bounds sense_data pointer, leaking adjacent response-ring/heap
memory into the command's sense buffer.
Clamp rsp_info_len to par_sense_len before the subtraction so
par_sense_len can never underflow and sense_data stays within the IOCB
data area. The fix sits before the comp_status switch, covering both
qla2x00_handle_sense() call sites. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Avoid req_q_map double-read in qla2x00_error_entry()
qla2x00_error_entry() reads ha->req_q_map[que] twice: once for the NULL
check and again when assigning it to req. The map slot is cleared by
qla25xx_free_req_que() (ha->req_q_map[que_id] = NULL under mq_lock)
during queue teardown, while the response-queue interrupt that drives
qla2x00_error_entry() is still registered (the IRQ is released later in
qla25xx_free_rsp_que()). If the slot is set to NULL between the two
reads, req becomes NULL and is dereferenced.
Read the slot once into req and NULL-check the local before use. mq_lock
is a mutex and cannot be taken from interrupt context, so the single
read plus local check is the appropriate fix for the reported NULL
dereference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Hold vport_slock for host map update in report ID acquisition
qla24xx_report_id_acquisition() format-1 handling drops vport_slock after
taking the vport reference and then calls qla_update_host_map() without
the lock. That reaches qla_update_vp_map(), which mutates the ha->host_map
btree via btree_insert32()/btree_update32()/btree_remove32() and is
documented to require vport_slock to be held by the caller. Running it
unlocked can race concurrent host_map updates and corrupt the btree.
The format-2 path in the same function already wraps its host_map update
(SET_AL_PA) in vport_slock; the format-1 path is the lone outlier.
Hold vport_slock across the format-1 qla_update_host_map() call to honor
the documented locking contract. The vref_count taken in the loop keeps
the vport valid, so this only adds the missing host_map serialization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Zero-init bsg stack buffers to avoid info leak
Several bsg handlers stage their request/reply in an uninitialized 256-byte
on-stack buffer (uint8_t bsg[DMA_POOL_SIZE]) and fill it via
sg_copy_to_buffer(), which only copies as many bytes as the user-supplied
request payload. When the request is shorter than the structure, the
remainder of the buffer is left holding stale stack data.
qla2x00_read_fru_status() and qla2x00_read_i2c() then copy the full
structure back to the reply payload with sg_copy_from_buffer(), leaking the
uninitialized stack bytes to user space. The write/update paths do not copy
the buffer back, but can feed uninitialized fields to the device.
Zero the stack buffer at declaration in all five handlers, mirroring the
heap kzalloc() approach, so short requests can no longer expose stale
memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Skip NVMe LS reject IOCB when FW not started
qla_nvme_xmt_ls_rsp() bails out to the out: label when firmware is not
started (!ha->flags.fw_started), but the out: path unconditionally calls
qla_nvme_ls_reject_iocb(), which ends in qla2x00_start_iocbs() and an
unconditional doorbell write to the request queue in-pointer register.
This rings the firmware doorbell and queues an IOCB that stopped or
resetting firmware cannot consume, and touches MMIO during the reset/EEH
window where fw_started is also clear.
Only emit the LS reject IOCB (and ring the doorbell) when fw_started is
set; otherwise just clean up and return. The post-allocation failure
cases (SRB alloc / qla2x00_start_sp() failure) run with firmware started
and still send the reject. Apply the same guard to the reject emission
in qla2xxx_process_purls_pkt(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: only redirty pinned folios in redirty_blocks
redirty_blocks() pins folios with read_cache_folio() and then walks the
same range again with filemap_lock_folio() to redirty them and drop the
references it took.
Commit 5951fee46bef ("f2fs: Use a folio in redirty_blocks()") changed
the second pass to a do/while loop. If read_cache_folio() fails before
anything is pinned, page_idx does not advance but the cleanup loop still
runs once.
If readahead has already populated the failed folio in page cache, that
extra iteration finds it and folio_put_refs(folio, 2) drops one
reference too many. Later drop_caches or reclaim can then report
"BUG: Bad page state".
Only redirty the range that was pinned successfully. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: validate MOVE_RANGE destination size
F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE checks the source range, but not the destination end
before updating i_size. A source hole can expose this: __clone_blkaddrs()
skips NULL_ADDR entries and returns success, so the caller can still extend
the destination inode with unchecked pos_out + len.
Reject destination overflow and use inode_newsize_ok() before extending
the destination inode. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: use the mount idmap for the owner check in f2fs_xattr_advise_set()
f2fs_xattr_advise_set() calls inode_owner_or_capable() with &nop_mnt_idmap
before allowing the "system.advise" xattr to be set, instead of the idmap
that the VFS passes to the ->set() handler.
f2fs supports idmapped mounts, so on such a mount this checks the caller's
fsuid against the unmapped on-disk owner rather than the mapped owner: the
actual owner can be wrongly denied with -EPERM and an unrelated caller
wrongly allowed. Pass the handler's idmap instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: limit recovery filename logging to stored length
F2FS stores recovery filenames as a length plus a fixed-size i_name
buffer. The buffer is not NUL-terminated, but recover_inode() and
recover_dentry() print it with %s.
For a 255-byte filename, recovery logging can read past i_name into the
following raw inode fields.
Print the name with a precision bounded by i_namelen and F2FS_NAME_LEN. |
