| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: fix io_thread race in rxrpc_wake_up_io_thread()
rxrpc_wake_up_io_thread() checks local->io_thread before waking it, but
then reloads the pointer for wake_up_process().
local->io_thread is cleared with WRITE_ONCE() when the I/O thread exits, so
the second load can see NULL even if the first load did not.
Take a READ_ONCE() snapshot and use it for both the NULL check and the
wake_up_process() call, as rxrpc_encap_rcv() already does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/dp_mst: Handle torn-down topology gracefully in drm_dp_mst_topology_queue_probe()
A hotplug or link-loss event can tear down the MST topology
(setting mgr->mst_state = false and mgr->mst_primary = NULL) concurrently
with a caller invoking drm_dp_mst_topology_queue_probe(). Since the check
is already performed under mgr->lock, the condition is not a programming
error but a valid race -- the topology was valid when the caller decided
to call this function, but was torn down before the lock was acquired.
Replace the drm_WARN_ON() with a graceful early return. This eliminates
spurious kernel warnings and the resulting compositor crashes observed
when connecting/disconnecting DP MST monitors, while keeping the correct
behavior of doing nothing when MST is not active. A drm_dbg_mst() trace
is added so the skipped probe remains observable under MST debug logging.
The existing WARN_ON(mgr->mst_primary) in drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst()
already catches the case where the topology is initialized twice, so no
diagnostic coverage is lost. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: cache csum_start/csum_offset to fix TOCTOU in xsk_skb_metadata()
The TX metadata area resides in the UMEM buffer which is memory-mapped
and concurrently writable by userspace. In xsk_skb_metadata(),
csum_start and csum_offset are read from shared memory for bounds
validation, then read again for skb assignment. A malicious userspace
application can race to overwrite these values between the two reads,
bypassing the bounds check and causing out-of-bounds memory access
during checksum computation in the transmit path.
Fix this by reading csum_start and csum_offset into local variables
once, then using the local copies for both validation and assignment.
Note that other metadata fields (flags, launch_time) and the cached
csum fields may be mutually inconsistent due to concurrent userspace
writes, but this is benign: the only security-critical invariant is
that each field's validated value is the same one used, which local
caching guarantees. |
| Time-of-check time-of-use race condition for the Intel(R) NPU Driver for Windows for all versions within Ring 1: Device Drivers may allow a denial of service. Unprivileged software adversary with an authenticated user combined with a high complexity attack may enable denial of service. This result may potentially occur via local access when attack requirements are present without special internal knowledge and requires no user interaction. The potential vulnerability may impact the confidentiality (none), integrity (low) and availability (high) of the vulnerable system, resulting in subsequent system confidentiality (none), integrity (none) and availability (none) impacts. |
| In the Aimeos Pagible content management system prior to version 0.10.4, the administrative proxy route (`cmsproxy`) is vulnerable to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attack via DNS Rebinding. A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition exists between the URL validation phase and the actual HTTP request phase, allowing attackers to access internal network resources and cloud metadata endpoints. Version 0.10.4 fixes the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/khugepaged: write all dirty file folios when collapsing
[There is no upstream commit, as this code was removed by upstream
commit 044925f9b565 ("mm: fs: remove filemap_nr_thps*() functions and their users")]
As-is, khugepaged and writable-file opening exclude each other. A file
cannot be open writeable and have THPs (because the filesystem is not aware
of them). khugepaged will never collapse file pages for files that are
opened writeable. On an open(O_RDWR/O_WRONLY), the page cache for that
particular file is dropped. This is fine because nothing could've been
dirtied.
However, there is an edge-case: collapse_file() might not be able to
coexist with concurrent writers, but it can coexist with dirty folios
(from previous writers). Therefore, the following can happen:
open(file, O_RDWR)
write(file)
close(file)
madvise(file_mapping, MADV_COLLAPSE, some non-dirty range)
open(file, O_RDWR)
nr_thps > 0
truncate_inode_pages()
/* THPs are cleared out, but so are the dirty folios */
When this edge-case happens, there is data loss, as the dirty folios are
fully discarded.
