| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.4, Request.post() does not limit the number of fields in a URL-encoded form body, and inserting many repeated keys into MultiDict takes quadratic time on the event loop. A remote attacker can send a form POST within client_max_size to a handler that calls Request.post() and block the event loop. This issue is fixed in version 3.14.4. |
| Tandoor Recipes before 2.7.4 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows space admins to reach internal hosts because Nextcloud.get_client builds WebDAV clients from Storage.url without calling safe_request. Attackers can create a NEXTCLOUD storage via POST /api/storage/ pointing at internal hosts, import a file, then call GET /api/get_recipe_file/<id>/ to read internal service or cloud metadata responses. |
| Modoboa before 2.13.0 contains a CRLF injection vulnerability that allows Resellers or users with domain add or change permission to inject rspamd DKIM selector map entries by supplying an unvalidated dkim_key_selector through the relay domain API. Attackers can embed a carriage return in the selector to override another tenant's domain selector, causing rspamd to sign its outgoing mail with a nonexistent selector and fail DKIM verification. |
| Manyfold 0.124.0 before 0.154.2 contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to make the instance fetch internal URLs by supplying malicious ActivityPub actor icon.url and image.url fields. Attackers can deliver Create or Update activities to the inbox, causing the Shrine remote_url plugin to request internal or cloud metadata hosts and store responses as creator avatar or banner attachments. |
| Tanium addressed an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Enforce. |
| Tanium addressed a denial of service vulnerability in Enforce. |
| Tanium addressed a denial of service vulnerability in Enforce. |
| Tanium addressed an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Enforce. |
| Tanium addressed an improper access controls vulnerability in Enforce. |
| Tanium addressed a compression bomb vulnerability in Enforce. |
| AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.4, BodyPartReader.read_chunk() processing a multipart part with Content-Transfer-Encoding set to base64 keeps reading until the chunk length is a multiple of four without enforcing a byte limit. A short Content-Length or a long run of whitespace can cause one call to read the remaining body into memory before the size check or spin on the event loop. A remote attacker can send such a multipart request to a handler that reads multipart data and bypass client_max_size. This issue is fixed in version 3.14.4. |
| Missing Authorization vulnerability in Dataprom Bilişim Teknolojileri LTD. ŞTİ. DataPer Access Control and Security Systems allows Privilege Escalation.
This issue affects DataPer Access Control and Security Systems: before v14.15(2026/11). |
| Improper neutralization of input during web page generation ('cross-site scripting') vulnerability in Kayaport Ödeme Kuruluşu A.Ş. BulutTahsilat – Virtual POS Infrastructure allows Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
This issue affects BulutTahsilat – Virtual POS Infrastructure: through 2026-11-05. |
| AIOHTTP is an asynchronous HTTP client/server framework for asyncio and Python. Prior to 3.14.4, the C WebSocket reader adds a declared frame length to the size of an already buffered partial message using signed 64-bit arithmetic. A length near two to the power of 63 can overflow, allowing the max_msg_size check to pass. A remote peer can send a small non-final fragment followed by an oversized message and cause unbounded memory consumption. The Python WebSocket reader is unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 3.14.4. |
| Inline mitigations exists. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: don't modify a session slot when replaying its cached reply
nfsd4_sequence() claims a session slot by setting NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE
under nn->client_lock. A reply served from the slot's reply cache does
not claim it, and that distinction lived only in cstate->status, which
nfsd4_sequence() set to nfserr_replay_cache. Commit cc028a10a48c
("NFSD: Hoist status code encoding into XDR encoder functions") moved
nfsd4_proc_compound()'s cstate->status assignment below the out:
label, and the replay path's goto out was the one path that relied on
skipping it. The test in nfsd4_sequence_done() therefore no longer
identifies a replay, and every replay now stores its reply and clears
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE as though it owned the slot.
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE is the interlock: check_slot_seqid() rejects every
sequence id for a slot that is in use, before replay_matches_cache()
runs. A replay never sets it, so two replays can be in flight on the
same slot at once. One can read slot->sl_cred under nn->client_lock
while the other's completion frees and rebuilds it from the XDR
encoder without that lock. Two completions can also collide with each
other and release the same group_info twice. free_svc_cred() leaves
cr_uid, cr_gid and cr_flavor intact, so the reader passes every
earlier test in same_creds() and dereferences a NULL cr_group_info.
From a 6.12.91 production server:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004
CPU: 63 UID: 0 PID: 39015 Comm: nfsd
RIP: 0010:same_creds+0x38/0xa0 [nfsd]
RDX: 0000000000000000
Call Trace:
nfsd4_sequence+0x6a8/0x910 [nfsd]
nfsd4_proc_compound+0x345/0x670 [nfsd]
nfsd_dispatch+0x100/0x220 [nfsd]
svc_process_common+0x311/0x700 [sunrpc]
svc_process+0x131/0x1c0 [sunrpc]
svc_recv+0x7ef/0x9c0 [sunrpc]
nfsd+0xa3/0x100 [nfsd]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Since v6.14 a live session's slot table can shrink, and the unowned
store becomes a use-after-free write. nfsd4_sequence() defers the
shrink while a slot is in use, but it tests NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE, which a
replay does not set, so free_session_slots() can kfree() the slot the
replay still holds in cstate->slot.
Record the claim in cstate->slot_owned when nfsd4_sequence() accepts a
request and test that in nfsd4_sequence_done(), so only the request
that claimed the slot updates its cached reply and clears
NFSD4_SLOT_INUSE. svc_generic_init_request() zeroes the compound
response before each request, so the flag starts clear. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: preflight SEQUENCE replies before accepting a slot
nfsd4_sequence() narrows the reply buffer to the session's cached
reply limit before it accepts the slot seqid. A client may negotiate
ca_maxresponsesize_cached down to NFSD_MIN_HDR_SEQ_SZ, and
nfsd4_alloc_slot() then gives every slot a zero-length sl_data[]. A
COMPOUND tag can fill that narrowed buffer until it holds the
SEQUENCE opcode but not the status word that follows.
nfsd4_encode_operation() returns without running
nfsd4_encode_sequence(), so cstate.data_offset stays zero. It leaves
op->status at nfs_ok as well, so the COMPOUND is treated as having
succeeded.
nfsd4_store_cache_entry() declines to cache a lone SEQUENCE that
returned an error. That test reads the status the operation
reported, so it passes here. The copy starts at offset zero and
takes the whole reply, RPC and COMPOUND headers included, into the
zero-length sl_data[]. The COMPOUND tag is copied along with it, so
the client picks most of the bytes written past the end of the slot:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390
Write of size 80 at addr ffff888003a549cd by task kunit_try_catch/24
__asan_memcpy+0x38/0x60
read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390
nfsd4_sequence_done+0x5b0/0x810
nfs4svc_encode_compoundres+0x1bf/0x240
Check that the fixed-size SEQUENCE result, plus room for a following
operation's error status, fits the negotiated limit before narrowing
the buffer and consuming the slot seqid. The slot and its reply
cache are left unchanged, as RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.1.2 requires of
an error returned from SEQUENCE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: zero NFSv4 COMPOUND tag padding
nfs4svc_encode_compoundres() copies the tag bytes into reserved XDR space
and skips directly to the aligned end of the field. xdr_reserve_space()
rounds the reservation up but does not initialize the padding bytes.
A remote client can choose a tag length that is not a multiple of four,
causing one to three stale bytes from the response page to be returned in
the COMPOUND reply.
Use xdr_encode_opaque_fixed() to copy the tag and clear its XDR padding. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Copy the deferred RPC Call from the head buffer
svc_defer() snapshots the RPC Call for replay once a pending cache
upcall resolves. It copies the Call starting (rq_arg.len -
head[0].iov_len) bytes before head[0].iov_base, a back-up that once
covered a transport header. No transport has had one since commit
983084b2672c ("SUNRPC: Remove svc_rqst::rq_xprt_hlen"), so the two
lengths are meant to be equal.
An RPCSEC_GSS Call breaks that assumption. Unwrapping the integrity
service truncates rq_arg.len by the length of the trailing checksum,
and unwrapping the privacy service leaves rq_arg.len short by an
amount the client sets with trailing bytes after the wrap token.
Neither adjusts head[0].iov_len. Both lengths are size_t, so the
subtraction underflows and the copy starts past head[0].iov_base.
Every deferred integrity Call replays a shifted snapshot.
A deferred replay skips GSS verification, so a shifted snapshot runs
as an authenticated Call. With the privacy service the offset is
client-chosen. A forged Call placed in that window, naming another
user's GSS context handle, runs under that identity.
Copy the Call from head[0].iov_base. Refuse to defer a Call whose
length runs past the head buffer, so the copy cannot read out of
bounds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: trace an accepted transport before publishing it
svc_handle_xprt() publishes a newly accepted transport before tracing
it. svc_add_new_temp_xprt() places the transport on sv_tempsocks and
clears XPT_BUSY, so another nfsd thread can dequeue it at once. If the
peer has already closed the connection, that thread runs
svc_delete_xprt(), which drops the list reference, the only reference
the new transport holds. trace_svc_xprt_accept() then reads the
transport's addresses and network namespace from freed memory.
Before publication the accepting thread owns the transport
exclusively: XPT_BUSY is still set from svc_xprt_init() and the
transport is on no list. Emit the tracepoint there.
[ cel: trace before publication instead of taking an extra reference ] |