Fix it by fully writing back the page cache (and waiting) when collapsing
file THPs. Doing so provides the guarantee that no dirty folio will be
observed while there are active THPs. To fully ensure this is safe, the
invalidate_lock needs to be held while doing the writeout, so that
do_dentry_open()'s page cache truncation excludes this write-and-wait.
As a side effect, move the nr_thps counter bumping outside the i_pages
lock. This is correct since the counter itself is an atomic_t and the
producer <-> consumer correctness is provided by a full memory barrier:
smp_mb() in collapse_file()/memory barrier implied by full ordering in
get_write_access() -> atomic_inc_unless_negative(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
debugobjects: Plug race against a concurrent OOM disable
syzbot reported a puzzling splat:
WARNING: kernel/time/hrtimer.c:443 at stub_timer+0xa/0x20
stub_timer() is installed as timer callback function in
hrtimer_fixup_assert_init(), which is invoked when
debug_object_assert_init() can't find a shadow object. In that case debug
objects emits a warning about it before invoking the fixup.
Though the provided console log lacks this warning and instead has the
following a few seconds before the splat:
ODEBUG: Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled
So the object was looked up in debug_object_assert_init() and the lookup
failed due a concurrent out of memory situation which disabled debug
objects and freed the shadow objects:
debug_object_assert_init()
if (!debug_objects_enabled)
return; obj = alloc();
if (!obj) {
// Out of memory
debug_objects_enabled = false;
free_objects();
obj = lookup_or_alloc();
// The lookup failed because the other side
// removed the objects, so this returns
// an error code as the object in question
// is not statically initialized
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(obj))
return;
if (!obj) {
debug_oom();
return;
}
print(...)
if (!debug_objects_enabled)
return;
fixup(...)
The debug object splat is skipped because debug_objects_enabled is false,
but the fixup callback is invoked unconditionally, which makes the timer
disfunctional.
This is only a problem in debug_object_assert_init() and
debug_object_activate() as both have to handle statically initialized
objects and therefore must handle the error pointer return case
gracefully. All other places only handle the found/not found case and the
NULL pointer return is a signal for OOM. Otherwise they get a valid shadow
object.
Plug the hole by checking whether debug objects are still enabled before
invoking the print and fixup function in those two places. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to get, not find, block 0
Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to use afs_dir_get_block() to get block 0 rather
than afs_dir_find_block() as the latter caches the found block in the
afs_dir_iter and may[*] switch out the page it's on if another
afs_dir_find_block() is done. This parallels what afs_edit_dir_add() does.
[*] There's more than one block per page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drop_monitor: perform u64_stats updates under IRQ-disabled section
In net_dm_packet_trace_kfree_skb_hit() and net_dm_hw_trap_packet_probe(),
u64_stats_update_begin() / u64_stats_inc() / u64_stats_update_end() were
called after spin_unlock_irqrestore(&...drop_queue.lock, flags), when local
IRQs had already been re-enabled.
Tracepoint probes can execute in IRQ or softirq context. On 32-bit
architectures, u64_stats_update_begin() disables preemption but not interrupts,
relying on seqcount writes. If a nested interrupt occurs on the same CPU during
the 64-bit stats update, the reentrant seqcount update can corrupt the
seqcount state or stats value.
Fix this by performing the 64-bit per-CPU stats update before releasing
drop_queue.lock via spin_unlock_irqrestore(), ensuring local interrupts remain
disabled during the u64_stats update. |
| The Zephyr ext2 file system validates the on-disk superblock in ext2_verify_disk_superblock() (subsys/fs/ext2/ext2_impl.c) before completing a mount. The validator checked the magic number, block size, revision and feature flags, but did not verify that the on-disk fields s_blocks_per_group and s_inodes_per_group are non-zero. Both fields are read directly from the image and are later used as divisors during mount-time initialization.
During mount, get_ngroups() divides and modulos s_blocks_count by s_blocks_per_group (reached via ext2_fetch_block_group() from ext2_init_fs()), and get_itable_entry() divides (ino - 1) by s_inodes_per_group when fetching the root inode (both in subsys/fs/ext2/ext2_diskops.c). A superblock with either field set to zero therefore causes an integer division by zero during the mount sequence.
An attacker who can present a crafted ext2 image to a device that mounts ext2 — removable media such as an SD card or a USB mass-storage device — can trigger this. On ARMv7-M / ARMv8-M-mainline Cortex-M targets, divide-by-zero trapping is enabled (SCB_CCR_DIV_0_TRP), so the division raises a UsageFault that Zephyr treats as a fatal error, producing a denial of service. The impact is limited to availability; the malformed value is consumed only as a divisor.
The fix rejects a zero s_blocks_per_group or s_inodes_per_group in the superblock validator, returning -EINVAL so the mount fails before any block-group or inode I/O occurs. |
| The UpdateHub management subsystem (subsys/mgmt/updatehub/updatehub.c) drives every update operation through a single file-scope ctx structure that holds the CoAP block context, payload buffer, status code, socket, and a one-element poll-fd array fds[1]. Access to ctx was not serialized, and prepare_fds() wrote ctx.fds[ctx.nfds] and incremented ctx.nfds with no bounds check.
Two independent paths mutate ctx concurrently: the background autohandler running on the system workqueue, and user-triggered operations reached through the updatehub run shell command, direct API calls, or — since the operations are exposed as syscalls — userspace threads. When a second flow enters prepare_fds() while ctx.nfds is already 1, the write lands one element past the array; by struct layout it overlaps the adjacent ctx.sock/ctx.nfds members. More broadly, the unsynchronized sharing lets two flows interleave connection setup and teardown, double-closing a socket descriptor or scribbling the shared buffers.
The result is corruption of the update subsystem's internal state and denial of service of the firmware-update path; the out-of-bounds write is contained within the ctx structure and there is no demonstrated path to memory outside it or to code execution. Triggering requires a local actor able to invoke update operations (or, with CONFIG_USERSPACE, an unprivileged userspace thread) and to win a timing race against the background handler; remote peers cannot control the race timing. The fix serializes the entry points with a mutex and adds a bounds check to prepare_fds(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uvc: hold opts->lock across XU walks in uvc_function_bind
uvc_function_bind() walks &opts->extension_units twice without holding
opts->lock:
- directly, for the iExtension string-descriptor fixup loop;
- indirectly, four times via uvc_copy_descriptors() (once per speed),
where the helper iterates uvc->desc.extension_units (which aliases
&opts->extension_units) to size and emit XU descriptors.
The configfs side (uvcg_extension_make / uvcg_extension_drop, in
drivers/usb/gadget/function/uvc_configfs.c) takes opts->lock around its
list_add_tail / list_del operations. A privileged userspace process
that holds the configfs subtree open and writes the gadget UDC name
to bind the function while concurrently rmdir()'ing an extensions
subdir can race uvcg_extension_drop() against the bind-time list walks
and dereference a freed struct uvcg_extension.
Hold opts->lock from the start of the XU string-descriptor fixup
through the last uvc_copy_descriptors() call, releasing on the
descriptor-error path via a new error_unlock label that drops the
lock before falling through to the existing error label. This
matches the locking discipline of the configfs callbacks and removes
the only remaining unsynchronised reader of the XU list during bind.
Reachability: only privileged processes that can mount configfs and
write to gadget UDC files can trigger the race, so this is a
correctness fix rather than a security boundary. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: davinci: fix division by zero on missing clock-frequency
When the 'clock-frequency' property is missing from the device tree,
the driver falls back to DAVINCI_I2C_DEFAULT_BUS_FREQ. However, this
macro was defined in kHz (100), whereas the device tree property is
expected in Hz.
The probe function divided the fallback value by 1000, causing
integer truncation that resulted in dev->bus_freq = 0. This triggered
a deterministic division-by-zero kernel panic when calculating clock
dividers later in the probe sequence.
Fix this by redefining DAVINCI_I2C_DEFAULT_BUS_FREQ in Hz (100000)
to match the expected device tree property unit, allowing the existing
division logic to work correctly for both cases. |
| Kernel software installed and running inside a Host VM may post improper commands to the GPU Firmware to trigger a memory write outside the permitted range of memory for the host kernel.
A TOCTOU bug existed where a malicious driver could modify values in memory after firmware validation but before use. |
| Diffusers is the a library for pretrained diffusion models. Prior to 0.38.0, Diffusers' DiffusionPipeline.from_pretrained flow can bypass the trust_remote_code guard because download() validates model_index.json and custom pipeline code before later loading from a cached folder that can change, allowing a Hub repository with custom .py pipeline code to execute through the custom pipeline flow without passing custom_pipeline or trust_remote_code=True. This issue is fixed in version 0.38.0. |
| The userspace syscall verifiers z_vrfy_zsock_sendmsg() and z_vrfy_zsock_recvmsg() in subsys/net/lib/sockets/sockets.c snapshot the caller-supplied struct net_msghdr into a kernel-side copy with k_usermode_from_copy(), but then re-read the still-live user struct for subsequent decisions. The kernel iovec shadow buffer is sized from one read of msg->msg_iovlen, while the population loop is bounded by a second, live read of the same field.
Because msg points into ordinary user memory, a cooperating second thread in the same memory domain can inflate msg->msg_iovlen in the window between the sizing read and the loop test (a classic double-fetch / TOCTOU). The population loop then iterates past the number of net_iovec slots actually allocated, writing attacker-influenced iov_base/iov_len values beyond the end of the kernel-heap shadow buffer. The recvmsg verifier has the same defect on both its inbound and result write-back loops.
The code is reachable from an unprivileged user thread whenever CONFIG_USERSPACE is enabled and the zsock_sendmsg/zsock_recvmsg syscalls are available. A successful race corrupts kernel-managed heap memory across the user-to-kernel privilege boundary, yielding a local privilege-escalation primitive or, at minimum, a kernel-fault denial of service. The fix copies the header once and derives every size, bound, and gate from the snapshot, copying each iovec entry atomically so its base and length can no longer be raced apart. |
| A rogue Velociraptor client can upload a malformed sparse file such that if the GUI attempts to expand the file, a panic occurs which may crash the server process.
The problem is a Divide by Zero bug in the ShouldPadFile() function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse-uring: Avoid queue->stopped races and set/read that value under lock
There are several readers of queue->stopped that check the value
under lock, but fuse_uring_commit_fetch() did not and actually
the value was not set under the lock in fuse_uring_abort_end_requests()
either. Especially in fuse_uring_commit_fetch it is important
to check under a lock, because due to races 'struct fuse_req'
might be freed with fuse_request_end, but another thread/cpu
might already do teardown work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Fix UAF read of tail->len in unix_stream_data_wait()
unix_stream_data_wait() does skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue) without
holding any lock that prevents SKBs on that queue from being dequeued and
freed.
This has been the case since commit 79f632c71bea ("unix/stream: fix
peeking with an offset larger than data in queue").
The first consequence of this is that the pointer comparison
`tail != last` can be false even if `last` semantically refers to an
already-freed SKB while `tail` is a new SKB allocated at the same address;
which can cause unix_stream_data_wait() to wrongly keep blocking after new
data has arrived, but only in a weird scenario where a peeking recv() and
a normal recv() on the same socket are racing, which is probably not a
real problem.
But since commit 2b514574f7e8 ("net: af_unix: implement splice for stream
af_unix sockets"), `tail` is actually dereferenced, which can cause UAF in
the following race scenario (where test_setup() runs single-threaded,
and afterwards, test_thread1() and test_thread2() run concurrently in
two threads:
```
static int socks[2];
void test_setup(void) {
socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, socks);
send(socks[1], "A", 1, 0);
int peekoff = 1;
setsockopt(socks[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEEK_OFF, &peekoff, sizeof(peekoff));
}
void test_thread1(void) {
char dummy;
recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, MSG_PEEK);
}
void test_thread2(void) {
char dummy;
recv(socks[0], &dummy, 1, 0);
shutdown(socks[1], SHUT_WR);
}
```
when racing like this:
```
thread1 thread2
unix_stream_read_generic
mutex_lock(&u->iolock)
skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
skb_peek_next(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue)
mutex_unlock(&u->iolock)
unix_stream_read_generic
unix_state_lock(sk)
skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
unix_state_unlock(sk)
unix_stream_data_wait
unix_state_lock(sk)
tail = skb_peek_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue)
spin_lock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock)
__skb_unlink(skb, &sk->sk_receive_queue)
spin_unlock(&sk->sk_receive_queue.lock)
consume_skb(skb) [frees the SKB]
`tail != last`: false
`tail`: true
`tail->len != last_len` ***UAF***
```
Fix the UAF by removing the read of tail->len; checking tail->len would
only make sense if SKBs in the receive queue of a UNIX socket could grow,
which can no longer happen.
Kuniyuki explained:
> When commit 869e7c62486e ("net: af_unix: implement stream sendpage
> support") added sendpage() support, data could be appended to the last
> skb in the receiver's queue.
>
> That's why we needed to check if the length of the last skb was changed
> while waiting for new data in unix_stream_data_wait().
>
> However, commit a0dbf5f818f9 ("af_unix: Support MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") and
> commit 57d44a354a43 ("unix: Convert unix_stream_sendpage() to use
> MSG_SPLICE_PAGES") refactored sendmsg(), and now data is always added
> to a new skb.
That means this fix is not suitable for kernels before 6.5. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rbd: eliminate a race in lock_dwork draining on unmap
Given how rbd_lock_add_request() and rbd_img_exclusive_lock() are
written, lock_dwork may be (re)queued more than it's actually needed:
for example in case a new I/O request comes in while we are in the
middle of rbd_acquire_lock() on behalf of another I/O request. This is
expected and with rbd_release_lock() preemptively canceling lock_dwork
is benign under normal operation.
A more problematic example is maybe_kick_acquire():
if (have_requests || delayed_work_pending(&rbd_dev->lock_dwork)) {
dout("%s rbd_dev %p kicking lock_dwork\n", __func__, rbd_dev);
mod_delayed_work(rbd_dev->task_wq, &rbd_dev->lock_dwork, 0);
}
It's not unrealistic for lock_dwork to get canceled right after
delayed_work_pending() returns true and for mod_delayed_work() to
requeue it right there anyway. This is a classic TOCTOU race.
When it comes to unmapping the image, there is an implicit assumption
of no self-initiated exclusive lock activity past the point of return
from rbd_dev_image_unlock() which unlocks the lock if it happens to be
held. This unlock is assumed to be final and lock_dwork (as well as
all other exclusive lock tasks, really) isn't expected to get queued
again. However, lock_dwork is canceled only in cancel_tasks_sync()
(i.e. later in the unmap sequence) and on top of that the cancellation
can get in effect nullified by maybe_kick_acquire(). This may result
in rbd_acquire_lock() executing after rbd_dev_device_release() and
rbd_dev_image_release() run and free and/or reset a bunch of things.
One of the possible failure modes then is a violated
rbd_assert(rbd_image_format_valid(rbd_dev->image_format));
in rbd_dev_header_info() which is called via rbd_dev_refresh() from
rbd_post_acquire_action().
Redo exclusive lock task draining to provide saner semantics and try
to meet the assumptions around rbd_dev_image_unlock(). |
